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Abstract 
 
 
v 
Questions of uncertainty and value conflict are increasingly pervasive challenges 
confronting policy makers seeking to address the range of environmental problems 
generated by contemporary technological systems. Yet these questions are ultimately 
political and moral in nature, and require a framework of strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) that is marked by informed and democratic civic governance. 
Reflecting this, the original, civic purposes of environmental assessment (EA) 
embraced science and public participation as interdependent elements in the creation 
of more sustaining forms of human-nature interaction. However, formal models of 
EA have forsaken meaningful democratic engagement to technique. Based on the 
instrumentalist assumption that better science automatically leads to better policy,  
EA has externalised the civic source of political energy that underpins its 
environmental expertise. Moreover, debates become polarised when science is 
uncritically imported into the adversarial forums of interest-based politics, so that 
environmental science is increasingly unable to support political action. I shall argue 
that the revolutionary potential of SEA to transform the policy process rests upon a 
recovery of its original, civic purposes. My thesis is that a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between scientific knowledge and political action is required if SEA 
is to be rigorous, and also relevant to public concerns. Philosophical pragmatism 
contributes epistemological resources vital to this task. By situating knowledge in the 
context of practice, and by recognising the dialogical, judgmental nature of 
rationality, the practical philosophy of pragmatism reclaims the contextually 
embedded nature of inquiry. When science is embedded in a wider ethical context, 
the meaning and purposes of environmental knowledge become central questions of 
policy. The procedural ethics of both liberal and Habermasian politics cannot address 
these questions, however, because they relegate questions of the public good to the 
realm of individual choice. Instead, I argue that public dialogue, guided by a praxis-
oriented virtue ethics, is required to recover objective environmental goods in the 
policy process. I also argue that Aristotlean rhetoric, with its focus on the credibility 
of expertise, is the mode of persuasive argument most appropriate for dialogical 
public forums. The public philosophy of civic environmental pragmatism is therefore 
presented as a richer theoretical framework for understanding the contribution of 
both experts and citizens in the development of environmental knowledge for policy. 
As a dialogical framework for SEA, civic environmental pragmatism constructively 
combines the critical/normative and instrumental/descriptive aspects of policy 
inquiry, both of which are required in the development of socially robust knowledge 
and politically feasible policy decisions.  
  
Table of Contents 
 
 
vii 
Abstract  v 
Table of Contents  vii 
Acknowledgements  xi 
Introduction  1 
Chapter 1  Understanding the Practice of Environmental 
Assessment  21 
  I  Origin and Intent of Environmental Assessment  24 
 II  Project-Based  Environmental Impact Assessment  30 
The Influence of Environmental Impact Assessment  30 
The Form of Environmental Impact Assessment  32 
  III  Science:  Integrating Environmental Considerations  35 
A Reactive Stance  37 
Impact Prediction  38 
Professional Judgment  41 
  IV  Politics:  Democratising Governmental Decision Making  43 
The Reactive Nature of the Process  46 
A Focus on Method  47 
  V  Beyond Project-Based Assessment  51 
Chapter 2  The Challenges for Strategic Environmental  
 Assessment  55 
  I  Strategic Environmental Assessment: An Overview  56 
Rationale and Objectives  56 
Scope and Methodology  60 
A Tiered Framework  63 
  II  Models of SEA:  Something Old … Something New?  66 
EIA-Based Model:  The Legacy of Proceduralism  66 
Policy-Derived Model:  Something New?  71 
  III  Policy EA:  The Need for a New Framework  80 
 IV  The  Challenges  83 
The Policy Context  84 
Uncertainty and Judgment  88 
Public Participation and Community Values  90 
  V  Rich Inheritance, Radical Potential  91 
 VI  Conclusion  98 viii 
Chapter 3  The Competing Influences of Scientism and    
  Pragmatism on Environmental Assessment  103 
  I  The Competing Influences on Policy Inquiry  106 
      The Enduring Legacy of Positivism  107 
      The Tacit Influence of Pragmatism  108 
  II  Knowledge and Action in Environmental Assessment  111 
      Scientism:  The Rational Model  113 
      Incrementalism:  A (Pre)Cautionary Tale  118 
  III  Challenges to the Epistemic Authority of Scientism  127 
      The Challenge to Rationality  128 
      The Challenge to Objectivity  133 
      The Challenge to Scientific Procedures  134 
  IV  The Defense of Scientism  135 
     Analysis  vs  Assessment  138 
      Public Disclosure: Democratising the Discourse of  
     Government?  140 
  V  The Dominant Epistemology of Environmental Assessment  143 
 VI  Conclusion  149 
Chapter 4  The Contemporary Tension Between Science and 
Politics  153 
  I  The Tension Between Science and Politics  156 
      The Politics of Expertise  158 
      The Advocacy Model of Environmental Assessment  161 
      The Limits of Organised Scepticism  166 
  II  The Contested Boundary Between Science and Politics  170 
      The Defenders of Value-Free Science  171 
      The Policy Context of Public Justification  173 
     Social  Constructivist Critiques of Science  175 
      The Limitations of the Social (De)Constructivist  
     Perspective  177 
  III  The Problematic Situations of Practice  178 
      The Dilemma of Rigor vs Relevance  178 
      The Problem of Problem Setting  181 
      Recovering the Purpose in Purposive Inquiry  184 
  IV  The Politics of Epistemology  187 
  V  Toward a More Interactive Accounting  192 
      The Co-Production of Science and Politics  193 
      The Resurgence of Pragmatism in Environmental  
     Assessment  196 
      The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis  198 
  VI  Conclusion:  The Road Not Taken  200  
ix 
Chapter 5  Pragmatism:  Rethinking the Tension  207 
  I  Practice and Action  210 
      The Problem of Judgment  210 
      The Promise of Pragmatism  213 
  II  The Pragmatic Theory of Policy Inquiry:  A Political  
    Epistemology of Practice  218 
      The Community of Inquiry  218 
      Democratising Policy Inquiry  220 
      The Dual Role of the Practitioner  223 
 III  Practical  Reason  226 
  IV  Knowledges in Context  231 
     Reflective  Practitioners  233 
     Reflective  Scientists  236 
      Socially Robust Knowledge  238 
  V  Reframing the Relationship Between Science and Democracy 241 
 VI  Recovering  Civic  Purposes  246 
Chapter 6  Toward a Civic Environmental Pragmatism  251 
  I  Toward a Civic Environmental Pragmatism  254 
      Professional Practice, the Public Interest, and the 
   Common  Good  254 
      The Civic Dimension of Professionalism  256 
      Reconnecting Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology  260 
  II  The Denial of Public Goods:  Liberalism and its Critics  262 
      Reason and Autonomy:  The Liberal Tradition  263 
     Against  Reason?  270 
      A Critique of Proceduralism  274 
      The Call for a Dialogical Response  278 
 III  Deliberative  Democracy  281 
      Habermasian Deliberative Democracy  281 
      Saving Public Dialogue from Habermas  290 
 IV  Recovering  Civic  Purposes  294 
     Virtue  Ethics  294 
     Ecological  Virtue  Ethics  298 
      The Intrinsic Value of Environmental Knowledge  299 
  V  A Rhetorical Account of the Forum  304 
      Rhetoric:  Reconnecting Epistemology and Ethics  306 
      The Meaning and Purpose of Knowledge  309 
 VI  Conclusion  312 x 
Chapter 7  Reframing Strategic Environmental Assessment  317 
  I  What is ‘Strategic’ About SEA?  320 
      Sustainability:  The Purpose of SEA  320 
      Technological Systems:  The Practical Focus of SEA  326 
  II  A Dialogical Framework  334 
      A Contextual Orientation:  Reflection and Action in SEA  336 
     Frame-Reflective  Policy  Inquiry  339 
  III  Reframing Strategic Environmental Assessment  342 
      (1)  Problem Setting  344 
      (2)  Anticipating Implementation  349 
      (3)  Adaptive Management  352 
 IV  Public  Dialogue  356 
      A Changing International Policy Climate  357 
      Models of Public Dialogue  359 
     Dialogical  Modes  of Communication   363 
 V  Sustaining  Institutions  366 
      Reflective Institutions:  Process is Context  367 
      Precaution:  An Emergent Design Principle  369 
 VI  Concluding  Remarks  370 
Epilogue     373 
Bibliography  377 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
xi 
The creation of this thesis has happily been a dialogue with many wonderful people. 
It is through my relationships with these people that I have learnt the most important 
lessons of this PhD journey—the value of humility, integrity, and commitment.  
I have been privileged to have supervisors whose passion and commitment to the 
issues that burden our humanity and our world has been a constant source of 
inspiration at a time when cynicism may seem the easier route. To my primary 
supervisor, Ian Barns, I owe a great debt of gratitude for his enduring, wise, and 
patient attention. Ian’s breadth of knowledge and depth of insight have provided 
encouragement and motivation throughout. Most of all I thank Ian for his lived 
commitment, always clear in the sparkle in his eyes, to the process of learning and 
exploration as valuable in itself. Special thanks also go to my associate supervisor, 
John Bailey, whose environmental assessment expertise, openness, and detailed 
comments on early draft chapters provided invaluable guidance at significant stages 
of the process.  
My friend and colleague Aidan Davison could not have been a better PhD 
companion. Aidan’s comments on draft chapters, and our many animated 
conversations about PhD life (oiled by a drop or two of ‘middling quality’ red wine), 
have been an invaluable source of support.  
For the unstinting friendship and love of my friends Julie and Michelle, I am blessed. 
We have worked to understand so much of life together, and these good and 
passionate women have helped me to see more clearly, and to believe in myself.  
My greatest thanks go to my family, whose love, generosity, support, and patience 
has been an endless comfort and inspiration, as well as being a vital refuge from the 
trials of PhD life these many years. I thank my dad and Ann, whose coastal retreat 
has helped me to escape this thesis and enjoy the sunset and the stars in good 
company on too few occasions. I thank my mum and Allen, who not only welcomed 
me into their home, but also provided invaluable editorial assistance in the frantic 
throws of thesis completion. It is my parents’ courage and humility that has 
motivated my belief in humanity, and the message I hope to have conveyed in this 
thesis. Finally I thank my brother James, who has always been the most true and 
devoted brother a girl could hope for, for his enduring goodness—a quality to which 
I shall continue to strive. As I write this, I look forward to spending more time with 
them all.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
– 1 – 
To define a problem more deeply may ultimately be the 
most important practical contribution. 
(Wynne 1987: 16) 
 
 
 
 
At a time when governments the world over are searching for constructive and 
equitable ways of incorporating sustainability principles into policy, strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) is emerging as a creative and systematic process 
with the potential to guide upstream decision making in more socially just and 
environmentally sustainable directions.  The ambivalent potential of contemporary 
technological systems, which are properly the subject matter of this upstream policy 
context, makes their informed and democratic governance crucial. At the same time, 
however, the practical environmental challenges of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and 
value conflict thrown up by developments ranging from biotechnology to energy 
policy indicate that the knowledges and techniques traditionally relied upon to 
‘solve’ the problems of policy are no longer adequate to the task. As a process of 
radical reform with the potential to facilitate disciplined inquiry into the public 
environmental consequences of technological structures and practices, and to 
cultivate an attitude of wise public judgment in their planning and management, SEA 
could prove vital as a practical response to the challenges that continue to threaten 
the environmental quality of life.  Introduction 
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The familiarity and experience of governments and private sector corporations in 
more than 100 countries with the environmental assessment (EA) process, together 
with its routine application by international development agencies, fortifies this 
conviction. In the 30 years since its inception, EA has been the subject of extensive 
scholarly and political commentary and analysis. It has succeeded in getting the 
environmental consequences of individual projects routinely considered in 
governmental decision making. However, it is precisely this ‘normalisation’ of the 
broader social and environmental concerns that prompted the creation of EA which 
also threatens to undermine its revolutionary potential. Incorporated into the 
machinery of government, environmental discourse has become increasingly 
disembedded from the source of political energy that underpins environmental 
expertise:  its civic context.  
The promise of SEA is, therefore, yet to be decided. The visibility of, and public 
access to, EA both as a product of the scientific management of the administrative 
state, and as a process that is potentially subversive of the instrumental rationality 
that informs it, has meant that both critics and supporters are loath to dismiss its 
potential. EA has prompted criticism that the process is yet another technique 
capable only of tinkering at the edges of the existing system—as yet another 
instrument deployed in the name of the development-oriented status quo. At the same 
time, the capacity of EA to ensure routine attention to issues otherwise invisible, and 
to promote the participation of interests otherwise excluded, has meant that EA has 
been characterised as possessing subversive potential, as a ‘worm in the brain’ of the 
administrative state (Torgerson 1997). By focusing public and policy-makers’ 
attention on the environmental side-effects of technological development, EA acts to Introduction 
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unsettle the ‘bounded rationality’ held to characterise administrative processes 
(Bartlett 1990). As institutionalised, then, EA both resists and reflects the influence 
of the broader social concerns which prompted its existence. In other words, EA both 
resists and reflects an orientation to its social and political context.  
These broader social concerns are the mark of the environment movement, which 
sparked an enduring and extensive influence on the core institutions of western 
societies. As Tim O’Riordan notes, in the past 30 or so years concern for the natural 
environment has been “one of the most profound and enduring social themes” 
(O’Riordan 1995: 1). This concern has taken effect in a plethora of initiatives, which 
include: the mobilisation of scientific innovation and collaboration; the creation of 
international treaties, through which a diversity of peoples are working toward 
common goals; the stimulation of new energy and material efficiencies and 
industries; innovations in regulatory approaches; and the formation of myriad interest 
groups and new alliances that span issues and systems of belief (O’Riordan 1995). It 
is difficult, in this, to ignore the pervasive spirit of human creativity and 
collaboration harnessed to the achievement of shared social goals. 
Given this contemporary dynamic, it is perhaps most remarkable that ‘the 
environment’ has only been a concept, a word in our vocabulary, since the 1960s. It 
had to be ‘invented’ so that otherwise disconnected issues and politics could be 
considered together as part of an overarching environmental crisis, and could thus 
become the focus of public attention. Even before that though, a range of empirical 
phenomena had to be considered problems rather than just evidence of ongoing 
environmental change (Szerszynski 1995). Introduction 
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The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 is held up as a landmark on 
both these counts. In eloquent prose, Carson presented evidence of the ubiquitous 
threat posed by industrial chemicals, the pervasiveness and persistence of which was 
found to be affecting the reproductive heart of life itself. Where external threats such 
as localised pollution and habitat loss had previously been the focus of concern, 
Carson located humans as part of a nature now systematically threatened by modern 
industrial processes. The human body, as Macnaghten and Urry vividly explain, “had 
become subject to invasion by dangerous agents which could not be properly sensed, 
let alone repelled” (Macnaghten and Urry 1998: 45).  
This new way of seeing sparked a conceptual shift that disrupted the standoff 
between nature protectionists and conservationists by redirecting attention to broader 
concerns about the character and direction of contemporary industrial society: 
If nature protection had been a moral crusade centred on the non-human environment, 
and conservation a utilitarian movement based on the rational management of natural 
resources, New Environmentalism addressed the entire human environment. For 
protectionists, the issue was wildlife and habitats; for conservationists, the issue was 
natural resources; for the New Environmentalists, human survival itself was at stake 
(McCormick 1995, cited in Macnaghten & Urry 1998: 45). 
The decisive shift promoted by the environment movement was thus to reorient 
attention from natural habitats and toward environmentally destructive social 
practices (Szerszynski 1995). As a wide-ranging appraisal of industrial society, 
environmentalism symbolised “a fundamental political critique of modern 
technoscience’s attitude to nature, as well as an alternative organizational ideal – a 
democratic, or participatory ideal – for the development of knowledge” (Jamison 
1996: 1).  Introduction 
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It was this alternative attitude of critical reflection on the structures and practices of 
modern governance, and the associated democratic ideal for the development of 
scientific knowledge to inform this process, which inspired the creation of EA and 
the interdisciplinary environmental sciences. Once the environment movement had 
successfully secured a place for ‘the environment’ on the political agenda of 
government, one of the most visible influences of environmentalism on the processes 
of public policy was the institutionalisation of EA (Torgerson 1997).
1 Ultimately, the 
goal of EA was to transform the policy process: 
Environmental impact analysis in its broader context represents a fundamental change 
in perceptions of how propositions regarding society’s environmental future should be 
evaluated and how political and economic decisions regarding the environment should 
be made (Caldwell 1989: 7). 
As a result of Lynton Caldwell’s influential contribution, the strategies of the 
environment movement were adopted as the goals of EA (Caldwell 1989). Thus, the 
aim of EA is to inform decision making about ‘private’ economic activities with 
knowledge of their public environmental consequences, and to democratise the 
policy-making process. 
Created in significant part as a response to the political pressures of a dissenting 
environmentalism, and with the aim of contributing to better informed and more 
democratic policy making, EA embraced the Enlightenment concerns of reason and 
democracy. But far from advocating more of the same, these concerns were oriented 
to the socially embedded purposes of the environment movement, which called 
attention to the destructive effects of industrial society on the social and 
environmental quality of life, and which ultimately challenged the rationality and 
                                                 
1 Lynton Caldwell was the first to recognise ‘the environment’ as a focus for policy (Caldwell 1995). Introduction 
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values guiding its path. Since its beginnings, however, the civic and ethical values 
which prompted the creation of EA have been considered external to the process 
itself.  
It will be my task in this thesis to argue that the ambivalence with which EA has 
been judged toward the achievement of its ultimate intended purpose—the 
reorientation of policy toward “the protection and improvement of the environmental 
quality of life” (Caldwell 1989: 9)—is a consequence of the tension between science 
(or, more specifically, scientism) and democracy (broadly conceived) characteristic 
of all attempts to institutionalise these values simultaneously within the processes of 
public governance. Although EA has facilitated greater public access to 
governmental decision-making processes, the focus to date on developing better 
techniques to facilitate the prediction of environmental impacts has been progressed 
at the expense of attention to the development of meaningful processes of public 
participation. Thus, the democratic promise of EA has yet to be fulfilled to anything 
like its potential.  
Whilst the need to develop good ‘scientifically rational’ and politically defensible 
technical methods for EA have been crucial in its early days, I will argue that the 
increasingly intractable nature of contemporary environmental debates indicate that 
the overriding focus on technique is now detrimental to the potential of EA to 
achieve its goals. Instead, I submit that the democratic deficit that characterises EA 
as currently practiced is a ‘gap’ which should be explored—a space that holds the 
promise of reclaiming the revolutionary potential of EA to become a meaningful and 
legitimate public process of democratic environmental governance.  Introduction 
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A re-evaluation of EA is timely. Since its inception, EA has mainly been employed 
to assess the environmental consequences of individual development projects. With a 
good 30 years’ practical experience with project-based EA, its scholars and 
practitioners have recently expended much effort evaluating its performance and 
contemplating its future (Sadler 1996, 1998). In particular, the increasing prominence 
of ‘sustainable development’ as an international environmental policy framework has 
spurred enthusiasm for the potential of EA to contribute to decision making that 
meets criteria of sustainability. Thus, attention has been directed to the development 
of SEA at decision levels upstream in the policy process.
2  
To date, however, there has been very little attention to understanding the theories 
that inform EA. As Robert Bartlett and Priya Kurian point out: 
There have been a number of valuable studies that have attempted empirical 
assessment of how [EA] has worked and why …. but few of these have attempted to 
contribute to theoretical knowledge about the kind of phenomenon [EA] is – its 
deontology, teleology, epistemic principles, ontology, or larger logic (Bartlett and 
Kurian 1999: 416). 
A comprehensive review of the EA literature by these authors reveals that theorising 
about environmental democracy in particular has been all but ignored. Moreover, 
there is an identified need for conceptual developments to inform a new approach to 
EA at the policy level (Chapter 2). Here, the insights of policy theory and analysis 
have been of particular interest to EA scholars.  
                                                 
2 I will only use the term SEA in chapters 2 and 7, where my aim is to focus on what is ‘strategic’ 
about SEA. Because it was always intended that EA should be applied at higher levels of decision 
making, and because it is my aim to draw upon the practical experience with EA, which has mainly 
been gained at the project level, I shall use the term EA to avoid a confusing proliferation of terms. Introduction 
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Developments in related fields of inquiry add to the timeliness of this re-evaluation. 
With respect to science, there is now a greater understanding of the social processes 
by which scientific knowledge is produced, and of the admixture of facts and values 
that defines science at the frontiers of knowledge. In the field of science and 
technology policy, a number of empirical studies into the intractability of 
scientifically intensive policy disputes have concluded that the main challenge is 
defining better questions, rather than doing better analysis on the old questions. 
Policy analysis has also changed character, and is increasingly understood as a 
process of governance embedded within multi-layered networks of social actors. A 
persistent theme in all these fields of inquiry is the need for more interactive and 
collaborative processes of public governance.   
It is my aim in this thesis to contribute to the identified need for a richer theoretical 
understanding of EA practice. In particular, I will focus on the development of a 
conceptual framework for EA at the policy level. However, I shall depart from EA 
scholarship by attending to issues of epistemology, which have been largely 
neglected in the literature to date. Of express relevance to my inquiry is the 
perspective of political epistemology and its concern with what makes knowledge 
legitimate for public policy, coupled with insights from political philosophy and its 
concern with the relationship between theory and practice.  
The theoretical concern guiding this research is the need for a richer conceptual 
framework, as well as a richer vocabulary, for talking about the contribution of both 
EA professionals and citizens to the development of environmental knowledge for 
policy. My thesis is that a deeper understanding of the relationship between scientific 
knowledge and political action is required if EA is to be a rigorous and relevant Introduction 
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process of democratic environmental governance. I aim to address the challenges of 
uncertainty and value conflict which threaten to undermine the rigor and relevance of 
EA, and which contribute to the ‘implementation deficits’ increasingly associated 
with environmental policy more generally, through the development of a theoretical 
framework that I dub ‘civic environmental pragmatism’. This framework combines 
the critical/political and the technical/instrumental aspects of policy inquiry, both of 
which are required in the development of resilient policy responses in the context of 
sustainability. Because both natural and social systems are inherently open-ended, 
attention shifts from a preoccupation with ‘correct’ decisions and toward a more 
open-ended concern for socially robust knowledge, and socially feasible decisions. In 
this, I shall argue, civic dialogue is an epistemological, political, and ethical 
imperative.  
The broad argument of this thesis, and the commitment to developing a richer 
theoretical grounding for SEA it embodies, rests upon Brian Wynne’s dictum that 
“[t]o define a problem more deeply may ultimately be the most important practical 
contribution” (Wynne 1987: 16). It is a commitment fortified in recent theoretical 
explorations in EA (cf. Bartlett 1997; Bartlett and Kurian 1999; Lawrence 1997, 
2000). The important practical contribution of theory is explained by Bruce Jennings: 
At first glance, my focus on models or theories of policy analysis may seem unduly 
abstract. But in this case abstractions matter. Models provide, so to speak, a reflexive 
self-understanding of the practice of policy analysis for its practitioners, its “clients,” 
and observant citizens. I believe that the most widely, albeit tacitly, held models are 
neither adequate as descriptive representations nor acceptable as prescriptive, 
regulative ideals. Consequently, policy analysis today is a practice in search of both a 
self-identity and a profession. Its theorists—practitioners who step back from its 
practice and systematically attempt to make sense of what they are doing, or 
commentators who try to examine its role and effects in our political system—find it Introduction 
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difficult both to give a public account of what policy analysis is and to articulate what 
values it should profess (Jennings 1993: 130).  
Taking my cue from Jennings, there is an evident danger that the EA profession is 
losing sight of the civic and human values it embodies and should be dedicated to 
serve. Various reviews of the EA theory literature over the past 20 or so years reveal 
that no one theory (and therefore, no one epistemology) seems to adequately describe 
the practice of EA (cf. Lawrence 2000; Weston 2000; Bailey 1997; Culhane et al. 
1987). Bartlett and Kurian’s (1999) recent review outlines six theoretical models of 
EA, each of which conveys a different understanding of what rules, methods and 
conventions of discourse govern EA practice. The aspirations of EA professionals to 
define what it is they wish to profess to policy makers—in particular, what it is about 
policy EA that will facilitate environmentally sound and democratic policy making—
lends this discussion a clear significance at this incipient stage of policy EA’s 
conceptual development. 
Methodological Framework 
The methodological orientation which guides the development of my argument in 
this thesis is based in the philosophical resources of pragmatism. The reconstructive 
practical intent of pragmatism is “intelligence at work to better fulfil the purposes 
implicit in a certain practice”—a critical approach popularised by John Dewey as 
eminently appropriate for social questions about which a detached, ‘objective’ stance 
is not possible, and yet which “demand serious and responsible efforts at 
understanding and response” (Sullivan 1995: 144). William Sullivan traces the 
origins of this reconstructive practical reason to the practical philosophy developed 
by Aristotle to deal with moral and political questions. As Sullivan explains, Introduction 
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reconstruction is “implicit in every exercise of critical intelligence. This is the core 
insight of American pragmatist philosophy” (Sullivan 1995: 144). 
With an emphasis on fulfilling the purposes of EA practice, the aim of this thesis is 
constructive: to provide insight into the process, to make implicit assumptions 
explicit, and to open up new (or hitherto obscured) possibilities. At the heart of this 
theoretical exploration is a reconstructive critique of commonly held understandings 
of the roles of science and democratic politics, identified earlier as the dual purposes 
of EA. The broader relevance of this framework is that it places EA firmly within 
larger societal debates about the respective roles of science and politics in policy 
making.  
Two overriding questions of policy making constitute these debates. These are the 
efficacy of policy in solving practical problems, and the responsiveness of policy to 
popular control. The implicit tension provoked by these questions has led Charles 
Lindblom to remark that: 
a deep conflict runs through common attitudes to policymaking. On the one hand, 
people want policy to be informed and well-analyzed. On the other hand, they want 
policymaking to be democratic…. In slightly different words, on the one hand they 
want policymaking to be more scientific; on the other, they want it to remain in the 
world of politics (Lindblom 1980, cited in Clark and Majone 1985: 15). 
This is a tension which confronts the practice of EA. On the one hand, conceived in 
terms of the application of science to inform decision making with knowledge of the 
environmental consequences of policy, the dominant role of EA has been one of 
‘speaking truth to power’, in Wildavsky’s (1979) much-celebrated phrase. The 
intrusion of ‘values’ and politics into the EA process, as Beattie (1995) points out, is Introduction 
 
 
– 12 – 
more often than not decried as tainting the scientifically rational, objective enterprise 
that EA might otherwise be.  
On the other hand, because of its role in opening up governmental decision making 
to public scrutiny, EA is a reflection of the post World War II demand for a socially 
negotiated civil legitimacy with respect to science, its ‘numinous’ legitimacy as an 
unquestioned source of authority severely tarnished (Clark and Majone 1985). The 
provision for public disclosure of the science used to inform policy making in EA is 
inherently an opportunity for public “testing, influencing, refuting and checking 
assumptions”, and thus for grounding the civic legitimacy of science (Petts 1999a: 
10).  
Thesis Structure 
True to the pragmatist spirit, we begin this reconstructive project from where we are, 
in a historically contingent context of ideas and institutions. We are not in a position 
to start anew—the ‘view from nowhere’, however tempting, is not a real option. 
Neither is my aim to propose a radical strategy of revolutionary change capable of 
razing the present in order to make way for the creation of a utopian future. With 
Dewey, I believe utopian thought too easily becomes an excuse for avoiding the 
tangled realities that confront us (Bernstein 1971). Rather, the emphasis is 
constructive—an emphasis which not only gives due recognition to the important 
role of enduring social practices in our late-modern society, but is also a refreshing 
change from the deconstructive temper of contemporary political analysis.  
The discussion begins in chapters 1 and 2 with a review of the EA literature in order 
to establish the problems associated with the implementation of EA, as they have Introduction 
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been identified by EA scholars and practitioners themselves. Chapter 1 is confined to 
a discussion of the limitations of project-level EA, whilst Chapter 2 turns on the 
challenges more specific to SEA at higher levels of decision making. The aim of both 
chapters is primarily descriptive, and therefore constitutes what is normally thought 
of as a literature review. Given the interdisciplinary and argumentative nature of this 
study, insights from additional literatures will be introduced as the argument 
proceeds throughout the thesis.  
The challenges identified for SEA at the policy level (Chapter 2) may be 
encompassed under three broad themes: scientific uncertainty and the need for 
practical judgment, public participation and the need to incorporate community 
values, and the dynamic nature of policy making, to which SEA must adapt. These 
issues set the stage for the immanent critique that makes up chapters 3 and 4 of the 
thesis.  
Recent critical scholarship centred in the policy analysis and risk assessment 
literature, as knowledge-based fields of policy inquiry, are explored in chapters 3 and 
4 for their contribution to a richer theoretical understanding of EA. The 
epistemological assumptions guiding policy analysis and risk assessment have been 
surveyed by Douglas Torgerson (1986) and Sheila Jasanoff (1999). Their 
investigations seek to understand these fields of inquiry in terms of (a) the theory of 
knowledge, or assessment of reason, that informs inquiry, and (b) the understanding 
of, and prescriptions for, linking scientific knowledge to political action. The 
discussion to follow broadly adopts this framework of analysis to elucidate the 
strands of thought informing dominant models of EA.  Introduction 
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Chapter 3 argues that two broad approaches to policy inquiry have informed the 
development of EA: (1) a ‘rational’ model informed by ‘scientism’; and (2) an 
‘incremental’ or adaptive model informed by pragmatism. Whilst the influence of a 
pragmatic rationality is clearly evident in EA practice, the formal institutionalisation 
of EA is based on the instrumentalist rationality of scientism. This latter model takes 
for granted the political authority of the natural sciences as a source of reliably 
objective knowledge. It therefore assumes that scientific knowledge may be 
uncritically applied to inform policy decisions. This strict separation of science and 
politics, and the assumption of ‘better science, better policy’ that informs it, has 
meant that the development of techniques to facilitate the EA process has progressed 
at the expense of attention to the social and political context of inquiry. However, 
this scientism does not help us to understand how we can provide authoritative 
knowledge to support political action at higher levels of decision making, where 
uncertainty and indeterminacy characterise the issues to be addressed.  
Chapter 4 examines the ‘politics of expertise’ that erupts when science is uncritically 
imported into the adversarial context of interest-based politics. Whilst the benefits of 
democratising access to science facilitated by the EA process are undeniable, these 
benefits are increasingly offset by the tendency for environmental debates to become 
polarised, and for scientific knowledge to be treated as an instrument by contending 
political interests. And where the influence of ‘values’ on science has the effect of 
challenging the autonomy and integrity of science itself, environmental science is 
increasingly unable to support political action. Therefore, the strict separation of 
science and politics seems to leave us with nothing but a futile dichotomy: science 
can be either rigorous but insensitive to concerns deriving from the social context of Introduction 
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inquiry, or relevant to social and political goals but thereby vulnerable to cooption by 
particular interests.  
The alternative to this dilemma of rigor and relevance is to situate inquiry in the 
context of practice. Instrumentalist rationality is not a neutral sanctuary. Rather, all 
epistemologies are political, and the choice of an epistemology is a political choice. 
Therefore, the constructive reconciliation of scientific knowledge and political action 
should move to centre stage in the development of a conceptual framework for policy 
EA. In this, the insights of interpretive policy inquiry more generally, and of 
pragmatism in particular, point to a methodological-political convergence on 
participatory dialogue as an epistemological and political imperative.  
Chapter 5 aims to recover what is already present in the conceptual heritage and the 
established practice of EA, but is yet to be explicitly recognised in either the formally 
institutionalised processes or the theoretical development of EA: namely, the 
epistemological resources of pragmatism. The constructive relationship between 
science and politics sought for here is a central characteristic of pragmatist 
philosophy. With its basis in the idea of a community of inquiry, John Dewey’s 
pragmatic theory of policy inquiry recognises the social nature of scientific 
knowledge, and the dialogical nature of rationality and practical judgment. Thus, in 
stark contrast to colloquial interpretations of ‘being pragmatic’ as pure 
instrumentalism, where something is meaningful only if it is useful, Dewey actually 
called for a philosophy of practical activity in which practice was a central theme. 
By emphasising the ends internal to practical activity, the idea of a practice—of a 
rule-governed, co-operative human activity with its own internal goods and standards 
of excellence—brings means and ends together, so that it becomes incoherent to Introduction 
 
 
– 16 – 
think of EA as mere means to some externally defined end. By reconnecting means 
and ends in the context of purposive inquiry, the critical/normative and 
technical/descriptive aspects of inquiry can no longer be so cleanly separated.  
Scholarship in the social studies of science fortifies the contextual view of science in 
pragmatism. Studies of scientifically intensive policy disputes have revealed that the 
production of science for policy is a socio-cognitive process, in which the ‘social 
robustness’ of knowledge becomes more important than the ‘certainty’ of the 
science. Together, these insights provide a richer and ultimately more realistic 
account of EA practice, and an inherently more meaningful and legitimate role for 
the competences of environmental practitioners in the process of inquiry. These 
insights, which point to the need for a broader alignment of scientific as well as 
cultural and moral values, interests and circumstances in the production of socially 
robust knowledge, also open the way for a recovery of the original, civic purposes of 
EA. This recovery is the subject of Chapter 6.  
The original, civic purposes of EA recognised both science and public participation 
as vital and interdependent elements in the creation of more sustaining forms of 
human engagement with the natural world. Pragmatism’s emphasis on the context-
dependent nature of environmental knowledge, as well as on the purposive nature of 
inquiry, means that the interaction of science with the ethical and political values of 
its civic context is central to both the rigor and relevance of EA. I shall argue in 
Chapter 6 that the irreducibly public nature of environmental problems demands a 
richer sense of publicness than either public consequences or public access, because 
neither strategy has facilitated the collective action that is required in the constructive 
resolution of these problems. Rather, I submit, public dialogue is central to Introduction 
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recovering the civic sources of political energy and ethical significance that underpin 
environmental expertise in EA.  
The reconstructive critique in this chapter therefore turns on the elaboration of a 
public philosophy capable of motivating collective action for the common good. I 
shall argue that both liberalism and Habermasian deliberative democracy fall short of 
this requirement because their proceduralism confines ethical commitments to the 
realm of individual choice. Instead, a praxis-oriented ecological virtue ethics is 
presented as a means of recovering objective environmental goods in policy inquiry. 
The complementary focus on moral character in the Aristotlean account of rhetoric, 
in which the credibility of expertise rather than the science itself becomes the object 
of judgment, provides an account of the dialogical public forum in which citizens can 
meaningfully participate. It is this rhetorical mode of public argument that facilitates 
the cultivated judgment and reasoned discussion of experts and citizens in the 
context of a shared commitment to action—the essence of Dewey’s pragmatic theory 
of policy inquiry.  
The public philosophy of civic environmental pragmatism thus developed provides 
the theoretical grounding for reframing SEA as a process of democratic 
environmental governance in which both environmental professionals and citizens 
may meaningfully contribute. The conceptual framework for SEA elaborated in 
Chapter 7, which concludes this thesis, aims to generate knowledge for political 
action that is politically legitimate, scientifically credible, and practically relevant. 
Three principles are proposed to guide the design and evaluation of SEA processes: 
(1) problem setting; (2) anticipating implementation; and (3) adaptive management. 
This dialogical framework seeks to reclaim Caldwell’s aspirations for EA as a Introduction 
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process in which foresight, wise judgment, and precautionary action transform policy 
making by re-embedding environmental science (as a discipline of interactive 
relationships) in its civic context.   
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… beyond the preparation of technical reports, EIA is a means 
to a larger end – the protection and improvement of the 
environmental quality of life. 
(Caldwell 1989: 9) 
 
 
 
 
Environmental assessment (EA)
1 is a governmental policy innovation devised in the 
late 1960s to provide a “governor on the exuberant expansionism of an unguided 
technological society” (Caldwell 1989: 16). A number of commentators have hailed 
EA as perhaps the most important governmental policy innovation of the twentieth 
century (Caldwell 1991; Clark 2000; Taylor 1984; Thissen 2000). Prior to the 1970s, 
environmental problems had been defined primarily in terms of pollution and 
‘amenity’. Governmental regulations, which aimed to protect human health and 
safety from the effects of pollution, had been the dominant response. Once 
recognised, pollution was mainly dealt with by imposing ‘end-of-pipe’ control 
measures to protect the quality of air and water.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis I will use the term ‘environmental assessment’ (EA) to refer to the process 
more broadly, and thus to encompass the range of possible forms, from the assessment of projects 
through programmes, plans and policies. References to environmental impact assessment (EIA) will 
pertain specifically to project-based EA because the predominance of this form of assessment to date 
means that the term EIA is has become associated with individual projects. Chapter 1 
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In contrast to this reactive and piecemeal strategy, EA was intended to work as a 
catalyst for the incorporation of environmental considerations throughout the 
bureaucracy: 
Catalytic controls require the bureaucracy to act and direct the bureaucracy towards 
certain goals but do not rob it of the capacity for creative problem-solving…. They 
prod, stimulate, and provoke bureaucrats but also allow them to be both innovative 
and efficient (Gormley 1987, cited in Bartlett 1997: 54). 
The novelty of EA is its capacity to force the consideration of the possible 
consequences of decisions that might prove to have major implications for 
environmental quality before a decision is made (Caldwell 1982). In effect, EA is 
foremost an informing and testing of policy alternatives in order to facilitate ‘better’ 
policy decisions. 
To this end, science and democracy were invoked by Lynton Caldwell, the architect 
of EA, as dual strategies of reform (Caldwell 1982). Science was considered 
necessary because “only through science, broadly defined, could the impact of man’s 
activities upon the environment adequately be assessed and remedial measures be 
applied where needed” (Caldwell 1982: 2). Public disclosure of this analysis, 
together with a democratisation of the process for “presenting conflicting claims 
regarding the relevance and adequacy of scientific knowledge”, was to ensure “a 
more sensitive and complex balancing of the values inherent in available 
alternatives” (Caldwell 1982: 72).  
The goals of EA should therefore be two-fold: to deploy science to inform 
governmental decision making, and to democratise the policy-making process. With 
respect to its primary goal, EA involves the systematic prediction and analysis of the Environmental Assessment 
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environmental consequences of a proposed development while it is still at the 
planning stage, when measures can be introduced to mitigate its environmental 
impacts, and before a decision is taken by government. As a result, a plethora of 
science-based analytical techniques have been developed to facilitate the prediction 
and analysis of environmental impacts. The production of the environmental report 
to government presenting the results of this analysis has tended to constitute an end 
in itself.  
However, as Caldwell has been at pains to stress, “beyond the preparation of 
technical reports, EIA [environmental impact analysis] is a means to a larger end – 
the protection and improvement of the environmental quality of life” (Caldwell 1989: 
9). Caldwell goes on to point out that this, the ultimate intended purpose of EA, 
derives from the goals of the environmental movement, which demanded that 
changing societal attitudes toward environmental quality should be manifest in the 
purposes of public policy, and realised through provisions for public participation in 
the formal processes of policy making. 
This chapter begins in Section I by exploring the origins of EA in more detail, with 
the aim of identifying the conceptual resources that originally informed EA as a 
strategy of policy reform. Section II briefly describes the influence of EA, and 
identifies a tension reported in the literature about whether EA is properly a 
technical, or a political, process. Sections III and IV then draw upon the past 30 or so 
years’ practical experience with project-based environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), as reported in the relevant literature. This discussion, which aims to clarify the 
problems experienced in practice in the achievement of EA’s dual goals, is focused Chapter 1 
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at the project level because it is at this level that EA has mainly been implemented to 
date. 
I  Origin and Intent of Environmental Assessment 
In terms of its practical intent, EA was originally conceived as a policy strategy: an 
‘action-forcing’ mechanism to institutionalise effective means of substantive 
environmental reform in the United States’ federal bureaucracy (Bailey and Dixon 
1999). There were other forms of policy analysis in use at the time (i.e. technology 
assessment, risk assessment) that were also designed to discover the impacts and 
consequences of proposed policies, and which also assumed that a systematic, 
focused and interdisciplinary use of science might improve the quality of policy 
decisions. “But could does not mean would” (Caldwell 1988: 75, emphasis in 
original). Thus it is the action-forcing provision of EA, ensuring that the process is 
enforceable, which separates EA from the rest. 
The work of Lynton Caldwell—widely acclaimed as the ‘father’ of EA—provides 
the basis of the following account of EA’s origins. Working closely with Senator 
Henry Jackson, Caldwell was largely responsible for crafting the United States’ 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and its EA provisions. NEPA 
was the first legislation to require EA of legislative and other major government 
actions which might have the potential to adversely affect the environment.
2 Given 
this influence, no meaningful evaluation of EA can seriously ignore the foundations 
                                                 
2 The mould-breaking nature of this Act has been recently described by Caldwell (1998) as having the 
greatest international impact of any US legislation. Environmental Assessment 
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provided by Caldwell’s incipient prescriptions, nor his more recent interpretations of 
EA practice in the light of its original purposes.  
It is thus appropriate to begin this discussion with Caldwell’s account of the 
significance of EA for public policy making:  
The application of our most reliable analytic capabilities toward disclosing the 
probable  consequences of human behaviour is the essence of impact analysis. … 
environmental impact analysis may be examined from several points of view. It is a 
technical process, it is a means toward administrative reform, and, more important, it 
establishes a  principle of policy. This final viewpoint is fundamental, not only to 
impact assessment, but to governance in today’s world. The basic purpose behind the 
development of environmental impact analysis was to broaden and strengthen the role 
of  foresight in governmental planning and decision making (Caldwell 1989: 7, 
emphasis added). 
The term consequences introduced here was deliberately invoked to call attention to 
the long-term implications of policy for the environment. But because the “idea of 
interactive relationships is implicit in the term ‘environmental’”, Caldwell (1989) 
emphasised that ‘environment’ should be understood as constitutive of the interactive 
relationships between ecological, political, physical, aesthetic, and ethical aspects. 
The role of foresight as a principle of policy also holds far-reaching potential. In 
order to operationalise this principle, Caldwell emphasised that EA must be 
interpreted as complementary to an “integrated interdisciplinary approach to policy” 
(Caldwell 1989: 11). 
The interdependence of the social and biophysical (‘natural’) worlds clearly 
anticipates the recent emphasis on the contribution of EA in the context of 
sustainability (Chapter 2). Indeed, the visionary nature of these prescriptions is clear 
when it is recognised that NEPA predated the 1972 United Nations Conference in Chapter 1 
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Stockholm, where concerns about the environment first emerged on the international 
agenda (Petts 1999b). 
Despite these revolutionary beginnings, scholars and practitioners of EA have tended 
to emphasise the other two ‘points of view’ outlined above by Caldwell: namely, EA 
as a technical process, and as an instrument of policy reform. This has meant the 
development of EA as a technique, with the Environmental Impact Statement (the 
EA report) as a legal requirement (Bartlett 1989). Furthermore, as practiced, the 
emphasis on EA as scientifically informed technique has meant a focus on the 
restricted quest of predicting and evaluating the environmental impacts of a proposed 
development.
3 Therefore, whilst foresight brings to mind notions of prudence and 
precaution in the making of wise judgments, the emphasis on prediction or 
forecasting has instead meant a preoccupation with the quantification of impacts, 
thus driving the continued search for better analytical techniques. This bias has led 
Caldwell to rue the “preoccupation with detail and quantification that elevates 
precision over relevance” prevalent in EA practice (Caldwell 1991: 83). 
Environmental assessment, Caldwell maintains, is not a procedural substitute for 
political judgment: “in reality, the ‘facts’ are silent – someone always speaks for the 
facts, and they are often susceptible to more than one interpretation. The application 
of scientific knowledge to any problem requires judgement as to what facts are 
relevant and reliable” (Caldwell 1982: 124). Indeed, Caldwell holds that it is 
precisely the opening up of the decision process to public scrutiny that has enabled 
EA to democratise the process for presenting conflicting claims regarding the 
                                                 
3 Whilst EA systems increasingly incorporate provisions for monitoring and management, this was not 
an early focus in the implementation of EA (Petts 1999a).  Environmental Assessment 
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relevance and adequacy of scientific knowledge. Mindful of the scope and power of 
science in modern society, Caldwell boldly endorses the benefits of EA as a 
manifestation of the need for the public management of science: science must be 
“guided in the public interest” (Caldwell 1982: 125). 
Attention to the ‘public interest’ was therefore an integral and intended element of 
EA design, and it is tempting to interpret Caldwell’s intent here as advocating the 
contribution of public participation in judging the relevance and direction of 
scientific inquiry. Caldwell maintains that the purposes of EA are to be found in the 
policy goals of the environment movement, and that the rise of the particular kind of 
science central to EA, an interdisciplinary environmental science, reflected a general 
public concern with the impacts of science and technology on society. Despite this, 
however, and following the constrained definition of public participation as judicial 
review and public disclosure, public involvement has remained marginal to the 
development of EA theory, and with few exceptions, amounts to little more than a 
procedural hurdle in EA practice.  
One might imagine that this limited attention to public participation is due, at least in 
part, to the central role Caldwell continues to attribute to what he calls ‘political 
support’ for EA (Caldwell 1988; 1989; 1998). But I would argue that this focus on 
externally exerted public pressure has diverted attention from the latent contribution 
of public participation within the EA process itself. Although pressure of the kind 
brought to bear in contemporary western societies by the environment movement and 
other politically charged social change movements has exerted considerable 
influence on the development of public policy since the 1960s, that influence has Chapter 1 
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waned in recent years, causing Caldwell to lament the lack of continued public 
support for the substantive goals of NEPA (Caldwell 1991).  
In any case, it is clear that Caldwell was not relying on direct public support for the 
success of EA. Instead, it would seem, he believed that the EA process itself was 
designed in such a way as to be self-sustaining of its dual purposes: “a way not only 
to deploy scientific knowledge in a way that will serve the public interest, but to 
discover criteria for the public interest on which everyone, at least in principle, can 
agree” (Caldwell 1982: 126). This is a considerable aspiration, and one that 
represents, according to Caldwell, the process at its best. On this view, EA is “a 
practical way to approximate the elusive goal of discovering the public interest” 
(Caldwell 1982: 72).  
Finally, then, it is both the link of mandatory procedure to substantive policy criteria, 
and the pressure to consider scientific evidence in decision making in order to reduce 
uncertainties, that Caldwell (1982) hails as the genius of NEPA. Serge Taylor 
concurs, and implies that it was the novel manner by which this procedure was 
institutionalised that enabled EA to come into existence at all: 
The novelty of the impact statement approach should be appreciated. The National 
Environmental Policy Act is a case of substituting analysis for reorganization….The 
drafters of NEPA chose not to use the more traditional strategies of bureaucratic 
reform – changing the legislative mandate and oversight bodies of each agency, or 
setting up one all-powerful regulatory agency to check on the environmental 
implications of all other agencies’ projects. Such strategies would have required 
enormous – and unobtainable – political resources. Instead, NEPA’s backers hoped to 
obtain the same results by requiring each agency to prepare a formal public analysis of 
its environmental impacts (Taylor 1984: 7). Environmental Assessment 
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In effect, EA would reform public decision making through procedure, 
institutionalising “patience, caution and looking before leaping” (Caldwell 1982: 
150). Achieving the substantive purposes embodied in NEPA, according to Caldwell, 
remains the task of policy makers; thus, the displacement of purpose by precision is 
also held by Caldwell to be the fault of politicians (Caldwell 1989).  
The location of EA within the processes of the administrative state sustains the 
radical separation of the technical and political spheres of policy making. This 
emphasis mirrors the broader policy framework within which EA is located, wherein 
a separation is maintained between substantive goals of politics, and the technical 
procedures of public administration. Although the commitment to public access 
embodies a distinctly normative democratic purpose, public participation in the EA 
process itself has nevertheless been enrolled in a largely instrumental capacity so that 
claims as to the relevance of the knowledge that informs EA relate only indirectly to 
the ‘public interest’. The justification for this approach may be gleaned from 
Caldwell’s belief that: 
Political authority today must more often be reconciled with the authority of 
knowledge. In more open democratic societies, where official and scientific 
information is available to knowledgeable citizens, the policy implications of 
scientific evidence cannot safely be ignored. Yet to manage this complex decision 
process is not easy. It is at least plausible that some of the policy failures in public 
administration result from the inability of public officials to orchestrate and direct 
collaborative decision making as well as from individual inability to think in 
integrative terms (Caldwell 1982: 106). 
In making this point, Caldwell invites an exploration of the barriers facing EA.  Chapter 1 
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II Project-Based  Environmental Impact Assessment 
The International Association of Impact Assessment (which has as its goal 
“advancing innovation, development and communication of best practice in impact 
assessment”) has defined EIA and its objectives in a recent statement (IAIA 1999): 
The process of identifying, predicting, evaluating, and mitigating the biophysical, 
social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions 
being taken and commitments made. 
•  To ensure that environmental considerations are explicitly addressed and 
incorporated into the development decision making process; 
•  To anticipate and avoid, minimize or offset the adverse significant 
biophysical, social and other relevant effects of development proposals; 
•  To protect the productivity and capacity of natural systems and the ecological 
processes which maintain their functions; and 
•  To promote development that is sustainable and optimizes resource use and 
management opportunities. 
Although this recent definition reflects the influence of the international sustainable 
development policy framework, the aim and objectives of EIA have otherwise 
remained largely unchanged since the process was developed.  
The Influence of Environmental Impact Assessment 
There is no doubt that the influence of EIA at the project level has been extensive. 
From its origins in NEPA, EIA legislation has been progressively introduced over 
subsequent years in California, Canada, Colombia, New Zealand, Australia and 
Thailand. This trend has intensified to the present day, so that EIA is now employed 
in some form in over 100 nations of the world (Petts 1999a). The global reach of EIA 
is also evident in its increasing application by multilateral aid organisations—the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations 
Environment Programme, and the United Nations Development Bank—and by Environmental Assessment 
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international development institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development 
Bank. Furthermore, Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (WCED 1992) calls for EIA’s universal adoption.
4  
The extensive influence of EIA has invoked criticism from all camps: from 
environmentalists concerned about the amount of control developers retain over the 
process, and from developers concerned about the delays and conflict public 
influence in the process often engenders. However, as Ray Clark points out, “both 
friend and foe of EIA are concerned about the extent to which it makes a difference 
in decision making” (Clark 2000). Despite this array of criticism, none of the key 
participants have called for its abolition (Hughes 1999). 
The practical consequences of EIA’s influence may be found in its reform of 
governmental decision making through the disclosure of information to the public, 
the enhancement of inter-agency coordination, and the extension of environment 
agency authority (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). This influence has been driven by a 
sustained public concern with environmental quality sufficient to ensure that “the 
rigorous project-by-project evaluation of significant impacts inherent in EIA [has 
been] seized upon as a solution to many environmental problems” (Petts 1999b: 4, 
after Wood 1995). Such enthusiasm has been attributed in part to the flexibility of 
EIA. One of the key characteristics of EIA in this regard is that it does not prescribe 
a predetermined process or outcome, which allows for adaptive and flexible 
                                                 
4 Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration reads: “Environmental impact assessment, as a national 
instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.” Chapter 1 
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implementation according to the particular social, political, administrative and 
legislative contexts of administering nations and states (Petts 1999b).  
The effectiveness of EIA has been found to depend in particular upon the prevailing 
political context. On the one hand, the existence of a consensual political culture has 
been found to facilitate a more informal approach, whilst on the other hand, 
insufficient national consensus on core values necessitates more formalised, 
mandatory procedures (Caldwell 1989). As a result, EIA has been institutionalised 
according to a variety of control mechanisms. For example, the rights-based culture 
of the United States is reflected in the dominance of legislative and judicial control 
processes governing EIA, whilst the UK culture of discretion and negotiation in 
policy making has meant that EIA has remained an ‘add-on’, rather than an integral 
component of, ministerial decision making (Petts 1999). 
The Form of Environmental Impact Assessment 
Despite claims that EIA does not prescribe a predetermined process, a set of 
generally agreed-upon consecutive steps has been developed which characterises the 
institutionalised procedure in EIA systems: 
•  Consideration of alternative means of achieving objectives. 
•  Designing the selected proposal. 
•  Determining whether an EIA is necessary in a particular case (screening). 
•  Deciding on the topics to be covered in the EIA (scoping). 
•  Preparing the EIA report (i.e. inter alia, describing the proposal and the 
environment affected by it and assessing the magnitude and significance of 
impacts). 
•  Reviewing the EIA report to check its adequacy. 
•  Making a decision on the proposal, using the EIA report and opinions expressed 
about it. 
•  Monitoring the impacts of the proposal if it is implemented (Wood 1999: 10). Environmental Assessment 
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Not all of these steps are incorporated into all systems, and where they are, their 
implementation is not always ‘effective’ (Wood 1999). Nonetheless, the received 
understanding of a ‘good’ EIA process as one that is more-or-less inclusive of these 
stages is evident in their elevation to the status of evaluation criteria (Wood 1999; 
Wood and Bailey 1994). According to Wood (1999), these evaluation criteria should 
be thought of as principles of EIA, a view which lends significant weight to the value 
of defining EIA in purely formal, procedural terms as a decision-aiding ‘tool’. 
Judith Petts has argued that “[p]erhaps the greatest political as well as practitioner 
confusion has arisen over whether EIA is merely a tool to aid decisions or is a 
process of making decisions” (Petts 1999a: 5). This distinction does not seem to have 
been identified as worthy of broader attention in the literature. It does have practical 
implications, however. Considered as a linear sequence of discrete events aimed at 
gathering information to inform ‘the decision’, the focus is on the methodologies and 
techniques of EIA.
5 In contrast, as an iterative process which allows for “all 
interested parties to both shape and revisit assumptions, data and results in the light 
of information, concerns, and evidence of knowledge deficiencies”, EIA represents a 
host of decisions ‘made’ by a variety of participants over time (Petts 1999b: 6). 
Attention here is directed to the processes of participation, communication, 
evaluation, and judgment that constitute EIA. That EIA is a political process, and not 
merely (and for many, unfortunately) situated in and influenced by politics, was 
clearly recognised by Caldwell: 
                                                 
5 It might also be seen to suggest, as Petts points out, that the proponent “can simply take the last EIA 
for their type of project off the shelf and, with a few judicious word changes, present a similar case for 
their development” (Petts 1999b: 7). Chapter 1 
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Impact assessment involves both science and art and cannot avoid implications for 
priorities among values. Hence to some degree it is, in the better sense of the term, a 
political process (Caldwell 1991: 81). 
A dominant focus on methodology has both positive and negative implications (Petts 
1999b). Whilst a methodological focus enables support for EIA to be united across 
the range of decision contexts which are facilitated by its flexibility, it can also 
suggest a commonality of approach that would appear to demand of proponents that 
they need only pass through the required procedural and reporting hoops. Attention 
to methodology has also meant that EIA is generally conceived in terms of pre-
decision assessment aimed at informing ‘the decision’, rather than as an ongoing 
process that extends beyond the decision into implementation, monitoring, and 
management. An oft-cited exception to this rule is the Western Australian EIA 
system, where monitoring and management have been deliberately emphasised since 
its inception. This system is “concern[ed] with EIA as a process that is of relevance 
from the planning through to the management of a proposed development”, a post-
development focus which has meant less emphasis on the significance of 
“scientifically testable and accurate predictions” (Bailey et al. 1990).  
The preceding discussion about the form of EIA broadly frames the remainder of this 
chapter, which aims to identify the challenges confronting the practice of EIA. In line 
with the pragmatist philosophy that guides this work, and which emphasises practice 
as the focus of inquiry, I shall attempt to elicit issues as they have been identified by 
EIA professionals themselves. The aim of such discussion is to gain a richer 
understanding of the barriers these issues have posed and continue to pose to the 
achievement of EIA’s dual purpose: namely, its capacity to integrate environmental Environmental Assessment 
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considerations into governmental decision making, and its contribution to 
democratising the decision-making process. 
III  Science: Integrating Environmental Considerations  
The primary goal of EIA, as intended by its designers, is the integration of 
environmental considerations into governmental decision making. The use of science 
in agency and governmental decision making to identify and assess the 
environmental consequences of political action, before such action is taken, is the 
enduring legacy of EIA. This is so not least, according to Caldwell (1989), because 
there is now a public expectation for such analysis. Ultimately, EIA aims to arrive at 
‘good’ decisions, “that is, decisions which avoid harm to human society and more 
latterly to the biosphere” (Caldwell 1991: 82).  
The rise of interdisciplinary environmental science in the 1960s, which embraced in 
particular the new science of ecology and its holistic outlook, was central to 
Caldwell’s ambitions for EIA in this regard (Caldwell 1982). This emerging 
environmental emphasis in science was itself “part of a larger expression of 
environmental concern”, a concern that preceded post-World War II public reactions 
to the ‘dark side of technology’ by several decades (1982: 41).  
Unfortunately, the benefits of such an interdisciplinary endeavour for EIA’s 
integrative potential remain largely latent, in part as a result of the tensions that 
afflict interdisciplinarity in EIA. These tensions are sustained by the artificial 
separation between facts and values, which manifests in what David Lawrence 
(1993) believes to be unproductive debates about the relative merits of a quantitative 
versus a qualitative approach in EIA. Characterised in an either/or manner, formal Chapter 1 
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quantitative methods are identified with scientific rigor, whilst qualitative approaches 
are often defined as the absence of rigor, relying instead on what is perceived to be 
unsubstantiated judgment. These debates are unproductive, according to Lawrence, 
because 
Even if one were to assume that science is value-free, science in impact assessment is 
concerned with the identification, prediction, and explanation of change. As soon as 
the orientation shifts to interpretation, evaluation, and prescription, impact assessment 
moves from the realm of science—to the value-laden realm of personal, social, and 
political preference and decision-making…. Thus … the issue is not objectivity or 
subjectivity but how well the subjective judgments are substantiated (Lawrence 1993: 
7).  
Caldwell (1991) introduces a conceptual distinction along the lines of this 
quantitative/qualitative dichotomy in his aptly titled paper ‘Analysis-Assessment-
Decision’. As Caldwell explains, whilst analysis should be a factual and objective 
report of possible impacts and effects, assessment is an inherently different activity, 
even though it may be a continuation of the analytic process. Assessment undertakes 
to translate the ‘technical’ findings of analysis into a language intelligible to decision 
makers and “amenable to a defensible decision” (Caldwell 1991: 86). Assessment is 
thus an evaluative activity which aims to clarify the implications of analysis for 
policy making. These implications, which may translate into long-term 
consequences, are often ignored at the expense of attention to the more immediate 
environmental ‘impacts’ of projects. This “inherent tendency to narrow focus is a 
critical factor in the assessment process that should be guarded against” (Caldwell 
1991: 87-8).  
The limitations of EIA as it has been implemented to date are related to this 
narrowing of focus, which has meant that the evaluative elements of assessment have Environmental Assessment 
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largely been subordinated to the analytical emphasis on quantitative technique. Two 
structural constraints contribute to this emphasis, which inhibit EIA’s ability to 
ensure that decisions consider the environmental consequences of development. The 
first is the reactive nature of the EIA process, which ensures a focus on short-term 
and immediate impacts. The second is the dominant ‘rational-comprehensive’ 
methodology adopted to facilitate the EIA process, which sustains a focus on the 
quantitative prediction of these impacts. 
A Reactive Stance 
Although EIA was conceived as a way of introducing environmental considerations 
early in the planning phase of project development, which would characterise the 
process as a proactive contribution to development planning, it has become 
increasingly clear that EIA is in practice only able to react to preconceived projects 
which have been developed largely in isolation of the EIA process (Boothroyd 1995; 
Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). By the time EIA is invoked to contribute to project 
planning, the developer is largely committed to both the design and siting of the 
project. In essence, many decisions have already been made which act to solidify the 
proponent’s commitment to a particular project. Thus, EIA is not able to challenge 
the form of development, nor to incorporate meaningful alternatives to the proposed 
development and its location (cf. Thissen 2000).  
The reactive nature of the process has meant that EIA is limited in three interrelated 
respects. First, the potential of the scoping phase is reduced to the identification of 
issues associated with the project as proposed. A second and related problem is that 
the treatment of alternatives is essentially limited to an analysis of alternative 
production processes. In other words, the definition of the ‘problem’, along with the Chapter 1 
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identification of associated issues to be addressed in the assessment process, 
essentially determines the kinds of alternative ‘solutions’ which may then be 
proposed. This is a critical deficiency given that the identification and analysis of 
meaningful alternatives is at the heart of the EIA process (Caldwell 1982; Petts 
1999a). Thus, whilst the procedural form of EIA may be preserved, Caldwell 
cautions that the process  
is capable of being shaped by how the proposal to be assessed is defined.… Questions 
for research may be structured to preclude unwanted answers and to advance those 
that are preferred. Thus, the form and ostensible intent of an impact assessment may 
be preserved, but substance may be corrupted by a bias in the formulation of the issue 
(Caldwell 1991: 84). 
The third limitation created by EIA’s reactive nature is the restriction of its influence 
on governmental decision making to recommending either rejection or acceptance of 
the project (Thissen 2000). In practice, outright rejection is extremely rare (Wood 
and Bailey 1994), and the main recourse available to EIA to minimise environmental 
impacts is to temper project acceptance by recommending that various mitigation 
measures be incorporated into project design and implementation.  
Impact Prediction 
The focus on the environmental ‘externalities’ of development has meant a focus on 
impact prediction. The problems associated with prediction, in particular the 
considerable uncertainty that surrounds the prediction of environmental impacts, 
have been increasingly recognised (cf. Amy 1990; de Jongh 1988). Ortolano and 
Shepherd (1995) have reported that predictions are often vague and untestable, a Environmental Assessment 
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view supported by several audits of EIA predictions.
6 The increasing use of models, 
which are frequently presented as ‘black boxes’, serves merely to mask uncertainties 
by inhibiting external scrutiny of both the assumptions informing the model and the 
predictions it generates (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). Such assessment of projects 
in isolation in the incremental, project-based approach of EIA has also meant that 
considerable uncertainty surrounds the cumulative and synergistic impacts which 
arise from multiple developments. 
In a recent review of EIA theory, Bailey (1997) discusses the problems of 
uncertainty in impact prediction within the dominant view of EIA as ‘scientifically 
rational’. Narrowly conceived as hypothesis testing, the model of EIA-as-science 
requires that impact predictions should be both testable and quantifiable. Therefore, 
the existence of uncertainty, when interpreted within this model, is generally 
perceived to reflect a deficiency in the information available to, and/or produced by, 
the assessment process. Uncertainty, conceived of in this way, then leads to a 
demand for more and better quantitative data, a task easily translated as a need for 
better methods and techniques of data collection and analysis. This process can 
obviously be self-reinforcing, and at the very least fails to challenge the 
appropriateness of either the model itself, or the analytical methods it sustains. 
Duinker clearly believes that uncertainty is a reasonable price to pay in the light of 
                                                 
6 The vague and untestable nature of impact predictions are confirmed by the results of Culhane et 
al.’s (1987) review of impact predictions within selected US environmental impact statements. In 
Australia, Buckley’s (1989, cited in Hughes 1999) review of all EIA documents produced in the 
federal system to 1989 revealed that the severity of environmental impacts was rarely predicted with 
certainty: actual impacts proved as or less severe than predicted for 57 per cent and more severe for 43 
per cent.  Chapter 1 
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the alternative, and claims that “[predictions are] better quantitative and wrong than 
qualitative and untestable” (Duinker 1987: 399).  
The inability of EIA, conceived of as a process of hypothesis testing, to accurately 
predict impacts, has meant that the introduction of measures to ameliorate the 
environmental effects of development is deemed essential. Indeed, an extensive 
evaluation of three decades of EIA practice has found that the feature characterising 
EIA’s enduring success is its ability to propose mitigation measures to minimise the 
impact of the project on the environment (Sadler and Verheem 1996).  
The key to validating both impact predictions and the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures is impact monitoring, which poses several problems of its own. As 
Thérivel et al. (1992) point out, techniques for impact monitoring and auditing are 
still in their infancy, and few existing EIA programs are able to ensure that the 
proposed mitigation measures are implemented (Arts and Nooteboom 1999; Ortolano 
and Shepherd 1995). Furthermore, even when the requirements for mitigation are 
legally enforceable, provisions for monitoring and audit to determine their success 
are extremely limited.  
A more significant problem affecting the reliance on quantitative prediction and 
monitoring is the limited extent to which monitoring and auditing information (even 
when available) can serve the objective of improving future predictions. An 
extensive review of the EIA literature has prompted Arts and Nooteboom (1999) to 
determine that uncertainties and limited information are as much a problem for 
monitoring as they are a reason for monitoring. In particular, the site-specific nature 
of scientific knowledge generated by monitoring cannot necessarily be generalised so 
as to inform future impact predictions. Limited recognition of these deficiencies, Environmental Assessment 
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which result from the demands of EIA-as-science, have hindered progress toward the 
development of an adaptive approach to EIA (Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). 
Professional Judgment 
In contrast to the dominant rational-comprehensive model of EIA, impact forecasting 
has been reported by some as a process which is in reality dominated by professional 
judgment (Culhane et al. 1987; Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). Two early attempts at 
understanding EIA are unusual in their recognition of the judgmental nature of the 
assessment process. Susskind and Dunlap (1981) identify the influence of 
practitioners’ values and beliefs throughout the process, and appeal to practitioners to 
develop an approach to accepting responsibility for non-objective judgments in a 
‘personal theory of practice’. In a strong statement, Lawrence Bacow concludes that  
Only when we approach impact assessment as something more than a technical 
exercise will it be truly useful. While the assembly of facts by experts plays an 
important role in documenting the existence of environmental hazards, most of the 
interesting questions that we hope will be answered by impact assessment require 
judgmental analysis…. As long as we continue to overestimate our technical capacity 
to perform each of these tasks, we will insulate many significant decisions from public 
scrutiny (Bacow 1980: 110).  
Some time elapses before Wood (1995) and Weston (2000) revisit the role of 
judgment in EIA, and report the dependence of the screening and scoping stages on 
professional judgment and experience. In recognition that EIA cannot provide the 
‘objective’ analyses demanded of the rational-comprehensive model, Beattie (1995) 
and Lawrence (1997) have been prompted to challenge EIA’s claim to credibility as 
being its basis in science, and to recognise that EIA is a political process. Formby 
(1993, in Ortolano and Shepherd 1995) has also called on EIA practitioners to 
embrace political realities, arguing that by ignoring politics EIA is decreasingly Chapter 1 
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related to actual decisions, and so is increasingly unable to achieve its ultimate 
purpose. Thus, political and institutional changes are identified by some 
commentators as more important than technical improvements in increasing the 
efficacy of EIA (Wathern 1988). 
These alternative interpretations of the problems faced by project-based EIA 
challenge the conception of EIA as defined by the ‘rational’ model, and emphasise 
the inherently political nature of the EIA process, highlight the difficulty of 
separating the ‘technical’ from the ‘political’ in EIA. Caldwell’s (1996) reminder 
that method may in effect become the message, is instructive: concern with technique 
tends to suggest that the intended object of research is precision. Pursuit of precision, 
however, is not a guarantor of relevance (see also Bailey 1997).  
Nonetheless, EIA’s preferred location within a rational-comprehensive framework 
still subordinates the more qualitative and political notion of assessment to a 
preoccupation with the analytic methods of quantitative prediction. In this way, 
attention is diverted from outcomes (consequences) to outputs (impact predictions), a 
focus which undermines the potential of EIA to “bring desirable outcomes and 
procedural issues back into close proximity” (Baber 1988: 177). Baber warns that 
there is “… a constant danger that impact assessment may substitute a cognitive 
process for interactive problem solving in any policy area where it is used” (Baber 
1988: 176). This is a point which brings us to the democratising role of EIA in the 
policy process. Environmental Assessment 
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IV Politics:  Democratising  Governmental Decision Making 
Democratising the policy process was always the less important of EIA’s goals. The 
provision of judicial review and the facilitation of public disclosure in EIA “were 
recognised, but considered secondary to the action-forcing purpose” (Caldwell 1982: 
93). Nonetheless, public participation is considered to be integral to EIA. Indeed, it 
has been said that “EIA is not EIA without consultation and participation” (Wood 
1995, cited in Petts 1999c: 152). The importance of this cannot be understated; the 
advent of EIA meant the introduction of public participation into the policy-making 
processes of many countries.  
Public review of the proponent’s EIA report dominates the legislative and 
administrative requirements for public participation in EIA, whereby members of the 
public are invited to express their concerns about the proposal through written 
submissions to government. Public hearings are also common practice, and 
opportunities may exist for the conduct of public inquiries. The trend more recently 
has been for earlier public participation in the scoping phase of EIA (Wood 1999).  
The broad intent of EIA’s provisions for public review was to formalise the inclusion 
of public environmental considerations into private economic decision-making 
(Caldwell 1988). As Amy (1990) points out, the indirect and hidden nature of the 
social and environmental costs of economic development, which have helped to 
ensure that economic development has remained unchallenged in capitalist societies, 
are made explicit through EIA. Thus, with the public disclosure of environmental 
impacts through public environmental reporting and review, environmental activists 
are provided with an important organising tool, as well as with new forms of citizen 
participation where none had existed previously (Amy 1990). These benefits are born Chapter 1 
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out in the legal requirements and administrative procedures for public involvement in 
many EIA systems, which provide the potential for a legitimate, informed and 
consistent platform for participation (Petts 1999c).  
The processes of public participation are, however, arguably designed to confer 
greater benefits on the proponent and decision authority than on participants. In 
support of this view, Petts (1999c) concludes that objectives for public participation 
are generally discussed in the EIA literature from this ‘top-down’ perspective, rather 
than from the viewpoint of participants. Defined in this way, participation is enlisted 
as a means to conflict resolution, to gain support for a viewpoint or action, to 
increase public confidence in decision making, and to improve the legitimacy of 
decisions. These objectives collectively represent the instrumental argument that lay 
participation will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of EIA. Process 
objectives, which support these longer-term outcomes, include (Petts 1999c: 149): 
•  reducing costs and decision delays; 
•  preventing unforeseen situations arising from inaccurate information; 
•  identifying concerns before they escalate; 
•  encouraging different stakeholders to express their views; 
•  bringing local knowledge and a fresh perspective; 
•  identifying opportunities for project modification and impact mitigation; 
•  ensuring alternatives are considered; 
•  making decision makers and proponents accountable. 
A normative argument also underpins the logic of public participation in liberal 
democracies which asserts the democratic right of citizens to participate in decisions Environmental Assessment 
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which affect their lives (Forrester 1999; Petts 1999c).
7 This argument is based on the 
presupposition that a technocratic decision-making process is incompatible with 
democratic ideals (Fiorino 1980). Governments must therefore provide opportunities 
for citizens to contribute to the process before a decision is made by their elected 
representative, who is ultimately authorised to make decisions on their behalf. The 
mechanisms to enable public participation in EIA thus aim to alleviate the publics’ 
distrust of public institutions and decision-making processes, which have 
traditionally disregarded affected interests and local knowledge in favour of 
‘objective’ expert analyses (Petts 1999c, after Renn et al. 1995). 
In practice, however, experience with public participation in EIA has been deemed 
inadequate by many (cf. Boothroyd 1995; Ortolano and Shepherd 1995). The EIA 
international effectiveness study reported that the greatest reservations about EIA 
performance were related to participation (Sadler 1996). Failing to resolve conflict 
and to deal effectively with public issues, the process falls short of both normative 
and instrumental goals (Petts 1999c).  
The problems encountered with public participation, as the following discussion will 
attest, are associated with the tensions that arise from EIA’s orientation to the 
decision, rather than to project planning and design. Thus, both EIA’s aspirations for 
procedural neutrality (i.e. the limited recognition of judgment in the process), and the 
incremental and reactive nature of its practice, have contributed to the constrained 
legislative and administrative provisions for public involvement within the process.  
                                                 
7 The Western Australian EIA process addresses the acceptability of public participation processes in 
terms of four ‘rights’: to know, to be informed, to be heard, and to object (Sippe 1997, in Petts 1999c).  Chapter 1 
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The Reactive Nature of the Process 
Defined by the prescriptive (but nonetheless formally enacted) rational-
comprehensive model of EIA, the purpose of public participation becomes a 
contribution to the overall goal of informing the decision. In this context, the 
provisions for public participation are designed to aid the generation of information. 
This approach is evident in the Western Australian system, where the guidelines for 
public input explicitly invite submissions that provide additional information (DEP 
1993). Public concerns related to deeper, but less easily articulated, moral and 
political concerns are thus formally discounted as ‘irrational’ in what is widely held 
to be a ‘technical’ process (Petts 1999c). Confirming this technocratic prejudice, the 
public are totally excluded from the core activities of EIA, including baseline studies, 
impact prediction and evaluation, which ensures that the lay public are excluded 
from the process of inquiry. Moreover, the transfer of information in this model 
travels one-way to the decision maker, reflecting the linear sequence of events which 
constitute an EIA process oriented to the decision (Petts 1999c; de Jongh 1988).  
On the whole, then, whilst the procedural form of EIA serves to legitimise public 
involvement, the constrained opportunities for public participation simultaneously 
stifle community debate about deeper concerns related to the public environmental 
issues to be decided. Conflict and dialogue are inimical to the formal neutrality 
espoused by the procedural approach because it assumes that citizens are the best 
judge of their own interests, which are protected by his/her representative, who 
ensures that all such interests are ‘taken into account’ in the final decision. 
These inadequacies have been explained by recourse to the ineffective integration of 
public participation into the EIA process. In essence, Boothroyd (1995) claims, the Environmental Assessment 
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mechanisms for public involvement are not able to adequately address substantive 
issues concerning the need for development and its alternatives because public 
participation was an add-on to the design process. In the linear sequence of events 
that defines EIA, public review follows the presentation of a project and its 
assessment, and is therefore reduced to the evaluation of predefined choices which 
have been framed by the proponent and embodied within the development proposal 
(Birkland 1999). The late stage of participation formally limits the public’s role in 
setting the agenda of issues which may be legitimately addressed in the EIA process. 
The major development decisions have already been made (Ortolano and Shepherd 
1995; Poisner 1996).  
Rather than participation, Ortolano and Shepherd (1995) point out, public 
involvement is often reduced to a public relations exercise, restricting influence to 
either rejection of the project, or its conditional acceptance based on the 
incorporation of measures to mitigate its impacts. Therefore, the reactive nature of 
EIA, and its consequent focus on the decision and the ‘externalities’ of development, 
hinders the capacity of public participation to contribute to the creation of more 
environmentally beneficial forms of development. 
A Focus on Method 
The failure to integrate public participation into the design process is a systemic 
problem because EIA directly threatens proponents’ privately oriented plans by 
forcing public disclosure of the impacts of development (Ortolano and Shepherd 
1995). It is perhaps for this reason that developers tend to focus on issues of process 
cost and uncertainty (Wathern 1988). Whilst the direct cost of EIA is not a legitimate 
criticism (cf. Court 1996), the cost of delay associated with the uncertain outcomes Chapter 1 
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of the assessment process is more significant. This is especially the case in the US, 
where reliance on the judicial system to resolve disputes can significantly delay 
decision making.
8  
One might imagine that the magnitude of this concern for proponents would direct 
attention to the causes of protest, which have resulted in participants’ search for 
alternatives to formal public review when they feel the decision has already been 
made (Roberts 1995). Several commentators point out that the very fact of public 
interest litigation in the United States (Commonwealth Environmental Protection 
Agency 1994; Wathern 1988), and of appeals in the Western Australian system 
(Bache 1998; Bailey et al. 1987), implies the inadequacy of provisions for 
participation from the publics’ point of view.  
Consistent with EIA more generally is a focus on the improvement of methods of 
public participation, with a focus on informing the decision (Petts 1999c). As the 
conclusions of the international EIA effectiveness study put it, there is a need for 
new modes of public participation which stress public ‘input’ to the process (Sadler 
1996). The contribution of the information provided by members of the public to the 
accountability sought by decision makers is thus a significant preoccupation in the 
EIA literature. 
By sustaining attention to the methods of public participation, the fairness of decision 
outcomes has essentially been ignored in the EIA literature because this is considered 
to be a burden of the decision maker. Given that there is no formal post-decision 
evaluation of outcomes, and that those who bear the negative consequences possess 
                                                 
8 Delay is also noted as a problem in Australia by the Bureau of Industry Economics (1990, cited in Environmental Assessment 
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limited capacity to raise public awareness of their plight, the inequitable distribution 
of environmental consequences has been largely obscured from view. Thus, EIA’s 
lack of attention to substantive concerns again reveals important inadequacies, this 
time with respect to its capacity to contribute to environmental justice. 
The problems of public participation highlighted by the preceding discussion 
therefore tend to mirror those associated with EIA more generally, and are related to 
the inherently reactive nature of EIA and orientation to informing the decision. The 
primary barrier to more effective public participation has been identified by Petts 
(1999c) as legislative, where a one-off requirement for public review within a linear 
exercise emphasises the decision-legitimising rather than decision-enhancing 
function of EIA. This limited commitment therefore reflects the dominant conception 
of EIA as a tool rather than an ongoing process (Petts 1999c).  
As noted earlier, informal ‘stakeholder’ participation in the scoping phase of EIA has 
been increasingly introduced as a response to the problems which beset public 
participation, such that early public participation is generally recognised as an 
important contribution to the EIA process (Petts 1999c). This view is not universal, 
however. One such dissenter is Wood (1995, in Petts 1999c), who is probably not 
alone in his belief that early public participation in project design and the 
identification of alternatives is often not feasible, and may create unnecessary alarm. 
There has been some support in the EIA community for exploring the potential of 
alternative, innovative participatory mechanisms for EIA (Petts 1999c; Sadler 1996). 
We must be mindful, however, that merely ‘adding on’ more meaningful processes 
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to the existing legislative and administrative framework may only mask the need for 
deeper institutional reforms (Birkland 1999). As Petts describes the challenge of 
public participation, in addition to questions of “whether and how more participative 
processes can be integrated into EIA”, it is possibly “more important to consider how 
EIA can be integrated into broader decision-making processes based on a 
participative approach” (Petts 1999c: 145).    
This point brings us full circle to the embeddedness of EIA within a broader political 
context. Political support for EIA, manifest in the values which community members 
attribute to the environment, is perceived to be vital to the future of EIA (Caldwell 
1982; Wood and Bailey 1994). But in this, very little merit is attributed to the 
importance of public values within the process itself; rather, the aim is to elicit the 
interests of individuals, or to rely upon political support from outside the process. 
Importantly, there is limited recognition of the role that the EIA process plays in 
creating these values. Boggs (1993) recognises that the creation of knowledge in EIA 
activates conflicting values. It is exactly the unavoidable prioritising of values that 
this engenders that has prompted Caldwell to acknowledge EIA as a political 
process. In other words, the assumptions and values underlying impact assessment 
will influence its findings: 
I do not underestimate the scientific and technical difficulties that may be encountered 
in impact analysis and assessment. But I continue to believe that the greater problem 
in the effective use of this procedure is in the opinions of people regarding how 
decisions should be made and what values should receive priority (Caldwell 1991: 
86). Environmental Assessment 
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V Beyond  Project-Based  Assessment 
The majority of its scholars and practitioners define EIA as “a technical process, 
governed by scientific and technical rationality, comprising information collection 
and processing” (Bartlett and Kurian 1999: 417). I have argued that the persistent 
problems of project-based EA, as they have been voiced by scholars and 
practitioners, are related to the overriding definition of EA as an instrumental 
procedure, which deflects attention from the inherent dynamism of EA as a political 
process. Rather than a contribution to the design process, the achievement of EA’s 
dual goals has been relegated to techniques capable of producing empirical-analytic 
information in a pre-decision process (Parenteau 1988). This orientation to ‘the 
decision’ rather than to project design has meant that EIA defers to the 
(developmentalist) values of proponents and politicians embodied in the 
preconceived project. The focus on technical analysis in a pre-decision process 
seriously inhibits the adaptive, learning aspirations of environmental science 
embodied in the intent of EA: to strengthen the role of foresight—of prudence, 
precautionary action, and wise judgments—in governmental policy making.  
The procedural approach to EA is thus problematic:  
•  oriented to prediction rather than to foresight, the ability of EA and public 
participation to provide meaningful insight into the substantive 
consequences of development has been significantly constrained;  
•  oriented to informing the decision about a preconceived project rather than 
to the design of environmentally sound development proposals, the 
creative, transformative potential of EA and public participation are stifled; Chapter 1 
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•  defined as a static, ‘technical’ contribution, EA and public participation are 
largely removed from the process of inquiry.  
Paradoxically, this procedural orientation to the decision has also meant that EA is 
decreasingly relevant to decision making, thus diminishing its capacity to 
meaningfully integrate public environmental considerations into governmental 
decision making—to contribute to democratic environmental governance. It follows 
that EA is increasingly unable to protect and enhance the public environmental 
values which it ultimately seeks to represent and sustain.  
Such inadequacies have been at least partly responsible for the increasing 
preoccupation of EA professionals with the crucial relationship between the EA 
process and its broader decision-making context (Wood 1999). In recent years, a 
near-consensus has emerged amongst EA professionals that the problems associated 
with achieving the broader goal of incorporating environmental considerations into 
decision making are in large part related to the reactive nature of EA at the project 
level. This reactive character, in turn, stems from the foreclosure of many options at 
higher levels of decision making. Therefore, a need for assessment of the 
environmental consequences of these more strategic political decisions has been 
identified. Perhaps mindful of Caldwell’s caution that “EIA alone should not be 
expected to do more than it was designed to do”, EA scholars and practitioners have 
been prompted to explore the concept of strategic environmental assessment as a 
means of overcoming some of the challenges faced by EA (Caldwell 1991: 90). 
Indeed, Caldwell has long believed that “the most significant development of [EA] in 
the future could be to strengthen and enlarge its role in the policy-making process” 
(Caldwell 1989: 14).  
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It is important to stress, at this point, that the need for a tool with 
the characteristics of SEA arose precisely because a different tool 
from project EIA was needed. 
(Partidário 1999: 71) 
 
 
 
The identified need for EA to take on a more expansive role at higher levels of 
decision making coincides with a time when governments the world over are 
searching for constructive and equitable ways of incorporating sustainability 
principles into policy. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is therefore 
emerging as a creative and systematic process with the potential to guide upstream 
decision making in more socially just and environmentally sustainable directions. 
With this significant potential in mind, the central purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the issues and challenges facing SEA. Given that the conceptualisation of 
SEA is in its infancy, the present discussion aims to examine its potential to 
overcome the barriers identified for project-based EIA (Chapter 1), as well as to 
ascertain the conceptual and methodological challenges more specific to SEA, 
particularly at the level of policy.
1  
                                                 
1 The term SEA is often used to refer to the environmental assessment of plans, programmes, and 
policies. However, it is widely recognised that a different approach is required for the environmental 
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Section I will provide a brief overview of the rationale and objectives of SEA, as 
well as an outline of the scope and methodologies which have been proposed to 
conduct the SEA process. The ‘tiered’ framework widely advocated for 
distinguishing between approaches to SEA, depending on the decision level to which 
it is applied, guides the exploration of developments in SEA in Section II. In Section 
III, the discussion turns to incipient developments toward a fundamentally ‘new’ 
conceptual framework for policy EA, the key challenges for this undertaking being 
elaborated in Section IV. The chapter concludes, in Section V, by reframing the 
challenges confronting policy EA in terms of the broader tension between science 
and politics that besets policy analysis more generally, and which will frame the 
response to this tension in the remainder of this thesis. 
I  Strategic Environmental Assessment: An Overview 
Rationale and Objectives 
Strategic environmental assessment was conceived at least two decades ago, when 
the idea of ‘policy review’ as a supplement to project appraisal was introduced by 
O’Riordan and Sewell (1981). O’Riordan and Hey (1976) had earlier determined that 
the piecemeal approach to policy in their UK home lacked strategic vision, and 
advanced an argument for formal review of the environmental implications of policy 
adoption. Specific use of the term SEA was later made by Wood and Djeddour 
(1992), sparking considerable attention to the development of SEA procedures and 
their application since that time (Partidário 1999). SEA requirements have now been 
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introduced in regional, national and international legislation and policy guidance 
(Bina 2000).  
The rationale for SEA is that its more strategic orientation holds the potential to 
overcome the problems faced by EIA at the project level, where the timing of 
analysis has constrained the capacity to deal proactively with environmental 
problems, and where the ad hoc nature of project-level decision making has meant 
EIA is unable to deal effectively with the cumulative effects of multiple activities. 
Thus, it is held that SEA is a structured means of introducing and safeguarding 
attention to environmental consequences at the level of policies, plans and 
programmes (Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel and Partidário 1996).
 There is now 
general agreement amongst practitioners on the overall concept of SEA as “a 
structured, proactive process to strengthen the role of environmental issues in 
strategic decision making” (Verheem and Tonk 2000: 177).  
The contribution of SEA at these higher levels of decision making is to 
constructively address the causes of environmental problems at their source, where it 
is possible to go beyond exploring ‘how’ to minimise the effects of proposed 
developments, and to raise more fundamental questions of ‘whether, where and what 
kind’ of development should occur (Sadler and Verheem 1996). This means that 
SEA is potentially able to assess the environmental impacts of ‘real’ alternatives—
technology, use of resources, lifestyle, etc.—before more specific commitments to 
project design and location have been made (Wood and Djeddour 1992). In this way, 
SEA moves away from a development-centred approach to one which (as stressed 
early on by Ortolano and Shepherd (1995), and later endorsed by Partidário (1999) 
and Petts (1999a)), can mitigate or abandon unsound concepts before they are turned Chapter 2 
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into particular projects. In this process, the consideration of alternatives ideally 
remains at the heart of SEA (Thérivel 1997).  
A further prompt for the development of SEA, as Partidário (1999) points out, was 
the need to contribute to contemporary environmental imperatives associated with 
the international environmental policy agenda of ‘sustainable development’, 
formalised at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992. The persistence of poverty, and the increasing prominence of global problems 
such as acid rain, climate change, toxic waste and biodiversity loss, prompted a 
commitment to the framework of sustainable development as a unifying international 
policy framework. In response to the predominantly antithetical framing of economic 
growth and environmental protection, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development declared that: “Humanity has the ability to make development 
sustainable—to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 8). Equity 
was thus a core consideration. Moreover, the strategy of ‘development’ rather than 
‘growth’ was to introduce a focus on quality of life issues. As a whole, then, 
sustainable development is broadly conceived of as being based on the integration of 
social, economic and environmental goals. The need for policy instruments capable 
of meeting the challenge of sustainable development has spurred enthusiasm for 
understanding the ways in which SEA might contribute to the creation of policy 
which meets the criteria of sustainability. As Sadler forthrightly states, “[t]he 
overriding requirement for the future is to link SEA more directly to sustainable 
development objectives and imperatives” (Sadler 1998: 37).  Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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Given this motivation, the aims of SEA are threefold (cf. Lee and Walsh 1992; 
Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel et al. 1992; Thérivel and Partidário 1996): 
•  to provide a means of facilitating the translation of sustainability goals into 
the ‘inner circles’ of policy making;   
•  to strengthen and support project-level EIA by providing an 
environmentally sound decision-making context; and 
•  to address indirect, large-scale, long-term, cumulative, and synergistic 
effects.
2 
What is immediately obvious from this list is that neither of EA’s original 
strategies—the deployment of science to inform decision-making, and the 
democratisation of decision-making processes—feature explicitly. This is despite 
universal agreement that, within the above framework, the philosophy and principles 
of EIA may be effectively translated ‘upstream’ in the context of SEA (Clark 2000).  
A recent definition of SEA published by the International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) reclaims the earlier emphasis on informing decision makers, and 
on democratic process: 
A good-quality Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) process informs planners, 
decision makers and affected public on the sustainability of strategic decisions, 
facilitates the search for the best alternative and ensures a democratic decision making 
process. This enhances the credibility of decisions and leads to more cost- and time-
effective EA at the project level (IAIA 2002).  
                                                 
2 The task of assessing cumulative effects has been recognised as a contribution to better EIA, rather 
than being SEA (Clark 2000; Partidário 1999).  Chapter 2 
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A “good-quality SEA process” is further characterised as one that is integrated, 
sustainability-led, focused, accountable, participative, and iterative. It is notable 
though that even in the more detailed performance criteria associated with these 
objectives, there remains no specific reference to science.
3  
As will become clear in Section II, and in accord with the procedural emphasis in 
EIA, the ‘principles’ adopted to guide SEA have generally been formulated in terms 
of the procedural stages of SEA (cf. Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel and Brown 
1999). This strategy has been adopted despite a recognition that SEA was conceived 
in response to the structural problems of EIA, which must be distinguished from 
procedural issues. In the words of Sadler and Verheem, the constraints imposed by 
the “structural weaknesses [of EIA], centred on its circumscribed role in decision 
making and relatively late stage at which it is applied” should be “distinguished from 
methodological and procedural constraints which respectively concern the tools and 
techniques of analysis and the provisions and components of the EIA process” 
(Sadler and Verheem 1996: 30). Thus, where EIA is focused on the procedural 
question of how a development should take place, SEA should focus on more 
substantive strategic questions of the need for the development—questions of 
whether, what, where. And, at the policy level, it is more specifically why questions 
that must take priority (Verheem and Tonk 2000).  
Scope and Methodology 
The potential to apply the principles of EIA ‘upstream’ extends to an almost 
boundless array of strategic decision-making contexts. These decision levels have 
                                                 
3 The full document can be found on the IAIA website at http://www.iaia.or/Publications/sp1.pdf Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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been generically understood within the EA literature in terms of Wood and 
Djeddour’s definitions, where a “policy is … considered as the inspiration and 
guidance for action, a plan as a set of coordinated and timed objectives for 
implementing the policy, and a program as a set of projects in a particular area” 
(Wood and Djeddour 1992: 8). Within these broad categories, specific applications 
include (based on Thérivel and Brown 1999: 444):  
•  legislative change, i.e. national/state/local, international treaties; 
•  green and white papers; 
•  economic policies, budgets, fiscal planning; 
•  integrated plans, i.e. national/regional plans, conservation areas; 
•  sectoral policies or plans, i.e. agriculture, transport, energy; 
•  resource management plans, i.e. coastal, forests; 
•  social policy or plan, i.e. employment, equity of transport access; 
•  policy or plan to guide incremental change, i.e. zoning, city consolidation; 
•  selection between alternatives, i.e. transport routes, energy sources. 
An additional application of SEA is the assessment of activities, such as agricultural 
or forestry management practices (Bregha et al. 1990; von Seht 1999; Wood and 
Djeddour 1992).  
This range of applications is not universally endorsed, however.
4 Clark (2000) claims 
that only policies are inherently strategic. Sectoral and technological programmes 
                                                 
4 As Partidário (1999) points out, considerable controversy surrounds the meaning of ‘strategic’, and 
has resulted in a burgeoning of more specific terms related to the policy field in which SEA is applied, 
including policy impact assessment; regional, sectoral, and programmatic environmental assessment; 
and environmental overview. Chapter 2 
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can be strategic if the question is framed broadly enough, but land-use and structure 
plans are site-specific, and should be classified as programmatic. The traditional case 
study approach in EIA has meant that, contrary to Clark’s viewpoint, case study 
experience with SEA, and in particular with the assessment of programmes based on 
the procedures and methods of EIA, has dominated developments in SEA until 
recently. 
An increasing recognition that EA at the level of policy poses a particular challenge 
has recently prompted the recommendation that the assessment of programmes and 
plans be treated differently to that of policies (Bailey and Dixon 1999). This proposal 
is related to the different decision-making processes which exist at these decision 
levels, which has meant different interpretations of the methodological framework 
deemed appropriate for plans and programmes on the one hand, and policies on the 
other. Thus, although much work has been done since 1993 when Partidário declared 
that “[SEA] lacks a practical conceptualization” (cited in Sadler and Verheem 1996: 
25), disagreement about the conceptual form of SEA remains. Two broad approaches 
may be identified (Bailey and Dixon 1999; Partidário 1999):  
•  the extension of EIA principles and methodology to higher levels of 
decision making (EIA-based); and  
•  the extension of policy analysis to enable the integration of environmental 
considerations, alongside economic and social concerns, within plan and 
policy formulation (policy-derived, or sustainability-led). 
The genesis of SEA in project-based EIA has strongly influenced the dominance of 
the former approach. Given these origins, this ‘bottom-up’ model of SEA has Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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adopted the methodology and methods of EIA (Lee and Walsh 1992), so that the 
majority of commentators describe SEA as a technique—a ‘tool’ or instrument—to 
aid decision making (Thérivel and Brown 1999; Wood and Djeddour 1992). As was 
the case with EIA, the development of a conceptual framework for SEA is evolving 
in the light of practical experience. Therefore, the fact that SEA ‘experiments’ have 
tended to employ the EIA-based model has meant the prevalence of attention to this 
approach in the literature (Thérivel 1993).  
On the other hand, the development of SEA from a ‘top-down’ or policy-derived 
perspective is comparatively new. Here, the goal is not to “do an [EA] of policy, but 
rather to ensure that the environmental considerations of policies are taken into 
account in an integrated way” (Sadler and Verheem 1996: 26). This policy-derived 
approach is advocated as a means to ‘trickle down’ the sustainability objectives of 
policy to lower-level decisions (Thérivel et al. 1992).  
A Tiered Framework 
A number of scholars have adopted the notion of ‘tiering’ as a framework for 
identifying the interdependent relationships between strategic decision levels 
(policies, plans and programmes), and sometimes between different jurisdictional 
levels (national, state, regional and project).
5 Tiering thus implies a ‘nesting’ of 
different stages of the decision process, and so provides a framework for 
coordinating EAs between decision levels. Tiering ensures that SEA and EIA 
complement and reinforce each other, and enables broader issues and implications 
                                                 
5 A tiered approach was recommended early on by O’Riordan and Hey (1976, in Thérivel et al. 1992). 
Case studies of the tiered integration of SEA into decision frameworks are given in the chapters by 
Shuttleworth and Howell, Brooke, and Verheem in Partidário and Clark (2000).  Chapter 2 
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(using policy-derived approaches) and more specific impacts (using the EIA-based 
approach) to be addressed at the appropriate decision level (Sadler and Verheem 
1996). The Netherlands has taken this approach, and conducts a comprehensive 
‘strategic environmental impact assessment’ for plans and programmes, and a 
simpler ‘environmental test’ for draft legislation (Verheem and Tonk 2000). The 
conceptual value of a tiered framework is therefore its recognition of the 
interrelationships between decision levels (Thérivel et al. 1992).  
Adoption of the notion of tiering is not without its problems, however. As Bailey and 
Dixon point out, the hierarchical framework provided by tiering reinforces the 
rational-comprehensive nature of EIA-sourced SEA, reliant as it is on two 
assumptions: 
1.  That there is an identifiable relationship between some or all of policies, plans, 
programmes and projects in which a higher-level proposal leads to the 
development of lower-level proposals, and where the lower-level proposals are 
constrained by the higher ones; and 
2.  That environmental assessment of lower-level proposals need only consider those 
residual impacts not adequately dealt with during earlier assessments (Bailey and 
Dixon 1999). 
With respect to this second assumption, a reduced assessment effort at the project 
level is claimed as a benefit of SEA by a number of commentators (Ortolano and 
Shepherd 1995; Thérivel et al. 1992; Thérivel and Partidário 1996). It is also 
assumed by some that the interdependence between decision levels may reduce the 
need for SEA. Wood and Djeddour propose such a benefit, claiming that “if 
alternatives are adequately addressed in project EIA, and if all of the various 
significant impacts are adequately examined, then there is no need to carry out an 
SEA”—although it is admitted that this situation would seldom arise (Wood and Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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Djeddour 1990). Bailey and Dixon (1999) also recognise the dependence of policy 
on project-based assessment, contending that policy making can and does occur 
through an incremental learning process based on the experience of project 
assessments. Given the potential of this beneficial relationship, which is based on the 
view that EIA is in itself an important process and should be retained, it is argued 
that SEA does not necessarily reduce the need for EIA (Bailey and Dixon 1999; 
Clark 2000).
6 Moreover, based on Canadian experience, Sadler and Verheem (1996) 
conclude that the promised integration between different decision levels is not 
always easy to achieve. Given these kinds of problems, the dominant hierarchical 
interpretation of this framework for SEA would appear to be overly optimistic 
(Bailey and Dixon 1999).  
However, Bailey and Dixon (1999) do consent to the view that ‘tiering’ might be 
adopted as a way to address the identified need to differentiate between SEA of 
policies on one hand, and plans and programmes on the other. This need has been 
strongly conveyed by Partidário and Clark (2000), who argue that “SEA must be 
absolutely tailor-made to the kind of decision at stake, and the nature of the decision-
making process in place” (cited in Brown and Thérivel 2000: 186). In a two-tiered 
approach, plans and programmes would be subjected to systematic and 
comprehensive analysis based on the EIA-derived approach, and a new approach 
based on policy analysis would be adopted for policies (see also Clark 2000).  
                                                 
6 The ability of SEA reduce the need for EIA in a tiered framework is also questioned by Boothroyd 
(1995). The ultimate failure of the “trickle down” growth paradigm of free-market economics, which 
has not contributed to equitable outcomes, not to mention sustainability and quality of life goals 
(Boothroyd 1995), should prompt a more considered interrogation of this assumption. Chapter 2 
 
 
– 66 – 
II  Models of SEA:  Something Old … Something New? 
The development of these two divergent models of SEA will be discussed with a 
view to identifying their responses to the challenges faced by EIA, and to achieving 
the stated aims of SEA. Although my emphasis is on policy EA, as noted earlier, the 
persistence of recommendations for, and use of, an EIA-based model means that this 
approach deserves a considered examination. The following examination will 
proceed by outlining the proposed form or process, and the problems associated with, 
each model in turn. I shall adopt the broad framework used in Chapter 1 to guide this 
discussion, and will therefore identify issues associated with the achievement of 
SEA’s two broad aims: to integrate environmental considerations into decision 
making, and to democratise the decision-making process. I believe this latter 
emphasis on public participation is justified on two counts: because it is central to the 
recent definition of SEA, and because there has always been a widespread 
commitment to translating the philosophy and principles of EIA to higher decision 
levels.  
EIA-Based Model: The Legacy of Proceduralism 
Early and continuing efforts to define SEA are clearly influenced by the EIA 
inheritance. For Sadler and Verheem (1996), this approach has been adopted for the 
practical reason that past experience with EIA would provide lessons for the 
methodological development of SEA. However, emulation rather than learning might 
be a more appropriate way of understanding the influence of EIA. Where the EIA-
based approach is endorsed, there is a tendency to focus on the procedural grounding 
EIA provides for the assessment of higher-level proposals, rather than to explore 
methodological innovations (Kirkpatrick and Lee 1999). This has also meant that Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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“[a]t the core of SEA methodologies are the familiar tools and techniques of EIA” 
(Partidário 2000: 652). 
The focus on the procedural elements of the assessment process is evident in the 
following widely cited definition of SEA: 
SEA can be defined as the formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of 
evaluating the environmental impacts of a policy, plan, or programme and its 
alternatives, including the preparation of a written report on the findings of that 
evaluation, and using the findings in publicly accountable decision-making (Thérivel 
and Partidário 1996: 19-20). 
A systematic, comprehensive approach is also advocated by Bregha et al. (1990), and 
is evident in Sadler and Verheem’s proposal that all outcomes should be assessed in 
their account of SEA as:  
the assessment of all outcomes of policies being planned, proposed or already in 
place…. it can and should clarify the problematic which a policy addresses, review all 
options and potential outcomes (not just externalities) and ask whether current 
objectives and directions are the ‘right’ ones (Sadler and Verheem 1996: 39). 
Although a more recent SEA framework proposed by Thérivel and Brown 
specifically addresses the sustainability requirements of SEA, it still closely reflects 
the procedural elements of EIA (the elements included in these stages are 
summarised in square brackets):
7 
                                                 
7 Wood and Djeddour’s (1992) early SEA model also directly adopts EIA’s procedural steps. Very 
similar procedural steps are given by both Sadler and Verheem (1996) and Thérivel and Partidário 
(1996). The persistence of the staged approach to SEA at all levels of decision making is also an issue 
raised by Olivia Bina (2001), who identifies examples from plans through policies, including: an SEA 
of transport planning conducted in 1992, the approach taken to SEA and structural fund plans and 
programmes by the European Community in 1998, and the UK Department of Transport and the 
Regions’ approach to SEA in the context of climate change in 2000.  Chapter 2 
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1.  Set the context for PPP [policy, programme, plan] making and SEA [identify 
purpose, process constraints and participants; collect background data]. 
2.  Determine objectives/vision of the PPP [topics, targets and indicators]. 
3.  Identify constraints and issues of concern [with respect to the environment, 
regulations and standards, management practices, and sustainability]. 
4.  Identify and describe alternative means by which the PPP objectives can be 
achieved; evaluate and compare alternatives [including justification of selected]. 
5.  Implement PPP and monitor results (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 446). 
It is clear from these examples that the differences between EIA and SEA in terms of 
scope and purpose have not prompted a radical departure from the dominant 
procedural approach. An important consequence of this procedural inheritance, as 
Bailey and Dixon (1999) point out, is that it also inevitably involves an extension of 
the associated rational-comprehensive methodological framework to higher-level 
decisions. This linear, rational-comprehensive SEA model has been associated with a 
problem-led approach to planning, which follows a rigid sequence of activities 
oriented toward a final outcome (Partidário 1999). Participants in an international 
workshop on policy EA reported widespread support for this approach, concluding 
that the assessment of policy “must be promoted as a problem solving, not problem 
raising, approach” (Sadler and Verheem 1996: 39).
8  
The procedural approach to SEA is reinforced by the widespread attention to 
techniques, which it is claimed “do exist and are useable in their present form” 
(Thérivel and Partidário 1996).
9 Wood and Djeddour appear to place unquestioning 
                                                 
8 This was a two-day workshop preceding the IAIA’s international conference in 1993. The discussion 
was based on and extended the report of an expert workshop on “Concepts and Principles for Policy 
IA” held in conjunction with the IAIA conference of 1992. 
9 At the same time, however, it is recognised that SEA methods and procedures “may be somewhat 
different” to those required for the assessment of projects (Wood and Djeddour 1992: 10; see also de 
Boer and Sadler 1996; Thérivel and Brown 1999; Thérivel and Partidário 1996). Sadler and Verheem 
(1996) believe that, although some modification may be required, the methods and techniques already 
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faith in the EIA-based approach, stating that “there is no fundamental 
methodological reason why SEA should not be introduced in any country provided 
there is the freedom to carry out the assessment…. utilising a form of SEA basically 
similar in its basic nature to that employed for projects” (Wood and Djeddour 1992: 
10-11). 
Challenges: Integrating Environmental Considerations 
The impediments associated with adopting the EIA-based approach at higher levels 
of decision-making have not gone unnoticed however. In particular, the uncertainties 
associated with the broader scale and scope of higher-level proposals have been a 
central focus. The response to uncertainty, which is attributed to the limited data for 
impact forecasting, has been to place considerable emphasis on the information 
requirements of various SEA methods (Sadler and Verheem 1996).  
The increased demand for data is also associated with achieving the desired goal of 
implementing sustainability. In response, Thérivel et al. (1992) advocate the concept 
of carrying capacity as the core means to operationalise sustainability (see also von 
Seht 1999). Problems with this approach are recognised, however, and relate to the 
complex and unpredictable nature of ecosystems, deficient information availability, 
and the inherent reliance on value judgments (Thérivel et al. 1992). Also recognised 
by Thérivel et al. (1992) is a need for a precautionary approach, which is explicitly 
associated with sustainability, and which is demanded when action must be taken in 
the absence of conclusive scientific evidence. On this view, impact monitoring and 
                                                                                                                                          
available in EIA, policy analysis and planning are all that is needed for impact identification and 
assessment in SEA. An Australian study also concluded that while SEA is currently inhibited by a 
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management remain definitive of SEA. However, this approach also poses problems 
because monitoring and auditing are not normally mandatory and are rarely 
undertaken (Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel and Partidário 1996). These 
difficulties point to systemic problems with the traditional emphasis on a data-
intensive approach to SEA. 
Challenges: Public Participation 
Several problems have also been identified with respect to defining the role of the 
public at higher decision levels, which are associated with the breadth and 
complexity of issues, the large areas involved, and the fact that there is no specific 
decision point (Thérivel et al. 1992). These concerns appear to be closely related to 
the public’s ability to deal with the information-based deficiencies associated with 
the more general issue of analytical complexity at higher levels of decision making. 
Ensuring that participants are representative, and arranging meetings between people 
in distant locations, are also noted as difficulties (Wood 1988). Again, in response to 
these issues, the recommendation is for further development of public participation 
and communication techniques.  
The provisions for public participation in this model parallel those in EIA—scoping 
and report review—although few suggest SEA procedures should be as 
comprehensive in their provisions (Boothroyd 1995). Public participation at the 
document review stage is championed by Wood and Djeddour (1992) as the key 
element of SEA (see also Lee and Walsh 1992). Some tentative scope for additional 
public influence is also provided for by these authors, who claim that ‘where 
                                                                                                                                          
lack of data, it is “able to be initiated now using tools already developed or in the process of 
development” (Court et al. 1996: 57). Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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feasible’ public views may be sought on the formulation and objectives of the action. 
This increased emphasis on the need for public participation in the scoping phase of 
SEA follows similar trends noted by Wood (1999) in EIA. Provisions for public 
participation in the formulation of alternatives, which is widely proclaimed to be at 
the heart of EA, are conspicuously absent. 
Despite the promise of SEA in dealing with the problems faced at the project level, 
then, the legacy of EIA’s procedural approach has meant that many issues remain 
unresolved. Indeed, the problems associated with impact prediction and monitoring, 
attributed to information deficiencies, are exacerbated at higher levels of decision 
making when a focus on quantitative analysis is maintained. Whilst limited attention 
is given to issues of public participation by these SEA professionals, the problems 
associated with the reactive role of the public identified in Chapter 1 are likely to 
remain.  
Policy-Derived Model: Something New? 
It is increasingly recognised that EIA-based methodologies are not appropriate at the 
policy level, and that the current overwhelming attention to this comprehensive 
model is inhibiting the development of sound approaches to SEA (Thérivel and 
Partidário 1996). As Thérivel explains, “… policies are different, they can change 
rapidly, it is often unclear how they will be implemented, and they may be drawn up 
in a very short timescale” (Thérivel 1997, cited in Bailey and Dixon 1999). Given 
these characteristics, Sadler has declared that understanding of how EA might apply 
to policy is “still in its infancy and has yet to be clearly defined” (Sadler 1996: 39). 
My discussion of the policy-derived model in this section will be confined initially to Chapter 2 
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earlier work on the subject, before turning to recent approaches that more clearly 
point toward a ‘new’ framework for policy EA. 
The overriding purpose of the policy-derived approach has been to investigate the 
best way to integrate environmental considerations into policy processes currently 
dominated by economic imperatives.
10 Governmental emphasis on economic growth, 
and the distinct lack of emphasis on the strategic environmental implications of 
economic growth, has been identified by Sadler and Verheem (1996) as an important 
institutional barrier to the adoption of SEA.  
The particular challenges thrown up at the policy level are exacerbated by the 
otherwise effective ‘learning-by-doing’ philosophy that has dominated EIA, because 
the majority of case studies have extended the EIA-based model to plans and 
programmes, whilst there has been limited case studies at the policy level.
11 Thus 
constrained, some time elapsed before enough case studies at the policy level had 
been reported for commentators to venture the conclusion that policy EA is feasible 
(Thérivel 1997;  Bailey and Dixon 1999).  
The move away from a comprehensive methodology is evident in Thérivel’s 
definition of policy EA as “an appraisal of the environmental impacts of a policy 
                                                 
10 Although the lack of attention to environmental consequences of policy decisions is clearly not new, 
given that the EA was devised to counter this situation, a more narrowly economic rationality has 
dominated governmental policy since the early 1980s, when economic restructuring associated with 
attention to the globalising economy took a firm hold on the priorities of nation states.  
11 Up until 1993 SEAs had only been carried out for plans and programmes (Thérivel 1993); in 1996 a 
collection of SEA case studies included 2 for policies (Thérivel and Partidário 1996); by 1997, 20 
additional case studies detail the application of SEA to policies (Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel 
1997). Recently, case studies at the policy level are included in Petts (1999) and Clark and Partidário 
(2000). Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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which is used in decision-making” (Thérivel 1997, cited in Bailey and Dixon 1999). 
The simplicity of this definition is complemented by a “simple and quick” approach 
to assessment—an approach endorsed by others (Bailey and Dixon 1999; Sadler and 
Verheem 1996). The Netherlands has adopted this informal approach with its 
‘environmental test’ for draft legislation. Dubbed the ‘e-test’, and required for all 
policy proposals which must meet the approval of the Council of Ministers, this 
assessment process is required to be practical and simple, with as few procedures as 
possible (deVries 2000). In practice, the e-test requires an analysis of the policy’s 
likely effects on the use of resources, energy use and mobility, waste and emissions, 
and land use.
12 This attention to a limited number of key macro issues in policy EA 
has been endorsed by Clark (2000), who adds human health and safety to his list.  
A somewhat less common development also evident in the SEA literature, perhaps to 
compensate for the dearth of empirical evidence, is an interest in examining how the 
theory and practice of policy analysis might contribute to an understanding of policy 
EA. Thérivel et al. (1992) address some of the problems of this ‘policy-derived’ 
approach by looking to problems associated with policy analysis more generally.
13 A 
key issue is the complexity of dealing with the dynamics of a ‘web of decisions’ 
evolving over time, rather than a single decision point. Thus, policy making is 
characterised by a redefinition of issues throughout the process, and the potential for 
a series of actions (not always formally sanctioned by a decision) to constitute 
policy. For SEA, the dynamic nature of system boundaries increases the analytical 
                                                 
12 Canada and Denmark have also adopted this informal, flexible approach to EA at the policy level. 
13 Thérivel et al. (1992) draw upon the policy analysis text by Ham and Hill (1984).  Chapter 2 
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complexity associated with the large number of subsequent decisions and 
developments that flow from policy decisions (Glasson 1995; Thérivel et al. 1992).  
Challenges: Integrating Environmental Considerations 
Whilst this complexity may be partially offset by the reduced requirement for detail 
and accuracy at the strategic level, and the absence of the time constraints that afflict 
EIA (Glasson 1995), problems remain. Importantly, the dominant hierarchical SEA 
framework disguises the complexity and non-linearity of the policy process. Lack of 
information about existing and future environmental conditions, as well as future 
development proposals, is also considered to be a challenge because impact 
predictions rely on precise information (Thérivel et al. 1992). Related to this is the 
uncertainty associated with defining system boundaries; dealing with large numbers 
of alternatives; and the limitations of current techniques (Thérivel and Partidário 
1996). Thus, the need for different techniques, such as compatibility matrices, 
exclusion zoning, and life-cycle analysis is called for (Thérivel and Partidário 1996).  
In response to these problems, the attention of SEA professionals has turned to the 
integration of SEA into existing policy processes (cf. Nitz and Brown 2000; 
Partidário 2000). In this approach, which Brown and Thérivel describe in terms of 
the need to “graft” SEA to the policy process, “SEA practitioners need to understand 
the dynamics, tools, and protocols of [the policy] process, and once having 
understood them, work to integrate the objectives of SEA with these procedures” 
(Brown and Thérivel 2000: 186) 
Peter Boothroyd (1995) explored the implications of the ‘traditional’ policy process 
for SEA in some depth, which he characterises in terms of its informal and heuristic 
qualities. Its informal nature has the benefits of emphasising “flexibility over rules, Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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trust over accountability, education over sanction” (Boothroyd 1995). 
Complementing this informality is a heuristic form of analysis, characterised as a 
process which is informed by science and metaphor, reflection and moral judgment, 
and which is oriented to collaborative intersubjectivity.  
The dominance of this heuristic process in policy-making practice indicates that the 
benefits of a deliberative and interactive approach to policy making are well accepted 
by policy makers and bureaucrats alike. However, the informality of the process 
means that it admits limited public involvement, so that these benefits are reserved 
for the deliberations of political elites behind closed doors. Without any procedural 
requirements, the proponent agency may retain total control of both the process and 
content of SEA. Further to the emphasis on economic efficiency over other public 
purposes, then, Boothroyd (1995) points out that prevailing informal, in-house 
processes can make no contribution to social learning.  
An early warning about uncritically adapting to prevailing policy processes was 
given by Caldwell (1982), and has been reiterated by James Boggs: 
Congress designed NEPA to help reform institutional realities with deeply embedded 
[development-oriented] values and world views. Paradoxically, these same entrenched 
views and perspectives often govern how agencies implement NEPA (Boggs 1993: 
29). 
More recently, Flynn et al. (1999) warn that “by failing to be sufficiently cognizant 
of the political imperatives that marginalize the environment and seeking to impose 
an external and spurious technical rationality on the process, SEA may itself become 
discredited” (cited in Bina 2000: 8).  Chapter 2 
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The implications of these cautions for policy EA are evident from the UK experience 
with policy appraisal, which uses cost-benefit analysis to inform decisions. This 
economic valuation technique has been criticised in terms of the reduced 
consideration it lends to environmental issues (Lee and Walsh 1992; Thérivel et al. 
1992). Being criteria which reduce all values—including environmental values—to 
economic currency, and which place the burden of proof on ‘weaker’ values and 
interests, the use of economic valuation techniques denies SEA its integrative and 
democratising potential. Questions of efficiency are increasingly prioritised in EIA, 
at least in part in response to proponents’ criticisms of the cost and time delays noted 
in Chapter 1.
14 These issues indicate that SEA scholars should be more discerning 
when appraising existing methods in EIA and policy analysis for their application to 
SEA, particularly given the opportunities provided by the incipient stage of SEA’s 
development. I will discuss the problems with the proposal to adapt SEA to existing 
policy processes in more detail in Section IV. 
Wither the Public? 
In principle, public involvement is widely considered to be integral to SEA (Sadler 
and Verheem 1996). Because it is the proponent who prepares the SEA, there is a 
need for procedural “checks and balances to ensure the process is properly applied 
and to maintain public confidence in its integrity” (Sadler and Verheem 1996: 80). 
Public involvement is considered to be the best countervail against political, 
bureaucratic and technocratic distortion; it is the “litmus test of the utility and 
effectiveness of SEA” (Sadler 1994, cited in Boothroyd 1995).  
                                                 
14 The recent IAIA (2002) definition of SEA cited earlier suggests that SEA “leads to a more cost- and 
time-effective EA at the project level.” Of the 14 basic principles for EIA, “cost-effective” and 
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Problems identified with public participation at the policy level are said to stem from 
the informality of in-house policy processes, which by definition devote little 
attention to devising procedural checks and balances for public accountability. It is 
assumed such procedures would pre-empt legitimate power; would not map well 
with the complex reality of policy making, where sources of initiative and 
assessment are diffuse and continuous; and would compromise the presumed need 
for confidentiality (Boothroyd 1995, see also Bregha et al. 1990; Sadler and 
Verheem 1996; Thérivel et al. 1992). As they look to this policy-derived model, SEA 
scholars and practitioners tend to provide no role for the public, even as they endorse 
public participation in principle.  
I submit that this attitude is based upon the notion that public participation in SEA, 
as much as in EIA, can only be endorsed in terms of the instrumental benefits it 
provides to the proponent. On this view, it is ‘stakeholders’ rather than the public 
who must be consulted, because it is these people who pose a threat to the smooth 
transition from proposal to implementation. In particular, environmental NGOs are 
increasingly being recognised as stakeholders because of the challenge they pose to 
the development-oriented values that have traditionally underpinned government 
policy. A driving force behind the invention of EA was of course the need to change 
this orientation—a task not achieved by existing regulatory frameworks, the 
prevalence of which has meant that “the root causes of the dangers [of 
industrialisation to environmental quality] are not addressed; to do so would imply 
radical changes in the economy” (Caldwell 1989). Thus, Thérivel and Brown (1999) 
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identify “stakeholder participation … as a theme inherent to all stages of SEA and 
which provides vital input to each stage” (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 449).  
As these authors point out, public review of the SEA document “is a wonderful way 
of paying lip service to the need for consultation but has virtually no effect on the 
[policy, plan or programme] and thus does not contribute to effective SEA” (Thérivel 
and Brown 1999: 449). These authors go on to advocate the use of more innovative 
participatory techniques—such as community advisory committees, planning cells, 
focus groups, and round tables—at the scoping stage to ensure that all significant 
topics are considered. This stage, consisting of the identification of objectives, and of 
the topics, targets and indicators to guide SEA, is “arguably the most important stage 
in SEA. It sets the framework for all the subsequent stages of SEA, and also sets the 
tone regarding consultation and cross-cutting perspectives” (Thérivel and Brown 
1999: 450). Importantly, there is a recognised need for public agreement on the 
relevance and meaning of indicators, which are later used to identify and measure 
baseline environmental conditions, predict impacts, compare alternatives and 
monitor implementation. However, despite the strength of this commitment, Thérivel 
and Brown (1999) suggest that this stage of the process can be carried out perhaps 
involving the public directly (as differentiated from the inclusion of stakeholders in 
the process). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how public agreement on the relevance 
and meaning of indicators is to be ascertained without public participation.  
The inclusion of citizen values and knowledges throughout the process, including 
problem framing and the identification of policy alternatives, is recommended by 
Boothroyd (1995), who emphasises empowering the least powerful publics. He 
therefore explicitly recognises that in order to generate information that might be Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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useful in defining the relationship between policies and societal goals, the input of 
citizens is essential. Thus, Boothroyd appears to provide a resoundingly more 
meaningful role for the public in the ongoing process of policy making and 
assessment than has been suggested in the SEA literature to date. However, at the 
end of the day the democratic potential of Boothroyd’s model is reduced to the 
“information support needed for good decision making in a complex society” 
(Boothroyd 1995, emphasis added). Boothroyd’s resolve with respect to the 
contribution of citizens’ values and knowledges, perhaps because of his emphasis on 
public participation as a procedural safeguard, seems to have been relinquished to 
the rather less meaningful process of information-exchange.  
There is a widely held belief amongst EA professionals that the public needs a 
concrete proposal to react to, rather than a less-than-developed policy concept (Clark 
2000). The difficulties associated with public participation at the policy level have 
therefore been articulated in terms of the problem of gaining the interest of the public 
when the issues are necessarily abstract (Bailey and Dixon 1999; Elling 1996; 
Partidário 1999a; Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel 1997).  
However, the necessarily abstract nature of policy issues is countered by Ray Clark 
with his claim that: 
even at the macro (ie. energy source) level, it is possible to assess which alternative 
strategy has more land occupation, which results in more habitat loss, whether one 
strategy results in more emissions of air pollutants, whether one approach consumes 
more energy, and whether one path may have more acceptable risks (Clark 2000). 
Clark goes on to point out that consultations amongst high-level policy makers do 
“provide shape and foreclose options. Few of these strategic decisions get revisited” Chapter 2 
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(Clark 2000). If politicians (i.e. elected citizens) manage to discuss policy issues, it is 
surely difficult to justify the assumption that other citizens would be unable to 
contribute to the discussion. It is also arguable that gaining public interest would 
pose much of a problem given the widespread and vocal public concern about 
broader policy issues, from biotechnology to forest and energy policy. Thus, one 
does not have to look far to conclude that it is not only local-level decisions which 
arouse concern in communities. Moreover, the formulation of strategic priorities can 
transfer conflict to communities without any site having been chosen (Clark 2000). 
This is a strong argument for the creation of democratic processes at the policy level, 
and one that is supported by the proclaimed benefits of SEA: the open discussion of 
the future it enables, together with the fact that there is no irreversible commitment 
of resources at the strategic decision level (Clark 2000). 
The professed need to adapt SEA to existing policy processes would ultimately mean 
that SEA would be adapting to the prevailing economic valuation processes (such as 
cost-benefit analysis) which already informing governmental policy-making 
processes. Moreover, if the SEA process is implemented without the direct input of 
the public, it seems likely that this approach would reinforce the inability of SEA to 
challenge the form of development. Therefore, grafting SEA onto existing policy 
processes would not enable SEA to fulfil its original purpose, which is to transform 
the policy process.  
III  Policy EA: The Need for a New Framework 
A promotional tone clearly permeates much of the SEA literature to date. Scholars 
have striven to articulate SEA’s objectives, role, benefits, and practical Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 
 
– 81 – 
achievements.
15 Prompted by evidence that planners and policy analysts already 
incorporate environmental considerations in their work (Boothroyd 1995; Bailey and 
Dixon 1999; Partidário 1999), which would imply that a separate SEA process is not 
required, Partidário (2000) has called upon scholars and practitioners to emphasise 
the ways in which SEA “adds value” to existing activities. In support of this strategy, 
Eggenberger and Partidário argue that it remains to be demonstrated that existing 
planning and policy-making traditions are already “carrying out systematic 
identification and integrated assessment of alternatives, in participatory contexts, in a 
way that is informative, and accountable” (2000: 202-3). The promise of SEA must 
ultimately be brought home to those making the decisions: “politicians will only 
accept SEA if it enables them to demonstrate to their voters the soundness and 
democratic character of their decisions, and thus increase their credibility” 
(Partidário 1999: 70).  
Despite this reference to the ‘soundness and democratic character’ of policy 
decisions, however, the main source of concern, and the spur to conceptual 
innovation in SEA, have not been related to science or democracy, but to the need to 
understand the policy context. The ‘complexity’ of policy processes (something of a 
blanket term used to refer to both the analytical and conceptual challenges for policy 
EA) is considered to constitute a significant obstacle for an instrument that has been 
tailored to informing decisions about recognisable projects in specific times and 
places. Many of the resources of EIA are not relevant to policies. Policies are 
                                                 
15 This is evident in Wood and Djeddour (1992) and Fischer (1999). A recent collection of essays and 
case studies on SEA openly declares that its intention is to convince sceptical decision makers of its 
value (Partidário and Clark 2000). Chapter 2 
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“constantly changing, largely unformulated and extremely vulnerable to an intricate 
pattern of related political decisions” (Partidário 1999: 64).  
Attention to EA at the policy level thus begins from a universal acceptance that a 
different approach is required. Maria Partidário makes this point succinctly when she 
says “[i]t is important to stress … that the need for a tool with the characteristics of 
SEA arose precisely because a different tool from project EIA was needed” 
(Partidário 1999: 71).
16 Ray Clark concurs: “SEA is a different kind of analysis. 
Recognising this difference may be a crucial condition for understanding SEA and to 
allow process and practice improvement” (Clark 2000). It follows that elaborating 
exactly what these differences might be, and the issues and challenges they raise, has 
become a dominant focus of professional effort.  
The range of such issues is neatly encapsulated by Partidário (1999), who contends 
that the SEA process must be simpler, less technocratic, less factual and information-
dependent, more proactive and responsive to uncertainty contexts, and more flexible 
and dynamic in its approach. “Most importantly, SEA must be more interactive and 
integrated into the decision-making process …” (Partidário 1999: 72).
17 The 
emphasis on flexibility and interaction here reveals a distinct break with the earlier 
focus on SEA procedures. Whilst the systematic character of the process remains 
                                                 
16 Other scholars who have echoed this sentiment include Bailey and Dixon (1999), von Seht (1999), 
Thérivel (1997), Nitz and Brown (2000), and Bina (2000). 
17 Partidário’s (1999) emphasis on ‘process’ indicates that use of the word “tool” to describe SEA, still 
common in the literature, is more habitual than considered (see also Thissen 2000). Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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important, continuity of process is now underscored, so that SEA has recently been 
defined as:
18 
a systematic, on-going process for evaluating, at the earliest appropriate stage of 
publicly accountable decision-making, the environmental quality, and consequences, 
of alternative visions and development intentions incorporated in policy, planning, or 
programme initiatives, ensuring full integration of relevant biophysical, economic, 
social and political considerations (Partidário 1999: 64, emphasis added). 
This definition raises a number of concepts which are new to the SEA literature: 
visions, intentions, and initiatives rather than ‘proposals’; environmental quality and 
consequences rather than ‘impacts’. Olivia Bina (2000) has argued that these kinds of 
changes in ‘terminology’, which have silently infiltrated the language of SEA over 
the past decade or so, are an important indicator that SEA scholars and practitioners 
are actively embracing the insights of other disciplines and perspectives.
19 These new 
directions are most clearly a response to the challenges for EA raised by the policy 
context. 
IV The  Challenges 
From the discussion so far, a number of key issues have been raised which constitute 
challenges for policy EA. These may be usefully encompassed by three broad 
themes, which parallel the framework adopted to this point:   
                                                 
18 Attention to process is reinforced by Brown and Thérivel, who declare that “[w]e cannot 
overemphasise this principle of SEA as process, not as report” (Brown and Thérivel 2000: 187). 
19 In tracing these changes, Bina (2000) emphasises that the general lack of reflection on the 
development of concepts and issues in the SEA literature makes it difficult to explain these changes. 
This point about the lack of critical reflection is one that can be more broadly applied, and which has 
made it difficult to understand the intent of scholars as they elaborate on their intentions for SEA – a 
point I make in note 5. Greater critical reflection in the peer-reviewed literature is an approach I would 
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•  the policy context (form), 
•  uncertainty and judgment (science),  
•  public participation and community values (democracy). 
I will discuss these issues and the responses to them as they have been framed by 
SEA scholars, before concluding this chapter with a call to revisit the rich heritage of 
EA. I shall suggest that these origins hold more radical implications for a ‘new’ 
conceptual framework for SEA than has yet been recognised.  
The Policy Context 
As discussed in Section II, the need to integrate SEA with existing policy processes 
is a preoccupation of its scholars. This approach is motivated by the belief that the 
dominant rational-comprehensive methodology is inappropriate for use at the policy 
level. It is a view substantiated by interviews of senior public servants in Australia by 
Bailey and Renton (1997), who report a “ distinct rejection by government agencies 
of EIA of policies … they are willing to integrate environmental concerns into their 
policy formulation procedures, but not by means of a simple extension of EIA to the 
level of policy” (cited in Brown and Thérivel 2000: 186).  
Prompted by the need to ‘graft’ SEA onto existing policy processes, a number of 
scholars have looked to policy theory and analysis in order to understand how SEA 
might contribute to the policy process. A central conclusion of these investigations is 
that “[m]any SEAs as currently practiced fall squarely in the tradition of rationalist 
decision making, with technocratic decision making and limited opportunities for 
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public involvement” (Thérivel and Partidário 2000). The parallels of SEA with this 
‘traditional’ model of policy analysis are noted by Thissen (2000) to include: 
objective support to decision makers, an emphasis on collecting, analysing and 
communicating policy-relevant information, and an orientation to informing ‘the 
decision’. Thissen concludes that “most SEA studies and their evaluations seem to fit 
best with the so-called traditional policy analysis paradigm”, which assumes science-
based knowledge will be instrumental in improving decision making (Thissen 2000). 
The key difference is the explicit environmental focus of SEA, whereas policy 
analysis claims to be neutral.  
In the spirit of concerns to flexibly adapt to existing policy processes, Kørnøv and 
Thissen ultimately recommend that practitioners adopt this latter, neutral role in the 
policy process:  
[there is a] need for SEA to keep fundamentally apart two missions that tend to get 
mixed up in present-day discussions: its advocative mission as an instrument to 
enhance the preservation of the natural environment, and the ambition to support 
balanced decision-making which requires a neutral position towards the stakes in the 
process (Kørnøv and Thissen 2000: 199). 
But this is to ignore Petts’ insight that “EIA can never be a neutral process, it is a 
‘civic’ science … where perceptions and values and social and economic priorities 
determine outcomes as much as the data and methods of impact prediction” (Petts 
1999a: 6). Moreover, as Caldwell pointed out some time ago, “merely to argue for 
balance evades the issue, because balance is the issue over which adversaries on 
environmental policies differ” (Caldwell 1982).  
Partidário’s (1999) definition cited above explicitly underscores both the early and 
the ongoing contribution of the SEA process, which complements the incremental Chapter 2 
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nature of policy making. In terms of early influence, it has been argued that “[t]he 
real value of SEA is as a creative tool in the design cycle of the formulation and 
reformulation of [policies]” (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 447). The merit of this 
approach is buttressed by Bailey and Renton’s report that “the majority of 
responding agencies view policy formulation as the most appropriate point in the 
decision-making process for the consideration of environmental effects” (1997, cited 
in Brown and Thérivel 2000: 187). This emphasis on early involvement has also led 
to the view that SEA should focus on improving the quality of the final decision 
(Partidário 2000).  
Conversely, Nitz and Brown (2000) have argued that recognising policy making as 
an iterative, cyclical process where policies are re-evaluated in the light of new 
information means that policy EA would need to respond accordingly, and should be 
conceived of as a learning process. These authors appropriate the term ‘adaptive 
environmental assessment’ for this purpose (see also Brown and Thérivel 2000). 
Bailey and Dixon (1999) also recognise that it is partly through the processes of 
implementation that a policy is made, and go on to suggest that since implementation 
is undertaken at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, the future development of policy 
EA will need to influence these street-level bureaucrats. 
The overall aspiration to adapt to existing policy making processes appears to be 
closely related to the ‘political’ challenge noted earlier (cf. Clark 2000; Glasson 
1995; Sadler and Verheem 1996). It is emphasised throughout the literature that the 
relevance of SEA is “derived from higher-level objectives” (Partidário 2000). For 
Boothroyd, this means policy EA is  Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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… the process by which fundamental policy options are continuously identified and 
assessed in terms of all highest-level societal goals … equity, quality of life and 
sustainable development, which are highlighted but still marginalised in [the EIA-
based model], become defining goals equal to economic efficiency and growth 
(Boothroyd 1995: 105). 
Of course, it is politicians who claim a monopoly on these big questions. Assumed is 
the lack of political will to expose policies while they are only half-baked, resistance 
from institutions that consider environmental issues an intrusion into their domain, 
the difficulties associated with pre-empting legitimate power, and the potential of 
policy EA to compromise the presumed need for confidentiality (Boothroyd 1995, 
see also Bregha et al. 1990; Sadler and Verheem 1996; Thérivel et al. 1992).  
The lack of attention to public participation seems to be a direct result of this 
political challenge. As Langdon Winner elaborates, this monopoly on the political by 
politicians is underpinned by deep-seated commitments of belief and attitude which 
pose strong barriers to thinking about the public dimensions of technological change:  
Technological change, defined as ‘progress’, is seen as an ineluctable process in 
modern history … To encourage progress is to encourage private inventors, 
entrepreneurs, to work unimpeded by state interference. As later theorists in the liberal 
tradition modify this understanding, they notice ‘market externalities’ that cause stress 
in the social system or environment. This does not alter the fundamental attitude 
toward economic and technical choices. The burden of proof rests on those who would 
interfere with the beneficial workings of the market and processes of technological 
development (Winner 1992: 55). 
And so it is in EA, where several scholars have recognised that the public must 
assume the burden of proof and provide grounds for objection to development 
proposals when ‘externalities’ are noticed. For one, Serge Taylor determines that 
“there has been no shifting of the burden of proof. When they allege inadequate 
analysis by the agency, environmentalists must still make their case by the Chapter 2 
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preponderance of evidence …” (Taylor 1984: 85). Similarly, James Boggs points out 
that EA must operate within government agencies which have inherited 
developmentalist philosophies that prioritise exploitation, and thus find “little ground 
indeed for supporting public values” (Boggs 1993: 30). In effect, says Winner, 
“[t]here is no moral community or public space in which technological issues are 
topics for deliberation, debate, and shared action” (Winner 1993: 56). 
Uncertainty and Judgment 
The move beyond the ad hoc nature of project-based EIA has lent issues of 
technological change a new importance, such that the management of change and 
uncertainty are identified as key challenges for SEA (Eggenberger and Partidário 
2000). The elevated uncertainty at the policy level has been associated with 
outcomes (Partidário 2000), which has prompted attention to qualitative methods, 
and to proposals for an adaptive approach as the best insurance against uncertainty.  
Qualitative approaches have been specifically recommended to cope with uncertainty 
and the lack of quantitative data. A more accepted alternative to carrying capacity, 
according to Thérivel and Brown (1999: 450), is the a process of identifying a 
“vision” for the future. In setting parameters for future development, these authors 
claim that this approach has the same ultimate effect as a statement of carrying 
capacity, but is more publicly acceptable and less scientifically challengeable. Clark 
(2000) also emphasises that the uncertainty associated with a lack of data is not 
relevant at the policy level; rather, this kind of data is required at lower levels of 
assessment. Instead, tools such as scenario development and risk assessment are 
recommended to enable the development of environmentally sustainable directions, Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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or pathways. Bailey and Dixon (1999) reiterate this commitment to scenarios as 
having the greatest potential to address the uncertainties of policy EA. 
Given the problem of uncertainty, it is increasingly recognised that evaluating the 
significance of future impacts is based on expert judgment: “Impact evaluation is 
normally done through ‘expert judgment’ as an intrinsic part of the political, 
decision-making process” (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 461). For Partidário, the 
practice of SEA “becomes essentially intuitive, and less factual or empirical” 
(Partidário 1999: 64). In order to ensure that the reliance on expertise does not 
counter the need for values, equity, and public opinions in the process, Thérivel and 
Partidário (1996) suggest that the assumptions and values inherent in impact 
evaluations be made explicit. This emphasis on judgment recalls a key challenge 
outlined by Judith Petts, who suggests that “[p]erhaps the greatest political as well as 
practical confusion has arisen over whether EIA is merely a tool to aid decisions or is 
a  process of  making decisions” (Petts 1999b: 5, emphasis added). The latter 
conception is endorsed by Thérivel and Brown (1999), who suggest that SEA should 
consist in an open-minded reappraisal of the policy and a willingness to change, 
rather than a technique which emphasises rigor, independence, reduction of 
uncertainty, and the preparation of a report. On this view, EA becomes primarily a 
process of discussion and education.  
If EA is to become a truly adaptive process, as many scholars would hope, it must 
direct its attention to the post-development as well as the pre-decision process 
(Bailey 1997; Petts 1999b). Boothroyd (1995) recommends caution, however. 
Although adaptive management confronts science’s inability to provide accurate 
predictions, it is not sufficient because decisions must still be made under conditions Chapter 2 
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of uncertainty—a point which suggests the need to adopt the precautionary principle 
with more conviction. In this, the early advice provided by Baber deserves 
consideration: “how is this analytic humility to be enforced if not by the constant 
oversight of legislatures? The only alternative would seem to be direct and effective 
citizen participation” (Baber 1988: 175).  
Public Participation and Community Values 
Practice has shown that an effective SEA is not only about science, but also about values 
(Partidário 2000: 659).  
Given that the executive arm of government often regards policy as its exclusive 
domain, Bailey and Dixon contend that “more needs to be done to understand how 
public involvement can be enhanced without engendering bureaucratic and political 
resistance” (Bailey and Dixon 1999). Commitments to public participation in policy 
EA are at best changeable.
20 Although Partidário (1999) defines SEA as an 
interactive process, no specific mention is made of direct public participation. 
Rather, SEA is part of a “publicly accountable decision-making,” which implies that 
public accountability is an assumed feature of the policy process into which SEA 
must integrate.  
For Partidário (2000), communication is important to reduce the potential for 
conflict. The aim is “to ensure that all partners in the SEA process are adequately 
involved and their perspectives considered”, a condition she presents for the 
achievement of sustainability in SEA—although it does come in last in her list of 
                                                 
20 As with many other incipient developments described in the recent SEA literature, references to 
communication and community values are not elaborated in sufficient detail to adequately judge their 
intended implications. Thus, my interpretations of the work of these authors is often tentative, due to 
the often unsubstantiated nature of their claims. Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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such conditions (Partidário 1999: 68). The reference to ‘partners’ again implies a 
stakeholder approach to participation. This somewhat oblique commitment to the 
participatory process is made concrete, I would suggest, in the assertion that “in the 
end, SEA should be about the values of communities and how to incorporate their 
concerns” (Partidário 1999: 71):  
Practice has shown that an effective SEA is not only about science, but also about 
values. Despite any sort of technical in-depth analysis that may be carried out, often it 
is the capacity to discuss openly the underlying objectives, options, and latent conflicts 
surrounding a decision that determines the success of an SEA. Therefore, in assessing 
the impacts of policies, plans, and programs, sufficient attention should be given to the 
values of the affected communities and to the communication mechanisms to be used, 
and whether they are available or need to be put in place (Partidário 2000: 659).  
When members of the public are denied a part in the interactive and open discussion 
of the future that constitutes SEA, its democratising potential remains unfulfilled. As 
noted earlier, difficulties in motivating public attention and participation have been 
blamed on the abstract nature of the issues and processes at the policy level. But this 
is to dismiss the issue too quickly. I would agree with Partidário that “this attention 
may be generated by tying public participation to issues that are meaningful to the 
public and that ultimately be affected by projects influenced or flowing from the 
policy” (Partidário 1999: 71).  
V Rich  Inheritance, Radical Potential 
In the midst of recent enthusiasm for SEA, it is worth remembering that the concept 
underlying EA of strategic proposals is not new at all, even though the theory and 
practice of EA have sustained a project-based focus. As originally proposed in 
NEPA, and subsequently institutionalised in countries other than the USA, the scope Chapter 2 
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of EA included (or at least did not rule out) the assessment of policies, plans and 
programmes (cf. Sadler and Verheem 1996; Bailey and Dixon 1999). An early 
evaluation of the largely technical and project-based nature of EA led Caldwell to re-
state the need for a policy focus:  
An unsubstantiated faith in solving society’s problems through economic growth 
continues to obstruct consideration of the basic causes of those problems and of 
alternative ways to cope with them. Thus, the most significant development of EIA in 
the future could be to strengthen and enlarge its role in the policy-making process 
(Caldwell 1989). 
The challenges posed by this policy context have prompted the use of a number of 
key concepts in SEA which, although innovative in the wake of the early attention to 
project-based models and techniques, are not new to EA per se, and may be traced 
back to Caldwell’s original aspirations. Specifically, with respect to ‘environmental 
quality’, we might recall the ultimate intended purpose of EA: “the protection and 
improvement of the environmental quality of life” (Caldwell 1989: 9). And with 
respect to ‘visions’ and a less information-dependent approach, we might recall 
Caldwell’s belief that “[p]roblem-solving is not a substitute for a consideration of 
preferred futures or for the old-fashioned quality called ‘wisdom’” (1988: 81).  
My point in calling attention to the early teachings of Lynton Caldwell is not only to 
recall the farsighted nature of his thinking, although that is clearly true and worthy of 
reminder. My point is also to emphasise that much of this rich heritage, which has 
been largely disregarded over past decades in favour of the quest to improve the 
techniques of impact prediction and analysis, has yet to be fully appreciated for its 
relevance to the task of developing a conceptual framework for SEA.  Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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The emphasis on “the soundness and democratic character” of policy decisions in the 
earlier statement by Partidário points to the roots of EA. The spirit of this statement 
is echoed in the IAIA (2002) definition cited earlier, which states that SEA should 
ensure “a democratic decision making process”. What is notable, however, is that 
nowhere is a role for science specified as part of the SEA process, nor is the extent 
and meaning of declared commitments to democratic process clear in conceptual 
directions for EA. As scholars look to the insights of policy analysis for guidance, I 
would suggest that the inheritance of EA has lessons to offer. 
Environmental assessment has long been understood to be a kind of science-based 
policy analysis (Bartlett 1986a; 1997), in which the scholar or exponent claims 
knowledge of and in policy as its focus (Lasswell 1971, in Hoppe 1999). Of these 
two interrelated aspects of policy inquiry, the predominant focus of attention in 
policy EA has been to gain knowledge of the policy process. Driving this emphasis 
has been a concern to understand the more dynamic context of policy making, to 
which the step-wise process adopted at the project level is considered ill-suited. With 
the identified need to understand how EA might be expected to work in the new 
‘upstream’ decision contexts, recent attention has focused on the relevance of 
theories of planning and policy analysis for EA (cf. Clark 2000; Lawrence 2000; 
Brown and Thérivel 2000). This orientation implicitly concedes that more and better 
knowledge of policy will make it easier to mobilise knowledge in policy (Hoppe 
1999).
21 This is in itself a constructive quest, given that an account of EA as a form 
of policy inquiry must be informed by an appreciation of the broader structure of 
                                                 
21 This latter understanding of the ways knowledge is mobilised in policy analysis has been explored 
by Kørnøv and Thissen (2000) for its relevance to SEA. Chapter 2 
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policy making in general, in order to understand what the structure of policy EA 
might look like in particular.  
Where we find prescriptions for a more contextually embedded understanding of EA 
is in Caldwell’s original formulation of the kind of science required to inform EA. 
Caldwell considered the largely specialised, reductionist and linear nature of modern 
science inadequate to contribute to an understanding of complex, interdependent, 
non-linear environmental phenomena (Caldwell 1982: 12).
22 The analytical tendency 
to study phenomena by breaking complex wholes down into their constituent parts, 
Caldwell believed, should be supplemented with interdisciplinary knowledge capable 
of understanding the interrelationships between these parts.  
Toward this end, Caldwell’s definition of the new, interdisciplinary environmental 
sciences staked out a central role for the science of ecology; but it pointed as well to 
the interrelationships between human and biophysical systems, and so to the need for 
knowledge derived from both  the physical and the social sciences. As noted in 
Chapter 1, for Caldwell (1989), the idea of interactive relationships is implicit in the 
term ‘environmental,’ which should be understood as constitutive of ecological, 
political, physical, aesthetic, and ethical aspects (see also Caldwell 1998). Taken 
seriously as a discipline of interactive relationships, environmental science is the 
attempt to make sense in the world; to recognise the environmental scientist and EA 
                                                 
22 The fragmented nature of the dominant reductionist approach to knowledge of environmental 
phenomena was also apparent in the way science was used by government agencies. Caldwell (1982) 
noted that the science employed by agencies tended to be defined according to their specialised area of 
responsibility, and in a reciprocal manner, the sciences characteristically employed by the agency 
tended to further entrench its specialised purpose. Thus, the EA provision of NEPA was designed in 
part to prompt agencies to look beyond the narrow confines of a single scientific discipline: to reform 
administration by changing the ways scientific knowledge and method were used in policy making.  Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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practitioner as active participants in the process of inquiry, and thus in the 
phenomenon investigated. 
This attention to the context of inquiry was further elaborated by Caldwell, who 
emphasised that while the redeployment of science in policy making was intended 
“to identify and perhaps reduce uncertainties,” it should also afford an “opportunity 
for expression of values” (Caldwell 1982: 50). Therefore, the centrality of science 
was not intended to usurp the social purpose of inquiry in EA, nor was science 
intended to substitute for the role of  judgment in evaluating the broader social 
relevance of scientific inquiry and its findings (Caldwell 1991).  
Unfortunately, despite the richness of Caldwell’s aspirations for the interdisciplinary 
character of environmental science, social inquiry and social scientific knowledges 
have not been embraced with the fervour that he had originally hoped. Furthermore 
(and perhaps as a corollary), the expectations of the physical sciences to alleviate the 
impact of human actions on the environment have escalated in recent years, to the 
point that these expectations increasingly cannot be met. In particular, incipient 
attempts to conceptualise policy EA have made it clear that unprecedented demands 
are being made on the capacity of modern science to predict the future consequences 
of proposed actions. Problems such as uncertainty, complexity and value conflict are 
regularly identified as defining characteristics of EA—as the kinds of issues EA must 
routinely address in the process of evaluating the consequences of policy decisions 
on the environment.  
The significance of understanding these epistemic challenges is captured in Brian 
Wynne’s belief that “[o]ne of the most important new goals of environmental and 
technology policies in the last decade has been the shift toward [risk] prevention” Chapter 2 
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(Wynne 1992: 111). Since the 1970s, the exposure of more and more previously 
unsuspected risks of industrialisation has prompted the shift from regulation of 
identified pollutants and other known harms towards prevention of the future 
unacceptable consequences of human action on the natural environment (Jasanoff 
1996).  
Although I have characterised the practical development of EA as essentially more 
reactive than preventive, its broader goal has always been to anticipate and act to 
prevent (or at least to mitigate) the negative consequences of human action on the 
environment. At the project level, where problems are relatively well-structured, 
static and neatly decomposable, EA has been very successful at doing just this. In 
this context, the instrumentalist orientation to environmental ‘externalities’ or 
impacts could be sustained almost without question. With the recent attention to 
strategic decisions ‘upstream’ in the policy process, however, it has become 
increasingly clear that the knowledges and techniques predominantly invoked to 
conduct the assessment are inadequate to deal with the issues of complexity, 
uncertainty and indeterminacy that arise in the more dynamic context of policy 
making. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, the dominant response to this 
predicament has been to call for more and better techniques to facilitate assessment 
and public participation in EA. 
It is therefore interesting that alongside this technocratic orientation, it has long been 
heard within the EA literature that the greater challenge is political, rather than 
technical. Given this decree, it is somewhat paradoxical that the political challenge is 
more often than not something EA scholars then defer to the ‘political’ realm: 
political support for EA is something that, it is assumed, will be generated externally Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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to EA. Presumably, those with the authority to implement the recommendations of an 
EA, namely the peoples’ elected representatives, claim the sole responsibility for 
taking up and acting upon the political values and goals emanating from society. 
References to EA as a process that is integrated into ‘publicly accountable decision 
making’ appear to affirm this assumption (cf. Partidário 1999). 
However, in so externalising the political, the fate of EA is ultimately entrusted to 
the vagaries of political bargaining and negotiation, something that EA scholars 
simultaneously—and often vehemently—lament. One of the more recent reviews of 
SEA practice exemplifies this attitude, its authors asserting that EA’s future form 
will be strongly influenced by forces external to EA itself, whether these turn out to 
be “democratising or otherwise” (Thérivel and Partidário 2000). Whether the 
apolitical attitude prevalent in the EA literature is the reason for the inattention to 
‘democratising the policy process’ as a specific goal of policy EA, is not clear. 
Nonetheless, given the curiously ambivalent attitude to politics apparent amongst EA 
scholars, one might expect to find instead a rekindling of the enthusiasm for 
science—in particular, for the interdisciplinary environmental sciences—which 
underpinned the creation of EA. But as I have repeatedly stressed, EA scholarship 
has largely rescinded this earlier emphasis on science as a topic for discussion as 
well. This stance is perhaps the result of a broadscale rejection of the EIA-based 
model for the assessment of policy. Again, however, the reason is unclear. What is 
clear is that even in the more recent EA literature, the theories presented to explain 
EA practice have nothing to say about science at all (cf. Bartlett and Kurian 1999; 
Lawrence 2000).  Chapter 2 
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VI Conclusion 
A recovery of the original intentions for EA is evident in the call for EA to be 
adaptive, interactive, process-oriented, interdisciplinary, and participatory (Partidário 
2000). It is my contention that the development of a conceptual framework for policy 
EA, and thus for a richer theoretical grounding, would benefit from the explicit 
recovery of its original goals. These goals are pronounced in the professional 
aspirations of IAIA, where EA is described as a process in which “sound science and 
full public participation provide a foundation for equitable and sustainable 
development.” The primary purpose of this professional body is the 
development of international and local capacity to make wise decisions regarding the 
anticipation, planning, and management of environmental change - in terms of 
ecological and human consequences - in order to enhance the quality of life for all. 
IAIA promotes ecologically sustainable and equitable development and is committed 
to environmental justice and the preservation of human rights (emphasis added).
23 
This explicit professional philosophy, which remains latent in the policy EA 
literature, clearly recalls Caldwell’s early prescriptions. It also reframes these 
intentions in the contemporary context, in which sustainability and environmental 
justice have become central to a moral vision for democratic environmental 
governance.  
As the discussion in this chapter has made clear, developments to date have, instead, 
emphasised what is different about policy EA, with the purpose of developing a new 
‘tool’. At the same time, the particular challenges thrown up by the policy context 
have led many scholars to recommend that EA adapt to whatever policy process is in 
                                                 
23 Given on the IAIA website at http://www.iaia.org Strategic Environmental Assessment 
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place, and to adopt a neutral stance in this process. It will be my task in this thesis to 
argue that in this approach there is a danger that EA will lose sight of its original 
purposes. The emphasis on accommodating EA to the existing decision-making 
context has largely diverted attention from these goals. As such, the promise of 
interdisciplinary environmental science as a ‘discipline of interactive relationships’, 
and the radical democratic potential of EA to transform the policy process, appear to 
have largely receded from view as goals to guide the development of policy EA. At 
the same time, however, the concepts invoked to describe EA—adaptive, interactive, 
process-oriented, interdisciplinary, participatory (Partidário 2000)—clearly recall 
these origins.  
The key point is that, in its attention to context, the existing policy context is a 
misguided location. Rather, the civic context is EA’s revolutionary home. The dual 
purposes of EA originated in the policy goals of the environment movement. The use 
of science to inform policy, and the participation of citizens in the process, were the 
strategies Caldwell adopted in order to change the way policy is made—to transform 
the policy process—with the ultimate purpose of transforming the relationship 
between humans and the natural environment. This purpose was not something 
conceived ‘on high’; rather, it originated in civil society. It will be my task in this 
dissertation to argue that revitalising the interaction of policy inquiry with its civic 
context is fundamental to the recovery of EA’s revolutionary potential. It is a task 
which, at its centre, requires reclaiming an emphasis on the interdependent 
relationship between science and democracy, and thus between questions of 
scientific knowledge and political action. The deeper challenges this presents is the 
subject of chapters 3 and 4.  
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The first step to understanding of men is the bringing to 
consciousness of the model or models that dominate and 
penetrate their thought and action …  
(Berlin 1962, cited in Bernstein 1976: 57) 
 
 
 
 
Given that the primary goal of environmental assessment (EA)
1 is to deploy science 
to inform decision making, surprisingly little has been said in the literature about 
what EA scholars and practitioners mean by science, or what the role of scientific 
knowledge is or ought to be.
2 Perhaps it is because science is so central to EA that it 
is so taken for granted as the source of legitimate knowledge for policy. This is an 
observation Serge Taylor makes for western society as a whole: “Since the 
consensual force of science is so pervasive in this society we barely notice it” 
(Taylor 1984: 315). The undeniable success of science, as evidenced by its 
                                                 
1 For the remainder of this thesis, the term environmental assessment (EA) will be employed unless 
the term ‘policy EA’ is necessary for reasons of clarity. Given that EA was always intended to be 
applied to policy, this is justified, whilst reducing the proliferation of terms throughout the text. 
2 This is a point also made by Bartlett and Kurian when they state that “[t]he literature is marked by an 
emphasis on science with little discussion of what constitutes science and who does science” (Bartlett 
and Kurian 1999: 426). The role of science in EA was a topic of discussion mainly in earlier literature, 
including Caldwell (1982), Taylor (1984), and Bartlett (1986a), and more recently Boggs (1993), 
Beattie (1995), and Bailey (1997).  Chapter 3 
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remarkable achievements over the past 300 years or so, has no doubt contributed to 
this general lack of critical questioning of the influence of, and appropriate place of, 
science in EA.  
In the context of environmental policy more generally, scientific knowledge has 
played a vital role in the creation and enforcement of a proliferation of environmental 
laws and standards since the late 1960s, including the provision for EA itself. 
Further, science will remain essential for identifying sustainable and unsustainable 
uses of environmental resources, for defining appropriate levels and kinds of 
protection, and for the monitoring and management of environmental conditions 
once policy agreements are in place (Jasanoff 1998). Of particular interest here is the 
contribution of science to the contemporary challenge of anticipating and regulating 
the future consequences of human action for the natural environment in the upstream 
context of policy making—the challenge EA must now embrace. This manifest 
challenge is further complicated by the contemporary climate of public policy 
making, in which the arguably ineluctable forces of a globalised economy 
increasingly dictate national priorities, and in which the fragile and intractable nature 
of public debate is itself often subordinated to the purely expedient managerial 
considerations of government. As Robert Hoppe points out, this is a climate in which 
“scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation 
of concepts, arguments and ideas” (Hoppe 1999).  
I shall argue that science is, and will remain, central to EA. The primary goal of EA 
is to employ science to inform policy. Moreover, the democratising goal of EA has 
always been defined in terms of democratising access to science. ‘Politics’ has 
generally been classed as something that is ‘not science’. Given that EA is a form of Competing Influences 
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knowledge-based policy analysis, EA theory must be informed by an account of the 
philosophical theories of knowledge informing the process. An understanding of 
what can be expected of science in the more explicitly political context of policy 
making, and of makes knowledge legitimate for political action, is therefore of 
relevance to the development of a richer theoretical framework for SEA practice. 
This is a point made well by Bruce Jennings: 
There is an important connection between the epistemic grounding of policy advice on 
one hand and the democratic legitimacy of policy analysis on the other. Policy 
analysts, as the saying goes, are in the business of speaking truth to power. By doing 
so they exercise a form of power of their own that is not arbitrary or illegitimate in a 
democratic political system. But saying this does not resolve the normative problem of 
what the practice of policy analysis should profess; it merely formulates that problem 
in a new and potentially fruitful way. It suggests that we must pay close attention to 
the epistemological dimensions of policy analysis as a prelude to an investigation of 
its ethical dimensions. It may well be that policy analysts should speak truth to power, 
but how they should speak (and how power should use what it hears) depends upon 
the nature of the truth that is spoken as well as the motive behind the speaking of it 
(Jennings 1993: 133). 
The broad argument to be presented in what follows is that EA has been informed by 
two quite different theories of knowledge, which have different implications for 
linking scientific knowledge and political action. Section I frames the discussion in 
this chapter by outlining two broad approaches to policy inquiry. Section II 
elaborates the influence of these competing theoretical orientations on two models of 
EA: (1) a ‘rational’ model informed by ‘scientism’ (or the exclusive reliance on the 
knowledge and procedures of the physical sciences); and (2) an ‘incremental’ or 
adaptive model informed by pragmatism. Whilst this latter, pragmatic influence 
remains marginalised, it is nonetheless significant in the latent challenge it poses to 
the unyielding scientism of the former, rational model.  Chapter 3 
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The epistemic authority of scientism has been challenged in a number of other ways 
by EA, as explained in Section III. Nonetheless, as Section IV makes clear, the gulf 
between science and politics is maintained within formal accounts of the EA process. 
Section V argues that despite the latent influence of a problem-oriented pragmatism, 
EA remains vulnerable because of the instrumentalist rationality that continues to 
guide a problem-solving approach to practice. The strict separation of science and 
politics is thereby sustained, which has meant that attention to technique in EA has 
proceeded at the expense of attention to its political context. 
I  The Competing Influences on Policy Inquiry 
Scholarship of policy analysis is rooted in Harold Lasswell’s ‘policy sciences of 
democracy’, which were to gain knowledge of and in society (Lasswell 1971). Thus, 
a questioning of the relationship between scientific knowledge and common 
understandings has infused policy analysis since its origins. Consolidating this 
unease have been the competing tendencies of policy inquiry: one a positivist search 
for deterministic laws by gaining knowledge of  an objective world through a 
detached mode of inquiry, and applying it to solve the problems of society; the other 
a pragmatist mode of inquiry which emphasised gaining knowledge in the world by 
conceiving of knowledge and application as interrelated dimensions of human 
activity. The concurrent influences of positivism and pragmatism on conventional 
models of policy analysis, as cogently narrated by Torgerson (1986, 1995), provide a 
timely reminder of the practical possibilities open to policy EA at this early stage of 
its conceptual development. Competing Influences 
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The Enduring Legacy of Positivism 
The assumed linear progression from the provision of scientific knowledge to the 
achievement of better decisions in EA reflects the positivist heritage of policy 
analysis (Torgerson 1995).
3 The ultimate purpose of policy analysis, Sheila Jasanoff 
explains, “is to bridge from the empirical and analytic to the prescriptive” (Jasanoff 
1990)—a purpose manifest in the assumption that scientific knowledge about 
environmental consequences will lead to environmentally better decisions. This 
assumption is the essence of the rational model of EA: “the provision of rational 
knowledge pertaining to the environmental consequences of decisions would lead to 
different, environmentally better decisions being made” (Bailey 1997: 320).  
This uncritical attitude to science as the sole source of knowledge for policy is 
known as scientism. Douglas Torgerson argues that scientism has been a dominant 
influence on policy professionalism, which “celebrates science as the only source of 
genuine knowledge, and regards scientifically grounded expertise as both the basis of 
its authority and the means of effective governance in the technologically complex 
society” (Torgerson 1997).  
Scientists and policy actors operating within this accepted model all agree on several 
universally accepted, ‘rhetorical’ benchmarks, which in turn enable the institutional 
separation of science and politics to be productively maintained. Jasanoff (1987) has 
elaborated these criteria to be threefold: that science should not be influenced by 
politics; that the definition of ‘good science’ should be left to scientists; and that 
scientists should not be involved in making ‘policy’. Driven by the assumption of a 
                                                 
3 The positivist character of much natural and social science and its influence on EA and social impact 
assessment was flagged by Craig (1990).  Chapter 3 
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positive correlation between scientific knowledge and technological achievement, a 
scientifically rationalised management formally replaces the politics of day-to-day 
decision making in the administration of public affairs. Refashioned in the image of 
science-based technique, statecraft has come to be thought of as a kind of social 
engineering (Schön 1983).  
This technocratic outlook sustains an attitude of detachment in developing 
knowledge of society so it can be applied to society; in this way, the production of 
knowledge is considered to be fully distinct from its application. The resulting gulf 
between theory and practice which defines this orientation has meant, in turn, the 
predominant understanding of EA as a ‘tool’ or technique—an orientation which acts 
to obfuscate and severely circumscribe its normative role. According to the rational 
model, the EA process seeks to guide rational, efficient and mostly incremental 
change within a bureaucratic and political environment that it largely takes as given. 
The role of science in EA is considered to be reactive and instrumental because, as 
Caldwell (1989) makes clear, questions of values or ends are properly determined 
externally to the EA process. Policy goals must be set by politics (politicians), not 
science.  
The Tacit Influence of Pragmatism 
The twin goals of science and democracy in EA may be seen to derive directly from 
the Deweyan hope to unite these two elements of reform into a single, progressive 
whole. Dewey sought to join expert problem solving to an active, democratic society, 
so that the policy process was envisaged as one capable of cultivating the judgment 
of both experts and citizens in matters of public concern. Dewey’s pragmatic theory 
of inquiry is based on an analysis of thinking as a problem-solving activity: thought Competing Influences 
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is active, or practical, in the sense that it is oriented to the solution of real-world 
problems. Based on this analysis, Dewey argued that all forms of problem solving 
follow a method, which proceeds from (1) a sense of perplexity, to (2) the definition 
of a problem, (3) the identification of alternatives capable of resolving the problem, 
(4) an assessment of the consequences of alternative actions, and finally (5) the 
testing of alternatives in practice (Torgerson 1995).  
Although this process appears formal and mechanistic, this was not Dewey’s intent. 
Rather, as Torgerson (1995) explains, the complexity of the process as conceived by 
Dewey meant that good judgment and attention to context were central elements of 
policy inquiry. Nonetheless, Dewey’s method has subsequently prompted divergent 
interpretations: one an explicit, replicable problem-solving method, the other a less 
precise, open-ended process. Students of Dewey have since tended to adopt an 
either/or interpretation of these two orientations to policy inquiry. Thus, Herbert 
Simon’s ‘administrative science’ reflects the formalism of positivism with a step-
wise interpretation of the model, whilst Charles Lindblom’s ‘science of muddling 
through’ is more clearly derived from an account of policy making as open-ended 
and unpredictable. Although my analysis of EA in earlier chapters identified the first 
of these interpretations as characteristic of the formal EA process, it was also noted 
that the implications of the second have long occupied—and perplexed—EA 
theorists. The discussion that follows in Section III provides evidence of these 
divergent approaches to EA practice: the formally institutionalised ‘rational’ model Chapter 3 
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follows Simon’s positivist bent, while the ‘adaptive’ model may be located in 
Lindblom’s incrementalism.
4  
However, the interpretations of Dewey presented by Simon and Lindblom do not 
fully recognise the attention to contextuality in pragmatism. The principle of 
contextuality was central to Lasswell’s framework of policy inquiry, which he 
proposed as “contextual, multi-method, and problem-oriented” (Lasswell 1971, cited 
in Dryzek 1982: 312). The principle of contextuality means that policy analysis 
should recognise, and be sensitive to, the reality of decision processes—the 
immediate context of policy making. Because analysis in the dynamic process of 
policy making must be provisional and speculative, the importance of a contextual 
orientation was “to promote creativity and flexibility for action and inquiry in a fluid, 
unpredictable political domain” (Torgerson 1995). It is for these reasons that the 
contextuality requirement has been recognised as a necessary orientation for EA 
scholarship. 
But for Lasswell, implementing the contextuality principle did not simply mean 
adapting to existing policy processes. The chief theoretical task of the policy sciences 
is rather to reformulate political prudence; the task of the analyst “to bring the 
liberating capacity of self-reflective rationality to bear on the policy process to 
transform the character of public life” (Torgerson 1995). This ‘reflective’ moment is 
distinguished from the active, ‘manipulative’ moment characterised by the problem-
solving orientation of systematic inquiry. Furthermore, Lasswell’s problem 
orientation means that analysis should be relevant to the real concerns of 
                                                 
4 And as Chapter 4 will illuminate, many share Lindblom’s abandonment of rationality to the pluralist 
politics of “partisan mutual adjustment” that characterises the real, political world policy making. Competing Influences 
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stakeholders in the policy process, which originate from the broader societal context 
of policy making. In this way, the central goal of a problem-oriented policy analysis 
is not to assert control, but to promote the conditions for freedom, and so to 
transform the character of public life. It is the dynamic interplay between these 
moments of reflection and action which provides for the political orientation of 
inquirers, in which good judgment is recognised as necessary for the successful 
application of analysis.  
It is clear that elements of Deweyan pragmatism have influenced leading policy 
scholars seeking both to understand the realities of policy making, and to develop 
models of policy analysis capable of contributing to an informed and democratic 
policy process. These influences have not been lost on scholars and practitioners of 
EA. However, as we shall see, EA is still a long way from the essence of Dewey’s 
pragmatic theory of inquiry: the cultivated judgment and reasoned discussion of 
experts and citizens in the context of a shared commitment to action. 
II  Knowledge and Action in Environmental Assessment  
The standard framing of science for policy is based on the assumption that science 
possesses an autonomous framework of validation and control that operates 
irrespective of the normative concerns and institutional practices of policy and the 
law (Jasanoff 1995). Unencumbered by such contextual concerns, science claims 
authority as an independent, self-regulating producer of truths about the natural 
world. The characteristics of science most valued for policy making are succinctly 
outlined by Sheila Jasanoff:  Chapter 3 
 
 
– 112 – 
Although its conclusions may be speculative, provisional, and subject to modification,  
science is ordinarily seen as set apart from all other social activities by virtue of its 
institutionalised procedures for overcoming particularity and context dependence and 
its capacity for generating claims of universal validity…. [we] celebrate science’s 
unique commitment to systematic testing of observations and its willingness to submit 
its conclusions to critical probing and falsification (Jasanoff 1995: 7). 
The model of linking scientific knowledge and political action in policy making is 
derived from a taken-for-granted relationship between scientific knowledge and 
political progress—a relationship identified by Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) to define 
environmental policy making more generally. Enlisted in the public institutions of 
policy making, science provides the relevant evidence, after which time the 
administrative process deals with value concerns.
5 In other words, it is only after the 
‘hard’ issues of science and technology are dealt with that the ‘soft’, value issues 
may be addressed. In this way, science is relied upon as a source of authority (policy 
is based on ‘what the experts say’), legitimacy (science is used to demonstrate the 
rationality of decisions in order to gain political acceptance), and accountability, thus 
providing some assurance that decisions are “not simply the product of narrow 
political interests, raw political ambition, or personal whim” (Ozawa 1991: 5).
  
This role for science is increasingly questioned, however. The inability of the 
knowledges and techniques traditionally relied upon to solve the problems of 
uncertainty, indeterminacy, and value conflict in the policy context raise two 
questions vital to aspirations that EA can provide sound policy advice: (1) How can 
we provide authoritative knowledge for EA? and (2) What burden of proof should 
scientific knowledge be expected to sustain? (Wynne 1992). The divergent Competing Influences 
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tendencies of EA along positivist and pragmatist lines will be explored in what 
follows for their ability to contribute to a better understanding of these challenges.  
Scientism: The Rational Model  
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the fact that EA was created at a time when 
rational-comprehensive models of policy making were dominant meant that early 
models and definitions of EA reflect this approach to decision making, particularly in 
terms of its determination to provide a systematic and comprehensive assessment of 
potential impacts, analysis of alternatives, and in its assumption of a rational decision 
maker (Weston 2000; Nilsson and Dalkman 2001; Lawrence 2000). Although many, 
if not most, scholars would admit that the practice of EA fails to live up to this ideal, 
the assumptions of the rational-comprehensive model remain dominant in models of 
EA practice today (Nitz and Brown 2000).
6 As such, David Lawrence contends that 
EA is 
often autocratic and technically biased, poorly designed to match contextual 
characteristics, and weak in fostering creativity, in facilitating dialogue, and in 
appreciating the political nature of planning. It, too, can be prone to artificial 
assumptions regarding comprehensiveness, a unitary public interest, objectivity, 
predictability, and control (Lawrence 2001: 611). 
Kørnøv and Thissen (2000) maintain that much of the SEA literature is also based on 
the rational model, with its assumption that the provision of rational information will 
improve decision making, and will therefore improve the prospects of a better result 
for the environment.  
                                                 
5 Within public administration itself, value concerns are processed according to the social engineering 
logic of administrative processes by redefining them in technical terms (see for example, Fischer 
1980). Chapter 3 
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The commitment to scientism in EA, and to an instrumentalist link between scientific 
knowledge and political action, may be inferred with reference to John Bailey’s 
account of Caldwell’s original intent for EA:  
[t]he original intent of NEPA and therefore of EIA … was to deploy science to 
redirect policy…. clearly the assumption was made that agency decision making is 
sufficiently rational that the provision of rational knowledge pertaining to the 
environmental consequences of those decisions would lead to different, 
environmentally better decisions being made. This assumption is, of course, the 
essence of the rational model of EIA (Bailey 1997: 319-20).  
This account emphasises the use of scientific (equated with ‘rational’) knowledge to 
inform governmental decision making in EA. It also shows that, further to the central 
role for scientific knowledge in EA, the processes of administrative decision making 
are also assumed to be ‘rational’, and thus scientific. As Lynton Caldwell elaborates, 
“to achieve its purpose [environmental impact] analysis must use scientific 
information and methods” (Caldwell 1982: 54, emphasis added).  
This attention to scientific methodology is also emphasised by Robert Bartlett when 
he says that “NEPA has been inadequately recognized as an attempt to force 
bureaucracies to use science-like analysis as a basis for policies and decisions—an 
attempt to force greater rationality in government decisionmaking” (Bartlett 1986a: 
105). Furthermore, Andrews et al. (1977) noted early on that the greatest contribution 
scientists can make to EA is the scientific method, while Taylor (1984) analysed 
NEPA as an attempt to import scientific norms and procedures into governmental 
decision making. Therefore, the introduction of scientific precepts and canons into 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Caldwell (1982), Taylor (1984), and Culhane et al. 1987). This conclusion is 
supported by virtually all empirical research in policy analysis (Kørnøv and Thissen 2000). Competing Influences 
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the process of policy making was a tacit objective of NEPA, and thus of EA (Bartlett 
1986a).  
The fact that EA aspires to emulate the logical canons of science is also manifestly 
evident in the requirement that, in the rational model, impact predictions should be 
framed as testable hypotheses (Bailey 1997). The expectation that science can 
provide reliable predictions of future events derives from science’s self-proclaimed 
ability to render the world predictable. This claim to certainty has been associated 
with modern science since Francis Bacon first articulated ‘The Scientific Method’ in 
the early seventeenth century.  
The scientific method, which has come to define modern science, rests 
fundamentally on the idea of controlled observation, experiment and measurement 
carried out in a detached manner. Based on the centrality of empirical data, 
disciplined inquiry guided by the logical canons of analytic-synthetic rationality is 
thought to be central to the advance of all human knowledge. Ultimately, knowledge 
of cause-effect relationships, and the subsequent generation of causal laws, enables 
science to predict future events. It is these features of science, and its resulting 
predictive success, which the rational model of EA aspires to emulate: analysis in EA 
grounds its claims to cognitive authority in its knowledge of causal links, which 
enable the prediction both of the impacts of technology on the natural environment, 
and of the effects of interventions introduced to ameliorate those impacts.  
Measurement is also central to EA, so that the role of science is often narrowly 
translated to mean that impacts must also be quantifiable (cf. Bartlett and Kurian 
1999; Duinker 1987). Indeed, the statement by Duinker cited in Chapter 1, that 
impact predictions are “better quantitative and wrong than qualitative and untestable” Chapter 3 
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explicitly captures a belief in the superiority of a theory of science reliant on 
measurement (Duinker 1987: 399). This is an approach which simultaneously denies 
the relevance of other (i.e. qualitative) forms of knowledge. In sum then, based on 
the broadly empiricist view of science just described (with its focus on observation, 
experiment and measurement), methodology in the rational model of EA emphasises 
empirical research designs, techniques for sampling and data collection, the 
measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive 
power (Fischer 1999).  
A recent review of the EA literature by Bartlett and Kurian (1999) confirms that a 
model based on the primacy of technical data is the dominant working model for the 
majority of EA professionals. The champions of this view, dubbed the ‘information 
processing’ model by Bartlett and Kurian, are found to be scientific analysts and 
technical experts, who view EA as 
… a technical process, governed by scientific and technical rationality, comprising the 
collection of relevant – mostly technical – information, its organisation, and its 
professional presentation by experts, concluding with a decision taken completely 
independent of the EIA process itself on, ideally, technocratic merits rather than any 
political considerations (Bartlett and Kurian 1999: 417).   
Educated in the canons of rational-analytical scientific inquiry, one may infer that it 
is the commitment of these practitioners to improving the scientific basis of EA that 
fuels their focus on data collection and analysis. The existence of uncertainty, when 
interpreted within this ‘rational’ model, is generally perceived to reflect an 
information deficiency—a lack of data.  
Uncertainties associated with a lack of technical data are also central to the problems 
associated with upstream policy making. As revealed in Chapter 2, Sadler and Competing Influences 
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Verheem (1996) and Thérivel et al. (1992) identify the need for data to address the 
uncertainties and analytical complexity associated with the scale of higher-level 
proposals, and thus to provide precise information on which to base impact 
predictions and to recommend mitigation measures.  
Bartlett and Kurian (1999) conclude their analysis of the ‘information processing’ 
model by proposing it does not tell us much about how EA actually works, or ought 
to work. On the contrary, I would argue that the dominant view of EA as 
scientifically rational has brought forth unrealistic, although very real, expectations 
that EA should conform to a classical view of scientific inquiry with the features just 
described. As Bartlett and Kurian’s analysis itself reveals, the expectations of EA for 
accuracy and precision in predicting future impacts—for certainty—are held by 
many EA professionals.
7 Furthermore, such expectations exist in the wider 
community. Weston goes so far as to interpret the popularity and legitimacy of EA 
partly in terms of its claim to be objective and rational, and thus ‘good’ (Weston 
2000: 189). 
At this point the objection might be made that EA is not considered to be science; 
rather, it merely uses scientific knowledge and procedures to fulfil its role. But as 
Beattie (1995) makes penetratingly clear, a focus on EA-as-science nonetheless 
actively creates the impression of (unachievable) impartial precision and objectivity 
which, when not achieved, is open to claims that the science—and by association, 
EA—is not ‘good’ enough. Beattie therefore hoped to prompt a recognition within 
                                                 
7 Serge Taylor makes a similar point with respect to the formal expectations of the courts in the US 
system of EA, namely that “scientific advances in impact prediction can raise the standards of what 
judges believe it is reasonable to expect of the agency, as the latest techniques are held up as the 
appropriate standard for judging current practice” (Taylor 1984: 231). Chapter 3 
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the community of EA professionals that their work is inevitably part of a broader 
public discourse, and thus acts to shape public attention.  
The assumption of a taken-for-granted relationship between science and better 
decision making, and the resulting instrumentalist focus on techniques, assumes a 
rational actor capable of effective action in pursuit of clearly defined goals. But 
predictive science is uncertain, goals are rarely clearly defined, and policies are more 
often made by a multiplicity of actors in the interactive process of implementation. 
This formal, rational model of EA practice therefore provides little guidance in 
defining a creative, transformative role for EA in the uncertain, dynamic context of 
policy making. 
Incrementalism: A (Pre)Cautionary Tale 
Although the narrowly technocratic orientation tends to be dominant in formal 
theories and models of EA, a much broader understanding of its influence has always 
characterised EA. In particular, with its origins in the effort to give explicit 
consideration to the environmental side-effects of technological and industrial 
progress, EA is  
predicated on a certain disillusionment with positivist notions concerning the progress 
of history toward a mature industrial civilisation. The institutionalisation of these 
forms of policy research represents a recognition of previously unforeseen problems in 
the development of industrial society. At least implicitly, then, the advent of impact 
assessment is founded on a view of the context of analysis which is at odds with the 
previously conventional one (Torgerson 1986, emphasis added). 
Therefore, while EA as formally institutionalised has tended to reflect the scientific 
management orientation of modern public administration, resistance to the defining 
context of an ever-expanding industrial society has always been a central premise of Competing Influences 
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EA. It is with this implicit challenge to the developmentalist status quo in mind that 
we must interpret EA’s intent to change the processes of governmental decision-
making. And it is this view of EA as a transformative force in public policy making 
that we find evidence of EA’s origins in pragmatism. 
Widespread recognition amongst EA scholars that ‘rational’ thought may only play a 
minor role in agency decision making has prompted the search for a more adequate 
theoretical account of the EA process. For scholars who have endeavoured to locate 
EA within a particular decision theory, evidence of the rational model is often 
curtailed with Lindblom’s pluralist model of policy making, variously called 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ or ‘partisan mutual adjustment’. Wood and Jones (1997) 
report the influence of both incrementalist and rationalist models in EA.  
For Lindblom, policy is about muddling through, the intelligence of democracy is 
believed to arise from the patterns of partisan mutual adjustment that characterise 
pluralist politics (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1970). Problem solving is given a 
central place in Lindblom’s ‘science of muddling through’, which he contrasts with 
the comprehensive nature of rational model of policy making. Instead, Lindblom 
conceived problem solving as an indirect process guided as much by chance as by 
system, and thus sought to downplay the role of analysis and the associated 
decisionist focus on informing ‘the decision maker’.
8 
The problem-solving orientation which characterises the adaptive approach to EA 
takes this incremental approach. Here we find a recognition of the characteristic 
uncertainty associated with EA’s predictive emphasis, which is in stark contrast to 
                                                 
8 As we shall see in Chapter 4, Serge Taylor (1984) explicitly likens his model of EA to Lindblom’s 
pluralist model of partisan mutual adjustment. Chapter 3 
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the rational model’s commitment to a linear progression from impact prediction to 
decision. Uncertainty in this model has been translated by EA scholars into the need 
for an ongoing and incremental (rather than a one-off comprehensive) investigation 
into environmental impacts, which extends the process beyond the decision to the 
monitoring and management of such impacts. Dewey’s articulation of problem 
solving as a process of trial and error applied in particular circumstances is clearly 
evident in this ‘learning by doing’ philosophy of EA practice, which has also guided 
the predominance of a case-study approach to the evaluation of particular projects 
and their consequences. 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management 
Attention to environmental monitoring and management in EA has been limited in 
comparison with the emphasis on impact prediction, a focus which more than likely 
stems from the emphasis of EA on informing ‘the decision’, and thus on the pre-
decision assessment process. John Bailey (1997) has recently endeavoured to revive 
attention to the relationship between EA and management—a relationship which 
does not rely solely on the quantitative scientific and technical aspects of prediction 
as a means of judging the influence, or effectiveness, of EA. An audit of predictions 
made in several EA’s in Western Australia showed that the emphasis on the accuracy 
of quantitative predictions as justification for the value of EA is misplaced (Bailey et 
al. 1992).
9 In this study, the mere identification of potential management problems 
prompted mitigation and management action on the part of development proponents. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the “environmental outcomes of a project are not 
necessarily reduced when the science involved in the EIA fails to accurately predict 
                                                 
9 Bailey and Hobbs (1990) had earlier noted the value of an environmental management focus. Competing Influences 
 
 
– 121 – 
an impact or to predict it at all” (Bailey 1997: 324). These results not only confirm 
that quantitative accuracy in impact prediction and rigor in impact monitoring are not 
necessary prerequisites for positive management action, and thus good 
environmental outcomes in EA. They also point to the potential utility and relevance 
of qualitative predictions and management prescriptions in EA.  
A significant benefit of reclaiming the link between EA and management is that 
attention is oriented to environmental outcomes.
10 The example of the Western 
Australian EA process cited above (a process in which management has always been 
a priority) also illustrates the value of implementing EA as an ongoing process 
through which the information gleaned from monitoring is used to adapt 
management commitments (Bailey et al. 1992). This attention to monitoring and 
management reclaims Caldwell’s original intention for EA as an ongoing process: 
This concept of monitoring, follow-up, and feedback would extend the EIS beyond a 
cautionary or action-forcing device to a continuing tool of management of evaluation. 
The full decision record and the feedback loop would assist an agency to assess the 
accuracy of its predictions, to see how mitigation measures have been working, and to 
adapt subsequent decisions as feedback may indicate. This concept of the EIS as a tool 
of active management is shared by practitioners in the field…. Building impact 
analysis into an active management process is exactly what NEPA was intended to 
accomplish and would make the EIS a true decision document and not merely a 
ritualistic report (Caldwell 1982: 135, emphasis added).  
It was therefore Caldwell’s intention to build EA into an active management 
process—not the other way around. In other words, management was not thought of 
as a purely manipulative strategy tacked onto the end of an EA process; nor was it 
                                                 
10 This attention to environmental outcomes rather than outputs—or, influence on the decision itself—
is heard less and less in the EA literature (see also Nitz and Brown 2000). In particular, Partidário’s 
(2000) recent recommendation was that success in SEA should be judged according to the value it 
adds to the decision.  Chapter 3 
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something assumed to proceed automatically from a decision-maker’s focus on 
implementation. Rather, the notion of ‘adaptive environmental assessment and 
management’, originally defined by Holling et al. (1978), was to represent the 
operational framework for EA at a more fundamental level.  
By conceiving of policy as an experiment, and EA as a process of comparing the 
results of monitoring with hypotheses (impact predictions), knowledge acquisition 
becomes an evolutionary process of learning from trial and error. This approach is 
clearly derived from the critical-rationalist policy analysis as espoused by Popper, 
whose theory of science embodies a pragmatist orientation, and builds upon his 
strategy of ‘falsification’ in science and his political philosophy of piecemeal social 
engineering. A clear strength of this incremental, adaptive approach is that it does not 
fall victim to the neopositivist illusion that delay of action may improve knowledge 
(Hoppe 1999).  
This adaptive approach has also been championed by several scholars as a means to 
deal with uncertainty at the strategic level in EA. Sadler and Verheem (1996) believe 
that this approach is the best insurance against high levels of uncertainty. Support for 
the adaptive approach is also found in Nitz and Brown (2000), who recommend an 
iterative and cyclical approach to EA which they describe as similar to adaptive 
management: policies would be re-evaluated in the light of new information, and EA 
procedures adapted accordingly. Such approaches clearly follow from a recognition 
of the indeterminate nature of scientific knowledge, and point to a more 
precautionary approach to policy making.  
However, the complexity, instability and uncertainty of policy outcomes has also 
meant an apparent resignation to the ideal that EA should merely adapt to the system Competing Influences 
 
 
– 123 – 
of policy making already in place. Partidário (1999; 2000) recommends that SEA 
should respond to the uncertainty of outcomes by flexibly adapting to its decision 
context. This approach defers to the rational model’s focus on the decision—on 
output rather than more directly on environmental outcomes.  
This approach is flawed because while the substantive decision that is made “has an 
effect on practices and outcomes … it does not automatically determine them, 
especially where decisions are part of a continuing multiorganisational process of 
interaction, negotiation, commitment, and adaptation” (Wynne 1987). With a 
definition of ‘the decision’ as what ‘the decision maker’ does, attention in EA would 
be restricted to a central policy maker, which excludes the complications involved in 
implementation, and thus relies upon a quasi-scientific purification of the social and 
institutional arenas of policy. As Wynne (1987) argues, this is an approach which 
assumes a hierarchical relationship between the policy-making ‘centre’ and the 
implementation ‘periphery’, in which policy making is presumed to have ironed out 
any value conflicts or ambiguities about the goals of policy, so that implementation 
requires only technical rule following. It is therefore assumed that implementation 
deficits (of technical precision, or competence, or resource scarcity) are due to 
deficits at the periphery.  
To be consistent with the contextuality principle in pragmatism, policy analysis must 
not merely adapt to, but transform, decision processes. And to be consistent with the 
problem-orientation of pragmatism, it must also promote the conditions for freedom, 
and so transform the character of public life. The benefits of the adaptive approach 
based on Popper’s critical rationalism is that it is clearly oriented to the political 
realities of time pressure and action imperatives—the political realities with which Chapter 3 
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EA must grapple. However, by seeking to artificially freeze contextual conditions in 
order to emulate the experiment’, Popper’s approach continues to artificially separate 
the production of knowledge from the context of inquiry and application. In contrast, 
the implications of contextuality and of a problem-oriented—rather than a narrowly 
defined problem-solving—mode of inquiry raise the stakes for a more radical 
interpretation of the relationship between SEA and its social and political context 
than has yet been recognised. 
The Precautionary Principle 
Conceived as an adaptive or precautionary policy strategy, it was Caldwell’s hope 
that EA would institutionalise “patience, caution and looking before leaping” 
(Caldwell 1982). Caldwell might be interpreted, therefore, to be advocating an 
approach to EA which explicitly recognised the deficit of science’s predictive 
capacity and the limitations of scientific knowledge in understanding environmental 
change processes, and which advocate instead a strategy of taking care in the face of 
the uncertain environmental consequences of human action. 
The need to strengthen the role of foresight in governmental decision making, 
advocated by Caldwell, has now become formally articulated as the ‘precautionary 
principle’ in environmental policy—a principle which has become particularly 
prominent with the rise of sustainability discourses internationally. Incorporated as 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 
precautionary principle states that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (UNCED 1992). The 
German notion of vorsorge, which spawned the precautionary principle, was Competing Influences 
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originally intended to encompass much more than this, however. Tim O’Riordan and 
his colleagues emphasise that vorsorge “absorbed the notions of risk prevention, cost 
effectiveness (although in a looser economic framework), ethical responsibilities 
towards maintaining the integrity of natural systems, and the fallibility of human 
understanding…. Precaution, therefore, presumes that mistakes can be made” 
(O’Riordan et al. 2001a: 11). 
A recognition that mistakes can be made invokes a number of principles and 
concepts associated with the implementation of a precautionary approach, identified 
by Andrew Stirling (1999) and given in Table 1. Together, Stirling argues, these 
principles and concepts prompt attention to the breadth of scope displayed in the 
various aspects of policy appraisal, played out in: 
the range of issues and types of effect taken into account, the accommodation of a 
plurality of perspectives and interests, the consideration of a variety of options, the 
contemplation of a disparate array of alternative possible outcomes and contingencies 
and the inclusion of benefits within the scope of appraisal (Stirling 1999: 9). 
To date, however, the possibilities of this potentially revolutionary principle have 
been somewhat constrained in formal processes of policy making. With the fallibility 
of human rationality narrowly redefined as ‘scientific’ uncertainty, ‘precaution’ is 
reinterpreted as a call to wait for more precise scientific information before taking 
action to control environmental risks. This is to place “the decision threshold further 
into the uncertainties, but on the assumption that this is an early-warning stance, 
which further scientific knowledge (less imprecision or uncertainty) would later 
prove correct” (Wynne 1992). Given the rationalist assumptions about scientific 
knowledge and procedures prominent in EA practice, there is a danger that the Chapter 3 
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incremental, ‘adaptive’ approach to EA will be narrowly interpreted in this way, 
solely as a commitment to the collection of more data on the road to certainty.  
Table 1  Key Principles and Concepts Associated with Precautionary 
Approaches  
‘Prevention’  A duty to prevent rather than to control or treat 
emissions 
‘Polluter Pays’  The placing of burdens on all parties responsible 
for, or benefiting from, damaging activities 
‘No Regrets’  Presume in favour of options simultaneously 
satisfying economic, environmental and wider 
criteria 
‘Clean 
Production’ 
Adopt only those investment or technology options 
which are demonstrably of lowest impact 
Subordinate 
Principles 
‘Biocentric Ethic’  Recognising the intrinsic value of non-human life 
•   Acknowledge the limitations of science, humility 
about knowledge and anticipation of surprise 
•   Recognise the vulnerability of the natural 
environment 
•   Uphold the rights of those who are adversely 
affected by technologies 
•   Take account of the availability of technical 
alternatives 
Associated 
Concepts 
•   Consider the complexity of behaviour in real 
organisations 
  •   Pay attention to variability of local and other 
contextual factors 
  •   Assign equal legitimacy to different value 
judgements 
  •   Adopt long-term, holistic and inclusive perspectives 
in appraisal 
Source: Stirling (1999) 
Alternatively, a commitment to ongoing inquiry and management in EA embodies an 
implicit “acceptance of the inherent limitations of the anticipatory knowledge on 
which decisions about environmental [impacts] are based” (Wynne 1992: 111). An 
adaptive approach implicitly embraces a commitment to the fallibility of human 
understanding. However, given that the adaptive approach to EA has not assumed a 
dominant influence, it remains to be seen whether this currently implicit acceptance 
of the limitations of scientific knowledge will bear on the development of innovative Competing Influences 
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ways to identify and assess the environmental consequences of decisions in EA. The 
move ‘upstream’ to the policy context makes this need particularly critical because 
the qualitatively different focus of the policy context raises questions about how we 
are to generate authoritative knowledge for decisions with consequences for the 
natural environment, and what burden of proof scientific knowledge should be 
expected to sustain.  
III  Challenges to the Epistemic Authority of Scientism 
Caldwell’s commitment to the interdisciplinary environmental sciences was 
ultimately a call for the development of a ‘megascience of environmental 
relationships’ (Caldwell 1982). This phrase brings to mind notions of a unified 
science which derive from positivism. The recognition that environmental policy 
decisions necessarily occur at the overlap of several disciplines was also the motive 
behind the ‘orchestration of the sciences’, which John O’Neill (1993) claims is the 
one defensible, but largely misunderstood, doctrine of positivism.
11 As defined in the 
International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, “The purpose of this work is to 
explore the foundations of the various sciences and to aid the integration of scientific 
knowledge. The universe does not follow the division of departments of a university” 
(cited in O’Neill 1993: 200, note 33). This project was defensible, according to 
O’Neill, because it highlighted the limits of relying upon any one expert in a single 
discipline to provide knowledge about particular matters. It is not sufficient, 
                                                 
11 The four distinct forms that the positivist project of a unified science took include: “(1) a 
reductionist project in which all the sciences would be logically derivable via bridge-laws from 
physics; (2) a project for a unified language of science; (3) a programme for a unified method of 
science; and (4) a project that would orchestrate the difference sciences, such that, for any specific 
problem, all relevant sciences could be called upon.” (O’Neill 1993: 200, note 33). Chapter 3 
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however, because it still fails to bridge the gap between scientific principles and the 
particular contexts in which they must be implemented. 
The interdependence of human-nature relationships in Caldwell’s conceptualisation 
of the environmental sciences at least implicitly challenges the epistemological 
assumptions of a scientistic policy analysis. Although the bounded nature of 
rationality is conceded as a working presupposition in the rational model of EA, the 
very subject matter of EA—the unintended side-effects of industrial and 
technological progress—directs attention to neglected contexts (Torgerson 1997). 
The original goals of EA were grounded in the political discourse of the environment 
movement, and reinforced by the scientific discourses of ecology and systems theory. 
Both discourses focused attention on the complex social-environmental 
interdependencies of human action. While the influence of these epistemological 
challenges on the policy process has been subtle, rather than radical, the contextual 
concerns of environmentalism have nonetheless opened the door to a critique of the 
scientific procedures upon which EA relies (Caldwell 1982; Bartlett 1986b). In this 
way, EA both reflects and resists the bounded rationality of the administrative state. 
The Challenge to Rationality 
Uncertainty 
The technological achievements attributed to the success of modern science have 
relied upon devoting attention to a strictly limited field of vision. In particular, 
confidence in the capacity of science to successfully confront whatever challenges 
the future might bring has meant the deliberate and systematic inattention to the 
complexities and ambiguities of a broader context (Torgerson 1997). In public 
administration and public policy making, the delimiting of variables has been Competing Influences 
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characterised by Herbert Simon in terms of the ‘bounded rationality’ of the human 
mind. Because Simon deemed the interdependencies and uncertainties of context to 
be irrelevant to administrative decision making, problems could be rationally 
isolated, analysed and solved in a selective manner. But when “the administrative 
state is made to think outside its conventional boxes, the fragility of its bounded 
rationality is exposed: administrative organisations are faced with a gross increase in 
‘relevant uncertainty’” (Torgerson 1997).  
The contextual origins of this ‘relevant uncertainty’ thereby rule out any claim EA 
might make to being a process of inquiry independent of its social and political 
context. Of course, Caldwell recognised that the reductivist metaphors of mechanism 
were insufficient to guide inquiry in EA. Instead, the new science of ecology was 
called upon—a science which, by accentuating the complex interdependencies of 
nature, often ruled out the causal explanations upon which the quest for prediction 
and control were based. Uncertainty in SEA has also been associated with the 
inability to clearly define causal relationships (Sadler and Verheem 1996). 
Ecological Rationality 
The ecological perspective, with its holistic presumption of interdependence, 
challenges the mechanistic paradigm of industrialism. This perspective firmly places 
the relationships between human society and the natural environment on the policy 
agenda. The challenge to rationality in EA has been explored most extensively by 
Robert Bartlett, who has worked to refine his analysis of the logic of NEPA with 
particular emphasis on the subversive influence of ‘ecological rationality’ in EA.
12 
                                                 
12 Bartlett has elaborated his work on ecological rationality in EA in a number of papers (1986b; 1990; 
1997; Baber and Bartlett 1999).  Chapter 3 
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Bartlett argues that it is this particular form of practical reason which, regardless of 
the formal process models developed to describe the operation of EA, represents the 
greatest challenge to conventional policy analysis. Thus, Bartlett (1997) has rebuked 
critics who interpret NEPA as an example of rational comprehensive decision 
making. Bartlett (1997) argues that NEPA does not incorporate any of the three 
characteristics associated with this model: namely, a production model of public 
policy, a market model of society, and a model of reasoning based on calculation and 
optimal choices. Instead, it is in terms of the facilitation of ecological rationality that 
the logic of NEPA and EA is best understood. 
Ecological rationality is a rationality of “living systems, an order of relationships 
among living systems, and their environments” (Bartlett 1986b: 229). A society is 
therefore considered ecologically irrational when its forms of epistemic authority and 
institutional practice threaten the ecosystemic relations on which it relies (Torgerson 
1997). While Bartlett, along with John Dryzek (1987), recognises that ecological 
rationality can not, and does not, stand alone in guiding administrative processes, it 
demands attention simply because the human life support value of ecosystems is at 
stake. Therefore, although ecological rationality must be understood alongside 
technical, economic, legal, social, and political rationality, Dryzek declares that 
ecological rationality should be considered to have “lexical priority” over other 
forms of reason: “the preservation and promotion of the integrity of the ecological 
and material underpinning of society – ecological rationality – should take priority 
over competing forms of reason in collective choices with an impact on that 
integrity” (Dryzek 1987: 58-59).  Competing Influences 
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However, Bartlett (1990) argues that Dryzek’s formulation of ecological rationality 
is insufficient because its narrowly functional perspective provides no means of 
getting from here to there. In Dryzek’s terms, ecological rationality is “the capability 
of ecosystems consistently and effectively to provide the good of human life support 
… From the perspective of ecological rationality … what one is interested in is the 
capacity of human systems and natural systems in combination to cope with human-
induced problems” (Dryzek 1987: 36). Bartlett (1990) argues that EA provides the 
means of achieving that functional ecological rationality which was omitted by 
Dryzek. It does so through its institutionalisation of procedural and substantive forms 
of ecological rationality. Thus, procedural ecological rationality forces political 
actors to consider environmental values; while substantive ecological rationality 
demands that environmental values and ecological criteria be legitimised as 
standards in the policy process.  
In this characterisation, however, Bartlett retains an emphasis on functional 
rationality as the ultimate goal. If functional rationality is the goal, and if this human 
welfare goal remains defined in terms of continuing increases in material goods and 
services, then the consideration of environmental values is easily translated as 
finding more sustainable means to the same, unsustainable ends (Barry 1999). 
Primarily concerned with human life support, Dryzek’s ‘functional’ ecological 
rationality fails to challenge the prevailing order. Grounded in an “instrumental view 
which judges social arrangements in terms of their ability, in conjunction with 
ecosystems, to produce long-term sustainability of a given view of human welfare 
and life support,” functional ecological rationality is necessarily concerned with what 
John Barry calls the ‘ecology-economy metabolism’. But this is only a subset of Chapter 3 
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social-environmental relations more broadly defined by Barry (1999). Introducing 
the idea of ecological limits to human action, and then merely recommending more 
efficient means to the same ends, serves only to prescribe a more efficient 
destruction of the environment: “If what we are seeking [through ecologically 
sustainable development] is as much economic development as ecological constraints 
will permit, then our aim is not really the preservation of the environment as much as 
its efficient destruction” (Goodin 1991, cited in Brown 1992: 403) 
Therefore, functional ecological rationality is necessary for, but not sufficient for, the 
achievement of substantive goals which are at once social and environmental. A 
necessary consequence of the commonly invoked emphasis on functional ecological 
rationality is that, because this goal contains no normative criteria, no reference is 
made to democracy, autonomy, or justice. Nor is any reference made to the value of 
the non-human world beyond its productive capacity to support human life. This is 
also a point Jasanoff (1999) makes when she claims that the ecological paradigm 
raises, but leaves unanswered, the question of the place of human beings in the 
biosphere. Dominant accounts define that place as either custodian or interloper, 
accounts which in turn imply quite different forms of human agency, and quite 
different ideas about what humans are entitled to do with their environment. 
Disconcertingly familiar cries that “life on earth will continue long after humans 
have destroyed themselves” assign humans no responsibility for sustaining their 
relationships with either nature or each other. Distinguishing between human use and 
abuse of the environment is therefore a central normative consideration in the 
stewardship framework for environmental policy making, and its emphasis on 
precaution and care. Competing Influences 
 
 
– 133 – 
The Challenge to Objectivity 
As we have seen, Robert Bartlett argues that the “forced institutionalisation of 
ecological rationality” in EA, by prompting attention to substantive as well as 
procedural issues, enables EA to provide a framework for the redirection of policy 
toward environmental goals (Bartlett 1997). In this way, Bartlett believes that EA is 
concerned with restructuring values as well as rules in government agencies. 
Understanding how EA achieves this restructuring of values requires an 
understanding of its catalytic character, which works to direct the creative problem-
solving capacity of the bureaucracy toward the achievement of environmental values 
(Bartlett 1997). In this context, ecological rationality works through EA to change 
the way government agencies think.  
To progress an understanding about how this occurs, Bartlett draws upon Weiss’s 
notion that ideas act as policy instruments in the policy process by 
inviting people to think differently about their situation, by providing them with 
information about new alternatives or about the advantages or disadvantages of 
existing alternatives, making some perspectives more salient than others, directing 
attention toward some phenomena and away from others, or leading people to accept 
different values or preferences…. Through ideas, government can animate and direct 
patterns of action and inaction to change policy outcomes (Weiss 1990, cited in 
Bartlett 1997). 
To be consistent with the goal of changing policy outcomes (for the better), rather 
than merely adding momentum to the status quo, EA cannot be recognised as a 
neutral process; rather, it must be recognised as an overtly and intentionally political 
process. In this process, “NEPA restructures environmental politics and policy 
making—the framework for political reasoning—so as to facilitate the greater use of 
ecological rationality in defining problems, defining ideals, and defining solutions” Chapter 3 
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(Bartlett 1997).
13 This restructuring of both the substantive and procedural aspects of 
policy processes means that EA stimulates a co-evolution of policy and politics by 
fostering “social intelligence with respect to the environment – not a narrowly 
instrumental intelligence, but an integrated political and ecological rationality, 
directed as much at the ends embraced as a society and a polity as at the means 
adopted in policy processes” (Bartlett 1997). In this way, EA brings ends and means 
closer together. 
James Boggs (1993) argues that the assumptions about human agency which define 
the process chosen to institutionalise EA also define the social reality that ensues. 
Boggs believes that the alternative views expressed by a mechanistic, market account 
of social choice informed by the preferences of self-interested individuals on the one 
hand, and an ethical account of social choice informed by public virtues on the other, 
“express contrasting visions of our social order not only as it is, but also as it ought 
to be. They not only envision, but also create, the social realities by which we live” 
(Boggs 1993). In this way, EA cannot be conceived as the value-neutral ‘discovery’ 
of an external reality, no matter how politically neutral or ‘objective’ mechanistic 
accounts of policy analysis claim to be.  
The Challenge to Scientific Procedures 
The most telling epistemic challenge to science-based forms of policy analysis, 
argues Torgerson, “emerges as experience with environmental problems throws into 
question the assumption that scientific procedures supply the knowledge necessary to 
handle such problems” (Torgerson 1997). Jasanoff concurs, announcing that “[f]or 
                                                 
13 It is also along these lines that Paehlke and Torgerson (1990) identify the ‘subversive potential’ of 
EA, wherein ecological rationality acts as a ‘worm in the brain’ of the bureaucracy. Competing Influences 
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science in the policy context, the age of innocence ended in the early 1970s” 
(Jasanoff 1987: 200). Since the environment movement exerted pressure on 
government to introduce preventative policies for environmental protection, the 
demands made of science to predict the future implications of policy choices have 
exposed the intuitive nature of much of the advice provided to government (Jasanoff 
1987). The recognition that subjective values and professional judgment characterise 
most stages of the EA process is increasingly being made explicit (cf. Wood 1995; 
Weston 2000). Furthermore, SEA is characterised by some as an intuitive process 
(Partidário 2000), perhaps better guided by public processes of ‘visioning’ rather 
than carrying capacity, as the former is “more publicly acceptable and less 
scientifically challengeable, since it bypasses any attempts at quantification” (Brown 
and Thérivel 1999).  Despite these challenges, however, consistent efforts to retain 
an authoritative space for science have been maintained. 
IV  The Defense of Scientism 
The magnitude of the threat of uncertainty to science-for-policy has been matched by 
the intensity of efforts to defend the boundary between science and politics, and so to 
preserve the authority of science. The success of this boundary-defining effort is 
evident in the now automatic distinction between ‘pure’ science and regulatory or 
‘applied’ science (Jasanoff 1990). This distinction assumes that ‘pure’ scientific 
activity must be conducted at arm’s length from the politically motivated application 
of science, because the application of science is directed by values in the social 
context of scientific inquiry. Therefore, as Jasanoff (1990) explains, regulatory 
science—or science for policy—is said to differ from pure science mainly in context, Chapter 3 
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because it is accepted that applied science is more explicitly evaluative, and cannot 
claim to be completely free from political influence.  
However, the distinctively practical intent of science mandated for policy means that 
it also differs in content. Jasanoff outlines three key attributes of regulatory science: 
knowledge production, where studies are designed to fill gaps in the existing 
knowledge base; knowledge synthesis, including activities such as the evaluation of 
results; and prediction, including associated determinations of the significance of an 
impact or risk (Jasanoff 1990). The uncertainty and judgment characteristic of many 
components of prediction, has meant that this remains the most controversial aspect 
of science for policy. These characteristics are also proving to present the greatest 
problems for EA. 
The earliest and perhaps most famous resolution to the problematic nature of the 
predictive component of decision making was Alvin Weinberg’s suggestion that a 
new branch of science be created specifically oriented to areas of scientific 
uncertainty. To this end, Weinberg conceptualised a grey zone, which he dubbed 
‘trans-science’. Located between science and policy, trans-science is characterised by 
questions “which can be asked of science and yet cannot be answered by science” 
(Weinberg 1972, cited in Jasanoff 1987: 201). The trans-scientific nature of the 
issues EA must deal with has been recognised by Lawrence, who states that 
“although the problems or opportunities toward which an EIA planning process are 
directed can be stated in scientific terms, this does not mean that they can be resolved 
through science” (Lawrence 1994: 15). By suggesting that the cognitive 
indeterminacy revealed by the policy process was not intrinsic to science per se, this 
concept proved crucial in protecting the professional authority of science as a Competing Influences 
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rational-analytic endeavour. Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) describe Weinberg’s trans-
science as “a careful balancing act,” which acted not to challenge the authority of 
advice provided by ‘pure’ science, but to concede that a different kind of science was 
needed to answer many contemporary policy questions.  
In his initial formulation of trans-science, Weinberg denied the influence of values in 
scientific inquiry itself. Later, he did acknowledge the intrusion of scientists’ values 
into their work, but argued that this was the case only when faced with trans-
scientific issues: 
No one would dispute that judgments of scientific truth are much affected by the 
scientist’s value system when the issues are at or close to the boundary between 
science and trans-science. On the other hand, as the matter under dispute approaches 
the domain of science, most would claim that the scientist’s extrascientific values 
intrude less and less (Weinberg 1985, cited in Jasanoff 1987: 202). 
Given the proclaimed capacity of scientists to be ‘objective,’ and to know ‘pure’ 
science when they see it, Weinberg went on to argue that the boundary between 
science and trans-science—the point at which ‘pure’ science ends and trans-science 
begins—should be set by scientists. Therefore, as Brian Wynne (1987) points out, 
Weinberg managed to fence off a realm of uncertainty and controversy from the 
domain of science itself in a formulation that assumes science is in principle prior to, 
and separate from, social values. Furthermore, Weinberg maintained that the best 
alternative for dealing with trans-scientific issues is the adversarial procedure of 
pluralist politics.
14  In this way, Weinberg’s trans-science maintains the strict 
separation between science and politics.  
                                                 
14 The implications of the adversarial model of politics for EA practice will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
when Taylor’s Science Model of EA will be explored. Chapter 3 
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Analysis vs Assessment 
The parallels of Weinberg’s account of trans-science with Caldwell’s elaboration of 
the distinction between analysis and assessment in EA are striking, and similarly 
boundary-defining. The broad separation of events in EA is captured in the title of 
Caldwell’s (1991) paper, “Analysis-assessment-decision: the anatomy of rational 
policymaking.” Caldwell describes analysis as a “factual and objective” report of 
possible impacts and effects, and thereby defines it as an exemplar of scientific 
rationality. In contrast, assessment is characterised as an evaluative activity which 
aims to elucidate the policy implications of analysis and translate them into a 
language intelligible to decision makers, and thus into a language “amenable to a 
defensible decision” (Caldwell 1991: 86). Caldwell (1982) had earlier emphasised 
the necessity of such evaluative activity, stating that “in reality, the ‘facts’ are silent 
– someone always speaks for the facts, and they are often susceptible to more than 
one interpretation. The application of scientific knowledge to any problem requires 
judgement as to what facts are relevant and reliable” (Caldwell 1982).
15 
In this formulation, however, it is only when scientific knowledge is applied that 
value judgments must be made; the integrity and cognitive authority of the ‘facts’ 
themselves—the scientific analysis required to inform assessment—is not questioned 
or doubted as being a realm free of subjective or contextual values. Caldwell’s 
distinction between analysis and assessment therefore reflects a standard framing of 
science and the more political policy process, which emphasises the distinctive and 
                                                 
15 This dualism is also evident in Kennedy’s (1988) characterisation of EA as both ‘science’ and ‘art’, 
so described according to Kennedy because EA combines a scientific approach to analysis with a 
recognition that decision making is inevitably a political process (cited in Weston 2000; see also Petts 
1999).  Competing Influences 
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divergent roles of these institutions.
16 This standard framing has been described by 
Brian Norton (forthcoming) as the ‘serial’ approach to policy making, in which a 
scientific, ‘fact-gathering’ activity precedes the evaluative assessment process, where 
the possible consequences of policy and management actions are identified. The 
interventions oriented to the achievement of social goals are then derived from the 
recommendations of this latter process.  
As Norton points out, this serial tendency is still compatible with an iterative 
conception of the policy process, wherein it may be possible to revisit the science 
and then to reconsider policy options. In this way, the impact of science on policy is 
revisited as the science is improved, and as more information becomes available. 
This iterative approach is of course central to the logic of adaptive management as it 
is usually conceived. However, the flow of information remains unidirectional in this 
model of policy making, from science to policy. There is no flow of information 
from policy to science, so that the impact of policy on science is not revisited: there is 
no dialogue about the impacts of the evaluative ‘policy’ discourse on the discourse of 
science. Therefore, despite the portrayal of science as an ongoing process of revision 
and improvement rather than an existing body of fact, the unidirectional flow of 
information from scientific description to evaluation and prediction still assumes that 
improvements in the science result from a process internal to science itself. This 
iterative approach therefore sustains the myth of value-neutrality in science which, it 
is assumed, can be purged of the corrupting influence of social values. 
                                                 
16 Jasanoff makes a parallel observation regarding the terms in which science and the law are 
generally described: “science seeks truth, while the law does justice; science is descriptive, but law is 
prescriptive; science emphasises progress, whereas the law emphasises process” (Jasanoff 1995). Chapter 3 
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Public Disclosure:  Democratising the Discourse of Government? 
The expansive public interest activism of the 1960s and 1970s facilitated what 
Jasanoff (1995) has dubbed the era of ‘social regulation’, during which new 
legislation supplemented predominantly economic objectives. New government 
agencies responsible for the protection of public health, safety and the environment 
were set up. Pressures to reduce the hegemony of experts, and to make decision 
making more transparent, were advanced most powerfully when such public activism 
was widespread. As a result, legislation saw the incorporation of provisions for 
public disclosure and comment throughout the bureaucracy. 
But the introduction of public participation into the processes of government has not 
challenged the instrumental relationship between science and policy. Rather, as 
Dryzek (1990) explains, democracy in this context has been introduced as an 
additional problem-solving method, so that its incorporation is reconciled to the 
structural status quo of liberal capitalism. In accordance with this tinkering with the 
status quo, public participation in EA has been interpreted from its inception as 
public disclosure of the science which informs policy decisions. In this way, the 
more explicitly public orientation of policy making, associated with provisions for 
public participation in EA, was accompanied by greater transparency in the policy 
process, so that the science informing political decisions was also made accessible 
(in principle) to all interested citizens and groups. The goal of democratising the 
policy-making process was defined as the democratisation of public access to 
science. Caldwell firmly believed that democratising access to scientific information 
would pressure policy makers to take account of the environmental consequences of 
their decisions: Competing Influences 
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Political authority today must more often be reconciled with the authority of 
knowledge. In more open democratic societies, where official and scientific 
information is available to knowledgeable citizens, the policy implications of 
scientific evidence cannot safely be ignored (Caldwell 1982). 
Caldwell went on to proclaim a need for the “public management of science” 
(Caldwell 1982). Two reasons are given, the first of which generally parallels the 
rationale for EA and its requirement for anticipatory and precautionary action: 
Caldwell argued that management of the demand for information in complex 
societies is necessary to avoid disasters that may result from conflicts of interest and 
from the unforeseen consequences of technological development. Although he 
recognised that the control of information by government is contentious because of 
the potential for its misuse and abuse, he conceded that someone would manage the 
information anyway, and so concluded that the best course of action was to ensure 
that such management was explicit and publicly accountable. In this way, Caldwell 
presents an argument for the public openness of science as a condition of the political 
authority claimed for its use in EA. 
Caldwell goes further than to merely locate science in the public domain, however. 
The historically controversial and dubious record of science was recognised by 
Caldwell, as was the nebulous character of ‘the public interest,’ so that Caldwell was 
quick to concede that the public role of science in EA was by no means foreordained. 
But EA was presented as a way to address both problems simultaneously. Caldwell 
thus presents the ‘action-forcing’ provision of EA as “a way not only to deploy 
scientific knowledge in a manner that will serve the public interest, but also to 
discover criteria for the public interest upon which almost everyone can, in principle, 
agree” (Caldwell 1982: 126). Where the ‘discovery’ of ‘the public interest’ had Chapter 3 
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previously come about by means of human experience—experience often achieved at 
the expense of life, values and property—the strategy of EA was to substitute this 
process of trial and error with what Caldwell refers to as the more reliable method of 
scientific inquiry. According to Caldwell, this is the EA process at its best: “a 
practical way to approximate the elusive goal of discovering the public interest” 
(Caldwell 1982).  
With this formulation, science becomes synonymous with the public interest: the 
knowledge produced by science is a more reliable and less tainted way of 
discovering the public interest. This formulation brings to mind the Enlightenment 
dictum that the application of scientific knowledge necessarily serves the betterment 
of humanity. Together with the necessity that citizens must ‘understand science’ if 
they wish to contribute to EA, Caldwell leaves us in no doubt about the relative 
contribution of science and the public toward ‘discovering’ the elusive public 
interest: “[i]t is not merely the opportunity for public participation in the decision 
process that gives NEPA its power; the strength of NEPA is rather to be found in the 
mandatory substantive provisions of the act regarding the uses of science in planning 
and decisionmaking” (Caldwell 1982: 128). In this formulation, the science itself is 
not questioned as the source of authoritative knowledge: “And so it is knowledge 
[defined as tested fact and theory], derived by professional scientists through 
methods believed to be scientific and applied to public affairs, with which we are Competing Influences 
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primarily concerned” (Caldwell 1982: 18).
17 In this way, the autonomy and 
‘objectivity’ of science is sustained, its self-regulating status and political neutrality 
unchallenged by the location of science in the public domain.  
What we see resulting from this well-meaning attempt to extend public participation 
in EA, then, parallels Steve Fuller’s account of America’s ‘Great Society’ 
programme: “Accordingly, the public would be swept up into the scientific 
enterprise. However, they would do so as citizen-subjects, not themselves citizen-
experimenters: the public would not initiate research but merely react or adapt to it, 
albeit often in quite critical and sophisticated ways” (Fuller 2000: 29). This 
alienation of citizens from the process of inquiry is particularly problematic because 
public policy is precisely about the need to attend to the public dimensions of 
technological choice—about the relationship between “democratic citizenship and 
the shaping of technological order” (Winner 1993: 62). 
V  The Dominant Epistemology of Environmental Assessment 
Up to this point I have argued that the authority of scientific knowledge is not 
questioned in EA, and that the commitment in EA to the instrumental application of 
science to inform policy making is intricately woven throughout the dominant formal 
                                                 
17 At greater length, Caldwell defines science as ‘(1) method (in fact, a body of methodology) for 
creating and testing knowledge. It is developed and used as (2) an occupation by “scientists” who seek 
to establish a body of (3) knowledge (i.e., tested fact and theory), which is often referred to as 
“science.” Finally … a distinction is sometimes drawn between so-called “pure” or basic science and 
its (4) application to human needs and purposes. And so it is knowledge, derived by professional 
scientists through methods believed to be scientific and applied to public affairs, with which we are 
primarily concerned. But … it is interdisciplinary, not multidisciplinary, knowledge and represents an 
effort to achieve new levels of informational and conceptual integration’ (Caldwell 1982: 18). He does 
recognise, however, that popular understanding of the term science is “less precise,” and usually 
thought to be “knowledge derived empirically from recorded experience or from experiment” Chapter 3 
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frameworks and theoretical models of the EA process. We have also seen that the 
problem-oriented,  pragmatic rationality which is implicit in the adaptive 
management model of EA has largely been interpreted as instrumentalist attention to 
problem-solving techniques. This is despite the increasing recognition that the 
knowledges and techniques traditionally drawn upon to inform EA are proving 
increasingly inadequate, particularly to address the uncertainties thrown up by 
attention to the assessment of policy proposals. 
As it has been defined within liberal-democratic societies, the methodological aim of 
inquiry is to ground knowledge in a rigorous manner in the systematic procedures of 
scientific methodology in order to avoid the radical scepticism which otherwise 
threatens to dominate politics. Without some kind of standard to which we can 
appeal, so the argument goes, the only test of value becomes that of subjective 
preference (Anderson 1990). This phenomena has been characterised by Bernstein 
(1983) in a broader context as ‘relativism’, or the claim that there is no substantive 
overarching framework or universal standards by which to evaluate competing 
alternatives. Because the subjective preferences of individuals are thought to be just 
that—subjective, and so based as easily on whim or fancy as on considered 
opinion—they provide no solid foundation upon which strategies for political action 
might be crafted. 
Attempts to justify the status of science as a uniquely authoritative method of gaining 
objective knowledge about the natural world have always involved the elaboration of 
boundary-defining criteria—criteria for testing hypotheses and assessing theories—
that demarcate the scientific method from other (ostensibly lesser) forms of inquiry, 
                                                 
(Caldwell 1982: 15); that is, the empiricist picture. Competing Influences 
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notably politics and religion. As Joseph Rouse explains, “our understanding of 
science and its place in our culture is far more deeply influenced by its presumed 
opposition to ‘the two-fold influence of tyranny and superstition’ than by any 
particular epistemology” (Rouse 1987). The task of providing a well-founded 
justification for the distinction between “beliefs scientifically arrived at and those 
materially influenced by the use of power” defines much contemporary scholarship 
of science (Rouse 1987).  
Evidence as to the influence of power on science itself in the latter twentieth century 
prompted attempts to further elaborate criteria to demarcate science from non-
science, and so to provide justification for science as being uniquely capable of 
advancing knowledge of the world. Popper, Merton and Kuhn all attempted to 
explain what they took to be the singular achievement of science: an improving 
validity and reliability in its models of the world (Gieryn 1995). Whether by 
Popper’s falsification, Merton’s norms, or Kuhn’s paradigmatic consensus, claims 
for the demarcation of science from non-science help construct and preserve the 
cognitive authority of science. The notion of trans-science is the latest development 
in such attempts. By defining the need for a different kind of science, this discursive 
boundary-defining concept has retained an authoritative space for science free from 
subjective values. 
The elevation of science above the vagaries of politics is sustained in binary accounts 
of EA, which separate the ‘scientific’ process of analysis from the ‘politicised’ 
assessment process. This approach is justified by the epistemological tenet known as 
the ‘fact-value dichotomy’—the rigorous separation of facts and values—which 
demands that empirical research be conducted independently of normative context Chapter 3 
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and implications. I submit that it is this instrumentalist character of EA which, by 
ignoring the institutional and social context through which policy must be formulated 
and implemented, ensures that it is incapable of addressing the challenges it is 
confronted with in the upstream context of policy EA.  
Richard Bernstein alerts us to the significance of instrumental rationality in modern 
society: “The view of reason as an instrument for determining the most efficient or 
effective means to a predeterminate end” has become the only concept of reason to 
make sense, while “the only concept of activity that seems viable is one of technical 
application, manipulation and control” (Bernstein 1983: 46). Framed by the 
epistemology of instrumental rationality, the activities of practice are succinctly 
characterised as “instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of 
scientific theory and technique” (Schön 1983: 21).  
Widely thought of as a problem-solving activity, it is of course the primary goal of 
EA to apply science to inform decision making. Further to this application of 
scientific knowledge, EA employs scientific methods and techniques. At the same 
time, however, Caldwell and others explicitly dissociate EA with science per se. For 
one, Beattie categorically declares that “EIAs are not science” in his aptly titled 
essay “Everything you know about EIA (but don’t often admit)” (Beattie 1995). But 
the point Beattie makes is that merely admitting that EA is not science—that is, 
adopting an uncritical attitude toward science itself and being concerned only with its 
application—does not help us to understand what we can expect from science. 
It is undeniably true that EA is concerned in part with the technical aspects of human 
action and its environmental consequences, and therefore aims to apply different 
means of analysis and technological control in order to identify, measure and Competing Influences 
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mitigate environmental impacts. But it is this emphasis on the application of science 
which ensures that a hierarchical model of knowledge is followed, and which 
artificially separates research from practice. As Schön (1983) explains, this hierarchy 
of knowledge elevates the general principles and standardised knowledge of science 
to the highest level, and subordinates concrete problem solving to the lowest rung: 
“The application of basic science yields applied science. Applied science yields 
diagnostic and problem-solving techniques which are applied in turn to the actual 
delivery of services” (Schön 1983: 24). Based on this schema, scientific knowledge 
enters the equation as a product, a theory or matter of fact that is itself considered to 
be unproblematic and need only be applied.  
Reliance on the application of science to inform governmental decision making is 
based on our society’s commitment to a rational—that is, reliably objective—policy 
process (Jasanoff 1995). In the first instance, the aim of science is to generate 
reliable  knowledge, “to render nature … predictable, familiar and routine” 
(Anderson 1990: 25). Therefore, the rational enterprise of EA, based on the methods 
of science, aspires to be a reliable way of knowing and acting, a disciplined approach 
to inquiry guided by the canons of tried-and-tested technique. This idea of the 
rationalisation of practice thus implies standardisation, an orientation which has led 
Charles Anderson to conclude that “[i]n the end, the justification for the most 
significant associations of our age is not tradition, or solidarity, or democratic 
consent, but the systematization of technique” (Anderson 1990: 22).  
It follows that in this conception of practice, practical rationality is narrowly 
understood to mean instrumental rationality, and is equated with a methodological 
calculus that demands the selection of good means to clarified ends (Dryzek 1990). Chapter 3 
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Practice is merely a conception of method—the purpose can be anything. The 
commitment to reliable knowledge in EA means that rational inquiry should enable a 
standard and consistent performance that functions in the same way in all similar 
situations. Based on this approach, the formally enshrined rational model of EA 
practice ensures that the process follows a consistent procedure in all relevant 
contexts—the purpose can be anything.
18  
Further to this commitment to reliable knowledge and performance, dependence 
upon the objective superiority of expert opinion, notes Sullivan (1995), has meant a 
similar reluctance to embrace a concern with the purposes of knowledge. As Sullivan 
(1995) goes on to explain, such uncritical affirmation of externally imposed 
standards has served to stifle the kind of reasoned public judgment which might 
enable consideration of the moral as well as technical aspects of important social 
issues that confront a practice. Underlying this reluctance, Sullivan argues, is a 
staunch commitment to the epistemic regime of positivism:
  
Although positivism in the technical sense as a theory of science, or in logical 
positivism, as a philosophical theory of meaning and language, has been successfully 
criticized many times, its power as a kind of ideology or understanding of life retains 
great influence. In significant part this is because that ideology valorizes scientific and 
technical rationality and certifies that their application to the human world can be 
unproblematic (Sullivan 1995: 166). 
On this basis, to borrow Steve Fuller’s evocative phrase, we might say that EA has 
succumbed to “the siren song of positivism” (Fuller 2000: 76).  
                                                 
18 More specifically, the ends of policy are deemed to be properly determined by politics, so that the 
purposes of knowledge are defined externally to the EA process itself. Competing Influences 
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VI Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to make explicit the assumptions which 
underpin conceptions of science in dominant models of EA practice. I have argued 
that the models of policy making which prevail in EA practice are based on a 
commitment to the ‘objectivity’ or political neutrality of science, and a reliance upon 
the knowledges and procedures of the natural sciences as the basis of policy 
legitimacy. This scientism is accompanied by an instrumentalist link between 
scientific knowledge and political action, so that science is uncritically applied to the 
problems of policy.  
A central theme that emerges within a model of policy making based on this 
commitment is that the analyst is conceived as a detached observer of objective 
phenomena, and therefore endeavours to gain knowledge of  environmental 
phenomena in order to apply it to policy. It is this detached stance which ensures that 
the uncertainties faced by EA are conceived as external to the structures and 
practices of EA itself, so that the predominant reaction is to call for more 
information—more knowledge of  the phenomenon being studied. This detached 
stance is also evident in recommendations that EA gain knowledge of the policy 
process, so that it might uncritically adapt to this process. This typically apolitical 
focus of EA testifies to the persistence of positivism and its tendency to promote 
service to established institutions. 
Whilst the implicit influence of a pragmatic rationality is evident in adaptive models 
of EA, the more radical implications of pragmatism appear to have gone unnoticed in 
the search for a model of policy inquiry for EA. By sustaining the gulf between 
theory and practice, dominant approaches to inquiry in EA do not help us to Chapter 3 
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understand how we can provide authoritative knowledge, nor what we can expect 
from science, when uncertainty and indeterminacy pervade policy making.   
 
− 4 − 
 
The Contemporary Tension 
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In the closing decades of the twentieth century the intellectual 
and technical advance of science coincides with its visible 
decline as a force in the rhetoric of liberal-democratic politics. 
(Ezrahi 1990) 
 
 
 
 
It has been established that the knowledges and techniques of the natural sciences are 
taken for granted as the sole source of legitimate knowledge in dominant models of 
EA practice. Whilst the founding assumptions of EA have challenged the epistemic 
authority of scientism from within, these challenges have not significantly altered the 
logic of EA as institutionalised, where a positivist attitude to joining knowledge and 
action has been formally adopted. Informed by an instrumentalist rationality, the 
detached problem-solving (rational) approach in EA has usurped the pragmatic 
rationality implicit in the contextual problem-oriented (adaptive) model of EA. 
However, because experience with environmental problems at the policy level has 
more explicitly questioned the assumption that scientific procedures can supply the 
knowledge necessary to solve such problems, the political question of what makes 
knowledge legitimate for policy can no longer be ignored.  Chapter 4 
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This is a question which has yet to be seriously considered by EA scholars and 
practitioners. Ignoring the question occurs despite the difficulties associated with 
evaluating the influence of EA on policy decisions (not to mention outcomes)—
something of a pre-occupation of EA scholars (Sadler 1996). It also occurs despite 
the widespread recognition of implementation deficits in environmental policy 
making more generally (Jordan 1999)—deficits which challenge the assumption that 
the substance of policy decisions necessarily translates into positive action on the 
ground. Implementation deficits confirm the tenuous nature of the instrumentalist 
link between scientific knowledge and political action held to govern EA practice.  
Nonetheless, the predominant approach to EA remains based on the assumption that 
the results of analysis can be imported into policy regardless of the way a policy 
process conceives of the link between knowledge and political action. As noted in 
Chapter 2, several theorists advance the view that frameworks for EA practice should 
ensure that the process is flexible so that it may adapt to existing policy making and 
planning procedures, whatever system is in place (cf. Partidário 2000; Thérivel and 
Partidário 2000). This has led Partidário to define the success of SEA in terms of the 
“quality of the final decision” (Partidário 2000: 658).
1 I will argue in the discussion 
to follow that this approach is at best problematic, at worst fatally flawed. Scientific 
knowledge is treated as an instrument when it becomes entangled with the 
conflicting interests in society, so that environmental science is increasingly unable 
to support policy action. In these circumstances, an instrumental role for EA in 
improving the decision will not on its own enable EA to transform the policy 
process, and thus contribute to sound and democratic environmental governance. The Contemporary Tension 
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The realities of sustaining the gulf between science and politics within formal 
processes of policy inquiry have been increasingly challenged with the entanglement 
of science and politics in contemporary policy making. In adversarial policy forums 
there is an increasing tendency for environmental issues to become polarised, and for 
policy debates to become intractable, so that environmental science is increasingly 
unable to support policy action. It is somewhat ironic, then, that the typical response 
of policy actors has been to more actively solidify the instrumental character of the 
commitment to both science and interest-based politics in public decision making, 
despite the realisation that “increasing knowledge and increasing participation—in 
the sense of larger numbers of voices at the table—do not by themselves 
automatically tell us how to act or how to make good decisions” (Jasanoff 1996: 65).  
Following Jasanoff, I propose that neither the technocratic model (more and better 
science), nor the democratic model (more and better public participation) 
“adequately captures what is at stake in decisions that are at once scientific and 
political” (Jasanoff 1990).
2 Of particular concern is the paradoxical situation that 
both science and politics are devalued when their relationship is constructed in this 
way (Jasanoff 1987).
3  
The call for better techniques is the prevailing orientation in moves to develop a 
methodological framework for EA in the policy context. There is of course a need for 
better techniques to facilitate environmental assessment and management; however, 
                                                 
1 As already noted, adapting SEA to dominant policy processes in order to improve the decision 
therefore confuses output (the decision) with outcome (improved prospects for sustainability). 
2 Nor does either model accurately portray the richness and practical potential of the processes they 
are alleged to represent; but that is to pre-empt the reconstructive arguments of chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 4 
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the challenge remains fundamentally political. This has been the admission of EA 
scholars since Caldwell, who go on to interpret the ‘political’ challenge as one 
fundamentally out of their hands. What I will show in this chapter is the danger 
inherent in this renunciation of responsibility. 
The chapter begins in Section I with an account of the problems that have arisen in 
policy more generally, and in EA in particular, with the increased provisions for 
public access to the science used to inform policy decisions. Section II explores the 
specivic challenges to the autonomy and integrity of science disclosed by this 
contemporary entanglement of science and politics. Section III examines the dualistic 
framing of the tension between science and politics that underpins these problems as 
it is manifested in the context of practice, and points to a need to recover attention to 
neglected issues of problem definition and context. Attention to these issues points to 
the inescapably political nature of epistemology, as discussed in Section IV, which 
reveals the inescapable interdependence of science and politics in policy making. 
This situation demands, I shall argue in Section V, a more constructive approach to 
policy making in which the interaction of science and politics is central. The chapter 
concludes by sketching the demands of such an approach, in which public 
participation becomes an epistemological and political imperative.  
I  The Tension Between Science and Politics  
Since the twin birth of liberal-democratic thought and modern science in the 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, science has been held as something of an 
                                                 
3 Recent concern about this issue is exemplified by the dedication of a special issue of the journal 
Science and Public Policy to the topic “Scientific expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of 
science in politics” (June 1999). The Contemporary Tension 
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exemplary community of freedom and co-operation in the pursuit of a common goal: 
“the use of reason to advance knowledge and thus to improve humanity’s lot” 
(Guston 2000). As a result, it has served as a model of integrity for the larger society, 
and of the efficacy of instrumental action and values, upon which representative 
government relies (Ezrahi 1990). Our society’s commitment to both science and 
democracy is confirmed by the fact that these are the only languages that have 
achieved anything close to universal validity in western culture (Jasanoff 1996). 
Interestingly, too, both practices appear in spirit as congenial to each other, 
emphasising free inquiry, open access to information, and informed critical debate 
(Jasanoff 1996; Anderson 1990). The basic difference between science and politics is 
considered to be that politics is interested, and science is disinterested. Steve Fuller 
provides a rich account of the congruity of science and politics in liberal-democratic 
societies, and of the way the autonomy of science has nonetheless been sustained: 
On the one hand, modern science’s ideological commitment to free exchange and 
mutual criticism conjures up the image of a democratically governed enterprise. All 
scientists participate as equals, and any of them is capable of successfully challenging 
whatever any of the rest says. Indeed, the most vividly drawn examples of democratic 
governance in the liberal tradition, as found in the writings of Mill, Dewey and 
Popper, are basically extended analogies from what they understood to be the 
normative structure of science (Merton 1973: Ch.13). On the other hand, however, 
both scientists and their defenders have been loath to extend this sense of democracy 
beyond the borders of science itself – that is, to make scientists accountable to the 
larger body of concerns represented by society. The positive way of putting this point 
has been to say that science flourishes in a state of ‘autonomy’. And, in so far as we 
unreflectively accept the sharpness of such distinctions as ‘producers vs. users’ of 
knowledge or ‘basic vs. applied’ research, we assent to this perspective. It continues 
the Plato-Durkheim tradition of knowledge dictating the terms of power, though this 
tradition is now complicated by the fact that many modern societies are themselves 
democratically organized, and hence include several interest groups capable of 
appropriating science to their advantage. Nevertheless, these groups still retain the 
subordinate status of mere ‘users’, ‘appliers’ and ‘consumers’ of knowledge (Fuller 
2000: 31). Chapter 4 
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As Jasanoff (1995) argues convincingly, making scientific knowledge and expertise 
more readily accessible to all parties must be considered an important contribution to 
democratising the processes of government. However, conceived merely as public 
disclosure of the science that will inform decision making, public access to science 
has resulted in consequences both unanticipated and unwanted by advocates of 
transparent government. What has very quickly come under threat with the 
democratisation of access to science, and the subsequent appropriation of science by 
citizens, is the political legitimacy of science as an autonomous source of cognitive 
authority for policy making: “Controversies reveal unavoidable interpretive 
flexibility of scientific claims, dispelling the idea of ‘pure’ or ‘objective’ scientific 
analysis in the political realm” (Jasanoff 1990).  
The Politics of Expertise 
Ideally, the direction and research priorities of science are determined internally, by 
scientists themselves. In the context of public policy, however, the selection of 
research questions and methods may be determined by policy actors concerned to 
direct the focus of policy making in a way that suits their own ends. The benefits of 
this contextual orientation should not be dismissed, in particular its implications for 
policy professionalism: 
Pursued with such a societal and institutional focus, the epistemological challenge to 
scientism raises the possibility of a reorientation of policy professionalism, toward 
practices which—while concerned with immediate issues of reform—are also attuned 
to a larger agenda animated by a spirit of dissent (Torgerson 1997).  
Thus attuned, environmental professionals may deliberately align themselves with 
the emergent social concerns of the environmental movement. This is the approach 
adopted in advocacy research, which is designed to directly confront the elitist biases The Contemporary Tension 
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of mainstream research (Fischer 1999). It is a deliberate attempt to transcend the 
alleged value-neutrality of expertise by consciously aligning research with the 
interests of groups in society. Directly connecting the concerns of citizens with the 
actions of professional practice, the ‘use’ of science by adversaries in political debate 
can no longer be conceived as entirely instrumental because it highlights the 
interdependence of science and its social context. 
At the same time, as Nelkin (1975) points out, the self-proclaimed autonomy of the 
scientific enterprise has rendered science itself ill-equipped to deal with these kinds 
of external pressures. The legacy of Mertonian and Popperian influences in science, 
which claim political autonomy as the normative criterion of scientific practice, 
presume the self-regulating practice of critical peer review will ensure that only 
certified knowledge enters the public realm: knowledge which has been tested and 
replicated, and may thus be presented as authoritative and value-free. The norms of 
science, it is presumed, will thereby insulate the institution of science from external 
influences.  
As Brian Wynne (1987) explains, the assumption that science is always driven by the 
aim of critically testing and revising its own basic frameworks and premises, which 
derives from the contemporary influence of the Popperian and Mertonian traditions 
in science, implies that science is inherently uncertainty seeking. It is therefore 
assumed that science automatically uncovers and explores the uncertainties in 
existing knowledge. In turn, when science is drawn upon to inform public policy and 
regulation, the fundamental uncertainties—labelled ‘technical’ or ‘scientific’—are 
thought to be at least within our understanding, and so theoretically can be rooted out 
and managed. Moreover, when science is injected into the political forums of policy Chapter 4 
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making, it is assumed that scientific knowledge is independently certified and need 
only be applied to inform policy. 
But numerous studies of the micro-politics of environmental controversies over the 
past three decades reveal that instead, when science is imported into the adversarial 
setting of pluralist politics characteristic of liberal-democratic societies, the uncritical 
application of scientific and technical expertise has meant that science is itself 
employed by opposing political interests. In situations of conflict of interest, the 
science itself inevitably becomes politicised; the disinterested status of science is 
compromised; and, as a direct consequence, the political authority of science as a 
self-regulating institution capable of providing value-free knowledge for policy 
comes into question. Thus, disputes become intractable, and science is increasingly 
unable to provide authoritative knowledge in support of political action.  
Studies by Dorothy Nelkin (1975) and others
4 have shown that scientific research is 
interpreted and employed by politicians and interest groups alike to reinforce their 
own strategic and partial purposes, so that science becomes mere ammunition in the 
context of interest-based politics. Such studies have made it clear that the external 
demands made of science for practical efficacy, and thus for knowledge that can be 
effectively utilised by decision makers to legitimise their policy choices, conflicts 
fundamentally with the internal demands of science, which bases its claims to truth 
on political neutrality and an objective, unbiased account of the facts. Thus, as 
Connie Ozawa explains, “conventional decision making methods that cultivate a 
highly antagonistic and competitive environment and set of relationships place 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Ozawa (1991), Collingridge and Reeve (1986), and Jasanoff (1987).  The Contemporary Tension 
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scientists in a position that is contrary to the professed norms of the scientific 
community” (Ozawa 1991).  
In public domains, this has direct implications for the social acceptance and 
credibility of expertise. Sheila Jasanoff articulates the consequences of this situation 
with distinctive clarity, declaring that the practice of “[i]nsulating the experts in 
closed worlds of formal inquiry and then, under the label of participation, opening up 
their findings to unlimited critical scrutiny appears to be a recipe for unending debate 
and spiralling distrust” (Jasanoff 1996: 69). Indeed, “there is reason to wonder if the 
basic prerequisites for decisionmaking under uncertainty have been correctly 
recognized” (Jasanoff 1996: 69). 
Despite the politicised nature of this adversarial process, however, the politics of 
expertise effectively remains a disinterested politics. Citizens who employ scientific 
knowledge to support their policy position do so on the assumption that it comes 
replete with a claim to scientific legitimacy and political authority. Citizens remain 
mere ‘appliers’ of knowledge to their chosen ends. Thus, where knowledge replaced 
politics with the positivist celebration of instrumental reason and the associated 
scientism of policy processes, here we reveal the paradoxical situation in which 
politics replaces knowledge in the interest-based politics of expertise. 
The Advocacy Model of Environmental Assessment 
One of few studies to explicitly investigate how EA works in the broader political 
context is Serge Taylor’s (1984) Making Bureaucracies Think. Taylor’s (1984) 
commitment to the positivist tenet that the provision of better knowledge necessarily Chapter 4 
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leads to better decisions is less than sanguine.
5 Rather than the search for technical 
information, Taylor argues that the task is to provide an account of how the social 
intelligence capabilities of public organisations operating under conditions of intense 
conflict have been enhanced by the introduction of EA. Thus, in contrast to the 
rational model’s inattention to context, Taylor attends to the success of EA as a 
‘science model’ of knowledge production imported into the adversarial context of 
liberal-democratic politics.
6  
It is Taylor’s thesis that “the Environmental Impact Statement process can be seen as 
an attempt to import ‘scientific’ norms and procedures into a political setting of 
intense conflict”, and thereby to contribute to the social intelligence government 
agencies require if they are to induce learning under conditions of conflict of interest 
(Taylor 1984: 8). The essence of Taylor’s argument for EA is “that an arrangement 
much like the scientific community—an analytical competition among government 
agencies and private groups that is regulated by some kind of rules—is the key to 
improving organizational intelligence” (Taylor 1984: 4). In this formulation, he 
presents a model of EA as a self-regulating process based upon the system of peer 
review in science, combined with a process of policy making based upon on 
Lindblom’s pluralist model of politics. In the spirit of Weinberg’s solution to trans-
scientific questions, then, Taylor maintains the institutionalised separation of science 
and politics. 
                                                 
5 I will explain Taylor’s thesis at some length here because his account of EA is the only account 
which presents EA in terms of the theory of knowledge which informs it, as well as a framework for 
linking knowledge to political action. 
6 This is also the basic intent of those scholars who would import EA into existing policy processes. The Contemporary Tension 
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Taylor believes that the key to overcoming the epistemological problems associated 
with prediction of environmental impacts, and thus with the causal relations assumed 
in the rational model of EA, is one of devising appropriate institutional 
arrangements. These arrangements ideally derive from the social and institutional 
conditions that constitute the normative framework of the scientific community. 
These normative conditions are purported to guide the conduct of research science, 
and thus to account for the flourishing of modern science (Jasanoff 1990). Drawing 
on the scholarship of several sociologists and philosophers of science,
7 notably 
Robert Merton, Taylor outlines five such conditions, which he describes as the norms 
of scientific inquiry.
8 The norms of scientific inquiry elaborated by Merton seek to 
establish the authority of science in the public domain. In particular, the obligation 
for open communication of scientific findings asserted by the norm of communism 
(or communalism) embodies a firm commitment to the public openness of science. 
At the same time, effective self-policing by the scientific community enhances the 
                                                 
7 Taylor cites Merton, Lakatos and Kuhn (among others) as scholars whose work he draws upon to 
derive these criteria. He does not, however, point to the influence of individual scholars on particular 
aspects of his thinking about how the scientific community works. Given that Kuhn and Merton 
propose quite different theories about the way knowledge progresses in science, I must make my own 
inferences about which theorists have been most influential in guiding Taylor’s thesis. In my view, 
Taylor’s work most closely resembles a combination of Merton’s social norms of inquiry, 
complemented by Lakatos’s framework of institutionalised criticism, which together aim to justify the 
political neutrality of science sustained by a system of ‘organised scepticism’, or peer review. 
8 The conditions given by Taylor closely parallel the criteria outlined by Merton to constitute the 
social and normative conditions necessary for progress in science. Taylor takes these norms to be the 
criteria which define ‘The Scientific Method’ (Taylor 1984: 327): 
1. Norms within the scientific community that call for disagreements to be decided solely on analytical 
grounds, without any legitimate competing goals to that of empirically corroborated truth.  
2. Insulation from other institutions that have different goals, such as political power or religious 
orthodoxy, so that theories can be more easily judged solely on empirical and logical grounds.  
3. Atomistic organization of scientific production, so that the proponents of one theory cannot gain a 
monopoly of resources to protect a theory from invalidation by those who doubt it.  
4. High social rewards within the scientific community for detecting error (in others) …  Chapter 4 
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political autonomy and social prestige of science (its disinterestedness) while holding 
scientists accountable to the standards of their peers. 
Within this framework, social cohesion in science is thought to be fostered by 
informal networks, while the formal process of peer review controls the diffusion of 
knowledge in the public realm (Jasanoff 1987). According to Merton, these 
conditions ensure the autonomy of science as a self-regulating social institution, one 
which operates independently of external interests and personal bias, so that science 
is able to ground its claim to authority on the ideals of ethical and political neutrality. 
Taylor claims that the ‘architecture’ of EA is based on just these conditions—
informal networks and peer review—and is therefore responsible for the autonomous 
status of EA as a self-regulating institution, which operates “without any formal 
requirement for its operation” (Taylor 1984).
9 
The informal networking and peer review conditions in EA are sustained by 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, respectively. Insiders are environmental analysts employed 
by the public agencies, described as institutionalised “analyst-advocates” of 
precarious environmental values (Taylor 1984: 251). External regulation of the EA 
process is facilitated by competition from other public organisations, and sustained 
by informal rules and expectations shared by all actors. This emphasis on 
competition is central to Taylor’s conception of knowledge advance in science: 
                                                 
5. The freedom of the scientific community to suspend judgment on a disputed problem … because it 
has no other competing goal to the goal of empirically corroborated truth (Taylor 1984: 22-23).  
9 Taylor also claims that EA has injected these norms into government agencies otherwise bereft of 
the social and institutional conditions for advancing knowledge. By arguing that EA provides an 
innovative framework in which science is not only applied, but is also advanced, Taylor is essentially 
arguing that EA takes on the institutionalised goal of science as its own. The Contemporary Tension 
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“Competition generates alternative theories, empirical selection criteria winnow out 
the weaker theories, knowledge of the physical world advances” (Taylor 1984: 24).
10 
Outsiders are interested members of the public provided with improved access to 
information. The rationale for this arrangement is derived from the formal process of 
peer review in science, so that the public commenting process in EA represents the 
primary means of enforcing the analytical norms of competition and mutual criticism 
on government agencies, and thus for controlling the diffusion of knowledge in the 
public realm.
11 Taylor asserts that it is the public nature of analysis in EA that 
ensures its success: “the existence of public analysis—and consequent political 
controversy—may impel the managers to improve the quality of the informal 
environmental analysis they obtain …” (Taylor 1984: 29). The public disclosure and 
commenting provisions of the EA process facilitate and channel public pressure and 
support for EA by outsiders, pressure believed to be essential for making insiders 
influential in progressing knowledge about the environmental consequences of 
policy, and thus for making the whole process successful. 
                                                 
10 Imre Lakatos most notably advanced this kind of scientific pluralism in his framework for scientific 
research programmes, in which the motivation to do analysis is sustained by the co-existence of a 
large range of scientific approaches, and where research communities are able to comment on each 
other’s work in public fora. Lakatos calls this approach ‘institutionalised criticism’. Although Lakatos 
refers to institutionalised criticism within the scientific community, Martin de Jong (1999) elaborates 
its relevance to the context of policy analysis in an approach similar to that taken by Taylor. 
11 This is also a requisite of orthodox liberalism, which is based on the assumption that the 
performance of the enterprise is enhanced by stimulating competition amongst individuals. This is an 
example of the parallels that exist between the logic of liberal politics and the logic of science given 
by Popper and Merton, reminiscent of the congruity of science and politics in liberal-democratic 
societies.  Chapter 4 
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The Limits of Organised Scepticism  
Taylor admits that the processes held to govern inquiry in his science model of EA 
are problematic when imported into the adversarial context of interest-based politics. 
Jasanoff (1990) argues that democratising access to science in the policy context has 
proven both beneficial and detrimental to the justification of policy choice. In 
processes like EA, where experimental methods for assessing environmental risks 
remain controversial, the opportunity for judicial review provides an additional 
barrier against the manipulation of expert opinion simply to further political interests. 
However, as Taylor found, reliance upon competition to produce better knowledge 
leaves the process vulnerable to problems associated with conflicts of interest, not 
least of which is the political expediency of knowledge when it is pursued in an 
openly adversarial process. James Boggs has articulated the politicisation of science 
in this way: “[k]nowledge produced under adversarial regimes tends to lose value as 
fact or science, because players regard it instrumentally as a tool for their own 
interests” (Boggs 1993: 32).  
Taylor also concludes that the public commenting process in EA largely fails as a 
system of peer review.
12 The limited capacity of the simulated peer review process as 
a way of institutionalising the relationship between science and politics in EA 
confirms the findings of extensive analyses of scientific controversies: peer review is 
relatively ineffective at reducing conflict in regulatory settings. The argument for 
importing peer review into the regulatory process rests upon the premise that peer 
review in science is capable of resolving disputes at the frontiers of knowledge. The 
                                                 
12 Taylor cites as reasons that conclusions are not replicated, inferences are not examined by qualified 
experts, public comments are mostly proforma, and proponents’ responses are usually ritualistic 
defences of the original arguments (Taylor 1984: 183) The Contemporary Tension 
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argument therefore relies upon a secondary premise: that science used in policy 
making is no different from the practice of science in the research setting (Jasanoff 
1990). But EA must operate at the margins of existing knowledge, whereas most 
research science is conducted within a paradigm of previously negotiated and 
relatively well accepted understandings about what constitutes good research 
methodology, as Kuhn’s (1970) analysis has amply demonstrated.  
The failings of peer review in science should be recognised for their role in exposing 
the social processes and social conflicts that underlie scientific claims (Jasanoff 
1990). The reason for the restricted practice of ‘organised scepticism’ in the 
production of science for policy, argues Jasanoff (1995), is that criticism is only 
effective within a context of trust, a context that does not characterise the adversarial 
context of pluralist politics typical of contemporary liberal-democratic polities. This 
point is also emphasised by Fuller (2000), who argues that open and critical 
discourse requires not just the toleration, but the expression of ideas in a context 
where individuals can safely claim the ‘right to be wrong’. As noted in Chapter 3, 
this tenet, described by O’Riordan et al. (2001) as the assumption that “mistakes can 
be made”, also constitutes a central premise of a precautionary approach to policy 
making. Acknowledgment of the fallibility of rationality a la Popper cannot therefore 
be uncritically imported into the social or institutional context of choice—context is 
supremely important. The expectation of being proven wrong also implies the 
willingness to revise one’s insights, so that  
rationality as openness to learning further presupposes the embeddedness of the 
scientist in a durable social context of dialogue and action. An action context, because 
only there the pragmatic alternation between thought and action exists which brings 
errors to light. A context of critical dialogue, because this catalyses the learning 
process. It is not accidental, then, that Habermas, defender par excellence of the idea Chapter 4 
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of the Enlightenment, has strongly argued that cognitive-analytic rationality is 
unthinkable without a rationality which, thus, needs to be social, interactive, and 
dialogic (Hoppe 1999: 203). 
The problems Taylor identifies (conflict of interest, and peer review) prompted a 
significant revision of his Science Model, so that Taylor concludes EA lies 
somewhere in between the Science Model and partisan mutual adjustment. In the 
end, less is required of participants in EA than the strict autonomy and self-
governing arrangements demanded of the scientific community, whilst considerably 
more is demanded of external oversight arrangements in EA than is the case in 
Lindblom’s partisan mutual adjustment, so that EA is guided by more “formal rules 
of due process and norms of analysis” (Taylor 1984: 306).
13 Even given these 
attenuated circumstances, however, Taylor argues that to the extent that the search 
for solutions to complex environmental problems activated by the EA process has 
improved the analytical competition between government agencies, the EA strategy 
of reform substantially improves the likelihood that the politicised assessment 
process will also be a social learning process.
14  
In sum, then, Taylor eschews scientific rationality and opts instead for the procedural 
rationality of pluralist politics to guide the process of knowledge production in EA: 
an adversarial process of analytical competition insufficiently guided by the 
                                                 
13 Further, rather than disputes being settled on analytical grounds, advocate-analysts require only the 
motivation to conduct analysis. Outside support is still considered crucial because the sheer 
multiplicity and diversity of external critics with different vulnerabilities is thought to ensure that if 
one source fails, another may succeed. This is Taylor’s “redundancy” thesis, which is presented as the 
impetus for a system in which the informal norms of analysis—the adversarial processes of mutual 
criticism—are stronger than those endorsed by the formal rules enunciated by the courts (Taylor 1984: 
262-74). The Contemporary Tension 
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procedural norms of fair play believed to govern peer review in science. Bruce 
Jennings neatly summarises the key features of this advocacy model of policy 
analysis: 
a sceptical or pessimistic view of the possibility of objective knowledge and 
disinterested (or, more accurately, publicly interested) motivation on one hand and a 
largely adversarial and procedural conception of legitimate processes of governance or 
policymaking on the other (Jennings 1987: 139). 
Jennings astutely notes that there is an irony inherent in this model, because its 
scepticism suggests an underlying affinity with positivism, despite the attempt to 
renounce it: “for the positivists one either had objective knowledge or subjective 
opinion; there was no middle ground. Defenders of policy analysis as advocacy seem 
to believe in that either/or as well” (Jennings 1987: 140).  
Thus, for Taylor, science is not politically neutral knowledge, but is rather socially 
created and championed by particular interests in support of their policy position—in 
this case the interest is the environment, championed by advocate-analysts located in 
government agencies. As Taylor explains, science is  
a social structure that creates inquiry and legitimizes particular ways of knowing…. 
The knowledge base that we refer to with such concreteness and confidence is, 
whatever else it may be, a socially created reality. It is an Archimedean point on 
which to stand in order to move the agencies … (Taylor 1984: 315) 
This is the point of departure for social constructivist critics of science, who argue 
that the contemporary entanglement of science and politics has only exposed the 
                                                 
14 Lindblom’s adversarial model fits well with the thesis of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), who 
recognise the use of science as intellectual ammunition in the short run, whilst submitting that policy-
oriented learning may occur in the long run. Chapter 4 
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necessarily socially constructed nature of science. For these critics, there is no such 
thing as politically neutral knowledge. 
II  The Contested Boundary Between Science and Politics 
From guardians of the common good producing objective knowledge, scientists are 
now perceived as hired brains of special interests and lobbyists of their own. There is 
now no doubt, if there ever was, that scientists are intimately involved in politics 
(Cozzens and Woodhouse 1995: 533). 
In public policy, the credibility and legitimacy of scientific knowledge derives from 
the need for public justification of decisions. In modern times, this has meant a 
reliance upon the political authority of science. But political legitimation has been 
achieved through science’s claim to autonomy, which has required the active 
alienation of the public from the practice of science itself (Fuller 2000). Therefore, 
justifying the credibility and authority of decisions within the context of public 
justification has centrally involved maintaining the authority of descriptions of 
scientific practice (Wynne 1987). 
Over the past three decades, however, social constructivist critics of science have 
challenged the authority of dominant descriptions of scientific practice. Grounded in 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, social constructivists have challenged the 
integrity of the very practices of science, concluding that the scientific knowledge 
they produce is a social construct (cf. Latour 1987). As these insights have been 
applied in the context of public policy, the dominant approach has been to propose a 
liberal and pluralistic solution to the problem of linking knowledge to action 
(Jasanoff 1999).  The Contemporary Tension 
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Challenges to the autonomy of science resulting from the politicisation of science 
have led commentators on science-based policy to claim that scientific knowledge 
has a very limited capacity to advance rational policy making (Collingridge and 
Reeve 1986). At the same time, defenders of value-free science continue to defend 
the integrity of science per se, and contend that any problems are associated only 
with its application in the policy process. A more nuanced understanding of the role 
of values in science is given by Schrader-Frechette (1985), who discriminates 
between the influence of three different kinds of values: bias values, contextual 
values, and constitutive values. The challenges to the authority of science posed by 
these values have been met by defenders of the value-neutrality of science. However, 
as we shall see, the influence of constructivist critics of science remains a potentially 
destructive force. 
The Defenders of Value-Free Science 
The first, and most easily explained, issue is the influence of bias values on science. 
The issue of an individual scientist’s credibility often takes centre stage in public 
debate because the science is said to be biased, or to have been influenced by the 
scientist’s personal, social, or cultural values. Cases of fraud, plagiarism and 
misconduct in science have served to reinforce the notion that any bias originates 
from the subjective values of scientists. Indeed, the fact that these episodes of ‘bad 
science’ have been uncovered by the process of peer review serves to reinforce the 
view that science is successfully adjudicating ‘good’ science from ‘bad’.  
Concerns about science being value-free or ‘objective’ generally refer to the 
influence of contextual values on the autonomy of science—values which originate 
in the social and political context in which science operates. This second challenge to Chapter 4 
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the authority of science, and one that is increasingly salient with industry research 
and corporate funding of university research, is the influence of these funding 
sources on the research agenda of science. This challenge can also be answered by 
the defender of value-neutrality in science, who invokes the distinction between the 
‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’.  
In the context of discovery, where the framing of the research question occurs, an 
individual scientist’s creativity in the creation of theories is sanctioned by science. 
Therefore, as Longino (1990) points out, the defender of the value freedom of 
science might claim that science is not autonomous in the extreme sense because the 
ideas of individuals do influence the creation of scientific theories when they are 
originally proposed. External direction of the research agenda may be identified as a 
phenomenon which is similar to this characteristic of science itself. However, it is 
held that such challenges have no bearing on the integrity of the internal practices of 
science—the scientific method—that make up the context of justification.  
It is the need to protect science from challenges to this context of justification that 
are at the heart of maintaining the integrity of science. Here, it is the influence of 
values on the criteria used to judge the relevance of evidence to the hypothesis being 
tested that is in question. The rigor of the scientific method is upheld because the 
rules and standards governing the processes of data collection, experimentation and 
analysis are derived from the goals of scientific inquiry, rather than from the ideas of 
individual scientists. These goals, or constitutive values,  are the normative 
constraints of truth, accuracy and predictive power, which function as a source of 
rules to determine what constitutes acceptable scientific practice and durable The Contemporary Tension 
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technique (Longino 1990). Defenders of value-free science maintain that contextual 
values do not intrude on the scientific method.  
Longino has argued that public attention to the research agendas of science (the 
context of discovery) may be acting to protect science’s claim to reliable knowledge 
from the more insidious challenge to its integrity, characterised in terms of the rigor 
of the scientific method. If evidence of the unwanted intrusion of contextual values is 
found in the reasoning process itself, the science is held to be ‘bad science’, and the 
fault is held to lie with the scientist. On this logic, when the fault lies with the 
scientist and not the science, the integrity of science remains unchallenged.  
The Policy Context of Public Justification 
Justification for the role of science in policy has accepted these arguments for value-
free science, so that the integrity of the results of science are not challenged as 
authoritative for policy. But as noted in Chapter 3, science for policy is understood to 
differ from research science in terms of both context and content. A key difference is 
that, whereas in science judgment can be suspended until further evidence is 
obtained, in politics the apparent urgency of issues often means that decisions must 
be made immediately and on the basis of inadequate information. Thus, in science-
intensive policy controversies, contextual values often intrude because of the need to 
fill the gap left by limited knowledge, and to permit a relatively coherent account of 
a given situation be provided to policy makers (Shrader-Frechette 1985). In other 
words, there is an explicit recognition that professional judgments have been made in 
order to fill the gap created by insufficient information. If available technical data are 
ambiguous or uncertain, science conducted for policy is freed from the ordinary Chapter 4 
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constraints imposed by constitutive norms, and becomes vulnerable to contextual 
values. As discussed in Chapter 2, EA is not immune from this dilemma:
15  
A cognitive process, no matter how scientific, cannot substitute for this interactive 
[political] process because it is almost certain that there will be more than one position 
on what the facts are, and hence the selection of data offers an early opportunity for 
biases to enter in. The objective and subjective judgments made in impact assessment 
are based upon values, feelings, beliefs, and prejudices and are functions of the 
professional, social, and institutional contexts of those conducting the assessment 
(Baber 1988: 175). 
However, recognition of the need for judgment is problematic within a decision 
framework which claims its legitimacy from the cognitive authority of a science held 
to be politically neutral. If judgments are being made, then the authority of an 
objective (or value-free) science cannot be called upon to determine the merits of 
competing policy positions. Therefore, despite the obvious benefits of increased 
transparency that result from public access to scientific information, citizens and 
policy makers are still want to know which expert to believe; by revealing imperfect 
information in the science, the process of democratising access to science has 
highlighted the indeterminacy of scientific knowledge at any given time.  
When science fails to provide certainty, and when competing knowledge claims 
require judgment rather than fact-finding, political criteria for assessment are likely 
to prevail (Schrader-Frechette 1985). Therefore, as we follow this scenario to its 
usual conclusion, political decision makers are provided with grounds to assert their 
authority to interpret the science, seizing upon scientific disagreement in order to 
                                                 
15 There has been an increasing recognition of the influence of subjective values as an intrinsic feature 
of EA (Wood 1995; Weston 2000). Planning officers in the UK’s Department of the Environment 
report that their appraisal of the information necessary to conduct an EA is purely a matter of 
professional judgment (DoE 1994, cited in Weston 2000). The Contemporary Tension 
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stress the limitations and uncertainties of scientific analysis. Although 
‘disinterestedness’ and ‘objectivity’ are precisely the qualities of science so highly 
prized by decision makers, the intervening policy process is in effect a public 
reconstruction of the scientific basis for environmental policy: “although scientists 
are often heavily involved in the early stages of decision making, the scientific story 
presented to the public is finally a creation of the political process” (Jasanoff 1987: 
197-8). As Jasanoff explains,  
Adherence to the Mertonian norms, coupled with a long tradition of critical peer 
control, has given scientists an assured basis for claiming cognitive authority. The 
policy process, however, simultaneously casts doubt on the distinterestedness and the 
certainty of science. These revealed weaknesses provide grounds for political 
decision-makers to assert that they have a right to engage in interpreting the science, 
especially in areas that are controversial. A partial remove of cognitive authority to the 
legal and political arena is seen as the only way of assuring that the interpretation of 
indeterminate facts reflects the public values embodied in the legislation as well as the 
norms of the scientific community (Jasanoff 1987: 198).  
Social Constructivist Critiques of Science 
If the social constructivist critique of science has a central conviction, it is that the 
perceptions of reality presented to us by science are always coloured by contextual 
features, including the professional, institutional, cultural, and political affiliations of 
the scientist (Jasanoff 1990). Scientific claims, shaped and sanctioned by social 
forces and local or background conditions of production, are therefore contingent and 
context dependent.  
If one accepts this premise, then disagreements amongst adversaries in a politicised 
environment (such as the policy-making process) seem altogether predictable 
(Jasanoff 1990). Given the contingencies of scientific claims, adversarially situated 
scientists are well placed to deconstruct such claims and thus to reveal the contingent Chapter 4 
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components and practices embedded in them. One particularly common manner of 
deconstruction is “experimenter’s regress,” in which critics reveal the contingencies 
of experiments such that no experiment could actually stand up to scrutiny. Thus, the 
certainty of the critical processes of replication and falsification is illusory because 
no pair of experiments could be truly identical.
16 
Therefore, social constructivists challenge the integrity of the scientific method itself. 
If theories guide empirical observations—or “act as nets for sifting through the 
infinite details of reality” (Gieryn 1995)—then the ‘facts’ are themselves theory-
laden. In other words, the facts reported by science are inevitably artefacts of 
particular theoretical assumptions built into the conceptual framework guiding 
scientific observations (Jennings 1995). As Wynne points out, since theoretical 
assumptions guide the selection of empirical evidence, “it is simply tautologous to 
say that scientific consensus is determined by empirical data” (Wynne 1987). These 
challenges to the criteria for demarcating science as a uniquely authoritative way of 
gaining objective knowledge of the world reveal that the boundary between science 
and non-science is not essential, but negotiated, and is therefore influenced by values 
originating in the context of inquiry. 
                                                 
16 It is assumed that the criteria used to replicate an experiment, and thus the information and evidence 
required to resolve disputes about theories at the frontiers of knowledge, can be known in advance 
(Bernstein 1983; Geiryn 1995). But Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) recount the problems with this 
assumption. Careful observation of the practice of scientists has revealed that disputes over scientific 
replication cannot be settled through direct appeals to nature but are worked out in micronegotiations 
amongst scientists about what counts as proper replication. What counts as a replication is partly 
settled by whether the results are thought to agree with previous ones, so that an inevitable confusion 
comes about between the correctness of an observation on one hand and the rightness of the 
observer’s practices and prior cognitive commitments on the other. Agreement among scientists, 
according to this analysis, is the ultimate means of closure. Inability to agree leads to “experimenter’s 
regress” in which critics reveal the contingencies of experiments such that no experiment could 
actually stand up to scrutiny.  The Contemporary Tension 
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The Limitations of the Social (De)Constructivist Perspective 
The constructivist argument that the boundaries between science and non-science are 
provisional and ambiguous has important consequences. One is the fear that 
constructivist methods and tenets may erode the cognitive authority of science. If all 
scientific contributions can be shown to be relative to the values that instigated the 
inquiries, then the adversarial model of interest-based politics is considered, by 
default, to be the best alternative. This was the conclusion of Alvin Weinberg (1972) 
for trans-scientific issues, and follows Lindblom’s unquestioned compliance with the 
supposed checks and balances of the pluralist system. Thus, social constructivist 
criticism may not just admit, but also legitimise, a dangerous relativism: “If 
constructivists manage to convince people that science is not a rational, objective, 
truth seeking and indeed truth finding enterprise, then science will have lost its role 
as ultimate arbiter of Nature and its competitive position against religion, politics and 
other traditional enterprises for providing a world view” (Guston 2000). And then 
there is the more immediate threat of instability, which stems from the belief that the 
objective role of science is necessary to prevent human activities from undermining 
the rational foundations of society, freeing them to slip down into some abyss of 
unreason.
17 Constructivist criticism may therefore do no more than nurture such fears 
by reinforcing the belief that science, and thus the boundary between science and 
politics, is socially constructed. We are left with no defensible account of science 
and, where science equates with rationality itself, no defensible basis for the rational 
organisation and orientation of society.  
                                                 
17 This threat is akin to political scientist Langdon Winner’s (1977) concept of ‘apraxia’: the danger of 
large-scale technological failure should certain conditions for the management of technology, such as 
technocratic forms of governance, not be fulfilled. Chapter 4 
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III  The Problematic Situations of Practice  
The preceding discussion of the perception of science as either autonomous and 
value-free, or socially constructed in the context of an interest-based politics, would 
appear to leave us with nothing but a futile dichotomy: science can be either rigorous 
but insensitive to the concerns deriving from the social context of inquiry, or relevant 
to social and political goals but thereby vulnerable to cooption by particular interests. 
This analysis therefore implies the intractability of the tension between science and 
politics. But this conclusion itself relies upon dominant formulations of the 
relationship between science and politics, which assume that there can be only 
objective knowledge or subjective opinion, and an instrumental relationship between 
the two. In this, science is merely applied to public problems, accounts of which 
inevitably conflict. It therefore takes the fact-value dichotomy of positivism as a 
given.  
The Dilemma of Rigor vs Relevance 
The influence of this positivist heritage has led Schön (1983) to describe the striking 
situation in which the dominant model of professional knowledge—the application 
of scientific theory and technique to the problems of practice—seems to require very 
little justification by its practitioners.  
The ultimate purpose of inquiry in EA, recall, is the “protection and improvement of 
the environmental quality of life,” the basic goal being to broaden and strengthen the 
role of foresight—of prudence and precautionary action—in governmental planning 
and decision making, and thus to change the way policy is made (Caldwell 1982). 
While EA aims to identify and perhaps reduce uncertainties, the social purposes of 
inquiry, and the social relevance of its findings, were central to Caldwell’s The Contemporary Tension 
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conception of the EA process. Defined in this way, the original purposes of EA were 
socially and politically embedded, and thus explicitly ‘practical’. But the inherent 
ignorance and latent conflict about uncertain consequences has been concealed by 
the scientific language of manageable uncertainties, artificially reducing social and 
institutional uncertainty to technical imprecision (Wynne 1987). In this vein, guided 
by an instrumental rationality (the positivist epistemology of practice), EA has 
largely forsaken the practical nature of its original purpose to the pursuit of 
technique, valorised as the application of scientific knowledge and methods to ends 
defined externally to the practice of EA itself. Thus, as Wynne resolutely argues, 
“Being pragmatic” as a (legitimate) norm has … been practically converted into a 
cynical lack of any greater purpose or hope than immediate survival, with the public 
language of rationality being left adrift to be elaborated as a Baroque façade of 
mounting structural dishonesty (Wynne 1987: ix-x). 
In this misguided and short-sighted conception of pragmatic rationality, our 
understanding of practical knowledge has been denigrated to knowledge of the 
relationship between means and ends, resources and values. But because it is 
ultimately dependent on prior agreement about ends, instrumental rationality cannot 
help us with problematic situations that involve conflict about ends: in a situation of 
value conflict, there is as yet no problem to be solved (Schön 1983). Therefore, the 
problematic situations which characterise EA practice cannot be adequately 
understood or explained within the dominant, instrumentalist conception of practical 
reasoning, rendering EA incapable of fulfilling its original socially embedded 
purposes.  
In their attempts to address the complexity and indeterminacy that define the 
situations of practice, practitioners find themselves caught in what Donald Schön Chapter 4 
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(1983) calls the dilemma of ‘rigor or relevance’. This is a dilemma which Caldwell 
has been prompted to lament, which he describes in terms of the “preoccupation with 
detail and quantification that elevates precision over relevance” in EA practice 
(Caldwell 1982). More recently, John Bailey (1997) has warned that the over-
emphasis on impacts amenable to quantitative measurement and testing can mean 
that other important issues, which may only be capable of definition in qualitative 
terms, are either ignored or missed altogether. Such is the “seductive force of 
reductionism [which] encourages analysts to study whatever they can measure [and] 
leads decision-makers to manage only what can be measured” (Andrews 2001: 7). 
As Schön vividly depicts the scene, practitioners may take the high ground of 
applying scientific theory and technique to well-defined problems; however, the 
problems of greatest human concern are in the “swampy lowland where situations 
are confusing ‘messes’ incapable of technical solution” (Schön 1983: 42). 
Practitioners who descend to the swamp and engage themselves in such crucially 
important problems, many of whom I think it fair to say would be practitioners of 
EA, find that they must describe their methods in terms of experience, trial and error, 
and ‘muddling through’. As such, practitioners in the swamp are cut off from 
recourse to the authoritative and ‘objective’ language of science claimed by those 
who remain on higher ground (Schön 1983: 43). And it must be noted that 
recognition of the influence of values and judgment in EA has been slow in coming; 
the scientists and technicians of EA have, as Bartlett and Kurian’s (1999) analysis 
revealed, chosen to remain on higher ground. The Contemporary Tension 
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The Problem of Problem Setting 
With the emphasis on problem solving, the requirements of problem setting have 
been largely ignored in the articulation of formal accounts of the EA process. The 
process of problem setting is one of converting a problematic situation into a 
problem, and requires that the practitioner make sense of an uncertain situation 
which at first makes no sense. Schön (1983) provides the example of determining 
what road to build, which at first appears as a situation ill-defined due to the multiple 
issues of geology, topography, existing transport routes, noise, dust, aesthetic 
considerations, and so on, with which the practitioner of EA is confronted. Making 
sense of the project we are confronted with requires political judgment, or what 
Charles Anderson (1990) calls deliberative action: fitting the legacy of ideas and 
institutions to the new contingencies and opportunities that present themselves.  
As in the example of the road, the important problems of political judgment in EA 
are context-specific. Anderson explains that “we enter public life always in 
midstream, never at the beginning. We are seized with a particular project: the 
construction of a road, the location of a factory, the adoption of a land-use plan … 
We do not tend to make up public problems. Rather, we are confronted by them, or 
charged with them, in a specific context and role of responsibility” (Anderson 1990: 
5-6). It is only once the choice is made as to what road to build that we have a 
‘problem’ to ‘solve’ by the application of available knowledges and techniques. The 
important point is that: 
while problem setting is a necessary condition of technical problem solving, it is not 
itself a technical problem. When we set the problem, we select what we will treat as 
the “things” of the situation, we set the boundaries of our attention to it, and we 
impose upon it a coherence which allows us to say what is wrong and in what 
directions the situation needs to be changed (Schön 1983: 40). Chapter 4 
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This is precisely what policy making is all about. Therefore, the effort to exclude this 
process of articulating meaning and value by denying the role of the analyst in 
establishing definitions of, and assigning meaning to, social problems “cuts the very 
heart out of political inquiry” (Fischer 1998). 
It is in this sense that the sole focus on technique in EA is misdirected, because it 
reflects the tendency to set aside the problematic nature of the situations with which 
EA is confronted, and to define the problem in terms of the traditional techniques 
favoured by EA practitioners. As William Sullivan points out, this purely technical 
approach is disturbing because it soon means that “increased use and effectiveness of 
the intervention itself comes to be seen as progress toward solving the problem” 
(Sullivan 1995: 153). In this way, once it is taken to be an organising principle of 
bureaucratic organisation, this means-ends reasoning aims to improve effectiveness 
by “encouraging the frequent obsolescence of means in the pursuit of ends” (Sullivan 
1995: 170). Thus, for example, installation of longer marine effluent pipelines comes 
to be seen as progress toward solving the problem of wastewater generated by human 
activity; meanwhile, the social and economic processes that represent the origins of 
the waste remain unquestioned. Brian Wynne reinforces this point with reference to 
the efficiency of industrial processes when he says that “[i]t is striking how 
effectively environmental policy discourses manage to insulate the technical focus on 
clean production from the equally material social dimensions of ever-increasing 
resource use and waste (including discarded product) output” (Wynne 1992: 111).  
Rather than a sustained attention to technique, then, the challenges characteristic of 
EA require a recognition that the practice has itself become ‘problematic’; that is, the 
practice of EA has become disoriented, or lost sight of its original purposes. The The Contemporary Tension 
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accepted ways of doing things and the knowledges once relied upon are no longer 
able to illuminate or make sense of the situations encountered by the practice. Where 
many (but not all) of the problems of project EA involve attention to relatively well-
structured systems in which the technical processes and parameters are well defined 
and amenable to control (i.e. a chemical plant), the badly structured problems and 
extensive nature of environmental systems which must be addressed in ‘upstream’ 
decision-making contexts (i.e. toxic waste) are characterised by pervasive complexity 
and uncertainty (Wynne 1992). In this way, the problem-solving orientation of EA 
and its recourse to analytical knowledges and techniques is no longer sufficient to 
tackle the most common situations of practice, nor to explain what practitioners 
commonly do. The problematic situations of practice reflect “a mismatch of 
traditional patterns of knowledge and practice to features of the practice situation—
complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict”, the importance 
of which practitioners are becoming increasingly aware (Schön 1983: 18).  
Although few have seen fit to publish such views, practitioners of EA would no 
doubt be quick to point out that their focus is not solely technical; that they do in fact 
recognise problems as changing and interconnected; that such dynamic situations 
require active and synthetic skills as much as those of technical application and 
control. Indeed, many may also agree with Schön that “professional practice has at 
least as much to do with finding the problem as with solving the problem” (Schön 
1983: 18). Such views are rarely voiced, however, and when they are the broad and 
unsubstantiated language of ‘professional judgment’ serves somewhat vacantly to 
articulate the complexities of professional expertise in EA practice. The dominant 
models of thought and action on which EA is based do not provide the resources for Chapter 4 
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practitioners to express what they do in any justifiable manner. As Schön astutely 
concedes, “[p]roblem setting has no place in a body of professional knowledge 
concerned exclusively with problem solving…. We are bound to an epistemology of 
practice which leaves us at a loss to explain, or even to describe, the competences to 
which we now give overriding importance” (Schön 1983: 19-20).  
Therefore, to describe EA as a predominantly technical process based on an 
instrumentalist rationality is not to deny the increasing recognition that EA is in 
practice a political process in which professional judgment is pervasive, nor to ignore 
the recommendations that policy EA should be a dynamic, interactive and adaptive 
process of creative design. It is merely to recognise that, captured by the overarching 
epistemological framework of positivism and the instrumental application of the 
science it espouses, there is no legitimate way to articulate such claims. This point is 
made eloquently by Sheila Jasanoff, who describes formal risk assessment as “the 
‘songline’ of contemporary risk society’s anxiety about its own technological 
achievements. Threats dimly conceived in the mind must be sung in this melody to 
exist and be perceived, as well as predicted and controlled” (Jasanoff 1999: 141). 
Recovering the Purpose in Purposive Inquiry 
The tensions between the technocratic and participatory dimensions of policy 
analysis have always been especially acute in impact assessment (Torgerson 1986). 
This is not surprising, given that the institutionalisation of EA was prompted by 
broader social concerns about the pace and direction of industrialisation. The attempt 
to narrowly define issues under the rubric of dominant technocratic conceptions of 
EA has been challenged from the outset by the tendency of issues to blossom into 
broader considerations about the shape and direction society is taking.  The Contemporary Tension 
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More than the selection of means, the very logic of EA entails a normative 
orientation to the goal of protecting the environmental quality of life, and thus to 
sustaining the human-nature relationships upon which this depends. Therefore, EA 
ultimately rests upon a logic of interactive relationships. In attending to 
environmental consequences, EA is not only concerned with predicting those 
consequences as externally manifest biophysical phenomena, but with trying to 
understand why they are consequential, and with the manner in which they will 
matter ethically and politically (Fischer and Forester 1993). 
But this broader definition of issues has been constrained, firstly, by the 
circumscribed agenda of modifying the implementation conditions of individual 
projects. This is an agenda which has facilitated a narrow emphasis on the 
specification of analytic techniques to ensure these implementation conditions are 
properly fulfilled. Later comes the second constraint, namely the desire to adapt EA 
to existing policy processes. Environmental assessment has therefore been cut off 
from the broader concerns emergent in its social and political context. It is in this 
way that EA has become disoriented, and lost sight of its original, socially and 
politically embedded purposes.  
The irony of setting rationality free from the selection of higher goals is that 
ultimate ends, the basic aims of life, cannot be selected or evaluated by rational 
procedures; they must be dealt with by arbitrary preference, or intuition, or by cultural 
and biological determinism. And yet it seems unfortunate to have rational procedures 
available for the relatively less important decisions of life and to have none for dealing 
with the most important decisions (Diesing, cited in Baber and Bartlett 1999).
18 
                                                 
18 This is perhaps why humanity has managed to reach the moon, and is as yet unable to solve the 
problems of the ghetto (Dryzek 1982, after Nelson). Chapter 4 
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This dilemma is confronted by Baber and Bartlett with the question: “If our choices 
as to goals are outside the sphere of rational discourse, what options do humans have 
for resolving the practical problems of everyday life which come replete with 
alternative means and ends?” (Baber and Bartlett 1999). What options do we have 
when goal-blind instrumental rationality, which cannot by definition help us with the 
most important decisions we face, has become the sole admissible value? And more 
particularly when we fail to see it as a value because it simply appears to coincide 
with rationality per se. 
The important question is how EA can be reconstructed to better deal with the 
contemporary imperatives of environmental problems at the policy level through an 
approach that reclaims a central and justifiable role for creativity and foresight as 
well as reliable, dependable systems of knowledge production. Beyond the either/or 
of prevailing discussions about science and politics, the task is to search for an 
approach to EA that is both rigorous and relevant. The demand for relevance is of 
course simultaneously the demand that EA explicitly recognise the values which 
derive from its civic context.  
The lack of attention to the social context of policy making has resulted in what 
Douglas Torgerson has dubbed the “paradoxical utility” that has come to represent 
the “modern quest to develop knowledge and apply it for the improvement of the 
human condition” (Torgerson 1995: 228). On the one hand, scientific knowledge of 
general laws is to be gained by rigorously abstracting from common understandings, 
whilst on the other hand, this same knowledge has become unavoidably detached 
from the context of application that was its intended destination. In this way, the 
aspiration for value-neutrality has meant that policy analysis has effectively detached The Contemporary Tension 
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itself from the very social contexts able to give its data meaning (Fischer 1998). So 
constrained by prevailing technical discourses, the inability of policy professionals to 
bridge the gulf between process and context has led Carol Weiss to declare that the 
field is in an intellectual crisis:  
That social scientists shape the world they study by the way they define the problem 
has come to be accepted not only by social scientists but by sophisticated political 
actors as well. They are aware that researchers’ assumptions, theories, and choice of 
variables can have large effects on the answer they find. This new understanding 
throws into doubt the accommodation [with political and administrative practice] that 
earlier generations of social scientists had negotiated. If they no longer claim to find 
the ‘truth’ about ‘reality’, what is their role in the policy process? The time seems to 
have arrived for a new set of assumptions and arrangements (Weiss 1991, cited in 
Hoppe 1999). 
IV The  Politics  of Epistemology 
The relationship between knowledge and politics needs to move to centre stage in the 
development of a conceptual framework for policy EA. This is so because the policy-
shaping conceptual framework of EA builds upon underlying social models of 
agency, causality and responsibility (Jasanoff 1999). In turn, these frames are 
“intellectually constraining in that they delimit the universe of scientific inquiry, 
political discourse, and possible policy options” (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). 
Instrumental rationality is not a neutral sanctuary; epistemology is inevitably 
political because “inherent in any form of knowledge are assumptions about the 
nature of subjects (hence about human nature). These assumptions influence 
conceptions of the possibilities of human action … hence also of the possibilities and 
necessities of political action and policy” (Flax 1981: 1011). Chapter 4 
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The aspiration in EA to externalise the political therefore has implications which go 
beyond merely sustaining a deceptive veil of neutrality. A reliance on external 
‘political support’ presupposes a depth of political culture that instrumentalist 
methods themselves undermine by seeking to circumvent a culture of political 
understanding. By formally externalising the political, there is a danger that the 
expert institutions of EA will  
manage to objectify and externalise the grounds of their own lack of public authority 
and trust, thus also cutting themselves off from the broader cultural movements and 
developments which can be understood as the source of the political energy 
underpinning environmental expertise and valuation at large (Wynne 1997). 
The central point is that the adoption of any methodological posture is inescapably a 
form of political action. The dominant methodological assumption of the detached, 
neutral observer presupposes a choice, implicit or explicit, of a particular form of 
political relationships—one which divides experts and citizens. Therefore, the gulf 
between expert and citizen is not a politically neutral arrangement, but a socially 
constructed artefact of the administrative state. As Torgerson warns, “there is no 
neutral alternative, only uncritical adherence to conventional notions” (Torgerson 
1985).  
Given this capacity of an epistemology to become a lens through which the 
possibilities of human experience can be ordered and shaped, a related issue becomes 
the role of science in ‘framing’ the problems and identifying potential solutions in 
EA. This is a role which is “unavoidably social as well as technical since in public 
domains scientific knowledge embodies implicit models or assumptions about the 
social world” (Irwin and Wynne 1996: 3). It is in this vein that Wynne (1987) has The Contemporary Tension 
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long argued that uncertainty is social and institutional, rather than scientific or 
technical.  
In a detailed empirical analysis of the role of science in several US federal agencies, 
Jasanoff (1990) concludes that the institutional and social context of inquiry is more 
important for political legitimacy than the accuracy and precision (the cognitive 
authority) of the products of science. Jasanoff points to the structural disharmony 
implicit in the dominant model of linking science to policy—disharmony that reflects 
“fundamental social disagreements about the extent to which science and scientists 
should control decision-making at the frontiers of knowledge” (Jasanoff 1987). For 
reasons which may be moral or historical, many are not prepared to submit to the 
untenable premise that a perfectly objective, god’s eye view can be attained through 
scientific inquiry. Thus, when such a premise becomes embodied in our public 
institutions, notions of controlling nature serve only to induce alienation and apathy 
(Irwin and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).  
But there are reasons to be concerned about the technocratic approach to EA even if 
one does not reject outright the scientific management of nature. Scepticism about 
the independence of knowledge production from its use in policy decisions flows in 
part from cross-national and historical research which underscores the role of 
political culture in interpreting the knowledge claims and procedures of scientific 
inquiry (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). This research reveals that the level of certainty 
attributed to the truth of a knowledge claim is often dependent upon what judgment 
is made about the trustworthiness of the institutional arrangements which produced it 
(Irwin and Wynne 1996). Where institutional trust is low, formal, quantitative 
methods are more likely to be in place to progress the assessment of policy Chapter 4 
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directives—an observation made by Ezrahi (1990) in US politics. Here, the more 
openly adversarial political context means that uncertainty is more readily identified, 
and is therefore more readily acknowledged by policy elites; but their response is to 
rapidly translate uncertainty into impersonal scientific discourse (Jasanoff 1987). On 
the other hand, in European countries where high levels of trust were exhibited 
toward policy elites, qualitative approaches were found to be dominant; in turn, the 
system of ad hoc and inexplicit rules means that elites were less inclined to admit 
uncertainty, because its existence was not a focus of public conflict (Jasanoff 1998).  
All told, then, uncertainty is about much more than generating scientific knowledge. 
As Jasanoff maintains, the challenge it poses is as much political as scientific: 
What clearly emerges is the socially embedded character of much that we do not 
know, as well as much that we claim to know, about the interactions of nature and 
society. Uncertainty about the environment increasingly appears as a very special form 
of politics. It is a social admission that there are things about our condition that we do 
not know (simple ignorance), but it is also an affirmation that we have the means and 
the will to find out more about those things that we label ‘uncertain’ (Jasanoff 1999). 
Jasanoff goes on to provide a timely warning of the potential consequences of 
attending with enthusiasm to improving the techniques of data collection and 
analysis to reduce uncertainties considered to be ‘scientific.’ In so doing, 
“environmental science … bears within it the seeds of its own unmaking” (Jasanoff 
1999). The increasing sophistication of techniques developed to facilitate EA has 
meant that more and more is known about the impacts of development on the 
environment, but it also continues to point to more and more that is not known, and 
may never be known. Because scientific uncertainty is important as a function of the 
extent of policy commitment riding on the body of knowledge concerned, as such 
commitments grow larger, we can tolerate less uncertainty, ironically as we discover The Contemporary Tension 
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more (Wynne 1987). If the policy process is unable to set credible limits on the scope 
of technical debate, then the science may be relentlessly questioned and 
deconstructed to the point where contested claims no longer support political action.  
Rather than exacerbating this tendency by using uncertainty as an excuse to delay 
action, as (narrowly) politically motivated interpretations of the precautionary 
principle dictate, Jasanoff seeks to remind us that the political will embodied in the 
notion of uncertainty should be embraced as the political opportunity for action that 
it represents. The socially embedded character of knowledge about the interactions of 
nature and society has also led Ulrich Beck to interpret the challenge of uncertainty 
as a potentially enriching opportunity to reclaim the human and civic values 
embodied in the Enlightenment promise: 
The other side of the uncertainty that the risk society brings upon tormented humanity 
is the opportunity to find and activate the increase of equality, freedom and self-
expression promised by modernity, against the limitations, the functional imperatives 
and the fatalism of progress in industrial society (Beck 1992, cited in Irwin 1995: 
173). 
A significant challenge for the policy-shaping framework of EA is to recognise the 
implications of clinging to the dubious benefits of a purportedly neutral, scientistic 
methodological framework. The tacit normative institutional commitments of 
scientism undermine the broader cultural change demanded of preventative 
environmental policies by inhibiting the kinds of public policy discourses that might 
facilitate it: 
Thus elaborating the methods of representing public values, all the while enforcing the 
assumption that these are founded on the objective physical risk, and that they are 
expressible in decontextualised, inflexible and individualistic-utilitarian form (thus 
reproducing and extending those same problematic social relations), may be an Chapter 4 
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obstacle to constructive institutional changes, ie. changes in the social relationships of 
the relevant domain of decision making (Wynne 1997).  
As Wynne (1987) makes resolutely clear in his analysis of hazardous waste 
management, if we wish to ensure that our policy responses are alive to the plurality 
of values that make up the social fabric of contemporary society, we must attend to 
the institutional dimensions of policy. In contrast, the rationalist approach to policy, 
“in neglecting and distorting the institutional dimension … would effectively replace 
the responsibility and freedom of ordinary institutions and social actors by abstract 
and authoritarian ‘expertise’” (Wynne 1987).  
V  Toward a More Interactive Accounting 
The intrusion of science into the realm of politics, and vice versa, has not only 
challenged the objectivity of science on epistemological grounds, but has also 
revealed the political interdependence of the relationship between science and policy 
on institutional grounds. If the strict boundary between science and politics can no 
longer be sustained, the question of how the interaction of science and politics is 
institutionalised comes to the fore (Jasanoff 1990, 1995; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; 
Rutgers and Mentzel 1999).
19 As currently institutionalised, “[t]he scope of scientific 
knowledge creates a vacuum in which should exist a vital social discourse about the 
conditions and boundaries of scientific knowledge in relation to moral and social 
knowledge” (Wynne 1992: 115). In addition to having the public “ringside” in policy 
disputes, we “need also to reconstruct our understanding of the science-citizen 
                                                 
19 See the contributions to the special issue of the journal Science and Public Policy dedicated to this 
topic. See note 2. The Contemporary Tension 
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relationship in order to acknowledge the possibility of wider sources of knowledge 
and understanding” (Irwin 1995: 79).  
Three sources of critical scholarship help to flesh out the terms of such a 
reconstruction, each of which takes as its aim the need to understand the 
interdependent nature of the relationship between scientific knowledge and political 
action:  
•  the sociology of science, which emphasises the co-production of scientific 
knowledge and political order; 
•  the resurgence of pragmatism in EA, which recognises the contextual 
orientation of policy inquiry; and 
•  the argumentative turn in policy analysis, which reclaims attention to the 
discursive processes which shape the construction of knowledge. 
The Co-Production of Science and Politics 
… to serve as a basis for collective action, scientific knowledge has to be produced in 
tandem with social legitimation. This is the core dilemma of environmental democracy 
(Jasanoff 1996: 69). 
Jasanoff (1995) contends that the cultures of law (or policy) and science are in fact 
mutually constitutive, so that these institutions are involved in jointly producing 
social and scientific knowledge as they concurrently construct each other. In effect, 
Weinberg’s trans-science was originally conceived as such a domain of ‘co-
production’, where policy criteria dictate the choice of ostensibly scientific 
procedures or techniques, which are in turn invoked to legitimate policy (Jasanoff 
and Wynne 1998).  Chapter 4 
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Although our society’s insistence that the domains of science and society remain 
separate has meant that this brief moment of clarity has been followed (in the main) 
by attempts to re-establish an authoritative space for science, the development of 
theories which incorporate the interaction of science and policy has been continued 
by scholars of environmental policy and politics. Since Weinberg’s invention of the 
domain of trans-science highlighted the hybrid character of science-for-policy, 
several conceptual frameworks have been developed which aim to provide a more 
accurate description of the complex and non-linear nature of the science-policy 
relationship (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
20 The connections between science and 
policy are derived in these models largely by attending to the interrelationships 
between the production of scientific knowledge (and uncertainty) and the production 
of political order (including policy choices). In this way, they have identified a gap 
between professional knowledge and the demands of real-world professional 
practice, although each formulates the gap quite differently (Schön 1983).  
Interestingly, as Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) describe these frameworks, most 
correspond with recent theoretical accounts of EA in that they accord no special 
status to scientific knowledge. In this way they parallel the well-known picture of the 
policy cycle, which provides no explicit mention of how knowledge enters the cycle, 
or of its role within the process.
21 The point to be made here is that, although no one 
                                                 
20 Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) identify five dominant models, which focus on: agenda setting as the 
confluence of problems, policies and politics; agenda setting as a product of power relationships and 
framing choices; knowledge change as dependent on systems uncertainties and decision stakes; policy 
cultures as the locus of divergent science-policy formulations; and policy interests as competing 
discourses struggling to shape scientific knowledge in ways that will serve their interests. 
21 In Kingdon’s (1984) model of agenda setting as the confluence of problems, policies and politics, 
for example, knowledge gains prominence largely by accident, either by chance “triggering events” 
such as disasters, or by the actions of policy entrepreneurs. A specified role for science is similarly 
absent from Cobb and Elder’s (1972) model of agenda-setting as a product of power relationships and The Contemporary Tension 
 
– 195 – 
framework provides a comprehensive account of all the interrelations influential in 
the production of scientific knowledge, together this contemporary policy literature 
“calls for a more interactive accounting, in which natural knowledge and political 
order are co-produced through a common social project that shores up the legitimacy 
of each” (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998: 14-15). Despite its disparate sources, the rich 
amalgam of empirical evidence for the model of co-production calls attention to the 
fact that social and cultural commitments are built into every phase of knowledge 
production and social action (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
22  
In moving beyond the strictly linear relationship between knowledge and politics, 
and the focus on science as a product (a fact or theory) that need only be applied, the 
notion of co-production takes us toward a conception of policy making as an 
interactive process of knowledge production and political action in which social 
commitments are embedded at every phase. As Frank Fischer puts it, “[t]he 
usefulness of an applied science depends on its interactive relationship with political 
deliberation” (Fischer 1999: 45). In this way, the demand for useful or relevant 
knowledge is simultaneously the demand for deliberative action, or practical 
judgment. Here, science is more than a means to politically defined ends: knowledge 
and action are inextricably linked in a process of inquiry that is itself a form of 
political action, in which the scientist or practitioner is an active agent. 
                                                 
framing choices. In contrast, the internal dynamics of scientific inquiry are central to the model of 
knowledge change as dependent on systems uncertainties and decision stakes developed by 
Functowicz and Ravetz (1992), as is the understanding of knowledge change.  
22 The scholarly foundations of, and evidence for, the model of co-production derive from: 
“ethnographic and sociological investigations of laboratory science; historical studies of scientific 
change; work on indigenous knowledge systems and their replacement with allegedly universal 
models of science; cultural and social studies of scientific controversies; inquiries into public 
perceptions and understanding of science; empirical studies of science policy” (Jasanoff and Wynne 
1998: 15). Chapter 4 
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The Resurgence of Pragmatism in Environmental Assessment 
The rich empirical picture of the mutual construction of science and political order 
painted by sociologists of science resonates with the practical philosophy of 
pragmatism. Pragmatism, and Deweyan pragmatism in particular, conceives of 
inquiry as an interactive process informed by a practical rationality, in which 
knowledge is gained through experience. When knowledge is gained through an 
interactive process with the phenomenon being studied, inquiry is itself a form of 
political action. Thus, as with the co-production model of science-for-policy, 
pragmatism views scientific knowledge as historically and socially contingent.  
The discussion in later sections of this chapter has pointed to the persistent influence 
of a pragmatic rationality in the practice of EA, even if this remains latent in formal 
models of its institutionalisation. The focus on implementation in adaptive 
approaches to EA, where what counts as relevant knowledge is negotiated with other 
societal actors in the particularities of a social and political context, highlights the 
more than instrumental role of EA practitioners. Instead of being detached, analysis 
and action are conceived as two moments which inform one another in a dialectical 
interplay of detached inquiry and critical reflection. Uncertainty is no longer 
externalised, but is reconceived of in terms of the indeterminacies of the knowledges 
and the ambiguities of the practice situation, which demands not information, but 
judgment. In other words, the situations of practice demand situated knowledge: 
knowledge in context.  
Brian Wynne provides a discriminating perspective on this concern to treat 
implementation as an interactive decision-making forum of comparable importance 
and complexity to the synoptic phases of policy making: The Contemporary Tension 
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Implementation is more than mere external or secondary context to the “real” 
analytical arena…. it is more than merely downstream decision enactment, but 
involves new organisational realities and rationalities which are artificially excluded 
from policymaking (and usually from policy modelling and analysis). These are more 
than merely “deviations” of the optimal, but reflect objective local institutional 
realities whose pragmatic accommodation is just as important for regulatory stability. 
This is part of the “context” that scientific approaches unconsciously amputate 
(Wynne 1987).  
As Chapter 2 made clear, attention to policy EA as an ongoing and interactive 
process reveals a shift toward reclaiming an earlier emphasis on the social and 
political context of inquiry—a shift toward reinvigorating the relationship between 
pre-decision analysis and the process of implementation. Of course, there have 
always been scholars who have grappled with the idea of EA as an iterative process, 
but these have generally been restricted to a one-way flow of information from 
science to policy. More recently, Judith Petts has articulated the implications of 
extending the process beyond the participation of scientists to opportunities for “all 
interested parties to both shape and revisit assumptions, data and results in the light 
of information, concerns, and evidence of knowledge deficiencies” (Petts 1999b: 6). 
This approach reveals a concern to enable the participatory dialogue of policy to 
influence the direction of future scientific analysis. It therefore signals a move 
beyond EA as the provision of service to established institutions, and toward EA as a 
form of political discourse potentially inclusive of social concerns seeking alternative 
policy directions and realignments of power (Torgerson 1995).  
Conceiving of EA as a political process therefore has significant implications for its 
capacity to contribute meaningfully to democratic environmental governance. An 
emphasis on implementation challenges the sharply dualistic thinking which holds 
that either scientifically grounded policy always determines the alignments which Chapter 4 
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characterise politics, or the features of politics always determine the shape of policy 
(Jasanoff 1998). The more interactive accounting intimated above implies that EA 
cannot reasonably be construed as neutral means—as an instrument, or tool—to 
politically determined ends. Social commitments are embodied throughout the 
interactive process of knowledge production and political action, so that ends and 
means are inextricably intertwined. 
The latent influence of Dewey’s pragmatic model of policy inquiry in EA has been 
interpreted by most EA scholars in terms of Lindblom’s notion of policy making as 
‘muddling through’. However, with the politicisation of science it becomes clear that 
Lindblom’s pluralistic pragmatism reaches a conceptual limit (Torgerson 1995): its 
reliance upon the strategic interaction of participants is not conducive to learning, 
and it lacks a non-arbitrary standpoint from which to critically scrutinise and 
adjudicate between conflicting perspectives. As we have seen from the discussion in 
this chapter, the results of a policy experiment frequently remain open to conflicting 
and ambiguous interpretation. In this situation, an experiment is no more than an 
argument. This observation leads Robert Hoppe (1999) to conclude that policy 
analysis is on the verge of an argumentative turn.  
The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis 
The argumentative turn in policy analysis signals the communicative shift advanced 
with ‘postpositivist’, or interpretive, modes of inquiry. The basic insight of the 
argumentative turn is that “[p]olicy analysis and planning are practical processes of 
argumentation” (Fischer and Forester 1993: 2). Argument “refers both to an analytic 
content (“the logic of the argument”) and to a practical performance (“the argument 
fell on deaf ears”)” (Fischer and Forester 1993: 4). Policy argument therefore The Contemporary Tension 
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demands attention to both technical analysis and political articulation, and thereby 
reclaims attention to the discursive processes which shape the construction of 
knowledge—the processes by which empirical data is turned into knowledge through 
interpretative interaction with other perspectives (Fischer 1998). Policy making as 
argumentation therefore constructs policy inquiry as a site of contention where 
different interests and perspectives are brought to bear. Grounding rationality in 
collective discourse, discursive interaction becomes the solution to linking 
knowledge and political action. Moreover, “[c]ontext becomes supremely important, 
because action occurs in no other setting” (Wolin, cited in Bernstein 1985). 
Although it has been established that inquiry in EA never had a fixed identity 
insulated from context, the influence of positivism has constrained the identity of EA 
as a technocratic instrument contained by a scientistic epistemology. That identity 
has been disrupted with the contemporary entanglement of science and politics, 
presenting conditions that anticipate a more vigorously democratic public life 
(Torgerson 1997). In particular, the politics of expertise has shown that 
“[p]ostpositivism has not emerged in isolation from dissenting social movements, but 
both reflects their influence and renders policy professionalism more receptive to that 
influence” (Torgerson 1997). These conditions are a reminder of the civic origins of 
EA, and anticipate a reorientation of EA as an interpretive mode of policy inquiry. Chapter 4 
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VI  Conclusion: The Road Not Taken 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
— Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken
23 
Situated at the boundary of science and politics, the practice of EA is “constituted by 
the intersection of principles and practices, ideals and institutions, the exercise of 
power and the legitimacy of public authority” (Jennings 1988). Thus, any attempt to 
address the challenges EA confronts must begin by recognising the contested nature 
of this boundary. I believe Brian Wynne is correct in claiming that the insulation of 
science from politics in the context of public justification “reflects a misleading 
image of rationality and science. Whatever value this image may have had, it is now 
outliving its worth in a new context of public decision making” (Wynne 1987).  
The state of play in debates about science and decision making has been 
encapsulated by Jasanoff and Wynne (1998). It is now widely recognised that many 
questions asked of science cannot be answered by science, so that there is explicit 
acknowledgment of the indeterminate nature of scientific knowledge for public 
policy. There is also general agreement that political judgment is necessary when 
decisions must be made on the basis of limited data. Nevertheless, it is still implicitly 
presumed that better scientific characterisation of a problem will lead to better 
policy.  
                                                 
23 Peter deLeon employs this quote to stress that “a more deliberative policy sciences of democracy”, 
is the unfinished project of the policy sciences (deLeon 1997: 124).  The Contemporary Tension 
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This instrumental relationship between scientific knowledge and political action has 
been questioned, however, with the proliferation of intractable policy disputes in 
recent decades. Although scientific uncertainty produces and sustains political 
conflict, studies of policy controversies have demonstrated that there is no reason to 
believe reducing scientific uncertainty will automatically reduce political conflict 
(Jasanoff 1990; Ozawa 1991). As Jasanoff  points out, demands for better science in 
the policy process “chronically overestimate the capacity of experts to rationalise the 
moral and political choices embroiled in policy making at the boundaries of the 
natural, material and social worlds” (Jasanoff 1995).  
One scenario that logically derives from this conclusion is that policy processes are 
destined to be characterised by endless technical debate. Investigations into the 
reality of this situation led Collingridge and Reeve (1986) to determine that scientific 
knowledge has a very limited capacity to advance rational policy making. 
Unfortunately, this resoundingly negative conclusion often prompts scholars to crawl 
back to the relative safety of their technocratic or democratic trenches. Jennings 
summarises this situation with characteristic clarity: 
[The dominant model of policy analysis as science] does not accurately represent—
and cannot methodologically or ethically guide—the actual or potential practice of 
policy analysis…. As a result, many who can no longer subscribe to policy analysis as 
science have turned—prematurely and unnecessarily, in my estimation—to policy 
analysis as advocacy as the only philosophically viable and politically honest 
alternative (Jennings 1987: 130-31). 
But instrumental rationality is by no means the only epistemology available to guide 
the conduct of inquiry in EA, empirical-analytic science by no means the only 
knowledge interest. Faced with the choice between positivism and pragmatism, EA Chapter 4 
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chose the positivist route. But the pragmatist alternative remains in view, and 
continues to vie for attention. I therefore follow Jennings in his belief that  
… if we carefully think through the epistemological and normative implications of 
recent criticisms of scientific or positivist policy analysis, we will come to [the 
conclusion that] these criticisms of positivism permit a different, but still fully 
serviceable and rational, conception of “objective” policy advice (Jennings 1987: 130-
31). 
Whilst EA inherited its twin goals—reason and democracy—from the 
Enlightenment, they remain the twin goals of postpositivist policy analysis: “even 
though those in the postpositivist genre do not seek to recapture the comfortable 
progressive association between science and democracy [they do advocate] the 
cultivation of a rational public life that involves the active participation of the 
citizenry” (Torgerson 1995). It is clear that the positivist interpretation of these goals 
can neither illuminate, nor constructively guide a way through, the challenges facing 
EA in the policy context. The need to maintain a rational and purposive orientation in 
a context of changing knowledges and perspectives, both social and scientific, means 
that modern societies are more often in need of capacities for practical, rather than 
technical, judgment (Sullivan 1995).  
The insights of pragmatism and interpretive policy inquiry briefly canvassed in the 
preceding discussion point to a methodological-political convergence on 
participation and dialogue as the epistemological imperatives of a more constructive 
reconciliation of scientific knowledge and political action in the policy context. With 
the recognition that value judgments permeate the EA process, practitioners are 
firmly implicated as active agents in all stages of the process of inquiry. This opens 
the door to a reorientation of inquiry in EA toward the essence of Dewey’s The Contemporary Tension 
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pragmatism: the cultivation of judgment and reasoned discussion between experts 
and citizens in the context of a shared commitment to action. The challenges to 
scientism, and the enduring influence of pragmatism in EA practice, prompt the 
epistemological shift from an instrumentalist rationality of strategic action, to a 
dialogical rationality of communicative interaction. The reconstructive critique 
advanced in the remainder of this thesis aims at reorienting EA toward earlier 
anticipations of such a reconciliation by recovering the contextual, transformative, 
and problem-oriented political epistemology of pragmatism:  the road not taken.  
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Professions … stand on the boundary of interaction between 
systems of technical capacity and the moral and political 
processes which aim to integrate these powers into humanly 
valuable forms of life. 
(Sullivan 1995: 144-45) 
 
 
 
 
The ultimate purpose of policy inquiry, Sheila Jasanoff (1990) reminds us, is to 
bridge from the empirical and analytic to the prescriptive. But, as Jasanoff continues, 
this essential relationship is seldom explored as a way to understand the nature of 
scientific claims and their sources of authority. Helen Longino takes up this point in 
her Science as Social Knowledge, stating that “in our fascination with individual 
theories it is easy to lose sight of the fact that scientific inquiry is a collaborative 
human activity”, one in which scientific practices and social values are in dynamic 
interaction (Longino 1990). Attention to the process and context of inquiry requires 
attention to the practice of science.  
Steve Fuller
 (2000) also directs our attention to the relatively neglected issues of the 
constitution of scientific knowledge itself and of the people who produce it—issues 
which constitute the governance of science, rather than the politics of science more Chapter 5 
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narrowly defined. That the people, processes, and products of science are usually 
given short shrift leaves us with a conception of science bereft of normative political 
meaning, as a mere instrument that can be used for good or ill (Fuller 2000). 
Understanding science as a collaborative, practical, and contextually embedded 
activity may help us to better understand the nature and authority of scientific 
knowledge, and it may also open up possibilities for a different way of thinking 
about scientific knowledge—about reliability and objectivity—better able to hold the 
descriptive-analytic and the normative in constructive tension in public decision 
making. 
The socially embedded character of knowledge (and uncertainty) highlighted in 
Chapter 4 demands attention to the interaction of knowledge and action in its social 
context. Given that EA was created in large part as a response to broader social 
concerns, and in response to the uncertain environmental consequences of 
technological development, surprisingly little has been said in the EA literature about 
what we should expect from scientific knowledge and procedures in this societal 
context. This conspicuously absent aspect of inquiry in EA is the attempt not only to 
make sense of the world, but also to make sense in the world; to recognise the EA 
practitioner as an active participant in the process of inquiry, and thus in the 
phenomenon investigated. This perspective prompts a closer look at the contextually 
oriented pragmatic rationality of EA, which offers the potential to reclaim inquiry as 
a contextually embedded practice.  
Research in the social studies of science also points to the human relations 
constitutive of science, and thus problematises the sharp separation of facts and 
values that characterises dominant notions of scientific knowledge in the policy Pragmatism 
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context (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). An overwhelming conclusion of these scholars 
is that any exploration of this relationship must be based on a recognition of the 
fundamentally negotiable nature of the boundary between science and policy.  
The manner in which this boundary is negotiated is crucial. As we have seen, 
uncritical acceptance of a pluralist link between knowledge and action, and the 
deconstruction of science which ensues, leads with apparent ease to an 
epistemological relativism. Having deconstructed the boundaries between science 
and politics, we are left with no defensible account of science, or of politics. The 
recognition of science as a collaborative social practice prompts us to question these 
assumptions. 
The constructive relationship between knowledge and action sought for here is a 
central characteristic of pragmatism, which is the subject of this chapter. Section I 
begins the chapter by highlighting the need for a critical re-examination of the issue 
of judgment in EA, and goes on to outline the promise of pragmatism for rethinking 
the link between knowledge and action by focusing on the idea of a ‘practice’. 
Section II elaborates the emphasis on a community of inquirers that is central to the 
political epistemology of practice in pragmatism. First used to describe the practice 
of science, the community of inquiry was adopted by John Dewey in his pragmatic 
theory of policy inquiry to emphasise the social nature of knowledge. And because 
inquiry is an interactive process that involves the intersubjective justification of 
knowledge claims, pragmatism provides a dialogical account of rationality, and 
affords a dialogical link between knowledge and action (Section III). Pragmatism 
therefore offers the contextually embedded account of knowledge production missing 
in either instrumentalist or pluralist accounts of policy inquiry.  Chapter 5 
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The implications of this situtated account of knowledge for policy inquiry are 
explored in Section IV. The discussion draws upon empirical accounts of 
professional expertise, and sociological accounts of knowledge production in 
science, to explore the relationship between science and society. Section V discusses 
the implications of the pragmatic theory of policy inquiry for reframing the 
relationship between science and democracy. The chapter concludes in Section VI 
with the call to recover the contextual orientation of EA, and thus to recognise the 
civic purposes of EA as a process of purposive inquiry.  
I  Practice and Action 
The Problem of Judgment 
“Off with her head,” cried the Queen at the top of her voice. Nobody moved.                               
— Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 
The situation the Queen finds herself in here serves as a pertinent reminder of the 
fact that “[n]oise is a common phenomenon in the world of policy and politics. 
Action, or at least effective action, is rarer” (Jenkins 1978: 202). This is why the 
phenomenon of noise—or the challenge of value conflict—is a problem that EA 
professionals try to resolve or avoid. But to claim that EA is political, and then to end 
the discussion, is hardly an effective lesson for EA theory and practice. More 
effective would be the search for theoretical resources that can redefine the 
relationship between values and action as a constructive contribution to the policy 
process.   
Recognition that EA is necessarily a political process, a process infused with 
judgment, has been made increasingly explicit by many of its scholars. It is no Pragmatism 
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coincidence that issues of judgment are central to EA. What counts as a good reason 
for a policy decision, and as an appropriate basis for political judgment, are essential 
elements of the central questions of policy analysis. The central questions for EA at 
higher levels of decision making have been defined in terms of ‘whether, where and 
what kind’ of proposals ought to be sanctioned—questions which logically arise 
prior to project-level EA and its attention to ways of minimising or ameliorating the 
immediate, site-specific environmental impacts of particular projects. But in the 
spirit of Dewey, I contend that in the policy context the question is not whether or 
not we should act—the action context is, after all, definitive of policy. Rather, the 
questions that demand our full attention in EA are how ought we to decide? and how 
ought we to act? (Anderson 1979).
1 The need to discriminate between the reasons for 
a policy decision means that the aim of political theory is “to recommend a discipline 
of political judgment, a mode of practical reason that will presumably result in 
‘better’ public decisions” (Anderson 1987: 34). On this framing, the question of 
value judgment is first and foremost a question of political epistemology.  
To date, however, issues of judgment have been somewhat vacantly referred to in the 
EA literature as ‘value judgment’ or ‘professional judgment.’ The recognition of 
judgment has therefore failed to prompt any kind of critical re-examination of the 
role or validity of judgment within the practice of EA. Rather, with the appeal to 
scientific objectivity (read political neutrality) in EA threatened with talk of value 
judgments, recourse to the language of subjective values seems to have been 
(implicitly or explicitly) adopted as the only alternative on offer in the political 
                                                 
1 A related point is made by Albert Borgmann, who notes that “the question inevitably is not whether 
but how the government should involve itself in shaping the tangible and morally decisive setting of 
common life” (Borgmann 1992: 138).  Chapter 5 
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regimes of liberal democracy. An act of judgment seems to be an incident of either 
wilful strategising or mere guesswork, and the Weberian call for practitioners to 
make their values explicit—to put their cards on the table, so to speak—seems to be 
the only way to distinguish the two.  
But a statement of ‘naïve preference’ does not take us very far toward an explanation 
of what environmental professionals are actually doing when they present their 
assessment of a particular course of action. And it takes us even less distance toward 
an understanding of how citizens might contribute to the assessment process in any 
meaningful way. As Chapter 4 made clear, the price of conceiving of politics merely 
as the clash of subjective opinions, and of EA as simply one more specialised 
discourse of advocacy within the pluralist context of interest-based liberalism, is that 
the policy process too often ends in stalemate. Therefore, the crippling result of 
relying upon the neutral competence thesis of public administration is a persistent 
failure to focus more directly on the interdependence of practice and action in policy 
making. By avoiding the value question in the quest to present rigorous analysis, 
John Forester argues,  
we fail to explore the possibilities of what really, strategically and feasibly, ought to 
be done. Seduced by ‘physics envy,’ taking solace in ‘at least being scientific,’ we 
document our distance from our goals, but we pay too little attention to the qualities of 
action and the capacities of organization that might bring us closer to these goals 
(Forester 1998: 3). 
To dislocate the means and ends of policy in this way is not only to present a 
descriptively deficient picture of the actual practice of policy inquiry, but also to 
deprive us of the normative expectations and demands a democratic society ought to 
place on policy discourse (Jennings 1993). Environmental assessment must avoid Pragmatism 
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submitting to what Forester describes as “the comforting fallacies of relativism” 
(Forester 1998: 6). Merely to state that we all have different values is to present a 
doctrine of policy making that says we cannot distinguish between good and bad 
policies, between environmental use and abuse, and so on. It is my contention, with 
Bruce Jennings, that “policy analysis ought to be held to a higher normative standard, 
one that attempts to capture a civic conception of participatory governance and 
policy debate leading to the emergence of a guiding consensus on the fundamental 
and common ends of public life” (Jennings 1993: 102). Again, Forester provides a 
pertinent warning when he says that “a planning theory that cannot teach us about 
value may well not be value-free, but valueless” (Forester 1998: 6).  
The Promise of Pragmatism  
[I]f you want a description of our age, here is one: the civilization of means without ends 
(Livingstone 1956, cited in Flyvbjerg 2001: 53). 
Perhaps the most alluring promise of pragmatism for the contemporary 
environmental problematic is its attention to the goals implicit in any act of inquiry, 
and thus in its capacity to reclaim attention to the original civic purpose of EA. The 
question of whether the EA practitioner should take the stance of neutrality or 
advocacy becomes incoherent in this framework. For pragmatism, inquiry is always a 
response to a perplexity—or a problematic situation—which has interrupted a 
practice. In this sense, a practice is conceived as a rule-governed, cooperative human 
activity that has its own internal goods and standards of excellence.
2 As Sullivan 
                                                 
2 The idea of a practice that Jennings draws upon was originally articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre. 
Since I find MacIntyre’s prose somewhat unwieldy, his original definition is given here rather than in 
the text: 
By a ‘practice’ I … mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which the goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of Chapter 5 
 
 
– 214 – 
(1995) points out, without an implicit interest in continuing a practice, there can be 
no focus for inquiry, and thus no problem to engage cognitive attention. Inquiry is 
always implicitly structured by a purpose, which derives in part from the constitutive 
values of the practice. Conversely, it is exactly the implicit purpose of inquiry that 
the positivist account of knowledge leaves out, but must take for granted (Sullivan 
1995). It is the positivist model’s “civilization of means without ends”, as 
Livingstone aptly characterises the modern age, that renders it insufficient as a model 
for policy inquiry oriented to, and guided by, the goal of environmental quality and 
sustainability.  
Of equal importance to EA is the pragmatic conviction, evident most notably in 
Dewey, that the point of inquiry is to change the world (Bernstein 1971). For the 
pragmatists, the point of departure for inquiry is the need for deliberate human action 
oriented to the transformation of a problematic situation into a settled situation. And 
as I have repeatedly stressed, it is the transformative intent of EA to change the 
policy process that represents its revolutionary potential. The pressing task for 
environmental governance in our time is the development of a strategy of radical 
democratic reform for modern, capitalist, western culture (Holdren 2001). It is this 
apparently contradictory attention to radical reform which holds within it the 
potential to reconcile politics and science in EA. As Forester points out, the need for 
a critical and yet action-oriented approach demands that policy analysts “must not 
only listen critically to conflicting and ambiguous claims of value, but they must also 
shape hope by speaking to real possibilities of public action” (Forester 1998: 14). 
                                                 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved are systematically extended (MacIntyre 1984: 187). Pragmatism 
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The emphasis of EA on sustaining the environmental quality of life, and thereby on 
social-environmental relationships, is also made explicit in Dewey’s conception of 
inquiry as the interaction of the human and natural worlds. It is this interaction which 
provides the context for social learning, and it was Dewey’s belief that collective 
learning from practical experience, guided by the principles of scientific inquiry, 
could lead society progressively toward a golden age (Parson and Clark 1995). 
Therefore, pragmatism provides an alternative that foregoes neither the 
Enlightenment values of human creativity and development, nor the Enlightenment 
goal of improving human civilisation by means of human inquiry—values and goals 
still cherished, I would venture, by most in the aforementioned western culture. It 
helps to progress an understanding of how the interaction of expert and civic 
judgment in EA might both be compatible with, and capable of reorienting, the larger 
values of the liberal-democratic political regime in which EA must operate in 
western societies. 
The judicious attention in pragmatism to the relationship between science and 
democracy is a core reason for its appeal as a conceptual framework for EA. 
Emphasising that the relationship between science and democracy rests on the social 
nature of intelligence, Deweyan pragmatism envisaged an intelligent form of 
democracy, one in which policies are devised and tested in an open, flexible and 
informed manner. As Bohman (1999) points out, even this weak analogy to science 
reclaims an emphasis on knowledge that is lacking in accounts of democracy today. 
Committed to the normative ideal of a democratic society, the cultivation of 
democratic public life was central to Dewey’s pragmatic theory of inquiry. In this, 
the emancipatory temper of the Enlightenment was evident in Dewey’s belief that Chapter 5 
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most worthy of preservation in the liberal-democratic tradition was the emphasis on 
encouraging the free exercise of individual capacities (MacGilvray 1999). 
Importantly, the creative potential of this individual freedom provides a corrective to 
the tendency for uncritical acceptance of the status quo. In this spirit, liberal politics 
was itself to be radically re-formed: 
Liberalism must now become radical, meaning by “radical” perception of the 
necessity of thorough-going changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding 
activity to bring the changes to pass. For the gulf between what the actual situation 
makes possible and the actual state itself is so great that it cannot be bridged by 
piecemeal policies undertaken ad hoc. The process of producing the changes will be, 
in any case, a gradual one. But “reforms” that deal now with this abuse and now with 
that without having a social goal based on an inclusive plan, differ entirely from effort 
at re-forming, in its literal sense, the institutional scheme of things (Dewey 1935, cited 
in Bernstein 1991: 232). 
As this statement makes clear, Dewey’s strategy bears little resemblance to the ad 
hocery often attributed to pragmatic incrementalism in contemporary policy 
discourse.
3 Instead, he recognised the need for a kind of radical democratic social 
reform capable of reconstructing democratic life—a form of life that both requires 
and cultivates civic virtue (Bernstein 1991). The impetus for this task of 
reconstruction issued from what Dewey considered to be the deepest conflict of his 
times: the divorce of science from practical life, or the divorce of theory from 
practice (Bernstein 1971). This, as we have seen, is a conflict which persists into the 
twenty-first century—a conflict whose reconciliation in the context of EA claims a 
central focus of this thesis.  
                                                 
3 The interpretation of pragmatic notions of being ‘practical’ as pure instrumentalism, and of the 
corollary belief that something is meaningful only if it is useful, have similarly misrepresented the 
pragmatist doctrine, as I shall explain in later sections of this chapter. Pragmatism 
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Committed to the practical necessity of integrating democratic everyday life with 
advances in science and technology, and based on his belief that democratic 
participation is compatible with the complexity of technological societies, Dewey’s 
pragmatic theory of policy inquiry was grounded in his conviction that the 
democratic community should be reconstructed according to the model of the 
scientific community. Democracy must be a form of social inquiry (Bohman 1999). 
Given that the ‘scientisation of politics’ was identified in Chapter 3 as an undesirable 
contemporary phenomenon, it might seem somewhat counter-intuitive to be 
proposing something of a ‘science model’ of politics. But this is to ignore the 
reconstructive achievements of pragmatism, which began in Peirce with a radical 
rethinking of the assumptions of modern science, and progressed with Dewey’s 
critical appropriation of these insights as a way to recover democratic politics from 
the individualism and laissez-faire economics that dominated government policy in 
his time. It is the concept of a ‘community of inquiry’ central to pragmatism’s 
understanding of science that provides the link between science and democracy. 
The first step is to elaborate the pragmatic theory of inquiry and the practical 
rationality that informs it, before revisiting the implications of pragmatism for a more 
constructive relationship between science and politics. Pragmatism can help us to 
glimpse the inadequacies of the received view because it challenges the claim that 
power is external to knowledge. The relationship between the normative and 
descriptive elements of policy analysis is central to pragmatism, a relationship 
mediated by the critical ‘community of inquirers’. Chapter 5 
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II  The Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: A Political Epistemology 
of Practice 
The Community of Inquiry 
At its roots, pragmatism is a theory of knowledge. But it was the intellectual task of 
the early pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce to fundamentally rethink the premises of 
modern science.
4 Peirce challenged what Dewey later called the ‘foundation’ 
metaphor of knowledge and the ‘spectator’ view of the knower so central to 
Enlightenment epistemologies. These aspects of modern thought have meant a 
tendency to focus on the theories and results of science, and on the work of the 
individual scientist—inclinations that Peirce believed were counterproductive to the 
quest for truth.  
The Peircean approach was to focus on the practice of science, and on the self-
critical ‘community of inquirers’ as a regulative ideal.
5 Within this community, man 
as inquirer was no longer spectator, but an active, critical participant in the process of 
inquiry. In the philosophy of Peirce, it is the idea of rationality as self-controlled 
conduct which provides the mediating link between theory and practice: “A rational 
person … not merely has habits, but also can exert a measure of self-control over his 
future actions” (Peirce, cited in Bernstein 1971: 189). Self-control, in turn, demands 
self-criticism. But self-criticism does not operate in a vacuum. It requires an active 
community of inquirers “without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of 
knowledge” (ibid: 190).  
                                                 
4 For an extensive discussion of Peirce and Dewey’s pragmatism, see Richard Bernstein’s (1971) 
Praxis and Action. 
5 Peirce was a practising scientist (Bernstein 1971). Pragmatism 
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This focus on the community of inquiry instead of the heroic individual scientist was 
underpinned by Peirce’s recognition that the individual mind is inherently fallible. 
The cognitive limitations of the individual were then taken as a prompt to recognise 
the necessarily intersubjective, social and communal character of knowledge. Peirce 
thus sought to divest inquiry of the atomistic thesis of knowledge acquisition and to 
replace it with a vision of inquiry as a critical, and inherently social, activity. For the 
pragmatists, then, giving up on the possibility of ultimate foundations did not mean 
universal doubt, or relativism, but fallibilism: the recognition that knowledge is 
always tentative, and is therefore always subject to further interpretation, criticism, 
and correction. For even as we give up on the idea of ultimate foundations, we 
cannot give up on the need for reasonable discriminations (Bernstein 1992). 
The community of inquiry also redefines the relationship between power and 
knowledge (Rouse 1987). Power is normally considered to be external to the ‘context 
of justification’ in science, exercised only in the application or distortion of 
knowledge.
6 By rejecting the existence of identifiable criteria to evaluate truth claims 
outside those arrived at through the practice of inquiry, pragmatism locates power as 
integral to epistemology: 
The connection between epistemology and social and political philosophy is perhaps 
most readily seen by reflecting on the implications of a pragmatic theory of truth. 
Truth, it is said, is to be understood in terms of the ultimate consensus of the 
community of inquirers…. [But] even such an “ideal” (indefinitely distant) consensus 
is not sufficient. For inquiry might continue indefinitely under conditions of 
psychological or political repression that would distort its conclusions at every stage 
(e.g., yield ideology rather than science). Accordingly, the possibility of truth—and 
hence of knowledge—requires the realization of a social and political environment 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the arguments made by defenders of ‘value-freedom’ in science. Chapter 5 
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that will permit inquiry without distorting constraints (Gutting 1979, cited in Rouse 
1987).
7 
This political concern for contextual conditions that will permit free and undistorted 
inquiry becomes integral to any understanding of the cognitive aspects of science. 
This emphasis on enabling the conditions for free inquiry, then, rests on the 
pragmatic maxim that the ultimate arbiter of ‘truth’ is the outcome (approached but 
never achieved) of unconstrained critical discussion within a community of inquirers. 
Inquiry is considered to be open-ended because any one particular result may be 
overturned by further investigations. Moreover, the standards and criteria by which 
results are appraised are also the product of inquiry. These standards cannot be 
identified in advance because what counts as an acceptable conclusion changes as 
inquiry proceeds. Therefore, an understanding of power must be integral to 
epistemology. Pragmatists are not concerned so much with distinguishing between 
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ as with the relationship between things and the way they are 
disclosed. When knowledge cannot be insulated from the operations of power, the 
way the world is cannot be clearly distinguished from the social context in which  it 
is disclosed. As Joseph Rouse explains: “What there is depends above all on what 
languages or vocabularies are available to describe what there is and on what values 
or ‘coherence conditions’ govern the adequacy of our descriptions” (Rouse 1987).  
The Pragmatic Theory of Policy Inquiry 
It was on the basis of Peirce’s view of science that Dewey identified the social and 
political consequences of the ‘community of inquiry’ as a model for the democratic 
                                                 
7 Readers of political theory will note the affinity here with Habermasean deliberative democracy, 
which will be discussed at length in Chapter 6.  Pragmatism 
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community. For Dewey, natural science was “forced by its own development to 
abandon the assumption of fixity and to recognise that what for it is actually 
‘universal’ is process … the most radical discovery yet made” (Dewey, cited in Siu 
2001). It was Dewey’s hope that a common commitment to the process of inquiry 
would displace political conflict and enable intelligent public action. But Dewey was 
to give the Enlightenment analogy between science and democracy a political twist: 
science is a successful rational enterprise not because it is ‘objective’, nor because it 
is grounded in universal laws, but because it is organised democratically (Bohman 
1999). On this view, the social conditions of inquiry become paramount. 
One key feature of science Dewey thought relevant to democracy was disciplined 
discussion:  
It is of the nature of science not so much to tolerate as to welcome diversity of 
opinion, while it insists that inquiry brings the evidence of observed facts to bear to 
effect a consensus of conclusions—and even to hold the conclusion subject to what is 
ascertained and made public in further new inquiries. I would not claim that any 
existing democracy has ever made complete or adequate use of scientific method in 
deciding upon its policies. But freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, 
freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as 
the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific 
method (Dewey 1916, cited in Bernstein 1971: 223). 
Dewey observes that the characteristics of scientific inquiry would present an 
improvement on current practices of democracy, in that the indefinite ‘community of 
inquiry’ would answer to the diversity of views within the context of free and open 
debate. The consensus reached would be tentative, and open to further challenge. 
However, his reference to the ‘intellectual consumer’ makes it clear why Dewey’s 
proposal to cultivate the judgment of experts and citizens is open to the charge of Chapter 5 
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reducing politics to science. I elaborate on the implications of this for policy-making 
in a later section of this chapter.  
The other key feature of science Dewey believed would improve democracy was 
experiment. But Dewey’s commitment to experiment was not based on a naïve 
empiricism. Whereas empiricism relies upon evidence of the past, or what is ‘given’, 
pragmatic policy inquiry is the attempt to change the ‘given’. Thus, whilst 
constrained by empirical knowledge, policy is oriented to future possibilities. Arie 
Rip makes this point cogently when he says that “[p]olicy is about the future, and 
evidence is about the past…. Evidence, in its strict sense, is too limited to base policy 
on. One needs diagnosis, inference, judgement” (Rip 2000: 2). Fallibility implies an 
expectation that we may be mistaken, so that we are willing to revise our insights. 
Science is rational not because it has a foundation, then, but because it is a self-
correcting enterprise. The relevance of a theory or philosophy is not its universal or 
foundational status, but its role as an instrument for transforming reality.  
In short, the core of the pragmatist argument is that knowing and inquiry are human 
activities that always take place as part of an engaged social practice (Sullivan 1995). 
Theory needs to be understood as critical reflection on practice; and, whilst grounded 
in practice, such reflection is always oriented to the identification of possible 
modifications of established practice (Bohman et al. 1991). The pragmatic approach 
to inquiry therefore “assumes a more active, yet more reflective stance toward 
inquiry” (Sullivan 1995). As such, it prompts us to become more reflective about 
what practitioners actually do. Pragmatism 
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The Dual Role of the Practitioner 
The interrelatedness of action and reflection in pragmatic inquiry is based on its 
conception of science as a dynamic interplay between the cooperative and critical 
moments of inquiry. Charles Anderson (1990) argues that the cooperative and critical 
capacities of science represent its conservative and radical influences, respectively, 
and that both modes of inquiry are necessary for the progress of knowledge. 
Moreover, this two-fold methodological commitment makes parallel demands of the 
practitioner—be they scientists or other professional practitioners—who must play a 
dual role in sustaining the goals of the practice.  
For heuristic purposes, cooperative and critical modes of inquiry may be thought of 
as conducted by the ‘community of practice’ and the ‘community of inquiry’, 
respectively (Anderson 1990). In the community of practice, it is the reliable 
performance of the enterprise that is at issue.
8 Reliable performance is ensured when 
the practitioner follows established procedure, and in so doing, contributes to the 
maintenance of standard technique. The scientist, as a member of the community of 
practice, must subordinate individuality to a system of collective norms and methods. 
It is the discipline of the scientist, explains Anderson, “to subsume personal 
observations under lawlike statements that can be sustained, in experience, over 
time” (Anderson 1990: 25). The justification for action then rests upon the 
                                                 
8 Anderson favours the term ‘enterprise’ over both ‘association’ and ‘organisation’ to define 
communities of practice. Enterprise is the more active word, and in pragmatism “it is purpose, more 
than solidarity alone, that matters” (Anderson 1990: 18). The term ‘association’ connotes a voluntary 
and democratic mode of practice which derives from the liberal belief that the state should not be the 
architect of social order, but that most social functions should be performed by associations arising 
autonomously within the political community. The term enterprise is also more accurate than 
‘organisation’ in the context of public policy because, to provide an example from political economy, 
it is the industry—the normative culture of practice—rather than the firm that is essential in the 
formulation of public action. Chapter 5 
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accumulated knowledge and established canons of practice—of tradition and 
disciplined inquiry.  
At the same time, this conservative influence is offset by the radical propensity of 
science to encourage the greatest possible range of conjecture and speculation. In this 
more creative role, as a member of the community of inquiry, it is the scientist’s 
responsibility to contribute to the scrutiny of established method and to search for 
innovative and better ways of doing things. Yet this initial tolerance of a diversity of 
ideas is not based on the premise that all ideas have equal worth—there is no naïve 
relativism here. Rather, open-mindedness is a fundamental condition of the search 
for truth. The basic reason for the rational consistency that accompanies predictable 
routine in the standardised techniques of science and policy is that it is a condition of 
human freedom. The order so essential to freedom arises from communities of good 
practice.  
As the practitioner undertakes to contribute to reliable knowledge and performance, 
then, there is an understanding that she be able to recount the process that led to the 
collective agreement. The aim of such critical accounting is to demonstrate that a 
specific practice is in fact good practice: 
To demonstrate the trustworthiness of scientific statement or practical technique, it is 
never enough to point to the consensus of investigators alone, or to the freedom they 
all had to speak their minds. Rather, one recounts the history of a critical analysis, 
citing the efforts made to think otherwise, the tests made to try to prove the hypothesis 
wrong, the repeated confirmations that the idea worked in practice, from all sorts of 
angles, in all kinds of applications. This is the case for the durability of knowledge, or 
technique (Anderson 1990: 47-8). 
This critical process is ideally public; that is, scientific knowledge should be public 
knowledge. It is on this understanding, argues Anderson, that “‘expert judgment’ is Pragmatism 
 
 
– 225 – 
compatible with the larger logic of liberalism” (Anderson 1990: 50). Knowledge 
claims are not to be trusted merely on the basis that inquiry incorporated free 
expression and consensus. It is the critical and public accounting for such claims that 
provides the justification for professional judgment as a legitimate contribution to 
rational inquiry. 
Moreover, as Fuller (2000) points out, true freedom requires the expression of 
different opinions, not just their toleration, as liberal politics would have it. This is 
because when individuals demonstrate their autonomy through the creative 
expression of ideas in the open critical engagement (the unconstrained discourse) 
amongst peers, they are simultaneously improving the collective body of knowledge 
upon which the community of practice ultimately depends.
9 Thus, freedom of 
opportunity is only realised through the individual’s acceptance of responsibility for 
the purpose and standards which are constitutive of the ‘community of practice’ 
(Sullivan 1995). It is in this way that the community of inquiry takes collective 
responsibility for both the objects and consequences of inquiry. 
The relationship between individual creativity and collective cooperation is therefore 
a dialectical one, mediated by the critical capacity of the community of inquiry. 
Individual freedom and collective responsibility depend mutually upon each other. 
And yet, because these features of professional life pull in opposite directions, a 
tension remains.  
                                                 
9 This republican condition, that the right of the autonomous individual to express an opinion is 
simultaneously an obligation to the broader polity, is exemplified throughout history: “Thucydides’ 
account of Periclean democracy in fourth-century BC Athens, Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment’s 
‘public use of reason’ and John Stuart Mill’s defence of free speech all share this obligatory character 
– and here we might add Popper’s exhortation that scientists falsify their hypotheses” (Fuller 2000: 
13). Chapter 5 
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III Practical  Reason 
An important implication that flows from the notion of the community of inquiry for 
policy inquiry is that it substantially changes the meaning of rationality:
  
central to this new understanding is a dialogical model of rationality that stresses the 
practical, communal character of this rationality in which there is choice, deliberation, 
interpretation, judicious weighting and application of “universal criteria”, and even 
rational disagreement about which criteria are relevant and most important (Bernstein 
1983: 172). 
Charles Anderson points out that the Deweyan commitment to practical, political 
reason is “almost precisely the Aristotlean ideal of phronesis” (Anderson 1990: 364). 
For Aristotle, practical reason (phronesis) was the kind of knowing concerned with 
orienting moral action. Practical reason involves deliberation about that which is 
variable, and about that which there can be differing opinions; it requires a 
judgmental mediation between general principles and a particular situation that 
requires choice (Bernstein 1983). Because the mark of a prudent individual is that 
she is “reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for 
man”, prudent action is clearly concerned with the relationship we have to society 
when we act (Aristotle, cited in Flyvbjerg 2001). In this way, it differs from what we 
have come to think of as ‘ethics’ in modern times, which denotes the relationship I 
have to myself when I act. The mediation between universal and particular ensures 
that attention to both collective action and concrete circumstances is sustained. 
Theory and science are often seen as the enemy of many scholars seeking to 
appropriate phronesis (Ruderman 1997). Theory is rigid, abstract, and the product of 
disengaged individual reasoning. Phronesis, on the other hand, is flexible, practical, 
and the product of shared understanding between particular human beings. As a form Pragmatism 
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of reasoning that emerges from practice, it encourages citizens to participate in 
politics, and so acts to reinforce a vital public sphere. Because it involves mutual 
deliberation, participatory democrats often advocate political judgment whilst 
simultaneously discounting the role of theory. The universal nature of theory is not 
respectful of difference. Therefore, the standards for political judgment must be those 
of the participants themselves (cf. Barber 1984). 
Ironically, as Ruderman (1997) points out, this stance means that advocates of 
participatory democracy leave one foot in the camp of Thomas Hobbes, who also 
consigns prudence and philosophy to different realms. It ignores the interrelated 
nature of theory and practice in the pragmatist community of inquiry, which demands 
the recognition that inquiry is inescapably normative:  
When we concentrate on the nature and role of community in scientific inquiry, on the 
ways in which rationality is essentially dialogic and subjective, then we must not only 
clarify the descriptive aspects of actual scientific communities but their normative 
dimensions as well. While it is possible for certain purposes to distinguish the 
descriptive and the normative dimensions of such communities, it is crucial to realise 
how intimately and dialectically these dimensions are interrelated (Bernstein 1985). 
The idea of a ‘practice’ central to pragmatism helps to understand this connection 
between the descriptive and normative aspects of the community of inquirers. As 
noted earlier, a practice is a rule-governed, cooperative human activity that has its 
own internal goods and standards of excellence. The emphasis on practice associated 
with Dewey’s pragmatism has been the source of much confusion and 
misrepresentation, however. In common usage, practical activity calls to mind 
mundane activity and material gain, in which theory has no place. Aidan Davison 
elaborates the terms of this modernist theory/practice divide: Chapter 5 
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Under the polarizing forces of dualism, the term practice is now so radically separated 
from and subordinated to theory that it is effectively defined through negative contrast 
with theory…. theory is pure cognitive activity and practice is pure bodily action. 
Practice, separated from thinking in this way, seems either devoid of theory (habitual, 
intuitive, instinctive behavior) or seems contingent upon the application of theory 
(rational, scientific, productive behavior) (Davison 2001: 160-61).  
On these terms, the pragmatists’ attention to practice means they are often accused of 
defining something as meaningful only if it is useful or productive—only if it 
‘works’. Thus, being pragmatic has been interpreted in the main, and translated in 
colloquial language, as pure instrumentalism.  
But what Dewey actually called for was “a practical philosophy or rather a 
philosophy of practical activity”, in which practice, and the nature of human action, 
were central themes (cited in Bernstein 1971: xiii). It is important not to think of this 
as the primacy of the practical, nor as the cue to reduce theory to practice. Indeed, it 
is just this dualistic framing—and the related tendency to elevate one element of this 
duo by subordinating the other—that pragmatism seeks to overcome. Dewey retained 
a critical role for philosophy because “in a complicated and perverse world, action 
which is not informed with vision, imagination, and reflection, is more likely to 
increase confusion and conflict than to straighten things out” (Dewey, cited in 
Bernstein 1971: 220). Theory, on this view, is something akin to critical reflection on 
practice, which is itself a purposive activity. By emphasising the ends internal to 
practical activity, the idea of a practice brings ends and means together because “the 
end cannot be adequately characterized independently of a characterization of the 
means” (MacIntyre 1984: 184).  
The dichotomy between means and ends, or procedure and substance, has become so 
widely accepted in the modern world that its proponents take it for granted, whilst its Pragmatism 
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critics have become ineffective. It is a separation that relies upon the foundational 
status of “standards capable of being invoked without the possibility of contradiction 
and therefore without responsibility and commitment”; a God’s-eye view or 
Archimedean point from which we can evaluate where we have been and where we 
are going (Pitkin 1972). The pragmatists remind us that instead, all we have are 
fallible human beings. We are, as Neurath said about science, “like sailors who must 
rebuild their ship on the high seas, without ever being able to take it apart in dry-
dock and construct it anew out of the best components” (cited in Pitkin 1972).  
The pragmatists’ acceptance of fallibility as the prompt for human creativity is a 
legacy with practical import for policy inquiry. The fallibility of inquiry is an 
incentive for rigorous and critical testing of knowledge claims. Unlike the universal 
doubt of Cartesian scepticism, however, fallibility does not mean we must question 
anything at all. It merely says that if we do entertain doubts about a particular belief 
or value, then we must provide justifiable reasons for doing so, which means we 
cannot call everything into question at once. Some things must be taken as given. 
Like Neurath’s sailors, who had to stand on one plank in order to fix another, not all 
our convictions can be criticised at the same time. But none are immune from 
criticism. There is no need to assume the existence of ultimate foundations to make 
this activity intelligible (Bernstein 1985).  
For Dewey, it is not ultimate foundations but ‘ends-in-view’ that provide the focus 
for deliberative action. The end-in-view is itself a means to a larger end or ‘truth’, 
which we approach but never achieve. For Dewey, purpose is constitutive of a 
practice; our ends-in-view are only visible to us as agents participating in a practice. 
But this approach of dealing with particulars in concrete situations is not the Chapter 5 
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instrumentalist view commonly attributed to practical reason. As Ruderman (1997) 
explains, the original phrase in Aristotle’s Ethics which has prompted this narrow 
interpretation of practical reason is that which states we do not deliberate about ends, 
but about pros to telos. Normally interpreted as “means to an end”, the Greek should 
instead be translated as “what is toward the end” (Wiggins 1980, cited in Ruderman 
1997). In other words, the ‘ends-in-view’ we should deliberate about count as the 
partial realisation of a larger end, as well as representing ends in themselves.  
Because the end-in-view is itself a means to restoring the ‘integration’ lacking in the 
problematic situation, it is then evaluated in terms of its ability to help resolve the 
problem under consideration. Without this process of interpretation and evaluation, 
“one ‘fact’ would be as good as any other” (Dewey, cited in Festenstein 2001).  
This process of interpretation, which orients inquiry to the broader context that 
makes it intelligible, thus exhibits the hermeneutic quality of emphasising knowledge 
acquisition and application as interrelated dimensions of human activity. Because the 
inquirer is not ‘spectator’ but agent, and intelligence is not rule-following but a form 
of purposive action, reflection is an integral aspect of action. Thus, intelligence must 
be seen not as the ability of an individual to draw inferences and conclusions from 
given premises, but rather as a social capacity:  
Intelligence consists of a complex set of flexible and growing habits that involve 
sensitivity; the ability to discern the complexities of situations; imagination that is 
exercised in seeing new possibilities and hypotheses; willingness to learn from 
experience; fairness and objectivity in judging and evaluating conflicting views and 
opinions; and the courage to change one’s views when it is demanded by the 
consequences of our actions and the criticisms of others (Bernstein 1971).  Pragmatism 
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If the normative and descriptive characteristics of a community of inquiry are 
interrelated aspects of a practice, then it is not enough to simply describe what 
practitioners do in a limited, empiricist sense. A pragmatist account of inquiry cannot 
be concerned solely with the description of actions as isolated events. Rather, agency 
in pragmatic thought has more to do with the notion of deliberate conduct, which 
directs us to take account of the norms embedded in intersubjective communication 
(Bernstein 1985).  
Deliberate conduct is a normative activity, for without norms to guide rational 
discrimination there can be no self-criticism. But if the norms of inquiry are the 
source of knowledge claims, a self-corrective process of inquiry also demands a 
critique of the norms themselves (Bernstein 1971). By subjecting the norms of 
inquiry to criticism, pragmatism avoids the moralising error of positivism, which 
insulates social inquiry from practical and evaluative considerations, and in so doing 
results only in the choice of means for goals already decided upon. It was this latter 
instrumentalism, in which the ends, goals or interests promoted by existing social 
arrangements were by definition immune from social criticism, that Dewey sought to 
avoid by subjecting descriptive and  normative statements to rational scrutiny 
(Festenstein 2001). 
IV  Knowledges in Context 
As described earlier, it is the public and critical process of knowledge testing in the 
pragmatic model of science that contributes to the trustworthiness and durability of 
knowledge. In this, the pragmatist account of knowledge production seems to assume 
that the empirical-analytical nature of this testing is unaffected by a broader Chapter 5 
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epistemic politics. Thus, it is not clear that pragmatism really gets beyond what Karl 
Popper later elaborated as the ideal of unrestrained self-criticism in science. 
This idealised account of the self-critical nature of scientific activity (at least if it 
were ‘properly’ practiced) has failed to be manifest in the empirical accounts of 
scientific practice described by scholars of the history and philosophy of science.
10 
Scientists, as Kuhn (1962) pointed out, do not routinely participate in critical 
reflection on the cultural practices of science itself, nor on the implicit limitations 
and contingencies of their own knowledge. In turn, when the dominant understanding 
of science as factual and ‘objective’ knowledge is uncritically reproduced in policy 
discourses, the dominant institutional culture denies any need for the critical 
examination of its own framing assumptions and contingencies. In this way, as 
Wynne points out, 
an optimistic Popperian model neglects the deeply entrenched and even perhaps 
unconscious cultural way in which such commitments shape explicit ‘rational’ thought 
in this context…. [This cultural syndrome] is constitutive of habitual, unquestioned 
ways of thought and practice—implicitly shaping what counts as reason, rather than 
resulting from deliberate reason. This cultural character is what makes it so 
extraordinarily difficult to point out to its agents, and for them to recognize themselves 
as such (Wynne 2001: 475).  
On this analysis, we cannot assume that either scientific or policy institutions will 
recognise, and open up for public testing and refutation, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that infuse dominant ‘rational’ environmental policy discourses (Wynne 
2002).  
                                                 
10 See the discussion on “The Limits of Organised Skepticism” in Chapter 4.  Pragmatism 
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The constructive relationship between knowledge and action in pragmatism, and its 
emphasis on practice, resonates with the insights of two additional fields of 
scholarship. The first is work by Donald Schön on the reflective stance of 
practitioners, and William Sullivan’s modification of this analysis to introduce an 
institutional dimension. The second is the concept of “social robustness” of 
knowledge, and the related “co-production” thesis of knowledge and political 
order.
11 Informed by these insights, the pragmatist notion of a community of 
practitioners of knowledge would be expanded to include both scientists and policy 
actors in a broader community of knowledge practitioners, thereby enriching the 
contextual orientation of pragmatism. 
Reflective Practitioners 
The pragmatic axiom that knowledge acquisition and application are interrelated 
dimensions of human activity is central to the work of the late Donald Schön (1983) 
in recovering attention to the value of professional expertise. Schön takes as his 
starting point the pragmatic insight that practical rationality is at the epistemological 
centre of professional expertise (Sullivan 1995). Practical rationality, or deliberative 
action, is a judgmental activity required to appraise the confused, problematic 
situations of practice so that they can be transformed into solvable problems. Schön, 
who calls this approach ‘reflection-in-action’, has demonstrated through in-depth 
case analyses of professional work that the skill of knowing-in-action is far from 
abstract rule following.  
                                                 
11 As noted in Chapter 4, this latter scholarship in social studies of science appears to have a close 
affinity with the constructive relationship between scientific knowledge and political action in 
pragmatism. Chapter 5 
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Clearly, a good practitioner has learned the rules and procedures of a particular field 
of practice. These skills become habitual and largely tacit over time, so that in 
routine practice, the practitioner is indeed a competent specialist. But Schön (1983) 
goes on to argue that the full dimensions of expertise go beyond this kind of 
competence, and are only fully revealed when the practitioner must respond to new 
situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. Here it is not the 
model of science ‘after the fact’, as a body of established propositions derived from 
research, that provides an understanding of professional expertise. Rather, it is 
science ‘before the fact’, as a process in which scientists grapple with uncertainties 
and display skills and qualities not reducible to the application of knowledge to 
instrumental decisions, that provides vital guidance.  
Confronted with the messy situations of practice, the practitioner’s habitualised skills 
are exercised as part of an holistic capacity to appreciate the novelty of the situation 
and to redefine it through experiment (Sullivan 1995). But this experimental attitude 
cannot be reduced to routine trial-and-error. It is rather a process of reflection-in-
action, where “a kind of knowing is inherent in intelligent action … the know-how is 
in the action” (Schön 1983: 50): 
When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context…. 
He does not keep means and ends separate, but defines them interactively as he frames 
a problematic situation. He does not separate thinking from doing, ratiocinating his 
way to a decision he must later convert to action. Because his experimenting is a kind 
of action, implementation is built into his inquiry (Schön 1983: 68).  
Schön’s model of reflective practice thus provides us with a description of 
professional skill in which communications between the technical and practical 
dimensions of expertise are re-opened. The active and synthetic skills of the Pragmatism 
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practitioner are conceived as valuable assets, rather than unwanted deviations from 
detached rule-following.  
Beyond this emphasis on practice, however, William Sullivan (1995) recognises the 
importance of introducing an institutional dimension to Schön’s analysis. On this 
institutional view, it is not the individual practitioner but the larger enterprise which 
is the relevant unit of inquiry. It is the climate of social interaction promoted by the 
professional enterprise that will determine the degree to which reflection-in-action 
becomes institutionalised in practice.  
This explicit attention to the broader societal context in which practice is situated 
reveals the linkage between the technical and moral dimensions of expertise: 
“Because real expertise is never entirely separable from communities of practice, it is 
never fully purified of social and moral engagement” (Sullivan 1995: 187):  
Skills depend upon embodied intelligence. This intelligence, however, is itself 
embedded in the character of human agents. But neither are these characters atomic 
bits. Rather, human intelligence and character develop within specific kinds of social 
context which are shaped by shared aims and values. Human agency, that is, grows 
out of an ecology of institutional life in which agents embody, modify, reject, or 
further develop common repertoires of skill, understandings, and purposes. The 
rediscovery of practical reason thus leads us to recognize the need to protect and foster 
human social ecologies as well as natural ones (Sullivan 1995: 185). 
But as Sullivan goes on to point out, the question remains as to whether the 
interdependence between professional expertise and its social context will be 
positive. The question, in other words, is whether practical reasoning contributes to 
the recovery of the civic dimension of professionalism. The answer to this question 
rests upon whether or not experts choose to become citizens. Implicit in this choice is Chapter 5 
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a recovery of expertise as a moral source, as well as a recovery of the moral sources 
of expertise:  
Maximizing public, as opposed to private, goods requires operating in different ways, 
asking how to best organize technique in support of valuable practices and the 
institutions which give the instrumentalities their focus and continuity (Sullivan 1995: 
186). 
On this view, sustaining public environmental goods requires that techniques are 
developed in support of the practice of EA. But if EA is to be recognised as a 
valuable social practice in its broader social context—if the expertise it contributes is 
to be a moral source—then the moral sources of its expertise must be recovered. The 
task of recovering the civic dimension of professionalism in EA must be taken 
seriously. I will return to the implications of this civic orientation in the final section 
of this chapter. 
Reflective Scientists 
An investigation into environmental scientists’ perspectives on the interaction of 
their research with the broader environmental policy context seems to suggest that 
these scientists went some way to acknowledging themselves as citizens. The 
scientists interviewed in this study, whose work was in the areas of climate change, 
ecological protection, BSE, and genetic engineering, were found to be sensitive to 
the broader societal and policy contexts of their work. In other words, the study 
clearly revealed the reflexivity of scientists, or the “reflexive identification and 
articulation of subjective assumptions and commitments shaping positive 
knowledges and their deployments” (Waterton 2000: 3). In particular, it was 
established that scientists do reflect upon the relationship of scientific knowledge to Pragmatism 
 
 
– 237 – 
the broader issues of uncertainty, precaution, accountability and responsibility that 
infuse environmental policy-making (Waterton et al. 2001). 
Interviews with scientists revealed that expressions of uncertainty and responsibility 
were closely related to the context in which the knowledge would be communicated. 
Scientists’ willingness to communicate openly about these issues of uncertainty, and 
about the role of judgment in dealing with uncertainties, was dependent upon the 
intended audience. In other words, communicative openness was dependent upon 
context. Importantly, too, scientists expressed feelings of responsibility associated 
with being an actor in a policy domain in which science is seen as making an 
important contribution to knowledge and regulatory processes.  
Although scientists were found in this study to reflect upon their work within its 
broader societal context, however, it is significant that these scientists did not 
consider this kind of activity a requisite part of their work. As such, these reflections 
are not part of an explicit public debate about science, even as scientists recognised 
the benefits for both science and public policy of this kind of public engagement. The 
implications of this were made clear by Waterton and her colleagues, who note that 
there are  
few open fora in which scientists would consider it worth their while to discuss how 
they approach research planning, who is responsible for asking the right questions, the 
conduct of research, changes in science and its relationship to society, changes in the 
demands and pressures faced by scientists, changes in the status of scientific 
knowledge in environmental regulation, planning and policy-making. Scientists seem 
to feel little incentive or opportunity to discuss such issues at large, even though much 
of the public’s so-called ‘misunderstanding’ of science (an issue that does concern 
most scientists), is predicated on just these kinds of wider science-society concerns, 
questions, and observations (Waterton et al. 2001: 27). Chapter 5 
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The lack of opportunity to engage in public debates suggests the need for public 
forums for open-ended learning about the nature and dynamics of science, and about 
the purpose and meaning of scientific knowledge for environmental policy. But as 
Waterton et al. (2001) conclude, the lack of incentive felt by scientists to join public 
discussions may well indicate that scientists ‘misunderstand’ the public and their 
willingness to engage with, and respond in a mature manner to, the issues of 
uncertainty and complexity associated with science. This identified need for 
improved communication in both directions, and thus for a creative dialectic between 
scientists and citizens, fortifies the contemporary relevance of Dewey’s end-in-view: 
the cultivation of judgment and reasoned discussion between experts and citizens in 
the context of a shared commitment to action.  
Socially Robust Knowledge 
Studies of science in society point out that this dialectical relationship between 
science and its broader social context is key to the stabilisation of science-for-policy. 
Dominant understandings of science as factual and objective knowledge ignore the 
fact that empirical-analytical approaches are predicated on the closure, however 
contingent, of broader epistemic problems (Rip 1999). Although it was noted earlier 
that the evidence provided by these prevailing approaches is an insufficient basis for 
policy-making, it is still a necessary basis. But it must be recognised that “[e]vidence 
is never tidy, and has a history” (Rip 2000: 3). This history includes the earlier 
efforts that represent the conditions of its present availability, as well as the research 
and political agendas that shaped these efforts.  
The pragmatic theory of inquiry has emphasised that science is a collaborative and 
open-ended process in which replication and generalisation are the result of work, Pragmatism 
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rather than the application of criteria known in advance. Because scientific 
knowledge is ‘underdetermined’ by evidence, closure is effectively a practical matter 
rather than a logical step. The quality and validity of knowledge are not 
characteristics of the ‘facts’ themselves, but are actively produced. In his studies of 
scientific controversies, Rip (1999) extends this pragmatist perspective to emphasise 
that the ‘robustness’ of scientific findings in the policy context is a matter of a 
broader alignment that goes beyond the scientific community. In the broader societal 
context, robustness is an “alignment of controlled observations and theoretical 
considerations, as well as cultural and moral values, interests and circumstances” 
(Rip 1999: 9). When temporary closure is achieved, it is not the resolution of an issue 
through knowledge alone, but the outcome of ongoing socio-cognitive processes.  
Scientists themselves have been found to apply this kind of pragmatic rationality, and 
thus to take into account the broader social and political context that will be the 
destination of knowledge, in order to create a robust outcome in their practice of 
constructing advice for policy. Tracing the history of expert advice for creating a 
standard for dioxin in the environment, Rip (1992) shows that experts themselves 
mixed science and politics as they took into account the societal effects of the 
various possible standards their research might support. In other words, experts took 
the actual and desired context into account as they made choices about what to 
consider, what to explore further, and which results to deconstruct. Moreover, such 
choices were related to broader public debates, in that the interaction between 
different actors’ agendas and problem definitions created focal points for both debate 
and research. “In short”, Rip concludes, “the state-of-the-art (i.e. our knowledge) in a 
domain derives from the state-of-the-debate” (Rip 1992: 374).  Chapter 5 
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According to this view, rather than clinging to the increasingly unproductive strategy 
of maintaining a dubious link between ‘sound science’ and ‘hard facts’, the incentive 
to incorporate societal considerations into scientific assessments is their contribution 
to the social robustness of expert advice. The concept of ‘socially robust advice’ 
therefore provides a way to recognise politics without becoming a slave to it, in the 
way that advocacy science does.  
The importance of this socio-cognitive perspective is that it reveals the '“co-
production” of science and political order: science is a dynamic social institution 
engaged with other societal actors in the creation of “social and epistemological 
order in modern societies” (Jasanoff 1995). According to this perspective, definitions 
of environmental issues are constructed by “myriad social interactions, 
encompassing not only the diverse activities and practices of scientific communities, 
but also the work of non-scientific actors and institutions in defining problems and 
endorsing solutions” (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998: 3). On this view of knowledge, the 
social robustness of policy advice depends as much on social, organisational, and 
political arrangements as it does on the cognitive aspects of scientific advice. These 
shared beliefs, cultural discourses and practices, and social goals and norms are all 
part of the context in which knowledge is produced (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). 
Therefore, the scientific discourses through which environmental issues are publicly 
expressed must be seen as historically and socially contingent. The attempt to short-
circuit political debates by referring to a world ‘out there’ is no longer a realistic 
alternative; “the particular way nature, or the world, speaks to us is part of 
arrangements that have emerged” (Rip 1999: 11).  Pragmatism 
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V  Reframing the Relationship Between Science and 
Democracy 
If we take the pragmatic spirit seriously, we will be suspicious of all attempts to fix 
once and for all boundaries … Peirce’s theory of inquiry stands as one of the great 
attempts to show how the classic dichotomies between thought and action, or theory 
and praxis, can be united in a theory of a community of inquirers committed to 
continuous, rational, self-critical activity (Bernstein 1971: 199).   
The value of the pragmatic theory of inquiry for the policy process is its potential to 
rid us of unhelpful dichotomies, to unfix the boundary between theory and practice, 
and relatedly, between science and politics. If, as Bernstein asserts above, theory and 
action are to be ‘united’, a tension should nonetheless remain:
12 theory should be 
able to challenge as well as guide practice, and practice must also be able to 
challenge theory (Torgerson 1992).  
The interdependent relationship between social scientists and the democratic public 
at the heart of Dewey’s conception of verification, which he proposed to ground the 
practice of science within the larger community it is to serve, has been elaborated by 
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn (1999). The location of science within its broader context 
is achieved through the participation of the public as experimenters in the practice of 
science itself. On insisting that “individuals in every branch of human endeavor 
should be experimentalists engaged in testing the findings of the theorist”, and that 
“such testing is the sole final guaranty for the sanity of the theorist”, Dewey is 
making the claim that scientific practice requires judgment on the value of any 
                                                 
12 The Hegelian influence on pragmatism is betrayed in this early statement by Bernstein. Hegel’s 
project, with Marx, was for a “fusion” or synthesis of theory and practice. In his more recent work, 
The New Constellation, Bernstein joins Hegelian reconciliation with postmodern rupture in what he 
calls the new constellation of “modernity/postmodernity”. “In a Hegelian (but also an anti-Hegelian) 
manner we can characterise this as the logic of “Both/And”’ (Bernstein 1991: 309).  Chapter 5 
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knowledge claim independent of that given by the scientific profession (Dewey 
1916, cited in Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 840). For Dewey, this independent judgment 
must derive from the public.  
Dewey proposed that social science only fulfils its claim to knowledge through its 
generation of a public capable of collective action, which in turn requires the 
achievement of an understanding common to all. Therefore, a hypothesis can only be 
warranted if the inchoate public first accept it as a plausible account of, and possible 
remedy to, the problematic situation they are faced with, and second, demonstrate 
that recognition through collective action. In other words, a hypothesis can only be 
true if it renders the situation more comprehensible to the affected public, if its 
“conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and 
their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us” (Dewey 
1958, cited in Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 841). The initial ‘objectification’ of the 
problematic situation by science is a necessary prelude to the reintegration of the 
public as active agents in the process of inquiry, so that the truth, to be effective, 
must finally be relevant to the self-understandings of democratic citizens: 
Telling the truth, telling a thing the way it is, means designating things in terms that 
observe the conventions of proper social intercourse…. Truth telling has always been 
a matter of adaptation to a social audience…. To represent things as they are is to 
represent them in ways that tend to maintain a common understanding; to misrepresent 
them is to injure—whether wilfully or no—the conditions of common understanding. 
An understanding is an agreement; a misunderstanding a disagreement, and 
understanding is a social necessity because it is a prerequisite of all community of 
action (Dewey 1978, cited in Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 842). 
If, on the other hand, scientific conclusions invoke an intensification of social 
conflicts, they must be deemed insufficient as they stand. The truth of an inquiry, on Pragmatism 
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this account, is only verified when that inquiry has been “translated into the self-
reflexive practice of successful collective action” (Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 842). 
Moreover, the objective consequences to which inquiry is directed must be judged 
“to be the end worth attaining under the given conditions” (Dewey 1938, cited in 
Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 843). In this way, the scientific method facilitates the 
empowerment of citizens because it transforms the ‘objects’ of a social engineering 
conception of politics into ‘subjects’ who are active agents in the creation of 
knowledge that functions “in liberation of human purpose” and “emancipation from 
the fixity of precommitted purpose” (Dewey 1978, cited in Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 
844). For Dewey, the key to this relational view of knowledge is dialogue: “Logic in 
its fulfillment recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue” (Dewey 1954, 
cited in Kaufman-Osborn 1999: 845).  
Conceived in terms of the relationship between science and politics, the dialectic 
between disciplined inquiry and individual freedom in the pragmatic theory of 
inquiry begins to help us understand the problem with either/or approaches dominant 
today (Anderson 1990: 38-43). On the one hand, the emphasis on practice—on 
traditions of collectively devised technique, and on the association of rationality with 
rules—presents an inherent bias for the participatory democrat seeking to uphold the 
freedom of  individuals to participate in public life. The ideal of discourse in theories 
of participatory democracy means that it must be completely open and ‘undistorted’, 
neutral among purposes; both the rules of process and the substantive outcomes must 
be determined in a discursive process amongst the participants.  
On the other hand, the emphasis on individual freedom in liberal politics—on the 
toleration of all systems of belief and action so as not to foreclose opportunities for Chapter 5 
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the pursuit of options—seems to mean that ‘anything goes’ from the perspective of 
the rational enterprise. Where there are no standards, rationality is reduced to 
persuasive argument, the test of its worth its ability to secure acceptance in the 
‘marketplace of ideas’. Therefore, neither systematic, disciplined inquiry nor 
individual freedom and creativity are alone sufficient to promote the conditions for 
democratic governance.  
The dialectical interplay between reflection and action in pragmatism therefore 
provides us with a richer understanding of both theory and practice. It is a model of 
science, or disciplined knowing, to which the practice of EA would be better, in my 
view, to aspire. Indeed, the pragmatic view of science helps us to better understand 
the already-existing practice of EA in several ways: it highlights the intersubjective 
and social nature of practice, it provides for the dual role of practitioners, it 
highlights the practical role of theory, and it provides a legitimate role for 
professional judgment. With the recognition that value judgments permeate the EA 
process, its practitioners are firmly implicated as active agents in all stages of the 
process of inquiry. The contemporary challenges to scientism, and the enduring 
(albeit implicit) influence of pragmatism, therefore open the door to an 
epistemological shift in EA from an instrumentalist rationality to the dialogical 
rationality of pragmatism. Ultimately, the pragmatic theory of policy inquiry 
provides a way to better understand the ‘political’ nature of EA practice in a manner 
that does not diminish its claim to ‘scientific’ rationality, and is also more true to its 
aspirations to be ‘action-forcing’ and ‘practical’. Based on pragmatism’s political 
epistemology of practice, EA may be conceived of as an engaged social practice in Pragmatism 
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which practitioners are active participants involved in purposive action toward the 
resolution of a problematic situation.  
At this point, it is prudent to redress the charge noted earlier, that Dewey tends to 
reduce politics to science—a charge which reveals a more fundamental problem: the 
implicit vulnerability of pragmatism to the charge of instrumentalism. The 
requirement for the public testing of knowledge claims, and thus for public access to 
science, has been interpreted in the main as a rather thin requirement for ‘publicity’, 
which easily falls prey to charges of public relations. Moreover, the attention to the 
public consequences of inquiry, conceived as the attempt to understand how and why 
impacts matter ethically and politically, judged in terms of ends worth attaining, is 
itself undermined by this narrow idea of ‘publicness’ because it isolates the process 
of inquiry from the civic context which can provide this broader understanding of 
issues.  
The discussion in chapters 3 and 4 of prevailing models of policy analysis reveal the 
ease with which Dewey’s model of policy inquiry has been appropriated on 
instrumentalist and relativist terms. Proposals by Aaron Wildavsky for the 
democratisation of politics are also taken to have some affinity with Deweyan 
pragmatism in that they go beyond a view of citizens as mere ‘appliers’ of 
knowledge. Instead, in recommending a voucher system for education, Wildavsky 
invites citizens to “act as analysts” in the making and implementation of policy 
(Wildavsky 1979: 19). However, the market rationality which imbues his 
recommended approach, in which citizens-as-analysts are able to make more fully 
informed choices about which schools to send their children to, merely enables 
participants to assert their private preferences more effectively. This proposal, Chapter 5 
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whereby individuals participate as ‘analysts’ to further their private ends, rather than 
as citizens oriented to issues of the common good, does little to incorporate societal 
concerns into policy making.  
Dewey’s conception of the relationship between scientists and the democratic public, 
of the dialogical conception of truth, and of the empowerment of citizens to 
deliberate and act in common, is less vulnerable to these charges. However, in his 
recommendation that policy inquiry should aim toward “the distribution of what is 
found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer”, Dewey reveals 
his tendency to accept a one-way relationship in which science informs citizens, even 
if citizens are granted the ‘right of reply.’ Dewey still fails to include citizens as 
agents in the process of formulating hypotheses, or framing the issues to be 
addressed; citizens only enter into the process as experimenters called upon to judge 
the worth of the hypotheses and their consequences proposed by scientists. In the 
requirement for policy theory and analysis to interpret the civic context of inquiry, 
there remains a tendency to insulate the practice of science from its broader civic 
context.  
VI Recovering  Civic  Purposes 
The idea of a practice is the starting point for a normative conception of policy 
inquiry. However, there remains the need for a more explicit recognition of the 
transformative nature of the relationship between the constitutive values of a practice 
and the broader contextual values which nurture and legitimise practice. The purpose 
of EA derives from its civic context. It did not derive from analysts’ interpretation of 
this context, relayed back to citizens for a confirmation of their self-understanding. It Pragmatism 
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was the broader civic values articulated by the environment movement which 
induced the transformation of policy-making processes, not least through the 
introduction of EA. This transformative interdependence is the particular measure of 
a civic pragmatism.  
It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that pragmatism provides a connection 
between epistemology and politics within the context of a practice, in which 
purposive inquiry is driven by values internal to the practice. By making human 
agency, and social relations and obligations, central to its study of science as a 
collaborative human activity, pragmatism has made explicit the political nature of 
epistemology. Pragmatism highlights the dynamic and socially negotiated nature of 
the criteria and standards that guide scientific practice within the community of 
inquirers. Moreover, the ‘truth’ of the knowledge produced is itself a social product, 
which is inherently dependent upon the interaction of science with social, political, 
and cultural forces for its robustness as a claim to truth in its societal context. 
Science, not just the application of scientific knowledge, is political. 
Joseph Rouse cogently argues that this “understanding of the values and goals 
internal to scientific practices is indeed crucial to any adequate assessment of their 
political significance” (Rouse 1987). However,  
this understanding is only the beginning. For what is at issue is whether and how to 
assess critically the place of these kinds of practices, with these kinds of values and 
goals, among the many other practices we engage in. We need a perspective from 
which we can describe and assess what is at stake politically in the way the sciences 
are practiced and deployed today” (Rouse 1987, emphasis added).  Chapter 5 
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We need, in other words, a perspective that can facilitate a “vital social discourse 
about the conditions and boundaries of scientific knowledge in relation to moral and 
social knowledge” (Wynne 1992: 115).  
We can take from Dewey that the key to a relational view of knowledge is dialogue. 
In turn, the dialogical stance of the participant in pragmatic inquiry provides a clue to 
the emancipation of pragmatism from the instrumentalist rationality that continues to 
haunt it. However, whilst pragmatism and related socio-cognitive perspectives 
provide a significantly more nuanced understanding of the situatedness of knowledge 
production as a process of purposive inquiry, there remains a lack of reflexivity with 
respect to the public framings or meanings of environmental policy issues. The 
distinctively moral sources of public environmental knowledge need to be recognised 
if the public meanings of environmental expertise are to contribute to the framing of 
policy issues in EA—or, in other words, if environmental expertise is to be a moral 
source. The search for a more explicitly civic form of dialogue that might enable the 
practical articulation of the public meanings of environmental knowledge, and thus 
the recovery of the original, civic purposes of EA, is the subject of Chapter 6.  
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Modern societies must continually engage in the complicated, 
ongoing effort to balance their several social processes, some 
technical and some moral and cultural, from whose interaction 
the unique freedoms and potentials of modernity arise. That is 
the task of civic democracy, to which professions can contribute 
only if they see themselves as part of an interacting public 
discussion of these problems. 
(Sullivan 1995: 171) 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I shall make the case for a recovery of the original, civic purposes of 
EA. By this I mean to recall (from Chapter 1) Lynton Caldwell’s explicit assertion 
that the social and political goals of the environment movement were, by way of his 
influential contribution, taken to be the goals of EA. These original purposes called 
attention to the need for both scientific knowledge and public participation as 
interdependent elements in the development of more sustaining forms of human-
nature interaction. The civic activism of the environment movement created a 
language of ‘environment’ which redefined as broader issues of justice and quality of 
life what had been thought of as hard, physical externalities (such as air and water 
pollution). This language blurred the boundary between society and the natural 
world. The influence of environmentalism came to be broadly felt in the creation of Chapter 6 
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new environmental policies and laws. In its capacity for critical reflection on the 
developmentalist priorities of modernity, embodied in public and private practices, 
and in its creation of a language of the environment with which to communicate 
social and political concerns, the creative cognitive and symbolic activity of the 
environment movement itself defined the ‘truth’ of the environmental crisis in an 
important way (Szerszynski et al. 1996). 
Recovering the civic purposes of EA is necessary because, from the start, these 
ethical values of quality, care, and responsibility, together with the commitment to 
critical reflection on the ideals of rationality, participation, and ‘values’, have been 
considered external to the EA process in its aspirations to emulate the methods of the 
physical sciences. But with the pragmatic insights into the political and context-
dependent nature of knowledge and inquiry elaborated in the previous chapter, the 
question of the interaction of science with the ethical and political values of its civic 
context can now be recast. The pragmatic theory of truth highlighted the social and 
contextually embedded nature of knowledge, and also the dialogical, judgmental 
quality of rationality. If truth depends upon context, it follows that accounts of reality 
cannot stand outside of culture, history, and judgment. Science must take its place 
among other social and political practices, and be located within a wider ethical and 
political picture.  
My attention in this chapter turns to this wider context. My argument will be that 
public dialogue is necessary to recover the civic purposes of EA. To reclaim this 
richer, dialogical notion of publicness, we need to turn to the elaboration of a public 
philosophy. It is a commitment to issues of the common good, of public purpose, that 
is required if we are to reclaim the irreducibly public nature of environmental goods Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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as a guiding force behind any policy for sustainability. Such a civic conception of 
politics demands more than public access to science, because this has failed to 
facilitate collective action, which is the key to achieving substantive environmental 
outcomes. Substantive politics is distinguished by collective action for the common 
good.  
Section I will present the case for re-embedding EA within its civic context. The 
need to articulate the ethical concerns associated with new technologies, which 
requires attention to the meaning of environmental knowledge, is identified as 
central. The first step in this reconstructive critique, I shall argue, is to understand the 
ethical dimensions of prevailing political theories. The discussion in Section II 
therefore turns on the procedural ethics of liberalism, and the postmodern protest 
against it. For all their differences, it is concluded that in their refusal to admit 
common goods, neither liberalism nor postmodernism are able to motivate collective 
action. Ironically, the expressivist thought of the postmoderns fits comfortably into 
the liberal instrumentalism it was supposed to challenge.  
Section III examines the Habermasian-derived theory of deliberative democracy, 
which offers public dialogue as an alternative to the utilitarian and market-based 
solutions of liberalism. The model has two core problems, however. The first is 
Habermas’s procedural ethics, which I respond to in Section IV by arguing for a 
recovery of virtue ethics. The second problem is the Kantian model of public reason 
adopted by Habermas, which I respond to in Section V by arguing for a recovery of 
rhetoric as a mode of persuasive argument more appropriate for dialogical public 
forums. The focus on moral character and human capacities in virtue ethics, and the 
emphasis on the credibility of expertise in rhetoric, together facilitate a recovery of Chapter 6 
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the civic purposes of EA, and thus the recovery of science and civic participation as 
interdependent strategies for achieving public environmental goals.  
I  Toward a Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
The normative aspiration of a more deliberately civic environmental pragmatism, to 
embed inquiry within its civic context, echoes Dewey’s conviction that inquiry must 
be understood as constitutive of a flourishing democracy (Festenstein 2001). It is on 
these terms that we can understand the claims of the environment movement in the 
1960s and 1970s as more than just empty claims for ‘rights’. The call for the use of 
science, and for opportunities for public participation in the policy process, aimed to 
politicise private economic activity in the name of a common good. In this way, the 
environment movement aimed to deepen democracy in both civil society and the 
state. The provision for democratising access to science, however, has come up 
against a number of problems, as detailed in Chapter 4. In the discussion that 
follows, I will argue that policy inquiry needs to attend to the ethical dimensions of 
public environmental goods. 
Professional Practice, the Public Interest, and the Common Good 
Implicit in the requirement for public access to science is a particular notion of what 
constitutes the professional practice of EA—of the ethical and civic values EA seeks 
to profess. We can recall that, for Caldwell, the contribution of technical expertise to 
public policy is one that serves the public interest. The concept of the public interest 
is aligned with a notion of society as a rational alliance of primarily self-interested 
individuals who join together in the pursuit of mutual advantage. The language of the 
public interest is thus individualistic: “To promote the public interest is to maximise Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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the collective realisation of individual interests, and to protect the integrity and 
functioning of those social arrangements, institutions, and values that make peaceful, 
orderly social life possible and mutually advantageous” (Jennings et al. 1987: 6).  
But to fulfil their public duties, the professions must also be oriented to the 
somewhat more amorphous notion of the common good. The common good is a 
language of community, in which the good of individuals is intimately bound up with 
the good of the community as a whole. Professions serve the common good by 
offering a critical perspective on basic human values, and by contributing to an 
ongoing civic discourse, or public philosophy, about what might constitute shared 
goals, common purposes, and a just social order (Jennings et al. 1987). Although 
these two modes of public service might be at odds at the level of political theory, 
they should be seen to provide complementary perspectives to the development of 
notions of professionalism and public duty. 
Given the close alliance of science and liberal democracy since the Enlightenment, it 
is unsurprising that Caldwell so closely aligned public access to science with the idea 
of the public interest. The enduring legacy of the Enlightenment is the project of 
human autonomy through reason. From the perspective of the public interest, then, 
EA renders a direct public service by providing policy makers with scientific and 
technical expertise on matters of public policy. It also provides a public service to 
individual members of the public through its disclosure of the science used to inform 
policy.  
The public interest view of public service is necessary, but not sufficient, however. It 
does not offer a sufficiently rich understanding of the social context in which Chapter 6 
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professional activities take place, and as such, it is unable to provide guidance in 
situations in which individual interests conflict. But if we recall the influence of 
ecological rationality, which works in and through the practice of EA to direct and 
shape the values upon which policies are based, we can recognise the EA profession 
as a powerful shaping force in our culture: 
[Professions] affect not only how individuals live and how institutions work, but also 
the way we think about how we should live and about the ends our social institutions 
should serve. They nurture particular values that are integral to our cultural heritage 
and to our way of life. In this sense the professions participate in our quest for a 
community of common purpose just as centrally as they do in our design of a society 
of mutual advantage. They have a responsibility to the common good as well as the 
public interest (Jennings et al. 1987: 8). 
The importance of gaining a richer understanding of this social context is evident 
once we recognise the dependence of professional expertise on the broader public for 
its rigor and relevance, its legitimacy, and its ethical significance.  
The Civic Dimension of Professionalism 
For Charles Anderson, pragmatism emphasises that all purposive enterprises have a 
political aspect: “the communities of practice have a public function, and there is a 
public interest in their governance and their performance” (Anderson 1990: 17). 
Therefore, both the claims of the citizen and the claims of the practitioner are 
required for politically astute and rationally sound governance:   
Without the social criticism of the citizen of the regime, the enterprise may become 
complacent and insensitive to the larger implications of its actions. Without the 
concern for the practice of the [practitioner] of the enterprise, the institutions of 
everyday life may become politicized, corrupt, or ineffective. Good government 
requires a sustained dialectic between the claims of theory and the claims of practice 
(Anderson 1990: 54). Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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In other words, citizens should be granted a key role in the critical appraisal of 
practice. On Anderson’s terms, citizens function as the defenders of ‘theory’, or 
normative political principles, in the policy process. Again, this approach evokes the 
claims of the environment movement, which called for reflection on the nature and 
role of ‘values’, rationality, democracy, and participation in policy making. By 
calling attention to the public (social and environmental) consequences of ‘private’ 
economic activities, which had previously gone unnoticed by many among the 
affected public, these civic activists sought to make these consequences the focus of 
public attention, and thus of collective action.  
Professional practice is also dependent upon engagement with its civic context for its 
political legitimacy. The civic dimension of professional practice arises from the fact 
that professional privilege is a social and political artefact (Sullivan 1995). This is 
clearly the case for EA, which was not only motivated by civic purposes, but has 
adopted those purposes as constitutive values of the practice itself. But the legitimacy 
of the profession is only maintained as long as there is no imbalance between a 
profession’s privileges—its authority and autonomy—and its contribution to public 
goals. And this requires, as William Sullivan cogently explains, that a dialogue be 
maintained with citizens: 
Modern societies must continually engage in the complicated, ongoing effort to 
balance their several social processes, some technical and some moral and cultural, 
from whose interaction the unique freedoms and potentials of modernity arise. That is 
the task of civic democracy, to which professions can contribute only if they see 
themselves as part of an interacting public discussion of these problems (Sullivan 
1995: 171). Chapter 6 
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In this sense, the civic context to which a civic pragmatism must be oriented is a 
space of negotiated interdependence and reciprocal, active trust. The public 
legitimacy of expertise is dependent upon inquiry being engaged with problems of 
public significance, rather than with problems of specialists. “A class of experts is so 
inevitably removed from common interests as to become a class with private 
interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all” 
(Dewey 1927: 364). Thus, a consequence of viewing a practice in abstraction from 
this context is that its work will become irrelevant to the pursuit of public goals.  
The need for an increased capacity for relevance in EA, and the qualitative 
evaluations this requires, was emphasised in Chapter 4. The value of the ‘technical’ 
contribution of a practice like EA is not self-evident. The value of the profession is in 
its ability to bring “the intricacies of technical processes within the sphere of moral 
meaning and social purposes” (Sullivan 1995: 144). In other words, the public 
significance of a practice is its ability to firmly locate inquiry within its civic context. 
Its failure to recognise this larger role, as Sullivan insightfully predicts, is likely to 
result in “a squeeze play in which instrumental pressures to maximise technical or 
economic efficiency weaken professional autonomy. The dominant language of 
technical rationality only compounds such problems by obfuscating this larger social 
context” (Sullivan 1995).
1  
                                                 
1 Environmental assessment scholars and practitioners in Western Australia are no stranger to this 
kind of result. The professional autonomy of the independent Environmental Protection Authority was 
weakened when the institutional conditions for its existence were substantially revised with a change 
in government in 1993. For a commentary, see Gardener (1993). However, the reasons for this 
vulnerability went unrecognised with attention focused on the results of Act amendments, and not on 
the underlying causes. For an argument positing the dominance of an instrumentalist rationality in the 
Western Australian EIA process, and the lack of meaningful opportunities for civic participation, as 
reasons for its vulnerability, see Wallington (1997).  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Introducing a civic dimension to pragmatism thus requires the contribution of a 
practice to public goals, or common purposes. The importance of our political ideals, 
Pitkin (1972) reminds us, is that they keep the possibility of critical thought and 
remedial action alive. If our ideals do not remain partly detached from the practices 
and institutions in which they are supposed to be realised, we have no way of 
reminding ourselves what they should mean in theory, as well as how they are 
worked out in practice. This detachment does not have to mean that ideals are 
assumed to be ‘given’ in the nature of things, however. It means rather the need to be 
mindful of Isaiah Berlin’s advice that “the history of thought and culture is … a 
changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating 
straitjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipating, and at the 
same time, enslaving concepts” (Berlin 1962, cited in Bernstein 1991: 51). Thus, the 
constitutive civic ideals of a practice can become corrupt, biased, or merely forgotten 
over time. Institutions have a way of developing purposes of their own, which may 
not in the end reflect the ideal that prompted their creation.  
The institutionalised procedures that have been developed to achieve the original 
civic purpose of EA have required interpretation, so that the standards now used to 
evaluate EA are really only a description of the procedures themselves. Procedural 
standards inevitably invoke the values of efficiency and effectiveness as measures of 
good practice. With the ‘normalisation’ of environmental goals into the technical 
languages of public administration, environmentalism’s capacity as a civic medium 
for critical reflection on the structures and practices of modern governance has been 
sidelined (Jamison 1996). Because the substantive issues that prompted the creation 
of EA have been interpreted as ‘value’ issues (and thus the proper focus of Chapter 6 
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politicians and not the process of inquiry itself), EA has relied for its continued 
existence on external political support. With its democratising goal narrowly defined 
as public access to the science used to inform decisions, EA has externalised the 
source of political energy that underpins its environmental expertise.  
Reconnecting Ethics, Politics, and Epistemology 
Reconnecting professional practice with its civic context is required if EA is to 
recover the moral sources of its environmental expertise, and if this expertise is to be 
a moral source. The location of science in this wider ethical context becomes clear 
once we recognise, with Dewey, that thinking is a human activity. As such, it 
“cannot be treated in isolation from other forms of human activity, including the 
forms of human activity which shape the humans who think” (Flax 1981: 1012). This 
contextual orientation, explored in Chapter 5, revealed that science is a social 
process, that knowledge is a social product, and that these activities are intimately 
related to broader societal processes of socialisation and legitimation. 
If the production of knowledge is a political as much as a cognitive process, then an 
understanding of the ethical dimensions of the political theories informing the 
structures and practices of modern governance is a prerequisite to understanding how 
knowledge comes to be seen as worthy of preservation and capable of motivating 
collective action. The policy orientation of EA, and thus its location at the boundary 
of government and the larger networks that make up governance more broadly 
understood, makes this understanding all the more pertinent. Institutions at this 
meso-level of governance, which is at once the level of ecological culture, mediate 
between the local and global levels. As John Barry explains: Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Without the meso-level of ecological culture, situated between the macro-level of the 
global biosphere (where ‘humanity’ interacts with ‘nature’) and the micro-level of 
particular environments (where individuals and communities interact with particular 
natural and urban environments) the connection between them would be largely 
opaque culturally and politically speaking. It is through the shared (and contested) 
grammar of culture that the ecological narratives of the local and the global may be 
created and transmitted while individuals can place themselves within wider and wider 
ecological contexts (Barry 1999).  
The first step, then, is to embark upon a reconstructive critique of the ethics of liberal 
politics, informed by its most vocal contemporary critics. This reconstructive 
approach, we recall, takes as a core premise the need to work from within the 
prevailing conceptual frameworks toward an alternative understanding. On this view, 
and following Barry (1999), the causes of social-environmental problems are to be 
found  within society. With Alan Irwin, I believe that “the social and cultural 
dimensions of environmental problems must be understood if we are to achieve 
understanding and practical action. Rather than simply presenting environmental 
degradation as an external threat, we need to ask fundamental questions about our 
societies and the value structures on which they currently depend” (Irwin 1995). 
Thus, political theorising with respect to social-environmental relations is 
multifaceted and dynamic, and “‘ecological’ thought does not have a monopoly on 
defining the scope, principles, or values” of these relations (Barry 1999).
2 Given the 
increasingly intractable nature of environmental debates in the context of liberal 
                                                 
2 In particular, as Barry (1999) points out, the ideological character of much green political thought 
(rather than theory) has meant a preoccupation with identifying the core principles of green politics in 
opposition to some other ideological position. However, the process of working out the theoretical and 
practical implications of these principles and values is often neglected. This is not surprising, given 
for example the view adopted by deep ecology that we are faced with a crisis of western culture, 
which is offered as an external critique that involves the rejection of anthropocentrism and the 
adoption of ecocentrism. Barry’s view, to which I hold, emphasises instead that ecological problems Chapter 6 
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politics, I take liberalism as the most obvious place to begin this questioning of the 
value structures of western society. 
II  The Denial of Public Goods:  Liberalism and its Critics 
The procedural politics of liberalism relies for its social authority on a denial that it 
gives primacy to any one particular conception of the good life for humans. On this 
basis, it is considered that issues of democratic representation, participation and 
accountability are adequately taken account of under the conditions of universal 
suffrage in the representative system of government.
3 In the discussion that follows, I 
will argue that prevailing interest-based theories of liberal politics already rely upon 
conceptions of the good, however vigorously these goods are denied. ‘Values’ are, 
after all, integral to the allegedly neutral procedures of liberal politics. Moreover, it is 
assumed that these values are commonly held. Therefore, the procedural politics of 
liberalism, justified in terms of its formal neutrality, has not exorcised a reliance on 
ideas of the common good. Or so I would wish to argue. First it is necessary to make 
explicit the assumptions about reason and autonomy in liberalism which currently 
lurk in the background of allegedly neutral policy-making strategies, but which 
nevertheless act as grounds to justify political action. 
                                                                                                                                            
result from a contradiction within western culture. It is on this basis that I focus on transforming the 
resources available within western culture for their sustain-ability. 
3 It is important to note, however, that the neutrality thesis of liberalism has only been dominant since 
the 1970s (Gray 2000).  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Reason and Autonomy: The Liberal Tradition 
Liberalism is characterised by a commitment to human freedom through the use of 
reason.
4 “The Enlightenment turn in philosophy,” Davison argues, “was more than 
anything else a turn toward the view that atomistic human consciousness is the 
foundational moral subject” (Davison 2001: 144). With the authority of theology 
displaced by science in the Enlightenment, all significance and purpose was confined 
to the human mind, accessible only through reason:  
every mature human agent … is endowed with the virtue of universal, objective 
reason. This emphasis on an ubiquitous, evenly distributed, and thus inherently 
democratic reason lent itself naturally to the view that moral judgment was most likely 
to be authentic when purified of social mores, traditional beliefs, and inherited 
practices (Davison 2001: 156). 
The Enlightenment’s location of reason and value with the individual provided the 
impetus for the interpretation of freedom as self-expression; authenticity, defined in 
terms of originality, demanded a revolt against convention (Taylor 1991). Morality is 
thereby confined to the realm of personal conviction or conscience. As MacIntyre 
(1984) made clear in his After Virtue, it is the relegation of moral questions of the 
good to the realm of private conscience, only to be translated into contested political 
opinion, that has led to the contemporary dilemma of relativism. It could not be 
otherwise, when moral judgments are considered to be little more than “expressions 
of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling” (MacIntyre 1984: 12).  
                                                 
4 Given the complicated history and complex threads which combine to make up the liberal political 
tradition since its beginnings with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704), 
liberalism cannot really be thought of as a coherent whole. For accounts of the protective liberalism of 
Hobbes and Locke through the developmental liberalism of John Stuart Mill, and of the relationship of 
liberalism to models of democracy from classical Greece to present times, see Held (1996). Chapter 6 
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The connection between liberalism and democracy is made by invoking the notion of 
human equality, the moral grounding of which is respect for human life and integrity. 
What is peculiar to the modern west amongst other higher civilizations, Charles 
Taylor (1989) reminds us, is the formulation of respect in terms of ‘rights’. With 
individual freedom paramount, political autonomy has been defined since Locke in 
terms of the freedom of each individual to develop in their own way, so that the 
principle of liberty has been the defining feature of liberalism. Liberty is, of course, 
always liberation from something. Framed in this way, the language of rights has 
easily translated into the legal doctrine by which the law, whilst conveying certain 
privileges, defines freedom ‘negatively’ in terms of the right to pursue life plans 
without interference (either from other individuals or from the state). Because in 
Locke’s view property was prior to both individual and society, the right to property 
is paramount: liberty is then ultimately conceived as a property-based conception of 
freedom, which defines self-realisation in terms of individual gratification through 
the private acquisition of goods. 
Given that individual freedom is the presumptive case in liberal thought, the 
difficulties begin with the specification of principles to measure individual freedom 
against—principles of restraint, reciprocity, public interest, and collective 
authority—and thus to specify the boundaries of legitimate government. The way 
liberal theorists through the modern age have specified the terms of the social 
contract is by trying to infer what people standing apart from inherited beliefs and 
values would accept as a fair and legitimate basis for government.
5 Thus, “the 
                                                 
5 As Anderson points out, “To picture individuals standing isolated from one another, stripped of 
tradition, emotion and social and cultural background, seems a very odd representation of the human 
situation—a point that has been made consistently, if somewhat monotonously, in Western philosophy Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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persistent aim of liberal philosophy has been to derive principles of individual right 
and legitimate public purpose from a basic agnosticism concerning conceptions of 
the good and ultimate human purpose” (Anderson 1987). Michael Sandel explains 
the logic of this liberal doctrine: 
… a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to 
pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must govern 
by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. What 
justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they … promote the good, but 
rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the 
good and independent of it. This liberalism says, in other words, that what makes the 
just society just is not the telos or purpose or end at which it aims, but precisely its 
refusal to choose in advance among competing purposes and ends (Sandel 1982, cited 
in Davison 2001: 147). 
The central ethic of the right, and the need to avoid specifying any substantive notion 
of the good, means that the procedures for adjudicating the competing demands of 
individuals become paramount. Theories of moral obligation must provide a 
procedural conception of ethics that is neutral between conceptions of the good.
6   
Liberal Proceduralism 
The procedures championed by liberal politics are based upon the idea of the 
‘unified’ subject, who is uniquely capable of both creating and judging the worth of 
his or her own life plans. Liberal politics, based upon an understanding of human 
rights, dignity and freedom that we all share, is left with the task of providing a 
neutral framework in which individuals may pursue their life plans. The challenge 
                                                                                                                                            
for almost three hundred years. Nonetheless, this strange and mechanical form of thought is the source 
of some of our firmest political convictions” (Anderson 1990: 8). 
6 Procedural reason is based on a judgment about the way we think, as compared to a substantive 
notion of reason, which requires a judgment about whether the outcome is substantively correct 
(Taylor 1989: 85-86). Chapter 6 
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for liberal political theory is to invoke impartial norms that unassociated but self-
interested individuals, who nevertheless need to cooperate for survival, would judge 
to be reasonable (Sullivan 1995). This commitment results in the interest-based 
politics we saw in Chapter 4, as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson explain: 
Proceduralists seek to resolve moral disagreement mainly by avoiding it: they make do 
with few substantive moral constraints, and they make little room for substantive 
moral discussion. Their silence about the content of political claims often accompanies 
a view of politics as the aggregation of individual or group interests. All claims come 
into the political process as expressions of preferences or interests. It is irrelevant, by 
proceduralist standards, whether these claims are supported by moral reasons or 
whether they can stand the test of public deliberation, as long as they are aggregated 
by the right procedure. The proceduralist view therefore naturally supports, and is in 
turn supported by, the well-known model of politics as interest-group bargaining, 
where the relative power of groups and their ability to take advantage of political 
procedures determines the outcome (Gutmann and Thompson 1995: 98). 
The claims to neutrality that underpin the procedural ethics of liberal politics are 
based upon a denial that practical reason favours any particular substantive end or 
goal for human life. Practical reason aims to determine the ‘right’ rather than the 
‘good’. Moreover, in Locke’s self-remaking subject, practical reason is a subjective 
capacity of the individual. We are thus conceived as an agency who is self-sufficient, 
self-determining, separable from all else save that given within us (Taylor 1989). 
Only the abstract ideals of freedom and reason can be invoked to justify procedures 
for right action. This problem of moral obligation in modernist epistemology has 
been recognised since Hume: one cannot directly derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. 
Therefore, it has been the task of theories of moral obligation to bridge this gap 
between description and prescription, where morals are understood to concern what 
we ought to do.  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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For this reason, as Charles Taylor (1989) explains, the dominant moral theories of 
our time are action-oriented and provide answers to this question. The utilitarian 
works out the greatest happiness for the greatest number, insisting that what makes 
an action right is its consequences. According to Kant, an action is morally worthy 
depending on one’s reasons for doing it, which must be universally applicable in 
accord with the ‘categorical imperative’.
7 For each, morality concerns what it is right 
to do—not what it is good to do, or what it is good to be.  
In each case, the Enlightenment quest to avoid the moral strife that might otherwise 
infect the now self-conscious pluralism of social and political life means that only the 
‘how’ but not the ‘what’ of ethical reasoning can be legislated (Richardson and 
Fowers 1998). The content of the outcome is irrelevant. The purpose of this strategy 
is to uphold the ideals of freedom and reason against the dogmatism liberalism 
associates with particular historical traditions:
8 
It is clear how … the stress on the procedural is bound up with [the] allegiance to 
modern freedom. To make practical reason substantive implies that practical wisdom 
                                                 
7 The categorical imperative has three formulations (Kant, cited in Tong 1986: 85): 
1.  Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law. 
2.  Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end; and 
3.  Never … perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a universal law, and 
consequently such that the will can regard itself as at the same time making universal laws by its 
maxim.  
8 The wholehearted rejection of authority in liberalism is a mark of its origins. With its beginnings in 
the attempt to challenge conditions characterised by the religious control of the polity by the church, 
and the political interference of the monarchy in civil society (a sphere then inclusive of personal, 
family and business life), liberalism sought to define a uniquely private sphere independent of both 
church and state (Held 1996). As a result, liberalism developed into the doctrine that individuals 
should be free to choose and pursue their preferences in domestic, political, economic, and religious 
affairs without external interference. Liberalism may therefore be characterised as “the attempt to 
uphold the values of freedom of choice, reason and toleration in the face of tyranny, the absolutist 
system and religious intolerance” (Held 1996: 74). Chapter 6 
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is a matter of seeing an order which is in some sense in nature. This order determines 
what ought to be done. To reverse this and give primacy to the agent’s own desires or 
his will, while still wanting to give value to practical reason, you have to redefine this 
in procedural terms. If the right thing to do still has to be understood as what is 
rationally justifiable, then the justification has to be procedural. It can’t be defined by 
the particular outcome, but by the way in which the outcome is arrived at (Taylor 
1989). 
The influence of utilitarianism on the procedures of liberal politics is widely felt. The 
very basis of utilitarianism, given the need to counter the tendency of its calculated 
hedonism to result in the ‘war of all against all’, assumes an expert mode of reason 
capable of transforming individual interests into the public interest. On this logic, it 
is clear why citizens are not directly involved in day-to-day politics. Rather, based on 
the Benthamite maxim of the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’, techniques 
such as cost-benefit analysis are employed which yield the maximum satisfaction of 
preferences. In this, the predominant solution of the social sciences has been to 
survey, measure, weigh, compare, and correlate values so that they might become an 
important ‘input’ to the decision process: “In the form of scientifically known ‘data’ 
such values can be ‘plugged in’ to help an otherwise directionless process find its 
way” (Winner 1986: 160). The process is egalitarian in that all preferences count 
equally, the job of the neutral analyst being their best aggregation. On this view, the 
role of democracy is to act as a check on authority. 
Utilitarian reason is also evident in constitutional engineering, or “the contrivance of 
institutions cunningly designed to transform private interest into public good” 
(Anderson 1993). Thus, the economic market is not an institution that arises 
naturally, but is the product of intentional social engineering. Democracy on this 
view is conceived as a surrogate market place in which citizens seek to maximise Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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their private utility through the processes of public policy making. Of course, 
markets always fail; the market requires an active, interventionist state to operate 
effectively. And therein lies the paradox: utilitarian reason, in which every way of 
life is as good as any other, is offered as the only alternative to rule by an elite; but 
calculated self-interest requires a constantly vigilant and intrusive elite to remedy 
inequalities to ensure each good life can actually be lived (Anderson 1993). 
Implications for Politics and Public Life 
The celebrated fact of individuals’ freedom to pursue their own conception of the 
good life has a number of detrimental effects on public life. A significant problem 
that emerges from the defense of neutrality in liberalism, as Charles Anderson (1990) 
explains, stems directly from the fact that practical decisions demand the 
identification of a ‘better’ way of doing things. The distinctions that must be made 
about better or worse performance, and about right or wrong ways of doing things, 
are judgments of quality characteristic of all substantive, purposive human activity. 
In the end, “if liberalism insists that it must be impartial on such questions, that 
issues of performance and effectiveness, excellence and merit, cannot be more than 
matters of individual preference, then liberalism cannot help us with our most 
important questions of practical reason” (Anderson 1990: 10). 
The tendency of policy debate to end in stalemate is also unsurprising. When moral 
responsibility is characterised solely in terms of private preferences or interests then 
conflicts of interest, whilst subject to bargaining, are finally intractable because “my 
interest and your interest are separated forever by the particularity of me and you” 
(Barber 1984: 201). The consequence for policy making of characterising citizens’ 
values as purely subjective is that Chapter 6 
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[t]he category of “values” acts like a lawn mower that cuts flat whole fields of 
meaning and leaves them characterless. Where previously we might have talked about 
what was good, worthy, virtuous, or desirable, we are now reduced to speculating 
about “values”…. Where not too long ago one could make a case for the wisdom of a 
particular action, one must now show how it matches someone’s “values.” 
Increasingly rare is the ability to make what were once fairly obvious distinctions and 
arguments (Winner 1986: 159). 
Perhaps the most important practical effect of this state of affairs, Winner (1986) 
goes on, is the inability to address shared reasons for action. After all, if values are 
purely subjective, it makes little sense to inquire after the reasons for action; no 
matter what these reasons are in substantive terms, their personal and idiosyncratic 
nature ensures that a person’s motivation can play no constructive role in judging the 
relative worth of values in the policy process. There is little hope of finding a rational 
basis for collective action. The vacuity of the notion of ‘values’ in contemporary 
politics thus has the important consequence of diverting attention from the 
substantive nature of public environmental goods. 
Against Reason? 
There have always been protests against the Enlightenment picture of the human 
subject that undergirds liberal political philosophy, protests heard most recently from 
so-called postmoderns. The postmodern critique clearly draws its inspiration from 
the Romantic movement, whose influence has been felt in Western societies since its 
beginnings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Richardson and 
Fowers 1998). These long-standing critiques of the Enlightenment have pointed to its 
excessive rationalism and individualism, its neglect of human emotions, and its 
preoccupation with instrumental control of events to the neglect of other important 
purposes. With its roots in Transcendentalism and in the writings of Rousseau, Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Wordsworth and Walt Whitman, Romanticism celebrates closeness to nature, 
instinct, beauty, and art. The goals of self-expression, self-realisation, self-fulfilment, 
and authentic existence are the qualities of the autonomous agent.
9 On this view, the 
universal laws of reason are a constraint on the sovereign individual, who has her 
own measure of value. In science, as in morality, all views of the world are 
perspectives that derive from particular interests and locations.  
For all their differences, however, Romantic expressivism (particularly in its 
contemporary variants) shares much with the Enlightenment sensibility it protests 
against. In particular, the consequences for politics are convergent. Because nothing 
can trump self-realisation, the language of morals and politics for both expressivism 
and instrumentalism “tends to sink to the relatively subjectivist talk of ‘values’” 
(Taylor 1989: 507).  
Public life, in turn, consists only in those associations which are formed voluntarily, 
and which foster self-fulfilment (Taylor 1989). Expressivism shares this voluntarism 
with the contract theories of liberalism, in which the legitimacy of social institutions 
is based upon a rational agreement reached between sovereign individuals (Smith 
1997). Beyond these associations, the only public ethic capable of securing self-
fulfilment is precisely that adopted by the instrumentalist outlook: procedural 
fairness. Expressivism thus tends to undermine its own radical potential, because in 
its politics “this bit of the ‘counter-culture’ fits perfectly into the instrumental, 
bureaucratic world it was thought to challenge. It strengthens it” (Taylor 1989: 508). 
                                                 
9 Environmentalism draws more deliberately on Romanticism’s richer conception of nature, and for 
deep ecology, the belief in the cosmic self’s identification with the whole. Chapter 6 
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There is a very real sense in which the depiction of liberalism and postmodernism as 
polarised opposites has occurred because of a perceived need amongst radicals to 
clearly and absolutely define an enemy.
10 But those who project the most forceful 
denials of one or another of modernity’s rich traditions generally live by variants of 
the very outlook they deny. Charles Taylor explores the contradictions in this contest 
between disengaged reason and expressivism in modern ethical and political thought: 
Narrow proponents of disengaged reason point to the irrational and anti-scientific 
facets of Romanticism and dismiss it out of hand, blithely unaware of how much they 
draw on a post-Romantic interpretation of life as they seek ‘fulfilment’ and 
‘expression’ in their emotional lives. On the other hand, those who condemn the fruits 
of disengaged reason in technological society or political atomism make the world 
simpler than it is when they see their opponents as motivated by a drive to “dominate 
nature” or to deny all dependence on others … (Taylor 1989: 503-4). 
For both Enlightenment rationalism with its disengaged self-remaking subject, and 
post-Romantic expressivism with its authentic self-creating subject, the will of the 
individual, self-defining subject is basic. Both outlooks are thereby fortified by an 
atomistic ontology. But on this atomistic reading of society, language, norms, 
institutions and customs are conceived of as mere instruments of the primordial 
individual (Smith 1997). It is only on the basis of this atomism that the commitment 
to voluntarism, identified earlier as defining of both liberal and postmodern political 
attitudes to others, can be justified.  
                                                 
10 This has been particularly true of feminist critiques, for “after so many sightings of ‘man’ in 
humanity”, many have come to “regard any claims to universality as therefore and inevitably a fraud” 
(Phillips 1992: 11). I shall take this opportunity to note that, although I have not directly attended to 
the feminist literature in this thesis, I acknowledge that many feminist arguments have provided not 
only some of the most penetrating critiques of liberalism, but have also motivated far-reaching 
changes to policy and law in western societies.  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Finally, then, informed by an atomistic view of society, neither liberalism nor 
postmodernism are able to motivate collective action in their refusal to admit the 
common goods which might empower it. It is assumed that the common good will be 
nurtured as a by-product of individuals pursuing their own self-interest, or self-
realisation, respectively. Neither tradition can own up to any of the goods, nor indeed 
to the diversity of goods, that orient them—“maturity, success, integrity, honour, the 
social good, beauty, knowledge, existential meaning, or spiritual fulfillment” 
(Richardson and Fowers 1998: 12).  
Clearly, however, liberalism is constituted by goods (Galston 1991; Salkever 1990; 
Sullivan 1990). The principle of respect for human dignity and integrity in 
liberalism, and the conception of human well-being that it espouses, is grounded in 
the central place of freedom and self-control and the consequent demand for 
universal justice and equality, the avoidance of death suffering, and productive 
activity (Taylor 1989). The moral imperatives thus embraced “emerge out of the 
long-standing moral notions of freedom, benevolence, and the affirmation of 
ordinary life” (Taylor 1989: 495). Nonetheless, liberalism seems strangely compelled 
to deny the status of these aspirations as ‘goods’. As Sullivan (1990) points out, 
liberals have taken this view in response to the historically particular circumstances 
from which the liberal tradition arose. All conceptions of common ends have been 
thought of as ‘metaphysical’ commitments in the sense that they imply a complete 
and final knowledge of the ultimate nature of things, which necessarily bears upon 
the conduct of life. Such commitments are therefore held to imperil the freedom of 
those who do not subscribe to them. Chapter 6 
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A Critique of Proceduralism 
For all their claims to neutrality, then, the procedural ethics of liberalism are in fact 
motivated by a particular conception of the good: freedom as self-determination. The 
foundational status of the ideal of self-responsibility in modern culture is “closely 
linked to the modern ideal of self-autonomy … To be free in the modern sense is to 
be self-responsible, to rely on your own judgment, to find purpose in yourself” 
(Taylor 1995: 7). For utilitarianism, individuals are the best judge of their own 
happiness, and freedom emerges as a rejection of paternalism. Individuals are 
independent, and must be free to determine the goals of their own lives without 
interference. For Kant, the mature, self-legislating, rational agent has a dignity that is 
unique in the universe.  
This idea of the disengaged self fits comfortably with the view that nothing outside 
the agent can have any ethical significance, a situation which has important 
consequences for the ability of environmental policy to attend to substantive 
environmental goods. Closely related to the representational idea of language, the 
self is “free and rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the 
natural and social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of 
what lies outside him in these worlds” (Taylor 1995: 7). If the individual must rely 
on her own judgment, find purpose in herself, self-responsible reason must be 
regarded as something like a moral ideal, which dictates that any overlap between 
self and world will compromise the individual’s integrity and dignity (Taylor 
1995).
11 Significantly, there is no place for objects of value, or notions of the good, 
                                                 
11 Paradoxically, the postmodern attempt to get past the representational view of knowledge with its 
“picture of our predicament as cut off from reality”, only makes sense “because of the way it contrasts 
with the binary opposition of self vs. world it is supposed to replace” (Guignon 1991). Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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which exist independently of the subject, and which might command her allegiance 
or will (Taylor 1989).  
The procedural neutrality of liberal politics, as I shall argue in what follows, does not 
stand up to scrutiny, particularly in the modified forms it predominantly takes in 
environmental policy. I shall begin with the emphasis on ‘private’ preferences in 
utilitarianism, before turning to the implications of the call for informed preferences 
in environmental policy.  
In the utilitarian theory of moral obligation, happiness (desire or pleasure) is 
recognised as an objective good. But as Taylor forcefully states, “this is characterised 
by a polemical refusal of any qualitative discrimination. There is no higher or lower. 
There is just desire, and the only standard which remains is the maximisation of its 
fulfilment” (Taylor 1989). Utilitarianism attempts to bridge the gap between facts 
and oughts by taking happiness as the unquestionable ‘fact’ and prescribing its 
maximisation. The assumptions that underpin this process are elaborated by O’Neill 
(1993). The source  of value is the evaluative attitudes of individuals—in other 
words, their preferences—because individuals are the best judge of their own 
interests and should be free to determine their own purposes without interference. 
Politics calls on the preferences individuals happen to have, because these are taken 
to provide an indicator of what produces pleasure. Thus, utilitarian strategies do not 
allow that the good, the pleasures that constitute happiness, can be the direct object 
of critical scrutiny. Individual freedom (measured in terms of preferences) is 
unconditional—its value overrides all else. To allow otherwise would be to challenge 
the moral integrity, the dignity, of the autonomous individual. The problems with this 
account of political choice have become increasingly clear. By maximising the total Chapter 6 
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amount of happiness, without attention to the content of its pleasures, utilitarianism 
includes pleasures that ought not to be realised at all (O’Neill 1993). Clearly, on 
ethical grounds, the neutrality thesis is unsatisfactory.
12  
Utilitarian strategies have become increasingly employed in environmental policy 
making. In particular, surrogate market mechanisms are touted as the way beyond the 
‘paternalistic’ strategies of regulatory policy, which were introduced in the 1970s 
and 1980s when governments emphasised the need to take public responsibility for 
the public environmental consequences of economic activity. The work of David 
Pearce and his colleagues, encapsulated in the somewhat paradoxically labelled 
Blueprint for a Green Economy, has been influential in defining policy for the 
environment in terms of cost-benefit analyses and the market-based remedies of neo-
classical economics (Pearce et al. 1989). The market is defended as a response to the 
plurality of values in society by providing a procedural and interactive method of 
social choice that is justified by its neutrality between conceptions of the good 
(O’Neill 1995).  
The criticism most often made of these surrogate market mechanisms is that they 
allow no role for reasoned argument. This is clearly an important omission in the 
case of environmental policy, which relies on science for the identification and 
analysis of environmental problems, as well as for strategies to ameliorate 
environmental ‘bads’. Thus, public policy has increasingly responded to the call to 
take  informed preferences into account. This move, however, simply begs the 
question. At issue in the choice of competing methods (or theories) to provide 
                                                 
12 Thus, as a measure of progress, GDP counts all ‘productive’ activity, including those activities 
(such as cleaning up oil spills) which clearly ought not to be counted as indicators of human Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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relevant information to explain a given environmental phenomenon, and thus 
determine the course of action, is what does and does not count as an item of 
information. And if information is given in terms of ‘private’ preferences, then we 
come full circle: which preference counts? If this appeal is not to result in a circular 
argument, then it must be recognised that “the appeal to ‘informed’ preferences is 
simply a disguised way of appealing to cognitive values” (O’Neill 1993).  
The reason why the preferences of the informed person are called upon as significant 
is that they are in a better position to make judgments about the value of, say, 
different places and habitats. What is important is the quality of the reasons and 
information given to support the judgment made. In other words, if the appeal to 
information is a direct appeal to cognitive values, then we are interested in the 
criteria relevant for theory choice in science: the norms of reliable evidence to 
support the theory, its testability, its consistency with other well-supported theories, 
and so on. Here, our attention is directed away from a choice between competing 
value claims to the object of value itself: the true theory. In the appeal to informed 
preferences, then, “truth, not preference satisfaction, does the work”: 
Desires answer to goods. We prefer apples to pears because we value gustatory 
pleasure and apples give us more pleasure. We prefer theory A to B because we value 
theories that are true and we believe A is a better candidate for truth. Values are doing 
the work (O’Neill 1993, emphasis added).  
As O’Neill (1993) points out, if the appeal to informed preferences has value, it is  
because it now mimics the appropriate form of decision making for public 
environmental goods: public debate (O’Neill 1993). This is the case because I 
                                                                                                                                            
‘progress’. Chapter 6 
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present my informed preference as the ‘true’ theory, and since reasoned argument is 
the process that appeals to the relevant criteria (the cognitive values) of theory 
choice, then politics becomes a process of reasoned argument. The appeal to experts 
as competent judges is an appeal to apply criteria of excellence, which presupposes 
the ideal of truth-finding. And “[if] politics is to be a forum that includes rational 
arguments about ends, then neutrality fails” (O’Neill 1993, see also Elster 1986). 
The Call for a Dialogical Response 
The irreducible plurality of commitments that exist simultaneously in society is a 
call, not for relativism, but for dialogue. We can agree with the postmoderns that 
much of what counts as communication in the modern age is little more than 
information transfer, the input and output of ‘data’. Therefore, we should take 
seriously claims about the dangers of uncritically pursuing notions of authentic 
dialogue, communication, and communicative rationality. However, we can do so 
without the need to relegate the very ideas of dialogue, community, and 
communicative rationality to the “dustbin of the now discredited history of Western 
rationality and metaphysics” (Bernstein 1991: 51). In this tactic the postmodern 
critique finally provides no real assessment of underlying assumptions and 
commitments, no real increase in awareness. Rather, whilst critical of the modernist 
presumption of fixed and stable dualisms—of the hierarchical distinctions between 
facts and values, nature and culture, and so on
13—the deconstructive strategy of the 
postmoderns tends only to reproduce the crude form of binary thinking that it set out 
to condemn: 
                                                 
13 Val Plumwood’s (1993) explication of dualism in her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature is 
exceptional. Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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In their insistence and valorization of ruptures, fragmentation, difference, plurality, 
and “otherness” and in their relentless attacks on logocentrism, universality, 
rationality, unity and totality, many “postmodern” thinkers seduce us into a misleading 
(and disastrous) either/or (Bernstein 1992: 836). 
In this way, postmodernism accepts and reinforces positivism’s mutually exclusive 
categories of abstract vs concrete, objectivity vs self, rationality vs affect, merely 
choosing the opposite pole. The simultaneously misleading and disastrous nature of 
such dualistic thinking is captured by Bernstein, who agrees with Habermas that “the 
Enlightenment legacy cannot be smoothed out into either a grand narrative of the 
progressive realization of freedom and justice or the cosmic night of ineluctable 
nihilistic self-destruction” (Bernstein 1991: ch7). In their acknowledgement of this, 
Richard Bernstein believes that the pragmatists were ultimately better postmodernists 
than many ‘so-called’ postmoderns:  
… for the pragmatists—who are more consistently “postmodern”—our task is to 
appreciate the role of both universality and particularity, identity and difference, 
wholeness  and fragmentation, etc. This pragmatic attitude also has significant 
consequences for their ethical-political outlook and strong commitment to democratic 
ideals. For they conceive of our collective project as one where we have to live 
without absolutes, or as Hannah Arendt once phrased it “to think without banisters” 
and at the same time not to succumb to a narcissistic despair. The creative task is to 
learn to live with an irreducible contingency and ambiguity—not to ignore it and not 
to wallow in it (Bernstein 1992: 838). 
The challenge, then, is to find a way of seeing the diverse and often contradictory 
pressures emanating from our society as constructive forces, rather than taking either 
the Enlightenment route of ‘disciplining’ ambiguity, or the postmodern route of 
wallowing in it. Richard Bernstein cogently articulates the practical import of the 
pragmatist legacy in his call for a dialogical response:  Chapter 6 
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The fact is that our situation is pluralistic. But the question becomes how we are to 
respond to this pluralism. There are powerful centrifugal tendencies toward 
fragmentation. But there are also counter-tendencies – not toward convergence, 
consensus, and harmony – but toward [a] breaking down of boundaries, “a loosening 
of old landmarks” and dialogical encounters where we reasonably explore our 
differences and conflicts. In this situation, the pragmatic legacy is especially relevant, 
in particular the call to nurture the type of community and solidarity where there is an 
engaged fallibilistic pluralism – one that is based upon mutual respect, where we are 
willing to risk our own prejudgments, are open to listening and learning from others, 
and we respond to others with responsiveness and responsibility (Bernstein 1991: 
339). 
The creative interpretation of the pragmatist legacy provided by Bernstein provides 
us with a kind of dialectical thought open to neither liberalism nor postmodernism. It 
does this in two interdependent ways.
14 First, dialectical thought is promoted in the 
sense that dialectic is related to dialogue. Dialogue allows us to take conflicting 
views seriously, whether from within or without, and thus ensures that opposing 
arguments genuinely meet. In this way, we can “put the investigating self back into 
the investigation, and into assertion and judgment and choice, without sacrificing 
objectivity” (Pitkin 1972). Second, dialectical thought provides a way to examine the 
contradictory commitments which pervade the social and political problems of 
contemporary society. In this, Pitkin elaborates, is the promise of “a new 
reconciliation of rational objectivity—that precious and hard-won human capacity—
with authenticity and affect and commitment, those qualities without which rational 
objectivity means death” (Pitkin 1972). 
                                                 
14 Pitkin (1972) attributes access to the two senses of dialectical thought described here to 
Wittgenstein in her insightful study into the possibility of a Wittgensteinian political theory. Pitkin 
herself acknowledges that Wittgensteinian philosophy and American pragmatism have much in 
common: “it is not so much a matter of shared doctrine, as of shared outlook, emphasis, orientation” 
(Pitkin 1972).  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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III Deliberative  Democracy 
Habermasian Deliberative Democracy 
The failure of utilitarian institutions to attend directly to the public nature of 
environmental claims and to enable a proper role for reason in politics has lent the 
revival of deliberative theories of democracy a particular salience in the sphere of 
environmental policy and politics. Reasoned public dialogue is the hallmark of the 
Habermasian-derived theory of deliberative democracy.
15 In response to the multiple 
and conflicting interests present in society, the model of deliberative democracy 
offers (against the aggregation of private preferences) a public forum in which 
preferences are transformed through reasoned dialogue between citizens (cf. Bohman 
1996; Cohen 1989; Dryzek 1990, 2000; Elster 1986; Fishkin 1991; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996; Miller 1992). The requirement that reasons be able to survive the 
test of publicity means that generalisable, rather than particular, interests will be the 
outcome of public debate. Hence, it is more likely that reasons which appeal to wider 
interests, including the interests of non-humans and future generations, will survive 
the test of deliberation.  
The affinity of Habermas with pragmatist themes is clear, particularly in his early 
work (Bernstein 1991; Bohman 1998). Habermas takes the self-conscious plurality of 
modern society as his starting point. Habermas shares with Dewey a strong 
commitment to the normative ideal of a democratic society in which all participate. 
For Dewey, the Peircean ideal of an ongoing self-critical community of inquirers, 
which is always open to criticising its validity claims, itself entails this normative Chapter 6 
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ideal, in which “the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more 
human experience in which all share and to which all contribute” (Dewey, cited in 
Bernstein 1991). On this model of the self-critical community of inquiry, it is when 
background consensus breaks down or is challenged that a dialogical response is 
called for. As Habermas puts it, “the shattering of naïve consensus is the impetus for 
… the ‘experience of reflection’” (cited in Bernstein 1991). At the same time, 
however, Habermas believes that the sceptical attitude to tradition which stems from 
the Enlightenment should be preserved: not all forms of life are to be celebrated; 
discriminating judgments must be made. And if we fail to accept this responsibility, 
we leave the path open to a “new form of tribalism in which difference and otherness 
are reified, and where there is a failure to seek out commonalities and solidarities” 
(Bernstein 1991: ch.10).  
As we have seen, however, the problem for the strategy of discriminating judgment 
championed by Habermas against what he calls the colonisation of the everyday 
‘lifeworld’ by the instrumental rationality
16 of the economic/administrative ‘system’ 
is that the deconstructive political temper of western politics appears to have 
                                                                                                                                            
15 Not all models of public deliberation derive from this Habermasian position. I shall elaborate on his 
model in some detail here because of its focus on public reason, as well as because much writing on 
deliberative democracy does at least begin with Habermas. 
16 Habermas follows in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, the cornerstone of which is the critique 
of instrumental reason (cf. Held 1980). But he criticises the pessimistic attitude toward modernity of 
others in this school, particularly Adorno, and locates their inability to see past the instrumental 
domination of object by subject in their entrapment within the subject/object dualism (Taylor 1989).  
The problem with modern society, for Habermas, is not technical control per se. Rather, it is the 
encroachment of the techniques appropriate to the economic/administrative ‘system’, into the 
everyday ‘lifeworld’ of social, historical relationships, where their application is deemed 
inappropriate. For whilst the application of the techniques of empirical science in the political realm 
“produce technical recommendations, they furnish no answer to practical questions” (Habermas 1973: 
254). Habermas argues that this colonisation of the lifeworld has undermined our ability to evaluate Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
 
 
– 283 – 
irredeemably discredited the very idea of critique itself.
17 Where the sovereign artist 
has “his measure of value” and should devise “his own virtue, his own categorical 
imperative” (Nietzsche, cited in O’Neill 1998), there is no measure independent of 
the subject upon which discriminating judgments of quality and substance might be 
made. This is the case in either the sphere of science or morality. Having rejected the 
notion of a unified subject, postmoderns take this as the cue to reject the ideals of 
reason and freedom altogether. Charles Taylor describes the altercation thus: 
The way the debate normally goes, it is all too easy for it to polarize into two camps. 
On one side are the holders of the ideals of self-responsible reason and freedom, who 
feel they therefore must take on the disengaged anthropology. Very often, this comes 
about through their attachment to an empiricist epistemology, whose omnicompetence 
does presuppose something like the Lockean view of the subject. On the other side are 
protesters against this somewhat desiccated outlook, who therefore feel that they have 
to reject altogether these ideals of reason and freedom (Taylor 1989: 514). 
And those ‘on the other side’, whose protest is against the critical standpoint 
assumed to be associated solely with the disengaged view of the subject, go on to 
argue that all frameworks must be taken to be equally valid.  
As the above statement by Taylor implies, however, there is no necessary connection 
between the ideals of self-responsible reason and freedom, and the radically 
‘disengaged’ stance of the Lockean self-remaking subject. In other words, it is 
possible to hold to the ideals of self-responsible reason and freedom without this 
move necessitating the conviction that all claims are relative. As Flax (1981) points 
out, this is to confuse ‘relative’ with ‘relational’. Thus, one can also be committed to 
                                                                                                                                            
the worth of our practical, or moral, ends on any basis other than the brute fact that they are preferred 
or desired. Chapter 6 
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these ideals whilst holding to a ‘relational’ or social ontology, which recognises that 
individuals are formed in and through relationships and are thus irreducibly social 
beings. 
With the adoption of a social ontology, the attachment to an empiricist epistemology 
becomes untenable.
18 It is only if we assume that privileged moral truth is a function 
of the extra-discursive notion of ‘happiness’, taken to be the empirical end of the 
(Lockean) subject and held to be equivalent across human contexts, that an empiricist 
epistemology makes sense. As critics such as Alasdair MacIntyre make clear, “the 
notion of human happiness is not a unitary, simple notion and cannot provide us with 
a criterion for making our key choices” (MacIntyre, cited in Szerszynski 1996: 110). 
When individuals are understood to be formed through relationships, identity is 
necessarily dialogical and not monological. For Habermas, then, the knowing agent 
is constituted by language, and thus by exchange between human agents.
19  
In a distinctively Weberian fashion, Habermas seeks to counter the limitations of the 
empirical sciences by differentiating reason into three distinct strands (Taylor 1989). 
He argues that the monolithic portrait of Enlightenment rationality used to discredit 
the project of modernity has failed to do justice to the existence of a communicative 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Habermas argues that the totalising critique of Nietzsche, who engages in radical critique whilst 
simultaneously calling into question all attempts to justify critique, “consumes the critical impulse 
itself” (cited in Bernstein 1991). 
18 It is worth emphasising again that the rejection of the narrowly empiricist epistemology of scientism 
does not preclude an important role for empirical knowledge per se. Quite the opposite: empirical 
knowledge of environmental phenomena is and must remain a central motivating force for the creation 
of environmental policy. 
19 Habermas takes this new understanding from Mead’s notion of practical intersubjectivity (Bernstein 
1991). Practical intersubjectivity provides the link between the dialogical rationality of the community 
of inquiry and the dialogical self, who internalises the perspectives of another in a conversation Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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rationality manifest in the democratic spaces of the public sphere (Bernstein 1991).
20 
Habermas reclaims this distinctive space of political action or praxis by associating 
communicative rationality with the public realm, so that the hermeneutic sciences, 
with their interest in intersubjective action, motives, and meanings, thereby regain 
their legitimate claim to rationality (Hoppe 1999).
21 Habermas then relegates the 
instrumentalist rationality of science, and its technical interest in control, to what he 
believes is its proper sphere. A third knowledge interest, which is retained from the 
Enlightenment, is the interest in emancipation. Thus, inherited meanings are to be 
subject to systematic criticism to avoid the potential for distorted communication, 
which is claimed to result “where meaningful interactions are suffocated by 
unconscious collective images or pre-understandings” (Hoppe 1999).  
Of these knowledge interests, it is communicative rationality that determines right 
action: “Communicative action is oriented toward intersubjective understanding, the 
coordination of actions through discussion, and the socialisation of members of the 
community. Communicative rationality is the extent to which this action is 
characterised by the reflective understanding of competent actors” (Dryzek 1990). 
                                                                                                                                            
oriented to mutual understanding. On this view, democratic individuality is compatible with, and 
presupposes, the practical intersubjectivity of the social self. 
20 For a Habermasian account of the rise of the public sphere, see Fraser (1997).  
21 Whilst Habermas has an affinity with hermeneutics, and draws in particular on the insights of 
Gadamer, Gadamer’s is an ontological hermeneutics whilst Habermas’s is a sociological perspective. 
Richard Bernstein (1991) argues that the importance of remembering Gadamer’s influence is (not 
least) because he shows us that communicative rationality is not a discovery of the twentieth century, 
but continues in the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy. Habermas dissociates himself from 
neo-Aristotelian contextualism and the continuity it engenders because it undermines the possibility of 
rationally grounded critique. In the end I think Bernstein is right: the temporal distance between 
ourselves and Aristotle permits a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s insights about practical reason, 
which we can make relevant to our questions and problems, without that necessitating the wholesale 
adoption of his philosophical framework. I will elaborate on Aristotelian arguments in sections IV and 
V of this chapter.  Chapter 6 
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Communicative action may be compared with “non-social instrumental action and 
social strategic action, both of which are oriented toward success” (Bernstein 1983: 
185). In communicative action, inquirer and agent have equal standing as agents in a 
shared practice (Bohman 1999).  
In order to set up a dynamic interplay between the particular needs and concerns 
emergent in the public sphere, and the general laws and policies based on justice and 
rightness that are the focus of democratic decision making, Habermas (1996) 
develops a twin-track theory of deliberative democracy. The public sphere, governed 
by the ‘anarchic’ processes of will-formation, is where objections to prevailing laws 
and policies are formulated (Habermas 1996: 418-27). These laws, policies and 
political principles must be constantly open to challenge. Moreover, no topic is 
ultimately immune from critical scrutiny. Because objections are raised on the basis 
of the probable ethical bias of existing policies and laws, deliberative democracy has 
the potential to overcome the ‘mobilisation of bias’ encountered by those who 
promote change (Torgerson 2000).
22 John Forester highlights the implications for 
democratisation of policy-making, which include: 
the exposure of issues that political-economic structures otherwise would bury from 
public view, the opening and raising of questions that otherwise would be kept out of 
public discussion, the nurturance of hope rather than the perpetuation of a modern 
cynicism under conditions of great complexity and interdependence (Forester 1993). 
In essence, the import of communicative action is that the rules, procedures, and 
political principles that make up the system of governance must remain (in principle) 
                                                 
22 The idea that non-decision making prevents issues from being raised was originally formulated by 
Schattschneider: “All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of some kinds of conflict Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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open to public challenge, debate, and re-definition by citizens. The dynamism of 
critique is sustained within the reasoning process as validity claims must be judged 
against the criteria of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness (Bernstein 
1983). Based on the norms of communicative rationality, public policy making is 
oriented to the value of public legitimacy, which trumps (but is not incompatible 
with) the instrumentalist goal of effectiveness. Politics becomes a dialogical forum 
which, in response to the plurality of beliefs about the good that exist in society, 
provides a public space for conversation that is itself neutral between these 
competing beliefs.
23 
The rational grounding of critique is sustained by Habermas’s adoption of the 
Kantian model of reason. For Kant, the ideal of autonomy is expressed in the moral 
maturity of the agent who is not reliant upon the authority of others: 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is 
the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. The 
immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of the 
enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding 
… For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in 
question is the most innocuous form of all – freedom to make public use of one’s 
reason in all matters (Kant, cited in O’Neill 1998: 84). 
The heroic nature of autonomous agents who accept only laws that can be affirmed 
by their own reasoning is therefore tempered by the public character of reason: “For 
                                                                                                                                            
and the suppression of others because  organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are 
organised into politics while others are organised out” (1960, cited in Jenkins 1978). 
23 Habermas believes that it is an inherent feature of human nature to seek a consensus about issues of 
rightness and justice, because these are values universally held in societies where the rule of law is in 
effect (Hunt 2002). Individuals’ development of their own conceptions of the good life is properly the 
concern of the subjective realm of expressive fulfilment and authenticity. Chapter 6 
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reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free 
citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, 
his objections or even his veto” (Kant, cited in O’Neill 1997: 4).
24 The social 
conditions provided by public deliberation are therefore necessary, on Kant’s view, 
for individual enlightenment.  
Criticism of the norms embodied in traditions and social practices requires the 
formulation of universal moral standards, which Kant formulates in terms of the 
Categorical Imperative. Given the self-legislating character of the moral agent, it is 
not surprising that, for Kant, moral and political practice is not simply a matter of 
following abstract rules of conduct.
25 Such rules are empty unless applied to 
particular situations. The application of a general principle to particular cases 
demands the power of judgment.
26 The power of judgment is social, since a 
comparison of one’s judgment with the judgment of others is required to avoid 
mistaking private, subjective conditions for objective conditions. Thus, for Kant, “the 
maxim ‘think for oneself’ and the maxim ‘think from the standpoint of everyone 
else’ are related” (O’Neill 1997: 4).  
                                                 
24 As O’Neill (1997) points out, the common view of Kant as an individualist “more concerned with 
the isolated subject than with social interaction” (Dryzek 1990: 14) is plainly wrong, given the 
centrality of public deliberation in the achievement of moral autonomy in Kant. The perceived novelty 
of Habermas’s dialogical adaptation of Kant’s allegedly ‘monological’ vision of maturity is also 
evident in Taylor: “Habermas’s conception of a discourse ethic … owes something to Kant but offers 
a ‘dialogical’ procedure in place of Kant’s, which each agent could carry out on his or her own” 
(Taylor 1989).  
25 Indeed, rule-following is a mark of immaturity: “Dogmas and formulas, those mechanical 
instruments for the rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural endowments, are the ball and chain of 
his permanent immaturity” (Kant, cited in O’Neill 1997: 309). 
26 Judgment cannot itself be considered the application of a rule, since this would require an infinite 
regress of finding rules to account for the application of each previous rule (Hunt 2002). Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Habermas adopts these Kantian maxims in his formulation of the ‘ideal speech 
situation’ that is to guide public dialogue. The validity of moral norms relies upon 
the intersubjective justification of these norms by a plurality of subjects. The aim of 
reasoned dialogue is, for Habermas, convergence in judgments: the agreement of free 
citizens. The fallibility of knowledge means that the adjudication of validity claims 
must proceed via unconstrained rational argument.  
Where Habermas diverges from Kant is in his rejection of universal moral standards. 
For Habermas, the pattern of the ideal speech situation is “built into our very nature 
as social, communicative beings” (Richardson and Fowers 1998: 10).
27 Instead of 
universal standards, then, a formal principle of universalisation applies: “Only those 
norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their 
role as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas 1995, cited in Hunt 2002: 
125). In this way, Habermas offers a procedural solution to the adjudication of 
validity claims by providing the social conditions in which judgments may be 
compared with other judgments, resulting in the ‘forceless force of the better 
argument’:   
Communicative rationality clearly obtains to the degree social action is free from 
domination (the exercise of power), strategizing by the actors involved, and (self-) 
deception. Further, all actors should be equally and fully capable of making and 
questioning arguments (communicatively competent). There should be no restrictions 
on the participation of these competent actors. Under such conditions, the only 
remaining authority is that of the good argument, which can be advanced on behalf of 
                                                 
27 There can be no explicit decision criteria, because this leads us to “fall into an infinite regress of 
having to find criteria to evaluate our norms, and then standards in terms of which to justify those 
criteria, and so on, indefinitely” (Richardson and Fowers 1998: 10). Instead, Habermas contended that 
the criteria for judging the validity of knowledge claims are implicit in the competences necessary for 
communicative action, and thus in the very notion of communication itself. Thus, we should engage in 
the process of argumentation itself until a consensus (as much as possible) on norms is reached 
(Richardson and Fowers 1998). Chapter 6 
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the veracity of empirical description, the understanding, and, equally important, the 
validity of normative judgements (Dryzek 1990: 15). 
Moral norms therefore derive their validity from “the claim to rest on good reasons” 
(Habermas 1993: 151). Because of its basis in the universal ideal of linguistic 
interaction, the result that emerges from intersubjective communication does so 
because of its intrinsic rationality. 
In sum, then, the ideal of a critical community of inquiry facilitates a dialectic 
between the expressive concerns of individual citizens and their potential 
reconciliation in a cooperative process of reasoned public dialogue aimed at mutual 
understanding. From this starting point, Habermas presents a strategy for redeeming 
the legitimacy of public governance wherein the existing ethical bias of prevailing 
institutions, rules, and principles may be challenged and redefined by citizens. This 
approach recognises the possibility that a central object of public concern is the rules, 
principles, and institutions which govern environmental practices and technological 
systems (and thus social-environmental relationships), and not merely biophysical 
environmental ‘impacts’.  
Saving Public Dialogue From Habermas 
In the end, the claim that deliberative procedures are neutral with respect to the good 
means that Habermas’s procedural response to moral conflict looks like a richer, 
dialogical version of liberal formalism (Richardson and Fowers 1998). Despite 
Habermas’s claim that his procedural solution is neutral between conceptions of the 
good, it is better conceived as a particular vision of the good: rational cooperation 
amongst individuals aimed at mutual understanding (Smith 1997). But the denial of 
this constitutive good means the focus of reasoned argument is on justifying the Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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procedural conditions for valid judgments, rather than on the substantive content of 
the judgments themselves.  
It is in this way (and of particular import for environmental policy making) that the 
Habermasian model of deliberative democracy emphasises the formal conditions for 
achieving consensus, not the content of the outcome. Habermas abandons the idea 
that reason can supply “substantive orientation for managing practical tasks” 
(Habermas 1996: 5). He cannot admit attention to environmental goods because, in 
his procedural solution to the avoidance of moral conflict, only the form but not the 
content of ethical reasoning can be legislated. Thus, the ideal speech situation 
follows in the liberal formalist tradition of providing an account of the procedural 
conditions for settling disputes, rather than attempting to settle the disputes 
themselves. As Szerszynski (1996) explains, the outcome is valid simply because it 
is the outcome. The historical and social locatedness of moral judgment is assumed 
to be intrinsic to inquiry, so that the good is no longer something that is pre-
existing—something that inquiry might discover. Rather, it is the outcome of an 
interactive process which, because it is governed by an innate rationality, simply is 
the best outcome: the good.  
A potential source of unease is that, by legislating the form of ethical reasoning 
without attention to its content, the ideal speech situation rules out discussion about 
whether the ‘generalisable interests’ that are its product are sufficient to counter the 
prevailing attitude of exploitation with respect to the environment (Richardson and 
Fowers 1998). It is also clear that Habermas’s procedural ground rules, lacking the 
force of empirical motives and not supplying any alternative source of ethical 
significance for participants, fail to explain why one would engage in the procedures Chapter 6 
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in the first place. As Smith puts it, “even if rational cooperation is built into universal 
structures of language, why should that move anyone to act in a rationally 
cooperative manner?” (Smith 1997). It is Habermas’s conviction that citizens will 
engage in the process because public deliberation is necessary to maximise the 
convergence of legitimacy (citizens can accept laws as valid) with justification (for 
reasons they accept as valid) (Cooke 2000). In other words, both legitimacy and 
justification are defined procedurally, in terms of consent. This confidence may not 
be borne out in practice, however, given the prevailing feeling that individuals lack 
the motivation to engage in deliberative environmental policy-making processes 
(Bloomfield et al. 2001). 
Nicholas Smith elaborates the basic flaw in the assumption that the outcome has an 
intrinsic rationality:  
Giving reasons requires a standard for reason giving, just as the practice of measuring 
requires a background agreement on the standards of measurement. It follows that, 
contrary to Habermas’s view, the use of language oriented towards a 
‘communicatively reached agreement’ which ‘must be based in the end on reasons’ 
cannot be the original use of language. For the rationally motivated agreement of 
communicative action presupposes a prior agreement about the standards of reason 
giving. A reason cannot be given for the justification of these standards, since they 
determine what is to count as the justified and unjustified use of words at all” (Smith 
1997).  
In the end, then, it is to standards independent of the process of reasoned argument 
that the appeal must be directed. In other words, if procedures are to have any ethical 
significance for participants, then a procedural account of justice is insufficient. 
Ultimately, Habermas fails to overcome the ‘paradox of application’ that arises when 
principles are applied to particular cases: theoretical justification of norms requires Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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detachment from particular institutions and practices, but their practical application 
relies on capacities that can only be fostered in these institutions and practices. 
Detaching citizens from the social, cultural, and institutional conditions of traditions 
and practices detaches them from the conditions which ground these ideals, and 
which nourish the practices in which they are manifest. Habermas recognises this 
problem, and concedes that the gap between justification and application can only be 
bridged if these institutions and practices already embody universal principles. In 
other words, there must be prior agreement on the impartial norms of justice, 
democracy and human rights embodied in the legal order.  
Habermas fails to acknowledge that the meaning of modern ideals will continue to be 
defined and redefined in particular contexts. Thus, formalising and universalising 
principles puts a lid on the possibility that our best intuitions about these ideals, as 
they evolve, will be reflected in our public institutions. Overcoming this paradox 
demands an account of the situatedness of contingent modern ideals in particular 
institutional and social contexts. It is in the context of practices that individuals 
develop the distinctively human capacities required for their ongoing evolution and 
achievement. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to recover public dialogue from Habermas’s 
procedural solution. I shall do this by reconnecting ethics and epistemology in the 
context of practices. I focus on the recovery of a praxis-oriented ecological virtue 
ethics in Section IV. In this, the practice of science is of particular significance for its 
ability to aid the recovery of objective environmental goods in policy inquiry. This 
discussion therefore challenges Habermas’s assumption that science cannot aim at 
interests other than the instrumental control of nature. Section V argues for a Chapter 6 
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rhetorical account of the public forum against the heroic picture of reason and 
autonomy adopted by Habermas.  
IV Recovering  Civic  Purposes 
Recovering the original civic purposes of EA, which centrally involved rethinking 
human-nature interactions, requires that a commitment to objective environmental 
goods is not independent of human well-being. If desires answer to goods, then it is a 
mistake to completely separate environmental goods from human well-being 
(O’Neill 1993). This separation is central to subjectivist ethics, which defines well-
being in terms of the self-determination of an agent whose integrity means 
dissociation from any ties with the social and natural worlds. But this ethic of 
conscience, which confines ethical commitments to the realm of individual choice, 
cannot recognise the social and relational nature of commitments to our wider 
ecology.  
In contrast, an objectivist ethics conceives well-being in terms of human capacities or 
excellences, which are oriented by goods. It therefore entails that the gap between 
human well-being and objective environmental goods is narrower than is usually 
assumed (O’Neill 1993). The recovery of an objectivist ethics for policy inquiry 
requires a focus on the development of human capacities within engaged social 
practices.  
Virtue Ethics 
The approach of virtue ethics, which originates with Aristotle, provides an important 
counter to the subjectivist theory of value by rejecting an heroic ethic of conscience 
or belief in favour of an emphasis on human capacities, capabilities, or dispositions. Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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For Aristotle, the good life consists in well-being or flourishing, “an active life in 
accord with excellence, or if there are more forms of excellence than one, in accord 
with the best and completest of them” (cited in Tong 1986: 87). On this view, 
capacities are cultivated in the context of engaged social practices. This praxis-
oriented view of the good life turns on what it is good to do, and good to be; conduct 
and character go hand in hand. Thus, the equality of respect that undergirds western 
culture is due because of the capacities we all share, rather than the actual beliefs we 
realise through the use of these capacities (which might be due contempt rather than 
respect, though we may tolerate them) (O’Neill 1993). On this view, neutrality 
between beliefs is not a requirement of politics. Beliefs can be, and ought to be, the 
object of appraisal. 
In Aristotle, morality or ethics concerns cultivating the virtues and maturity, which 
are the capacities we require to live a good and worthwhile life. The good life 
involves the pursuit of a number of different goods, and in this pursuit our conduct 
exhibits a number of different virtues. On this approach, “integrity or authenticity is a 
virtue only in good company” (O’Neill 1995b: 213). To have integrity, to live in 
truth, requires that “[a]uthenticity is a virtue only given good ethical judgment, and 
that concept presupposes it makes sense to distinguish what I believe is good and 
what is [good]” (O’Neill 1995b: 213). The need for practical judgment therefore 
involves a responsibility to discover what is true, or what is good.  
The objectivist account of well-being therefore constructively complements the 
pragmatist insight that all knowledge is fallible. This ideal-regarding strategy 
embraces the fact of human contingency, which means that individuals might make 
mistakes about what is good for them, or about what the good life entails. And Chapter 6 
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because the objectivist account recognises that well-being is not about satisfying our 
preferences per se, but about educating our capacities of judgment so that we come 
to prefer what is good (given that we might make mistakes), it entails a more realistic 
account of moral autonomy than that of the liberal or postmodern subject discussed 
earlier. Autonomy is not a matter of decision and will, as invoked by the picture of 
the individual either as a self-determining agent or as a self-creating free spirit. 
Rather, autonomy is a matter of judgment. This moral autonomy brings with it a 
special responsibility in ethical and political matters, one that “consists in care in 
reasoning, sensibility and perception, and not care in creation” (O’Neill 1998: 91). 
When autonomy depends on judgment, it is not neutrality between beliefs about the 
good that is required, because some beliefs may thwart the development of human 
capacities, including the capacity for good ethical judgment. Rather, what is required 
is a particular conception of the good that facilitates the development of these human 
capacities. And because humans require a plurality of goods for their well-being, 
then that particular conception of the good must include a plurality of goods: “We 
can speak of a single ‘complete good’ (teleion agathon), because our condition is 
such that the disparate goods we seek have to be coherently combined into a single 
life, and in their right proportions” (Taylor 1989). 
The variety of conceptions of the good life are presupposed by theorists in the classic 
liberal tradition, such as John Stuart Mill, who sees public dialogue as a path to 
knowledge of what is true (O’Neill 1993).
28 Indeed, the activity of public dialogue 
                                                 
28 Theorists in the tradition of classic liberalism, such as John Stuart Mill, have prioritised self-rule 
over an exclusive focus on the attempt to limit power that pervades more recent versions of liberalism. 
The priority given to self-rule ensures that power is responsive to collective concerns, and the health 
of democracy is conceived as a system of collective self-rule. The emphasis is on the dignity of Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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presupposes a plurality of beliefs about the good. Each participant seeks to argue for 
the validity of their belief, and thus to convince, whilst being open to the arguments 
of others. When we argue for the priority of a particular good, we are identifying 
what we believe is worth paying attention to and acting upon (Hajer and Wagenaar 
2003).  
However, as O’Neill (1993) makes clear, plurality of beliefs is not the goal of 
dialogue. The ideal is convergence of belief, founded on good reasons. It is the 
appeal to good reasons which ensures not mere convergence, but convergence on 
truths. The convergence of beliefs is a mark of truth only if it is achieved through 
unconstrained public dialogue in which opposing arguments genuinely meet. The 
practice of reasoned dialogue tends to cultivate the social virtue of tolerance required 
for the civility of this genuine encounter of arguments.
29 Indeed, it might be said that 
“[c]ivility dies with the death of dialogue” (John Courney Murray, cited in Bernstein 
1991: 339). 
                                                                                                                                            
humans as citizens, whose political institutions are seen as an expression of themselves. This more 
positive attachment to common good or general liberty is not the familiar, apolitical attachment to 
universal principle.  
   The political heritage of western societies also includes the civic republican tradition, which is based 
on a ‘positive’ conception of freedom as the freedom to participate in public life. Theorists in the civic 
republican tradition include Mouffe (1988), Oldfield (1990), Jordan (1989), Marquand (1988) and 
Bellah et al. (1985). We can thus go some way to explaining the ‘freedom schizophrenia’ apparent in 
liberal democracies by recognising that “liberalism and democracy are as much competing as 
complementary political traditions” (Barns 1995: 102). 
29 For Ian Marsh (1995), the connection between civic dialogue and individual character is the 
orientation to truthful inquiry, and thus to truthfulness. Drawing on the work of Iris Murdoch, Marsh 
suggests that a number of secondary virtues are implicit in, and nourished by, truthful deliberation. 
These include moderation, justice (realised in truthful shared purposes), patience (nurtured in the 
civilities of deliberation), prudence (developed in the requirement for comprehensive judgement), and 
a form of courage (fostered in honest advocacy). Chapter 6 
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Ecological Virtue Ethics 
The value of a virtue ethics approach as a way of connecting humans to their wider 
ecology is at the centre of John Barry’s (1999) thesis for Rethinking Green Politics. 
In particular, it provides a way to overcome the apparent imperative to choose 
between ecologism and environmentalism, which come packaged as radical and 
ecocentric, or reformist and anthropocentric, respectively. The ecological virtue 
approach is presented by Barry as a reformed ‘naturalistic humanism’. A naturalistic 
humanism implies that how we treat non-humans is related to what it means to be 
(uniquely) human. On this view, it is not humanism but arrogant humanism that is 
the proper object of critique. At the same time, it is not human-nature interactions but 
the complete submersion of humans within nature that is problematic, not least 
because it privileges human-nature relations over relations between people.
30 Thus, 
on the classic understanding of virtue as a mean between vices or extremes, an 
ecological virtue approach avoids the extremes of deep ecological ‘submissiveness’ 
in respect to nature, and the ‘arrogance’ of the domination of nature, by conceiving 
of humans as a part of but also apart from nature:  
While the ecological vice of deep ecology can be seen to rest on its failure to 
adequately differentiate humanity from nature, the ecological vice of arrogant 
anthropocentrism is based on a false separation of humanity from the rest of the 
natural order. From one end, the similarities between humanity and nature are over-
emphasized, while from the other they are denied. As a mean between two extremes 
(vices), an ecological virtue approach adopts a mode of apprehension and interaction 
with the natural world in which humans are seen as a part of but also apart from 
nature (Barry 1999: 11, note 3).  
                                                 
30 The latter view is evident in Robyn Eckersley’s statement that “[in] terms of fundamental priorities, 
an ecocentric approach regards the question of our proper place in the rest of nature as logically prior 
to the question of what are the most appropriate social and political arrangements for human 
communities” (Eckersley 1992: 28). Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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As a mode of knowing and interacting with the natural world, an ecological virtue 
ethics provides a connection between epistemology and ethics in the context of 
policy inquiry. Aristotle recognised intellectual virtues, such as knowledge and 
wisdom, and the moral virtues associated with character, such as humility, 
generosity, justice, and courage. An ecological virtue ethics would therefore 
recognise that policy inquiry needs scientific and local knowledges, as well as the 
cultivation of humility, prudence, and care given the unavoidable fact of human 
ignorance in environmental matters. Moreover, because the virtues help people to 
cope with the inherently contingent and contextual character of experience, rather 
than to eliminate the inalienable problems of the human condition, it is an approach 
which clearly supports the stewardship ethic that has always been central to EA, and 
which is widely touted as central to a precautionary approach to sustainability.  
The Intrinsic Value of Environmental Knowledge 
The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art 
and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who no longer pauses to wonder and 
stand in rapt awe, is as good as dead.  
— Albert Einstein 
Informed by an ecological virtue perspective, the idea of reconnecting society with 
the natural environment does not mean that the division between nature and culture is 
denied. In other words, a commitment to a holistic ontology is not required (Barry 
1999). To hold that we are apart from the natural world is to recognise that the 
strangeness of nature, and its indifference to our concerns, is not something we are 
capable of changing, even if we wanted to. This point is made by John Passmore 
when he says that  Chapter 6 
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the philosopher has to learn to live with the ‘strangeness’ of nature, with the fact that 
natural processes are entirely indifferent to our existence and welfare – not positively 
indifferent, of course, but incapable of caring about us – and are complex in a way 
that rules out the possibility of our wholly mastering and transforming them (Passmore 
1980, cited in O’Neill 1993: 151).  
As O’Neill (1993) argues, it is nature’s ‘otherness’ that provides much of its value. It 
is often precisely because natural processes and phenomena lack human significance 
that they have value as objects of contemplation. When we gaze in awe at the stars at 
night, or wonder at the frog that lives in the desert by humidifying the atmosphere of 
an underground hole, or are amazed at the complex social structures of ant colonies, 
we find value not in reciprocity, but (at least in part) in the world’s indifference to 
our concerns. A belief in the ultimate transparency of the natural world to human 
reason, which contributes to the arrogance of humanism, is tempered by this 
perspective on human-nature relations (Barry 1999). Neither submissiveness nor 
transparency are required for the proper human valuation of nature: 
The assumption that nature’s impersonality and indifference is something to be 
regretted, a cause of a ‘disenchantment’ of the world, needs to be rejected…. The 
depersonalization of nature represents not a disenchantment of the world but the basis 
for a proper enchantment with it. Appreciation of the strangeness of nature is a 
component of a proper valuation of it (O’Neill 1993: 151).  
It is precisely because the value of knowledge consists in this enchantment, in the 
contemplation of things wonderful and beautiful, that engaging in the practice of 
science provides a connection between a commitment to environmental goods and 
human well-being. 
Science develops in its participants certain human capacities, for example, powers of 
observation, judgment, and reason. These human capacities, in turn, presuppose the Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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ideal of truth finding: I am disposed to see what is there, to judge correctly, to argue 
validly. This process of contemplation develops a capacity in the human agent to 
respond to the qualities that objects in nature possess independently of the agent. 
Thus, the “specification of such desirable capacities presupposes some reference to 
the goods in which they issue” (O’Neill 1993: 73). The development of these 
capacities presupposes that I am attending to an object of value that is independent of 
me, but which orients the way I act in the world. 
It is for these reasons that Marx remarked on the way that science and the arts 
‘humanise the senses’ by developing our ability to respond in a disinterested fashion. 
Driven by utilitarian and commercial interests, the farmer sees creatures and land as 
general problems of vermin and undrained soil. In contrast, motivated by a desire to 
understand, the field ecologist sees particular natural beings with particular life 
histories in a particular habitat. It is in the development of the specifically human 
capacity of perception, which allows us to respond to objects in nature for their own 
qualities, to see the real nature of the object, that the practice of science develops in 
us not only intellectual virtues but also ethical virtues.  
When it is recognised that human well-being is intimately related to objects of value 
independent of the human subject, human flourishing is not a quality realised by the 
self-sufficient agent. Rather, when the real substance of the object of our attention 
matters, well-being is a quality realised in the relationship itself. It follows that the 
nature of the object is not merely of instrumental value to me, for this would mean 
that the specific nature of the object would not matter; its reality would not matter; a Chapter 6 
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surrogate would do.
31 But if it is appreciation of the object itself that we seek, a 
surrogate would not do. Nature is not a puzzle or game, the solving of which satisfies 
our curiosity. Paradoxically, an overbearing desire for knowledge for its own sake, 
rather than for an understanding of the object itself, is likely to work against the 
capacities of sensitivity and openness to the object itself, and thus against the ethical 
virtues developed through engagement in the practice of science: 
I came on my first Military orchid, a species I had long wanted to encounter but 
hitherto had never seen outside a book. I fell on my knees before it in a way that all 
botanists will know. I identified, to be quite certain, with Professors Clapham, Tutin, 
and Wargurg in hand (the standard British Flora), I measured, I photographed, I 
worked out where I was on the map, for future reference. I was excited, very happy, 
one always remembers one’s ‘firsts’ of rarer species. Yet five minutes after my wife 
had finally … torn me away, I suffered a strange feeling. I realised I had not actually 
seen the three plants in the little colony we had found (Fowles 1979, cited in O’Neill 
1993: 163). 
When the real nature of the object matters, it is not knowledge for its own sake, but 
appreciation of the object for its value, that we seek: “One does not seek knowledge 
of objects to get pleasure, one gets pleasure in knowing about them” (O’Neill 1993: 
165). And where the goods of scientific knowledge are properly understood, “the 
pursuit of knowledge itself imposes [limits] on the means to and objects of 
knowledge” (ibid). Clearly, means of discovery which destroy the object are ruled 
out, as are objects that are the improper focus of human inquiry. Sometimes we must 
be content with a mystery.  
                                                 
31 Habermas’s view that science cannot aim at interests other than the instrumental control of nature is 
plainly false. An interest in the instrumental control of nature is not intrinsic to the practice of science. 
This view rests on a confusion of measurement and prediction with control that is often heard from 
members of the Frankfurt School. Measurement and prediction need not issue in control: astronomy, 
for example, clearly deals in phenomena that it cannot control (O’Neill 1993).  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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The preceding discussion has argued that an ecological virtue ethics, as a mode of 
knowing and interacting with the natural world, provides a connection between a 
commitment to environmental goods and human well-being. Thus, an appeal to the 
value of an object in nature does not necessarily signify a subjective preference, as 
the subjectivist ethics of liberal politics would have it. The qualitative process of 
valuation central to an ecological virtue ethics demonstrates that preferences answer 
to values: I prefer an ecosystem because it is of value; I do not value an ecosystem 
because it is preferred. The objective environmental good, which exists 
independently of my valuation, serves to orient what I believe it is good to do, or 
good to be. Preferences are shaped by the practices we encounter, so that we come to 
prefer what is good. As Taylor makes clear, it is only when “we sideline a sense or 
vision of the good and consider it irrelevant to moral thinking [that] our notion of 
practical reason has to be procedural” (Taylor 1989: 86).  
This point, however, returns us to a problem that haunts public dialogue about 
environmental matters. For if participation in the practice of science is required to 
cultivate the intellectual and ethical virtues which enable a proper valuation of 
environmental issues, then citizens without a scientific education remain unable to 
judge the competing scientific knowledges with which they are presented. Citizens 
are at a loss to know which expert to believe, which expert to trust.  Chapter 6 
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V  A Rhetorical Account of the Forum 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have 
lost in information?  
— T.S. Eliot 
The issue of trust and its relationship to democracy has become a core focus of 
attention in recent times (Warren 1999; Cox 1995). There is increasing evidence to 
suggest that information and transparency do not of themselves improve trust in the 
institutions governing the production and regulation of scientific knowledge and new 
technologies (cf. Grove-White 2000; Wynne 2001). This lack of reflexivity 
privileges the notion that if expertise is present, trust is not required, “as if scientific 
belief and knowledge were not also pervaded by trust, emotion and faith” (Wynne 
2001: 457).  
It is often held that the promise of deliberative institutions is their capacity to 
increase public trust in the institutions of governance. The legitimacy of deliberative 
institutions is based on the active pursuit of trust as participants must arrive at 
common judgments based on reasoned argument. It is precisely the need for citizens 
to judge reasons, however, that is problematic in the Habermasian model of the 
forum.  
A common criticism of Habermas is the privilege given to reasoned argument in 
deliberative democracy. One such critic is Iris Marion Young, who promotes instead 
the use of “any forms of communicative interaction where people aim to reach 
understanding across their differences,” including chants, music, singing, and 
dancing (Young 1992: 139). Notably though, as Torgerson points out, “she does not 
make her case by chanting, singing, or dancing, but by engaging in argument—Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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making explicit claims and giving explicit reasons” (Torgerson 2003). Indeed, she 
could not do otherwise! Arguments that criticise authoritative standards as 
incompatible with authenticity or autonomy are incoherent because “[t]he very 
activity of argument calls upon standards independent of the speakers” (O’Neill 
1998: 96). Thus, in the act of arguing against reasoned dialogue, the speaker is 
implicitly reliant upon the authoritativeness of the very standards rejected.  
What is required to address these criticisms of reasoned public dialogue is not a 
rejection of reason, but a rejection of the particular picture of reason Habermas 
invokes. It is the Kantian picture of reason, and the heroic version of the autonomous 
agent that it relies upon, which need to be reconsidered. In deliberative institutions, 
such as citizens juries and consensus conferences, participants are required to hear 
and evaluate evidence presented by the expert witnesses they call upon. The problem 
with the Habermasian model of testing validity claims is that citizens are expected to 
judge reasons directly. The problem is, how are citizens to judge the reasons given?  
In the rhetorical tradition of persuasive argument championed by Aristotle, it is not 
the reasons given but the credibility of the expertise that is the object of judgment. 
Because rhetoric has both epistemological and ethical dimensions, it offers itself as a 
more realistic account of reasonable discourse in dialogical public forums and of 
citizen participation therein. It also invites public debate about the ethical 
significance and quality of scientific knowledge, which are at the heart of public trust 
concerns. Chapter 6 
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Rhetoric:  Reconnecting Epistemology and Ethics 
Since the view of language as an accurate representation of reality took hold, and 
language was sterilized of metaphor and analogy, it has been assumed that rhetoric is 
the opposite of rational discourse.
32 Any appeal to the emotions serves only to 
misdirect judgment, and has no place in discourse that aims at truth and knowledge. 
For example, in Plato we find two forms of persuasion: “one providing conviction 
without knowledge, the other providing knowledge” (cited in O’Neill 1998: 2). In a 
similar manner, Locke describes rhetoric as the “arts of fallacy” and the “instrument 
of error and deceit” (ibid). For Kant, because it aims to deceive, rhetoric is 
inconsistent with a respect for autonomy. The model of public dialogue in Habermas 
follows Kant in disallowing the use of rhetoric in moral discourse. The only 
legitimate discourse for inquiry into truth is logical argument. 
Against this appeal to logical argument, John O’Neill (1997, 1998) has cogently 
presented the case for a rhetorical account of reasoned discourse. Although the 
deductive reasoning of logical argument is suitable in mathematics, other domains 
require different levels of rigor. The purposes of inquiry also differ. Whereas the aim 
of scientific discourse is ‘truth’, the aim of rhetorical discourse is practical: to bring 
an audience to act. Reason remains central to the achievement of both, however, 
because dialectical argument has a role in both.  
                                                 
32 With Descartes came the inward turn which defined knowledge as the correct inner representation 
of an outer reality, or independent realm of objects. The modern conception of truth came to be 
defined as the correspondence of language with reality, as a regime whereby “[word] and thing are 
brought to coincide in the sense that the former is a completely adequate and transparent 
representation of the latter” (Reiss 1982, cited in Szerszynski 1996: 108). The congruence of between 
the ideas in the mind and the reality outside “has to come about through a reliable method, generating 
well-founded confidence” (Taylor 1995: 4). The certainty science demands, for Descartes, can only be 
grounded in evidence. Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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Thus, for Aristotle, there are three modes of persuasion through language: providing 
arguments that are persuasive in themselves (dialectical argument); exhibiting the 
authoritative and virtuous character of the speaker; and addressing the emotions of 
the audience. Rhetoric therefore presupposes dialectical argument, which provides 
the epistemological dimension of reasoned argument. The remaining two modes of 
persuasion have ethical dimensions. All three, though, are open to reasoned 
appraisal.  
The feature of dialectical argument of note here is that it takes authoritative opinions 
as its starting point: “It is the art of interrogating the conflict between propositions 
thus offered to us by others” (O’Neill 1997: 10). Deliberation from this starting point 
requires good judgment in the evaluation of persuasive arguments. In effect, then, 
what is being judged is not reasons per se, but the credibility of the expertise being 
presented. Thus, for Aristotle, judgments of credibility are central to the art of 
rhetoric. An analogy is drawn between this resolution of conflicting claims and the 
process a judge follows in deciding a lawsuit: 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions – the hearers decide between 
one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision – the orator must 
not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; 
he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, 
in the right frame of mind (Aristotle, cited in O’Neill 1997: 10).  
Credibility therefore has both epistemological and ethical dimensions. Speakers must 
not only be reliable in the formation of judgments, but must also demonstrate moral 
character by providing grounds that allow us to believe that they are not inclined to 
deceive. The legal analogy used here has implications for the kind of role the citizen 
must perform in the citizens’ jury model of public dialogue.  Chapter 6 
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The emphasis in rhetoric on reasoning from opinion is not confined to public 
deliberation, and does not undermine its claim to rationality. The acceptance of 
epistemological authority, and the role of character evaluation this demands, is also 
central to scientific and philosophical discourses. In their studies of the micro-
negotiations of scientists, Latour and Woolgar observe that data are often accepted or 
rejected in science based on an evaluation of who produced it: 
Reference to the human agency involved in the production of statements was very 
common. Indeed, it was clear from participants’ discussions that who had made the 
claim was as important as the claim itself. In a sense, these discussions constituted a 
complex sociology and psychology of science engaged in by the participants 
themselves (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 164).
33 
Judgments about the reliability of the sources of knowledge are unavoidable. We 
cannot confirm each and every claim ourselves. Indeed, as O’Neill points out, most 
of what we believe is founded on the testimony of others: “We are all, whether 
mathematicians, scientists or citizens, forced to accept the testimony of explorers in 
intellectual landscapes to which we have not and could not have access” (O’Neill 
1995: 86).  
The problem that Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers have with authority rests on 
the idea that authority is associated with wealth, power, or status. Clearly, this kind 
of authority never provides justifiable grounds for deference. The conditions for 
justifiable deference to epistemological authority are the conditions a community of 
inquiry must possess if its authority is to be accepted (O’Neill 1998). First, there 
must be good reasons to believe that a person’s judgments meet standards 
                                                 
33 Recognising that deductive argument is not the whole of science does not warrant the strong social 
constructivist claims about science these authors go on to make.  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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independent of that person. Second, we need good grounds for believing that the 
authority could be redeemed in public argument within the relevant community of 
inquiry.
34 
The Meaning and Purpose of Knowledge 
The third mode of persuasion in Aristotle’s account of rhetoric is the appeal to the 
emotions. It is precisely this appeal to the passions rather than to judgment that 
caused Kant to reject rhetoric. Since the passions are irrational, rhetoric is 
inconsistent with the rational pursuit of truth. The persistence of this view is evident 
today. Even where ‘ethical’ issues are considered to be legitimate in policy 
discourses, the ethical dimensions of knowledge are clearly separated from its 
cognitive dimensions. As Brian Wynne puts it, the “‘ethical’ dimensions of public 
concern are accepted as legitimate, but only by assuming them to be of a particular 
emotional, ‘touchy-feely’ kind [which] evacuates their substantive content” (Wynne 
2001: 476).
35 This is an approach which “systematically and endlessly defers 
                                                 
34 Therefore, the maturity of the autonomous agent is not, with Kant, the courage to use one’s own 
understanding without the guidance of another. Rather, it is the courage to admit we might be wrong, 
and the willingness to subject our beliefs and knowledge claims to public scrutiny. On this view, the 
mature agent “is able to reason well for herself, but knows when her own reason is insufficient; she is 
not credulous nor willing to accept all and any propositions put to her by putative authorities; she is 
able to judgment whose testimony is reliable, whose is not; she knows when and how to be suspicious 
– she is versed in the practical art of suspicion” (O’Neill 1997: 13). 
35 The ethical analysis that is conducted as part of the policy process typically proceeds in two-stages, 
according to familiar utilitarian and deontological distinctions (Wynne 2001). The first stage assumes 
that science either can, or will be able to, provide knowledge of environmental consequences. This is 
of course a prerequisite of the utilitarian approach, which assumes knowledge of the consequences of 
our actions. The issue of endemic ignorance is excluded (even if it is recognised in the abstract), the 
remaining task being one of weighing costs and benefits. In the second stage, the residual 
deontological questions of intrinsic right and wrong are translated atomistically, into questions of 
individual (consumer) choice. The public dimensions of ethical significance are systematically 
ignored in this analysis.  Chapter 6 
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recognition of the deeper need to open up the human purposes and forces driving 
scientific research to wider accountability and debate” (Wynne 2001: 466).  
In his account of rhetoric, Aristotle challenged the dominant view of emotions, 
arguing instead that emotions are open to reasoned appraisal because they are partly 
constituted by beliefs. For example, part of what it means to feel pity is to believe 
that harm has come to the person to whom pity is directed. This belief then becomes 
open to rational appraisal: 
We can be afraid, e.g., or be confident, or have appetite, or get angry, or feel pity, in 
general have pleasure or pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well; 
but [having these feelings] at the right times, about the right things, towards the right 
people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, 
and this is proper to virtue (Aristotle, cited in O’Neill 1997: 14).  
To suggest that the beliefs which partly constitute emotions are open to rational 
persuasion is also to recognise the fallibility of one’s beliefs. In order to convince, 
we must give grounds for our beliefs. In public dialogue, we must appeal to 
standards independent of ourselves to provide this justification. These can be the 
cognitive values of reasoned dialogue, as described in Section II, if we are making a 
claim to the truth of the matter. And as the discussion in Section IV suggested, we 
may appeal to the objective environmental goods which act as independent standards 
by which to orient inquiry and action.  
The assumption that public perceptions about and responses to new technologies and 
policies are based on intellectually vacuous emotive concerns is a clear 
misrepresentation, as Brian Wynne and others have shown (Wynne 2001; Grove-
White et al. 1997, 2001). Citizens generally accept the inevitability of uncertainty, 
and the ignorance of science, so that public trust concerns are founded in judgments Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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about the unacknowledged limits of prevailing scientific and policy discourses. Trust 
concerns are grounded in the quality of the existing knowledge for policy, its 
cognitive and ethical dimensions, which include “whether thorough and adequate 
risk assessment is always possible, what value-assumptions structure it, and why it is 
invariably beset with contingency, and lack of full predictive control” (Wynne 2001: 
458). Institutional dimensions, such as the institutionalised forms of ownership, 
control, direction, and regulation, are also at the forefront of public trust concerns 
about science—concerns which are centred in the quality of institutionalised social 
relationships.  
The interdependence of the cognitive and ethical aspects of knowledge in science 
points to the challenge of cultivating a richer understanding of the meaning and 
purposes of knowledge. Truth is a good, but it is not the only good (O’Neill 1993). 
As Dewey argued,  
… the realm of meanings is wider than that of true-and-false meanings; it is more 
urgent and more fertile. When the claim of meanings to truth enter in, then truth is 
indeed pre-eminent. But this fact is often confused with the idea that truth has a claim 
to enter everywhere; that it has monopolistic jurisdiction. Poetic meanings, moral 
meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of 
meanings, rather than truth…. “Social reform” [should not be] taken to mean anything 
less than precisely the liberation and expansion of the meanings of which experience 
is capable (Dewey 1926: 410-11).  
Questions about the meaning and purpose of scientific knowledge, and about the 
meaning and purpose of policy trajectories, cannot be the purview of experts alone. 
The ethical and political beliefs embedded in the cultural practices of science and 
technology shape people’s lives, and demand practical assent. They must be the 
subject-matter of civic dialogue, to which experts (as scientists/practitioners and Chapter 6 
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citizens) have a responsibility to contribute. The purposes, meaning, and quality of 
knowledge, including but not limited to matters of scientific truth, become the central 
questions of policy dialogue.   
VI Conclusion 
The original, civic purposes of EA recognised both science and civic participation as 
vital and interdependent elements in the creation of more sustaining forms of human 
engagement with the natural world. A crucial dimension of a ‘greener’ science-
policy culture is a “‘civic science’ or the science of open public debate about 
determining uncertain futures” (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995: 207). I have argued that 
civic dialogue is central to the recovery of these civic purposes. Civic dialogue is the 
path to recovering the objective goods we seek to sustain in the natural world, to 
recognising the ethical significance of these goods, and to articulating the meaning 
and quality of the environmental knowledges that make claims on policy.  
Politics, as Brian Wynne (2001) points out, should be a domain constituted by the 
civilised contestation of public meanings. The ‘common good’ to which politics aims 
then becomes a practical, political concept which includes a plurality of goods, and 
which sustains an openness to the public examination, argument, and testing of 
beliefs (Sullivan 1990). This suggests that 
what should be central in the new relationships between industry, government and 
publics is less the direct pursuit of trust as ‘the goal’, than the more active cultivation 
of the true conditions from which trust can emerge – the patient, shared construction 
of patterns of genuine honesty, humility, accountability, and mutual respect between 
institutions and publics (Grove-White et al. 2000: 35).  Civic Environmental Pragmatism 
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This attitude is one relevant to truth claims as much as to relations of trust. For if 
truth depends on history, culture, and judgment, then “‘what is true’ is, in the end, 
relative to the evaluation of the kind of human relationship that the knowledge 
supports” (Wynne 1987: 439, after Bonhoeffer).   
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In the realm of the political relations of science a new 
pragmatism is … in evidence as is the reaffirmation of values 
associated with democratic theories and practices. What seems 
increasingly clear … is that when science remains in the realm 
of civil society … the chances are greater for sorting out its 
disparate elements, and for maintaining boundaries around 
whatever political interests or agendas scientists or the 
sponsors of science may incorporate within science.  
(Jacob 1992: 492) 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by elaborating a conceptual framework for strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA),
1 based on the public philosophy of civic 
environmental pragmatism developed in chapters 5 and 6. In the spirit of Lasswell’s 
dream for the ‘policy sciences of democracy’, the proposed framework aims to 
cultivate an attitude of critical reflection on the structures and practices of modern 
governance, through which to secure a constructive relationship between the 
philosophical and epistemological resources of policy inquiry and the civic resources 
of a democratic society. It is a framework which seeks to reclaim Caldwell’s 
                                                      
1 I shall reclaim the term SEA in this final chapter because I want to emphasise the ‘strategic’ aspects 
of SEA in the policy context. The emphasis on policy in this chapter means that there is no need to 
differentiate between other levels of decision-making in EA, so there is no longer a problem with the 
proliferation of terms that may have been distracting earlier in the thesis. Chapter 7 
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aspirations for SEA as a process in which foresight, wise public judgment, and 
precautionary action transform policy making by re-embedding environmental 
science (as a discipline of interactive relationships) in its civic context.  
The need for the civic grounding of policy inquiry, realised in dialogical public 
forums, has been a key message of this thesis.
2 The pressing need for policy inquiry 
in the contemporary context of sustainability is to create institutionalised forums that 
foster reflective and dialogical forms of rationality. “[R]eflection is a unique intrinsic 
good”, Dewey insists, “since beyond other goods it has power of replenishment” 
(Dewey 1926: 406). The recovery of temporal categories like replenishment and 
restoration is a central task for policy inquiry oriented to sustainability. For Dewey, it 
                                                      
2 It is important to make the point that reconnecting SEA with its multivalent civic context may in fact 
weaken environmental commitments. Therefore, we should not romanticise civil society and its 
sustainability commitments, but rather realistically identify the conditions of better sustainability 
policies. There is no doubt that “better” substantive ethical-political outcomes cannot be guaranteed 
through improved civic agency and engagement. The perceived need for certainty, and the recourse to 
‘scientific certainty’ this normally provokes, has been revoked by the philosophy of pragmatism. All 
we have is fallible human beings, who must take responsibility for the discriminating judgments of 
quality that must be made in the search for “better” policy outcomes. What we can do, however, is 
create “more systematic ways of coping with the unknown, undefined or uncertain aspects of science 
and technology. There is a need for ‘technologies of humility’ that incorporate the expectation of 
unforeseen consequences and acknowledge from the start the need for plural viewpoints and mutual 
learning” (Jasanoff 2002: 377).  
   As a technology of humility, the practice of SEA must recognise that the indeterminate nature of 
environmental knowledges and policy commitments requires practical (social and political) judgment. 
The indeterminacy of environmental knowledge is intimately connected with its ambiguity, and thus 
with questions of purpose and intent, ethical and political choice, and the interpretation of meaning 
(Forester 1993)—questions which derive from the social and political context of inquiry. A core 
condition of “better” sustainability policies must therefore be a reflexive policy process, which 
focuses on the interpretive questions through which citizens make sense of environmental knowledge, 
and of their experiences of technological and environmental change. This approach recognises, as 
emphasised in Chapter 6, that the consequences of existing and proposed technologies are as much 
about larger competing visions of the good as they are about specific ‘impacts’, and should therefore 
be the legitimate object of democratic deliberation.  
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is clearly problematic that these categories have largely been rescinded with the 
dominance of an instrumentalist rationality, and its emphasis on the linear and spatial 
dimensions of our existence: “the problems which constitute modern epistemology 
… have a single origin in the dogma which denies temporal quality to reality as 
such” (Dewey 1926: 149).   
The need to recover the social nature of knowledge and the collaborative nature of 
inquiry has also been a central message in this thesis. The unique value of this 
constructive understanding of science as a common good in western culture is 
echoed in the words of Margaret Jacob: 
The great strength of the contemporary history and sociology of science lies in its 
willingness to take seriously the power of science, in effect to see that science can be 
socially framed, possess political meaning, and also occasionally be sufficiently true, 
or less false, in such a way that we cherish its findings. The challenge comes in trying 
to understand how knowledge worth preserving occurs in time, possesses deep social 
relations, and can also be progressive—i.e., capable of leading to more knowledge, 
and seen to be worthy of preservation (Jacob 1992: 501).  
The embeddedness of science (broadly conceived as disciplined knowing) in a wider 
ethical context makes clear the challenge of cultivating a richer understanding of 
what kind of knowledge is worthy of preservation. When politics is a domain 
constituted by the civilised contestation of public meanings, the public character of 
knowledge takes on the richer sense of publicness as political judgment, or 
deliberative action: the collective practice of deliberating and choosing ways to order 
and direct public life. The social and political character of science means that it is no 
longer just the application of knowledge that might be judged ‘good’ or ‘bad’, better 
or worse. Scientists, as citizens of both a profession and a wider polity, must take Chapter 7 
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responsibility for the means to and objects of knowledge. The purposes of, and 
reasons for, pursuing particular paths to knowledge must be open to public scrutiny.  
The implications of understanding SEA as a communicative process of purposive 
inquiry embedded in its civic context will be elaborated in this final chapter. The first 
step is to clarify the ‘strategic’ orientation of SEA (Section I). A dialogical 
framework for SEA, which facilitates a creative dialectic between reflection and 
action and is oriented to its civic context, is elaborated in Section II. The process 
(form) of SEA is re-framed in Section III based on the epistemological and 
philosophical insights of civic environmental pragmatism discussed in chapters 5 and 
6. In Section IV, the benefits of public dialogue, and a number of forms this might 
take in the SEA process, are suggested. Section V attends to the benefits of a re-
framed SEA for more resilient institutional relationships.  
I  What is ‘Strategic’ About SEA? 
As a process of purposive inquiry with practical (transformative) intent along 
Deweyan lines, SEA is strategic in terms of both its purpose and its practical focus. I 
shall suggest that in the policy context, sustainability is the overriding purposive 
orientation of SEA—a purpose which recognises the social nature of environmental 
problems, and the future-orientation of inquiry. The practical focus of SEA in the 
policy context becomes technological systems, rather than the individual 
technological developments that capture attention at lower levels of decision making. 
The implications of this strategic orientation will be explored in the discussion that 
follows. Reframing SEA 
 
 
– 321 – 
Sustainability:  The Purpose of SEA 
The future is not a pre-existing land towards which we are all moving, and which it is our 
task to discern through the mist and prepare for, but something which is created and shaped 
through all the decisions we make. A simultaneous recognition of the intrinsic indeterminacy 
of the future, and of all our roles in shaping that future, impose on us all the duty to take 
responsibility for the future that we are creating (Szerszynski et al. 1996: 10). 
The international policy framework of sustainable development formally entered 
mainstream politics in 1987 with the publication of the Brundtland Report, Our 
Common Future (WCED 1987). The message of sustainable development proposed 
by Brundtland has come to represent a significant turning point in international 
relations over the environment, where the natural environment and human 
development were redefined as complementary, rather than competing, social goals. 
The original communitarian overtones of the Brundtland Report echoed the social 
and cultural focus of the environment movement with its recognition that notions of 
global equity, justice, and basic human rights are intrinsic to the environmental issue.  
In its dominant interpretations, however, sustainable development has tended to 
reaffirm earlier ‘limits to growth’ debates of the 1970s in its attention to ‘carrying 
capacity’, although there has been some attention to the equity dimension of 
sustainable development with the introduction of concepts such as ‘critical natural 
capital’. Nonetheless, both of these concepts are based upon the same assumption: 
that there is some kind of baseline criterion that represents human demand on natural 
regeneration, and that may be captured by ‘indicators’ of environmental and human 
welfare states. Moreover, it is assumed that this baseline will remain constant over 
time (Foster undated).  Chapter 7 
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The overarching goal in this mainstream understanding of sustainable development is 
to maintain productive economic-ecological interactions in a manner that does not 
deplete overall capital stocks (Pearce et al. 1993). This model is one “defined by 
expert (principally natural scientific) knowledge, purportedly able to be implemented 
by harnessing ‘stakeholders’ and the wider public, through education and 
exhortation, leading in turn to public ‘participation’ in the refinement and ultimate 
achievement of sustainability goals” (Grove-White 1996: 278). Despite these heroic 
aspirations, it is increasingly evident that the prevailing discourse of sustainable 
development has failed to motivate the participation of the very people implicated in 
the achievement of its goals: the public.  
A persuasive explanatory hypothesis for this lack of public resonance is the 
alienating character of tacit models of human nature embedded in the public 
discourses and institutions of sustainable development (Grove-White 1996; 
Macnaghten and Urry 1998). These models, which derive from the individualistic, 
instrumental, non-relational assumptions that frame official economistic discourses, 
serve only to alienate citizens from their public institutions. Extensive discussions 
with people from all walks of life have found that the assumptions made by public 
institutions seeking to implicate people in contributing to a more sustainable future 
do not resonate with the wider population (Macnaghten and Urry 1998).  
The dominant sustainable development discourses make three core assumptions: (1) 
that environmental issues are global and may be identified through scientific inquiry; 
(2) that people will act ‘rationally’ in response to information about environmental 
issues, and so will change their behaviour; and (3) that people’s relationships to 
government and industry are unproblematic.  Reframing SEA 
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Respondents, on the other hand: (1) believed that the statistical indicators generated 
by science do not capture the important issues of concern; (2) felt very little or no 
personal agency; and (3) saw the state as part of the problem. Therefore, citizen 
concern for the environment, and unease about the direction of society more 
generally, did not translate into action. People are insufficiently motivated to 
articulate strong concerns on issues where they do not feel significant public 
‘agency’, or the ability to effect substantive change.  
Robin Grove-White echoes the thoughts of these and other sociological analyses 
when he says that “the ‘myths’ of modernity – of planning, control, and the 
individual in control of his/her destiny – are now being undermined by the very 
social and technological dynamics they have set in motion” (Grove-White 1996: 
284). At base, these culturally disembedded models of the human agent are 
inadequate conceptions of what people are really like, and what their relational needs 
might be in complex modern societies. 
The alternative language of ‘sustainability’—the ability-to-sustain—holds within it a 
relational view of social-environmental concerns and a contextual view of public 
agency. Sustainability emphasises the whole gambit of material, moral, political, 
cultural, and spiritual human-environmental relations which encompass, but are not 
reducible to, the relationships between economy and ecology that currently define 
sustainable development (Barry 1999). It is recognised that, like core political 
concepts such as justice, sustainability is not something authoritatively ‘given’, so 
that its meaning will inevitably be contested. Its normative character means that, like 
other ideals and principles (including the scientific), “sustainability does not come 
with its own rules of implementation” (Barry 1996: 118). Rather, collective Chapter 7 
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deliberation and practical judgment are required to apply it to particular 
circumstances. This intrinsic indeterminacy means that its translation from a ethical-
political principle into a regulatory social goal capable of motivating action will 
require the participation of citizens.  
Collaborative public judgment will also be required both to construct and interpret 
the indicators to measure sustainability—to understand exactly what it is they are 
indicating. As John Foster points out, “indicators don’t read themselves – nor do they 
simply register whether particular forms of development are ‘sustainable’ or not” 
(Foster undated: 9). They require creative intelligence in their interpretation and 
application. Their role as indicators of a sustainable trend, rather than of a particular 
development in isolation, will encompass judgments regarding a number of 
interdependent factors, including the trustworthiness of the institutions involved, the 
acceptability of the assumed scientific framings, and the validity of the various 
statistical measures in relation to people’s lived experience. For Foster, it is the 
centrality of judgment, of a living responsibility for judgment, that a ‘deep’ 
sustainability genuinely demands: 
… deep sustainability is about not judging (interpreting, understanding) as if there 
were no tomorrow. Positively, it is about making sense in a way which recognises the 
claims of tomorrow … It is not just another way of formulating the precautionary 
principle [because] its deployment depends on judgements, not just about how much 
leeway is likely to be adequate in particular kinds of case and what costs are actually 
possible, but also about what outcomes are to count as costs and about how much we 
ought to reckon that we don’t know (Foster undated: 14).  
Civic environmental pragmatism, as a collaborative process of inquiry that facilitates 
the creative intelligence of experts and citizens and recognises the centrality of 
practical judgment, provides a constructive framework for inquiry that meets the Reframing SEA 
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more contextually embedded notion of ‘sustainability’. Institutionalised through the 
SEA process, these assumptions are more likely to engender the public resonance 
required to motivate citizen participation in the realisation of sustainability goals. 
A Temporal Dimension 
The future orientation demanded of SEA in the context of sustainability means that it 
must render “present action temporally meaningful” (Szerszynski 2002: 188). In this 
regard, SEA has tended to adopt a consequentialist orientation which organises 
present activity around the intention or expectation of influencing the future. 
Whether oriented to securing ‘goods’ or avoiding ‘bads’, this idea of exerting 
influence, or acting at a distance, is predicated on a notion of productive agency that 
betrays the instrumentalist tenor of modernity (Rip 1998).  
Bronislaw Szerszynski elaborates a second kind of future orientation, based more on 
an attitude of hope than control: “This is a politics of prefiguration, anticipating in 
the here-and-now a different and better world …” (Szerszynski 2002: 188). It is just 
this attitude of hope which, as John Forester has highlighted in his various writings, 
is often missing in policy and planning discourses predicated on control. On these 
terms, present activities would be evaluated in terms of anticipating a future 
glimpsed in present activities. Thus, it is not prediction but ‘anticipating 
implementation’ that better describes the process of SEA (see Section III). This 
embedding or situating of present activities in time requires an attitude based more 
on humility than control. On this temporal horizon, SEA holds the promise of 
nurturing hope by enabling a politics of remembrance and anticipation in which to 
shape  present activities, rather than attempting to predict future  consequences of 
present actions. Chapter 7 
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Importantly for the motivation of collective action in SEA, the temporal dimension of 
sustainability emphasises the need to hold together something shared: “a 
commitment to securing resources and opportunities for future generations … is an 
appropriate way of expressing our belief that the society and culture that matters to 
us are important enough to survive into the future” (MacLean 1983, cited in 
Thompson and Rayner 1998: 268).  
Technological Systems:  The Practical Focus of SEA 
The aim of SEA has always been to address the causes of environmental problems at 
their policy source (see Chapter 2). As will become clear in the discussion to follow, 
at the policy level, the focus of inquiry in SEA is technological systems rather than 
individual technological developments in isolation. In a similar manner, to call upon 
an example from political economy, it is the industry rather than the firm that is 
essential in the formulation of public action.  
In order to understand the unmistakably ethical and political nature of the issues with 
which SEA must deal at the level of technological systems, Aidan Davison’s 
discussion is characteristically insightful. In a distinction that may usefully be 
employed here to gain a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter of SEA 
compared to that of project-based EA, Davison distinguishes between the 
‘background’ of technological systems and the ‘foreground’ of technological 
devices. Simply put, the technological artefacts (the tangible commodities) that 
dominate the foreground of our experience often act to divert attention from the more 
pervasive but less visible technological systems, which exist as mere background in 
our experience:  Reframing SEA 
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To appreciate this juxtaposition of background and foreground, we need only to 
consider the ways in which industrial agriculture is bringing about a standardization 
and homogenization of agricultural practices. Modern technological advance in 
agriculture has drastically reduced the diversity of productive species, landscapes, and 
rural communities, and it continues to do so. Industrial agriculture has established 
ecologically moribund, machine-dominated monocultures around the globe. Yet we 
consume the resultant agricultural produce as a stupendous array and a dazzling 
celebration of traditional world cuisines and their unaccountably many hybrids 
(Davison 2001: 142). 
With a focus on the ‘background’ of technological systems, SEA must attend to the 
distinctive regimes of policy for agriculture, energy, transport, and so on. These 
regimes, which may be thought of as normative cultures of practice, are what direct 
‘downstream’ plans, programmes, and projects. In the main, these systems are 
inconspicuous as mere background, acting as the stage upon which the “drama of 
self-conscious agency unfolds” (Davison 2001: 105). The focus on particular 
technologies, or devices, which characterises project-level EA ensures that it is the 
ends—the particular development projects—which command attention in the 
foreground of our experience. Meanwhile, the means—or technological systems—
which spawn such projects recede from view: “The device thus permits little or no 
insight into or engagement with its machinery. Its promise is to make commodities 
available as ‘mere end, unencumbered by means’” (Davison 2001: 110).  
Technology-as-device, as Davison explains, is conceived as external means to ends 
determined by our autonomous selves, thus liberated from worldly constraints. The 
irony, however, is that we are at once liberated from what burdens and what sustains 
us: “The promise leads to the irony of technology when liberation by way of Chapter 7 
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disburdenment yields to disengagement [and] enrichment by way of diversion is 
overtaken by distraction” (Borgmann, cited in Davison 2001: 111).  
Driven to Distraction 
In their study of everyday moral experience in US society, Robert Bellah and his 
colleagues argue that it is this distraction which has produced the attitude and pattern 
of ‘exploitation’ that is destructive to both natural environment and democratic 
engagement (Bellah et al. 1992). Manifested in the goal of individual accumulation, 
which is itself disengaged from other social goods, exploitation has become the all-
encompassing liberal ideal: “When the pioneer had skinned the soil, he moved on; 
when the miner had exhausted his mine, he moved on; when the timber cutter had 
gutted out the forests of the Appalachians, he moved on. All those social types left 
rack and ruin behind them” (Mumford, cited in Bellah et al. 1992: 265). This pattern 
of exploitation is one that infuses politics today when it offers solutions that serve 
only to increase our distraction; for example, when it offers the solution of extra 
traffic lanes to address problems associated with automobile-based systems of 
transport, or indeed when it offers the panacea of ‘growth’ as the cure to all modern 
ills. 
The alternative to the pattern of exploitation is ‘cultivation’, which involves the 
creation and realisation of human possibilities and purposes (Bellah et al. 1992).
3 
Constitutive of cultivation is the quality of paying  attention, rather than the 
distraction that characterises exploitation. Cultivation thus prompts us to attend to—
                                                      
3 It is worth bearing in mind that, as with much of Enlightenment vocabulary, both “cultivation” and 
“exploitation” are competing definitions of that marvellously ambiguous term “development” (Bellah 
et al. 1992). Reframing SEA 
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or, in other words, to care for—things which express the larger meaning and purpose 
of our lives together in the long run, rather than things which express only the 
parsimonious and distracting pursuit of individual (material) purposes for short-term 
individual advantage.  
Informed by an attitude of cultivation, democracy might be defined as “a political 
system in which people actively attend to what is significant” (Bellah et al. 1992: 
273). Decision making would be recognised as an ongoing process, as Iris Murdoch 
explains: 
If we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and 
how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be 
surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already 
over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the 
exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and 
not a grandiose leaping about unimpeded at important moments (Murdoch 1970, cited 
in Forester 1993 note 32). 
The revolutionary potential of SEA, I believe, lies in its ability to bring the 
background of technological systems into the foreground of our experience, so that 
attention might take precedence over distraction, and cultivation might displace 
exploitation. Thought of in this way, the normative cultures of practice that represent 
the focus of inquiry in SEA are not so much ‘causes’ as ‘re-sources’, or sources of 
renewal.  
Making Policy, Building Worlds 
For a cogent statement of the importance of attending to this ‘background’ of 
technological systems, and the social-environmental relations these systems embody, 
we cannot go past Langdon Winner’s discerning analysis of the process of Chapter 7 
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technology assessment. Winner clearly reveals the empirical and moral inadequacies 
of dominant cause-and-effect models of technology assessment when he reminds us 
that in the process of technological development, “[n]ew worlds are being made. 
There is nothing ‘secondary’ about this phenomenon” (1986: 11):  
Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose 
structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, 
travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. In the processes by which 
structuring decisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess 
unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness. By far the greatest 
latitude of choice exists the very first time a particular instrument, system, or 
technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material 
equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for 
all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made. In that sense 
technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that 
establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations 
(Winner 1986: 28).
4 
The enduring framework for public order that the ‘structuring’ decisions of SEA will 
help to set in play demands a similarly enduring commitment to an adaptive process 
that preserves (as much as possible) the original flexibility of choice. Attending only 
to the immediate impacts of technological systems, we are likely to build a world in 
which technology begets technology in a process of innovation made necessary to 
maintain, improve, and remedy the impacts spawned by the systems themselves 
(Davison 2001; Winner 1977). Although the late-modern project of ecoefficiency 
                                                      
4 Winner (1986) illustrates this phenomenon with the example of the multitude of bridges over the 
parkways on Long Island, New York. The observation that these bridges are unusually low, Winner 
explains, would not normally invoke a second thought. However, it turns out that the designer of these 
low-hanging bridges, Robert Moses, built them to achieve a particular social effect: to discourage 
buses on his parkways. The result was that car-owning, middle-class white residents would be free to 
use the parkways, whereas the low-income and black residents who travelled on the tall public buses 
would not. Access of the former, but not the latter, to Moses’ acclaimed public park, Jones Beach, was 
thereby assured. Reframing SEA 
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apparently bestows upon us a stupendous array of technological choice with which to 
quell these unintended consequences, it is nonetheless a project which threatens the 
“adjustment of human ends to match the character of the available means” (Winner 
1976: 229). And it is just such an adjustment which threatens to redefine SEA’s goal 
of enhancing the environmental quality of life as being, instead, the goal of 
ecoefficiency—a goal which, in turn, risks being interpreted as the ever-more-
efficient destruction of the natural environment.  
If we allow the promise of the device to distract us from careful attention to the 
policy regime, or what Winner (1986) calls the ‘form of life’,
5 that sired it, the 
normative cultures of practice which characterise these technological systems will 
continue to remain unquestioned. As Robert Bellah (1986) observes, technology 
often obliterates a practice and replaces it with a chasm between an end we want and 
a means we do not understand. This, in turn, is how technology becomes addictive—
a phenomenon so common to us that we await, almost complacently, the next 
‘technological fix’. It is this ‘technological somnambulism’, this disorienting stance 
of detached engagement, that preoccupies Winner when he says that “the interesting 
puzzle in our times is that we so willingly sleepwalk through the process of 
reconstituting the conditions of human existence” (Winner 1986: 10).  
Defining Contexts 
The orientation of SEA to the background of technological systems is at the same 
time an orientation to the social and political context of development. The 
interdependence of technological systems with these institutionalised social, 
                                                      
5 Winner (1986) pp. 3-18. Chapter 7 
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economic, and cultural realities is nowhere clearer than with reference to the so-
called ‘green revolution’ in agriculture: 
The green revolution’s combination of monocultures using new hybrid seeds, 
intensive fertilization, controlled irrigation, mechanization, and extensive application 
of pesticides is not applicable within just any social system. These techniques cannot 
be effectively applied to small acreages. This limitation is partly due to their capital 
requirements, which are beyond the reach of small farmers, and it also results from 
their increased riskiness: high-yield techniques run greater risks of a single disastrous 
year … But even if smaller farmers were subsidized or formed cooperatives to pool 
capital and absorb risk, the machines, irrigation systems, and pesticides need large 
fields to be effectively employed. Farmers must also invest substantial time and skill 
to acquire the understanding necessary to use them effectively … And perhaps most 
important, these techniques drastically reduce the need for (and therefore the 
economic value of) human agricultural labour…. The result is a massive reshaping of 
the social roles and practices of agricultural communities (Rouse 1987: 239). 
This reshaping of the social roles and practices that define the social context of 
policy regimes has particularly important implications for the monitoring and 
management responsibilities associated with SEA, as well as for the process of 
‘anticipating implementation’ that constitutes the strategy of policy making itself 
(see Section III). As Joseph Rouse (1987) explains, as technologies and procedures 
become more complex and tightly coupled, so too must the social relations that deal 
with them. In particular, when systems are highly sensitive to environmental change 
or malfunction, the social institutions that manage these systems must be capable of 
maintaining conditions of stability (sometimes necessary to avert potential 
catastrophe). These institutions must therefore be capable of responding to change in 
a manner dictated by the time frames and action sequences built into the systems 
themselves. The more closely a system must be monitored, the more constrained 
must be those doing the monitoring.  Reframing SEA 
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The important point is that our social practices must often be adapted and controlled 
to fit the requirements of the technology, rather than the other way around. At base, 
Rouse maintains, the extension of science and technology beyond the laboratory and 
the drawing board in a manner that ‘works’ more often than not requires that we 
change the world to suit it: “To extend the know-how scientists develop beyond its 
local context, one must not only refine and adapt the procedures, strategies, and 
equipment themselves but must also partially reconstruct the situation within which 
the know-how is to be applied” (Rouse 1987: 118).  
The green revolution in agriculture is a clear, if well-worn, example of the need to 
consider the social and political context in which a policy regime will be 
implemented. We cannot ignore the ways in which “what is defined as rational is 
both affected by and affects social and political factors” (Flax 1981: 1014). The 
importance of a contextual orientation for policy is that these factors affect the way a 
problem or issue is defined: 
Political and social interests are not “add-ons” to an otherwise transcendental science 
that is inherently indifferent to human society; scientific beliefs, practices, institutions, 
histories, and problematics are constituted in and through contemporary political and 
social projects, and always have been (Harding 1991).  
Of equal significance is the undeniable effect of the context of policy implementation 
on the translation of an issue from the drawing board (or the laboratory, or the 
bureaucrat’s desk) into the world—a world invested with a diversity of social 
practices that will ultimately influence the way a policy is implemented. If, as I have 
suggested, decisions about technological systems are a matter of choosing which 
social values we wish to live with, then “[t]here ought rationally to be a dialectical 
interaction between technological progress and social learning, whereby each adapts, Chapter 7 
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adapts to, and encourages the (nonpredetermined) development of the other” (Wynne 
1987).  
It is exactly this kind of dialectical relationship that characterises the socio-cognitive 
processes of science for policy described in Chapter 5. The implications for SEA of 
this broad alignment of scientific knowledge, technological systems, and social and 
political interests and values will be discussed in Section III, where I will argue that 
SEA should be a strategy of adaptive management. First, however, it is necessary to 
elaborate the broader, dialogical framework within which the strategy of SEA will be 
played out. 
II  A Dialogical Framework for Strategic Environmental 
Assessment 
Given the centrality of science and technology in modern lives, and technology’s 
power to lock in unjust as well as just social arrangements … democratic societies 
today have an obligation to fashion meaningful ways of talking about the interactions 
between science, technology and politics (Jasanoff 1999: 60-1). 
Thinking about SEA on Dewey’s terms, as a strategic or purposive process that 
involves (by definition) careful appraisal of policy actions, together with the 
requirement for formal discussion and awareness of consequences that characterises 
policy dialogue, we can begin to flesh out the already-implicit meaning of a 
dialogical framework for SEA.
6 That practitioners are clearly aware of the necessary 
                                                      
6 By definition, “strategic”, or “the art of devising or employing plans toward a goal”, implies 
purposive action. Of course, the goal may be determined by anyone. But SEA has a constitutive 
goal—the “protection and improvement of the environmental quality of life”—and it is this purpose 
which should inform and guide the strategic action. Furthermore, the definition of “strategy” as 
“careful plans or methods” provides an explicit link with the deliberative approach advocated here: 
deliberate (adjective) means “characterised by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration, Reframing SEA 
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duality of practice—of the moments of action and reflection—is a central theme of 
the literature that foresees an ‘argumentative turn’ in policy analysis (Fischer and 
Forester 1993). In the same way, it is precisely this dynamic interplay between 
reflection and action in pragmatism, discussed in Chapter 5, that represents its 
contribution to a dialogical framework for policy inquiry.  
The dialogical stance of the participant in pragmatic policy inquiry prompts us to 
think in terms of a policy discourse, and of the communicative context it provides for 
the discursive interaction of experts and citizens in the process of inquiry (Torgerson 
2003). Whilst mechanistic accounts of politics consist of static, private, and 
subjective categories which require only monological transmission, pragmatic 
accounts are active, critical and intersubjective, and require dialogue. Policy 
scholars, notably Giandomenico Majone (1989) and Deborah Stone (1988), have 
been drawing attention to the role of discourse in policy analysis for over a decade. 
Even so, it is still typical of the policy mainstream to deflect attention from the 
unerring fact that policy analysis is a form of discourse—to avoid the looking glass, 
as Torgerson (2003) vividly portrays the dilemma, for fear that all in the policy world 
will be reversed. A related fear, as discussed in Chapter 4, is that a failure to 
prioritise scientific rationality in social decisions can mean only irrationality. 
                                                                                                                                                      
arrived at after due thought; characterised by awareness of the consequences;” whilst deliberate (verb) 
requires formal discussion. 
    Interestingly, a strategy is also defined as “an adaptation or complex of adaptations that serves or 
appears to serve an important function in evolutionary success, ie. foraging strategies of insects”. This 
definition implies that the evolutionary approach characteristic of adaptive management, and its 
attention to an ongoing process of implementation and management, are already-implicit in the notion 
of EA. All definitions given here are taken from Merriam-Webster Online <http://www.m-w.com>. Chapter 7 
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This fear is unwarranted. Whilst civic pragmatism will indeed see the policy world 
turned ‘upside-down’, so that policy inquiry is properly re-embedded in its civic 
context (rather than citizen participation being an add-on to existing policy 
processes), policy inquiry is not thereby irrational. Rather, locating inquiry in its 
civic context means that reason becomes an integral part of democratic politics: 
It is evident, in any case, that the whole prospect of policy analysis as a collective 
rational enterprise depends upon the establishment of procedures and institutions 
advancing the project of contextual orientation. Consequently, anyone committed to 
policy analysis is in principle also committed to creating and maintaining certain 
social and political conditions necessary for collective rationality. Any form of 
collective rationality – to make the point generally – presupposes a community of 
inquirers which is itself a social and political phenomenon. Commitment to the ideal 
of this community cannot be abandoned without abandoning commitment to reason 
itself (Torgerson 1985). 
The contextual orientation of civic environmental pragmatism, and the associated 
emphasis on the need to situate expertise within the context of practices, also 
recognises the shift in policy analysis more generally from government to 
‘governance’. Introducing their forthcoming book Deliberative Policy Analysis, 
Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) argue that this conceptual shift is indicative of the fact 
that politics and policy making have changed character.
7 These authors go on to 
argue that a policy science with epistemological features capable of responding to the 
characteristics of contemporary democracy is rooted in the tradition of Deweyan 
pragmatism, and rests on three pillars: interpretation, practice, and deliberation. 
There are clear affinities between this model and the civic environmental pragmatism 
developed in this thesis.  Reframing SEA 
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A Contextual Orientation:  Reflection and Action in SEA 
A constructive way of sustaining the dialectic between theory and practice in SEA 
(in a way that recognises both the dialogical character of rationality and the civic 
origins of its purpose) has been formulated by Bruce Jennings (1988). For Jennings, 
both political theory and policy analysis should be thought of as different, but 
reciprocally illuminating, discursive practices.  
The concept of a discursive practice implies that dialogue provides the mediating 
link between theory and practice in an extended exchange of ideas whereby 
proposals for action, as well as tests to establish their merit, are deliberated. The 
pragmatic theory of inquiry turns our attention to the way in which the norms of 
scientific practice may constrain and guide our collective actions in public policy 
processes—norms such as willingness to submit claims to public examination, to 
collaborate, to experiment, and to revise our claims. In this sense, the dialogical 
process may be associated with a pragmatic conception of truth, in which appeal is 
ultimately to the community of inquirers (Anderson 1987).  
The value-laden character of policy analysis has rightfully claimed the attention of 
many policy scholars concerned with the scientistic and procedural mainstream. But 
with the renewed emphasis on general moral and political principles comes the 
tendency, Jennings (1988) points out, to start with such principles and attempt to 
apply them to practice.
8 This approach is mistaken because “moral and political 
                                                                                                                                                      
7 As a result, the analysis of policy making and politics must address a number of new challenges: the 
new spaces of politics, radical uncertainty, ‘difference’, interdependence, and the dynamics of trust 
and identity (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
8 Jennings points in particular to the early work of Charles Anderson (1979), in his essay ‘The place of 
principles in policy analysis’. Jennings argues that Anderson gives pride of place to political theory Chapter 7 
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principles specified independently of their application to particular situations can 
only be formal and contentless” (Jennings 1988, after MacIntyre 1984).  
The alternative proposed by Jennings, in which we start with practice, does not rule 
out the existence and role of substantive moral principles in shaping thought and 
action. What it does do is more clearly expose the strict distinction between policy 
analysis (scientific and practical) and political theory (principled and critical) as 
unrealistic: 
… analysts inevitably deal with questions of justice, equality, rights, liberty and 
authority. And theorists address substantive and procedural questions of public policy, 
how institutions work, and what is feasible at any given time or place. This is because 
the discourse of both policy analysis and political theory is constituted by the 
intersection of principles and practices, ideals and institutions, the exercise of public 
power and the legitimacy of public authority (Jennings 1988).  
When a distinction is constructed between static content (scientific laws or political 
principles) and method narrowly conceived, attention is directed away from the civic 
purposes specific to policy analysis. As a practice, attention is refocused on these 
characteristic excellences—on the goods internal to the practice—which both guide 
practice and sustain attention to the civic context from which they derive.  
                                                                                                                                                      
and the substantive normative principles derived from it. But I would suggest that Jennings’ criticism 
of Anderson (rather than his point more generally) is misguided, because Anderson’s argument is that 
the ‘principles’ are constitutive of the practice of policy analysis. In other words, they are 
simultaneously the internal goods and the standards of excellence of policy analysis. Moreover, these 
constitutive principles originated from the broader societal context. Jennings only recognises the 
virtues embedded in the practice as serving this role; the substantive principles highlighted by 
Anderson are viewed as external to the practice of policy analysis.  Reframing SEA 
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Policy analysis as discursive practice, which Jennings calls political counsel, posits a 
distinctive relationship between its aims and its virtues—virtues which are both 
embedded in the practice, and which the practice seeks to nurture in its participants: 
1.  To grasp the present meaning and future significance of contemporary problems as 
they are experienced, adapted to, and struggled against by the counsellor’s fellow 
citizens: the reasonable, responsible, and purposive agents who comprise the 
political community. This aim requires the virtue of political and moral 
imagination and empathy. 
2.  To clarify and interpret the meaning of those problems so as to assist strategically 
located political agents (legitimately empowered public officials and policy 
makers) in devising a set of efficacious and just solutions to them. This requires the 
virtue of insight and prudence in the telling of truth and the exercise of power. 
3. To guide the selection of one particular policy from the set of policy options in 
light of a more general vision of the good of the community as a whole, tempered 
by an understanding of the value and limits of the regime and governmental 
process. This aim requires the virtue of theoretical vision (theoria) tempered by a 
spirit of civitas (Jennings 1988). 
Although both political theory and policy analysis share the same aims and 
constitutive ideals, political theory is characterised by a critical intent not required 
for the practice of policy analysis. It is this feature of policy inquiry that sustains the 
necessary tension between reflection and action. Nonetheless, the contextual 
orientation of both—the fact that both theory and analysis seek to influence and 
interpret the same civic context—means that there must be a dialogue between them 
if one is not to supplant the other in the quest for political understanding. Clearly, the 
procedural rationality so characteristic of liberal politics no longer dominates here, 
even though the discourse of counsel does not replace the democratic process of 
representative politics. Instead, policy inquiry as discursive practice requires a kind 
of practical, political reason to sustain the dynamic interplay between critical 
reflection and action.  Chapter 7 
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As a collective policy process, counsel gives voice to different kinds of moral and 
political arguments. As such, it “demands a structure for public discourse that 
transforms, and does not simply transmit, moral reflection and civic deliberation” 
(Jennings 1993). This capacity of counsel to change social reality, and to transform 
the listener, is exactly the quality required of a dialogical framework for SEA.  
Frame-Reflective Policy Inquiry 
Situating SEA within a broader ethical framework involves articulating the 
constitutive meanings that frame particular policy issues. This process of ethical 
reflection and articulation may be facilitated in what has been called frame-reflective 
policy inquiry: 
  … the fundamental ethical purpose of such frame reflection is to overcome the 
pervasive dominance of an instrumental rationality and to recover a mode of practical 
reason which makes possible the deliberative articulation of underlying conceptions of 
‘the good life’ within specific policy making situations (Barns 1998: 7).  
The process of framing is described by David Laws and Martin Rein (2003) “as a 
particular way of representing knowledge, and as the reliance on (and development 
of) interpretative schemas that bound and order a chaotic situation, facilitate 
interpretation, and provide a guide for doing and acting” (Laws and Rein 2003). The 
concept of framing is one used in everyday life, when we talk about framing a poem, 
about the frame of a building that we know provides structure but that we cannot see, 
or about a picture frame that directs our attention to what is inside the frame and 
away from the context beyond. Thus, framing involves “distinguishing between what 
demands attention and what can be neglected, and of giving stable shape by 
providing structure, even when that structure cannot be directly observed” (Laws and 
Rein 2003). Policy frames may also be thought of as a special kind of story that Reframing SEA 
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directs attention and provides shape and structure by narrating a particular problem-
centred discourse as it develops over time. In other words, frames serve as a basis for 
discussion and action.  
Indeed, it is the common commitment to action that links individuals to a broader, 
but loosely defined, network of actors. It is the shared ‘practice concerns’ of 
individuals and more distantly located professionals, however different other aspects 
of their lives may be, which ensures that action enjoins the experiential worlds of 
these disparate actors. For these actors, a policy frame represents “a struggle that 
generates efforts to make sense of a changing situation and to coordinate action” 
(Laws and Rein 2003).  
The dynamism of policy frames opens up the possibility of understanding the 
reframing of policy issues, which has been identified as central to the resolution of 
intractable policy conflicts (cf. van Eeten 1999). The critical, or reflective, moment 
in policy making triggered by what Dewey called the ‘irritation of doubt’ inevitably 
leads to a rush to restore control, in part by the opportunities it presents for 
influencing the distribution of resources among groups in the policy process. 
Reframing, or learning, takes place  
when a series of one off exchanges is transformed into a continuous discussion; when 
the status quo is persistently perturbed, either because it is inherently uncertain or 
unstable or because it is consistently upset by the actors involved; and when actors 
become involved in a joint exploration of the limits of understanding and of common 
ends that prompts a reconsideration on the part of the actors involved of the “views of 
self, the world, and interests arising from both” (Laws and Rein 2003, citing Sabel 
1994).   Chapter 7 
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This reframing of policy issues, in the case studies reported by Laws and Rein, 
emerged out of concrete situated interactions.   
The influence of policy framing on the ability to generate political action can be 
great. A study of the joint negotiations between the United States and European 
nations on future ozone control strategies found that these negotiations were difficult 
largely because of their different framing assumptions (Farrell et al. 2001). As a 
result, the scientists from each party had built up different standards of credibility for 
policy advice: a requirement for accurate, high-resolution concentration estimates in 
the US, versus a requirement for integrated analysis that included economic concerns 
and could demonstrate source/receptor relationships in Europe. The development of 
policy mechanisms agreeable to both parties was thereby held up as scientists 
disputed the quality of each others’ modelling.
9 
Policy frames inevitably involve making assumptions in order to simplify complex 
natural and human systems, and to specify the grounds of their relevance to the issue 
at hand. These assumptions then become normalised or backgrounded in the routine 
institutional practices of knowledge production and policy making. The particular 
grounds chosen to assess the robustness, equity, quality, and appropriateness (and so 
on) of a particular frame in a particular context are themselves contingent and subject 
                                                      
9 In a similar study, this time with a focus on climate change discourses, Miller (2000) recounts how 
the reframing of environmental problems as global rather than local helped shift the policy debate in 
the United States in two decisive ways. First, there was a shift from an exclusive focus on energy to 
broader considerations of deforestation, carbon sequestration, and so on. Second, there was a shift 
from a national response to a global policy response, so that instruments such as emissions trading 
could be introduced. This process of reframing enabled the US to focus on policy initiatives that were 
less politically sensitive than energy planning (ie. reducing methane emissions) while also generating 
broad public support (ie. eliminating CFCs). The broader ‘pollution’ discourse in which these debates 
took place was adopted because demonstrated harms carry greater moral authority than potential risks 
in the United States.  Reframing SEA 
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to contestation and judgment. Therefore, critical reflection on these assumptions is 
crucial.
10 The design of a critically reflective assessment process depends for its 
legitimacy on the inclusion of a wide array of perspectives.  
III  Reframing Strategic Environmental Assessment 
It is this arena of co-operative analysis, social judgement and creative governance that 
will become the hallmark of sustainability in the decades to come (O’Riordan 2000: 
xii). 
As a policy-shaping framework for generating knowledge and authority in society, 
SEA is properly problem-oriented and contextual, drawing upon multiple methods 
and ways of knowing. A guiding principle in the design of effective SEA processes is 
therefore the interaction of these processes with their broader social and political 
context. Each assessment is part of many larger social processes by which societies 
identify, understand, and deal with environmental problems. Each assessment is also 
part of “processes by which scientists participate in society, thus helping to justify 
the research funding and respect given to them” (Farrell et al. 2001: 331). After 
Dewey, then, SEA should facilitate the cultivated judgment and reasoned discussion 
of experts and citizens in the context of a shared commitment to action. 
The following design principles for SEA are envisaged as a means to promote an 
iterative process of reflection and action that allows for a dynamic, adaptive and 
contextually embedded process of inquiry capable of contributing to policy that is 
both rigorous and relevant. The model for SEA to be outlined below is adopted from 
                                                      
10 The tacit assumptions about human behaviour embedded in risk assessment frames, which can lead 
to inappropriate claims about the magnitude of risk and the possibilities for control, has been 
emphasised by Wynne (1995, 1996). Chapter 7 
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the process of policy inquiry elaborated by Dewey. On this basis, inquiry proceeds 
from (i) a sense of perplexity, to (ii) the definition of a problem, (iii) the 
identification of alternatives capable of resolving the problem, (iv) an assessment of 
the consequences of alternative actions, and finally (v) the testing of alternatives in 
practice (Torgerson 1995). Based on this approach, the focus of inquiry in EA shifts:  
(1)  from problem solving to problem setting (steps i and ii);  
(2)  from impact prediction to anticipating implementation (steps iii and iv);  
(3)  from informing ‘the decision’ to adaptive management, an ongoing and 
incremental approach to policy making and implementation (step v). 
These ‘stages’ are necessarily interdependent rather than consecutive.
11 
My aim in this formulation of the process is to respond to demands for a conceptual 
framework for SEA, rather than to elaborate the specifics of each stage in any detail. 
This latter task is one in which scholars and practitioners of SEA are already adept. It 
follows that it is also not my aim to elaborate on the methods and techniques required 
to facilitate the process in any detail. The following discussion, then, will emphasise 
the conceptual shift required if SEA is to be a process of policy inquiry theoretically 
grounded in the epistemological and philosophical resources of civic environmental 
pragmatism.  
                                                      
11 The key stages of SEA identified by Thérivel and Brown, and reproduced below, are clearly 
accounted for in this framework:  
1.  Set the context for PPP [policy, plan, programme] making and SEA.  
2.  Determine objectives/vision of the PPP.  
3.  Identify constraints and issues of concern.  
4.  Identify and describe alternative means by which the PPP objectives can be achieved; evaluate 
and compare alternatives.  
5.  Implement PPP and monitor results (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 446). Reframing SEA 
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The practical intent of this framework is to generate knowledge for political action 
that is politically legitimate, scientifically credible, and practically relevant. 
Legitimacy derives from the civic context of inquiry, credibility demands a 
dialectical relationship between expert and lay knowledges, and practical relevance is 
a function of the involvement of key policy actors in the ongoing process of policy 
making and implementation.  
(1) Problem  Setting 
The process of problem setting, or problem framing, requires the conversion of a 
problematic situation into a problem that is amenable to analysis. Sadler and 
Verheem (1996) identified the need for this kind of conversion when dealing with the 
more abstract issues of policy when they suggested that SEA must first ‘clarify the 
problematic’. Moreover, there is overwhelming agreement amongst its scholars that 
SEA should play an influential role at the earliest possible stage of policy making. It 
has been argued that “[t]he real value of SEA is as a creative tool in the design cycle 
of the formulation and reformulation of [policies]” (Thérivel and Brown 1999: 447). 
This is also the view of policy elites (Bailey and Renton 1997).  
In line with the broad commitment that SEA should adapt to existing policy 
processes, a theme that resounds through the literature is that in order to influence 
policy formulation, SEA should be a simple and quick process, perhaps without any 
procedural requirements. An example of an SEA process that has been employed in 
the formulation of governmental activities by the OECD is the Environmental 
Overview process (Brown 2000). Whilst this process is ‘quick’, it nevertheless 
requires a structured, participatory, interactive approach. The process is described as:  Chapter 7 
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a small group approach where its participants examine the proposal and its context, 
scope the potential social and environmental consequences and opportunities 
associated with the proposal, and propose how it can be modified to reduce the 
unwanted consequences and to enhance the opportunities. The involvement of a broad 
cross-section of interests and disciplinary skills in the small group is fundamental to 
its operation (Brown 2000: 131).  
This process is exemplary because “interactive process … is the heart of the 
technique” (Brown 2000: 133). This ensures that the process facilitates creativity 
through its inclusion of multiple interests and disciplinary perspectives. It also 
facilitates a creative dialectic between critical reflection and a more active, 
manipulative moment as attention shifts iteratively between a critique of the proposal 
and suggestions for its modification. In this way, the Environmental Overview 
process parallels Lasswell’s emphasis on the dynamic interplay between these 
moments of inquiry (Chapter 3), which provides both for the contextual and problem 
orientation of inquirers, and for the transformative character of policy inquiry.   
The key point to note at this stage of the process is that the formulation of the 
problem is simultaneously the formulation of the policy ‘solution’. Problem solving 
depends upon the prior process of problem setting, a “process in which, interactively, 
we name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will 
attend to them” (Schön 1983). Comparative studies of SEAs have found that early 
and open dialogue about research and policy questions helps to ensure that a broad 
framing, which incorporates the concerns of all parties, is achieved (Farrell et al. 
2001). Indeed, this interpretive framing itself influences determinations of who and 
what is relevant to the assessment, which has implications for who will participate in 
later stages of analysis and implementation.  Reframing SEA 
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Robin Grove-White provides a sample of the kinds of commitments implicated in the 
framing of problems for scientific assessments:  
The adventitious ways in which particular problems for scientific assessment tend to 
be characterised at the outset; the tacitly ‘given’ substantive boundaries of such 
problems; the inherited assumptions concerning which specific disciplines and forms 
of expertise should be regarded as ‘relevant’; the burdens of ‘proof’ understood to be 
appropriate; the agreed cut-off points for assessments of additional potential synergies 
– all of these contingencies and many more help frame the identification of ‘do-able 
problems’ on which scientific expertise in particular regulatory domains may be 
brought to bear (Grove-White 1999: 281).  
The importance of these framing assumptions and commitments, as Grove-White 
continues, is that the most politically intractable controversies are tending to emerge 
in cases where they do not cohere with broader public understandings of the 
problem. This public dissonance with official policy discourses is evidence that the 
“broader, more analytically-elusive concerns of the wider public about the multiple 
implications of future … development trajectories” remain outside the dominant 
framing of policy issues (Grove-White 1999: 281).  
It needs to be emphasised that this broader public discord has less to do with the 
‘truth’ of particular scientific findings, and more to do with the way that the 
problems on which scientists come to focus are shaped and framed. Technical 
analysis of policy problems can no longer be so clearly separated from the 
consideration of values in the assessment process. Eminent policy-making 
institutions in the United States and the United Kingdom have acknowledged that 
values, interests, and judgments inescapably influence the framing of policy issues, 
and that the public should be proactively involved in policy formulation (National 
Research Council 1996; Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1998).  Chapter 7 
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However, as discussed in Chapter 6, studies have shown that lay judgments are based 
on a more realistic acceptance of uncertainty and fallibility than they are given credit 
for in dominant policy discourses. It is often assumed that public resistance to new 
technologies and associated policy developments is based on irrational fears or 
ignorance (cf. Jasanoff 2002; Wynne 2001; Irwin and Wynne 1994). Compared to 
the picture presented by politicians, public assessments of risk reflect “different 
framings of technology’s social implications, different appraisals of the values at 
stake, and different judgments about fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits” 
(Jasanoff 2002: 369).  
The divergent nature of these understandings between legitimate policy actors 
suggests that the process of problem framing is a particularly important point at 
which research in the social sciences can contribute to a richer interdisciplinarity in 
SEA. It is the diverse goals, justifications, and institutional contexts present at the 
inception of the SEA process that ‘frame’ assessment conduct and outcomes (Farrell 
et al. 2001). The process of frame-reflective policy analysis described in Section II 
provides a constructive approach to the interpretive process of framing and reframing 
policy issues that occurs not only in the first instance, when a policy is deemed to be 
‘conceived’, but also over time when, for example, different information comes to 
light or different interests get involved.  
The process of ‘multi-criteria mapping’ has also proved useful as a systematic and 
participatory tool for exploring framing assumptions in judgments about policy 
issues and the inherent uncertainties involved (Stirling and Mayer 1999; Stirling 
2001). As a process that combines quantitative and qualitative factors in appraisal, 
multi-criteria mapping acts as an aid to deliberation and reasoned judgment, as well Reframing SEA 
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as rendering more transparent the factors that underpin the framing of scientific 
advice.   
Justification for the choice of a particular set of framing assumptions adopted for a 
particular SEA, and according to which problem setting in SEA may be evaluated, 
will involve (ESRC 1999): 
•  the legitimacy of the institution making the justification; 
•  the degree of democratic accountability to which the institution is 
subjected; and 
•  the ethical acceptability of the assumptions adopted. 
(2) Anticipating  Implementation 
The management of change and uncertainty are identified as key challenges for SEA 
(cf. Eggenberger and Partidário 2000). The primary purpose of the International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), and thus of SEA more specifically, is the 
“development of international and local capacity to make wise decisions regarding 
the anticipation, planning, and management of environmental change - in terms of 
ecological and human consequences - in order to enhance the quality of life for all” 
(emphasis added).
12 I have emphasised in this thesis that the need to maintain a 
rational and purposive orientation in a context of changing knowledges and 
perspectives, both social and scientific, means that modern societies are more often 
in need of capacities for practical, rather than technical, judgment (Sullivan 1995).  
                                                      
12 Given on the IAIA website at http://www.iaia.org Chapter 7 
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Practical judgment is judgment amongst multiple perspectives in the context of 
change. This may also be thought of as deliberative action, or the communicative act 
of debating and choosing ways of living together. Policy making as a deliberative 
process of acting to shape and anticipate change is more than the prediction of 
environmental consequences. In trying to understand why the effects of policy are 
consequential, with how they will matter ethically and politically, SEA is more 
accurately defined as ‘anticipating implementation’:  
Facing a complex environment and an uncertain future, the analyst needs less to 
predict and evaluate project consequences than practically to anticipate possible 
implemented outcomes and respond accordingly, taking steps early on not only to 
foresee potential consequences but to shape them as well (Forester 1987). 
This practical anticipation of policy implementation, as John Forester so prudently 
describes the strategy of policy analysis, provides an invaluable understanding of the 
strategy demanded of a good SEA process. As a continual interplay of means and 
ends, it provides a way of incorporating issues of political feasibility, and therefore 
the political implications of action, into the process of policy inquiry itself.  
On this view, SEA remains a problem-oriented endeavour because the analyst must, 
at least in part, formulate the problems for analysis. But as Forester points out, 
although problem formulation has always been understood as value-laden and 
selective in its description of possible futures, it is “not just arbitrarily, but 
systematically normative” (Forester 1987).
13 And as a necessary complement, 
                                                      
13 In practice, policy practitioners are “practical ethicists; their work demands that they make ethical 
judgments—judgments of good and bad, more valued and less valued, more significant and less—
again and again as they work” (Forester 1993: 197). And in their role as facilitators in policy forums, 
practitioners enhance deliberative capacity through their accounts of practice:  Reframing SEA 
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problem formulation is “also inescapably and practically theoretical” (ibid). 
Behavioural theories, normative political theories, and moral and cultural theories 
about institutions are a practical necessity, because  
without this range of substantive theories the analyst could never envision future 
implementation situations and their consequences, prepare and manage arguments 
exploring implementation alternatives, or present either a cogent analysis of several 
alternatives or a recommendation of what ought to be done (Forester 1987).  
To describe the process of SEA as one of preparing and managing arguments is to 
move beyond conceptions of policy inquiry as either purely ‘scientific’ (and so 
reliant upon the calculation central to analysis as cognitive problem-solving), or 
purely ‘political’ (and so reliant upon the strategies of bargaining and exchange held 
to characterise structured social interaction). Instead, SEA becomes a process 
constituted by strategically crafted arguments. In this process, actions are both 
purposive and practically communicative (rather than instrumental and monological). 
In crafting these arguments about what is do-able, practitioners do particular kinds of 
work:  
descriptive work of reportage; moral work of constructing character and reputation (of 
oneself and others); political work of identifying friends and foes, interests and needs, 
and the play of power in support and opposition; and, most important … deliberative 
work of considering means and ends, values and options, what is relevant and 
significant, what is possible and what matters, all together (Forester 1993: 195). 
                                                                                                                                                      
If we listen closely, not to the portrayals of fact in these stories but to their claims of value and 
significance, we discover an infrastructure of ethics, an ethical substructure of practice, a finely woven 
tapestry of value being woven sentence by sentence; each sentence not simply adding, description by 
description, to a picture of the world, but adding, care by care, to a sensitivity to the practical world, to 
a richly prudent appreciation of that world (Forester 1993: 199-200).  Chapter 7 
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The practical arguments which make up this process of deliberative interaction must 
be managed strategically so that the analysis is not ignored, produced too late to be 
useful, or manipulated toward ends not constitutive of the process (Forester 1987). 
From this perspective, the strategy of SEA is essentially the purposive management 
of strategically crafted arguments, which are devised and revised throughout the 
process.  
It should be clear from the discussion in earlier chapters that understanding SEA as 
an argumentative practice gives no ground to the relativist:  
Policy and planning arguments are practical productions. They can play many roles at 
once, including description, prediction, evaluation, agenda setting, symbolic 
reassurance, and proposal testing. But always these arguments make claims that can be 
criticised by others or can subtly shape their attention to issues at hand (Fischer and 
Forester 1993: 3).  
We can evaluate such claims “… not only for their truth or falsity but also for their 
partiality, their selective framing of the issues at hand, their elegance or crudeness of 
presentation, their political timeliness, their symbolic significance, and more” 
(Fischer and Forester 1993: 2). This process of critical evaluation thereby contributes 
to the rigor and relevance of SEA. 
(3) Adaptive  Management 
Policy formation kept separate from implementation approaches a formula for failure 
(Jenkins 1978). 
The commitment amongst SEA scholars and practitioners to an adaptive and 
dynamic process can be fleshed out by conceiving of policy making as incremental, Reframing SEA 
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and of policy decisions as embedded in continuing social relationships.
14 Attention to 
the interdependence of policy making and implementation, and thus to the context of 
implementation, makes clear that “events and decisions are part of a stream of 
relationships and experiences…. No issue is an island” (Wynne 1987). 
The dynamic nature of policy demands that SEA is itself a transformative process 
that is less about finding the right policy, and more about creating resilient 
institutional conditions which facilitate learning from experience. Whilst ‘the 
decision’ does influence environmental outcomes, policy is more often made in the 
process of negotiation and compromise that characterises the process of 
implementation. In this process, SEA involves managing the interactions between 
policy actors. This approach clearly recalls Caldwell’s original intent for SEA: to 
embed SEA within an ongoing and active management process. Management was 
never meant to be a manipulative strategy tacked onto the end of the SEA process.  
Where SEA is an ongoing process of policy formulation and implementation, the 
production of knowledge for policy is clearly embedded in its broader social and 
political context. The authority of scientific knowledge for policy making, as we saw 
in Chapter 5, is a function of its social ‘robustness’. Knowledge becomes robust 
through an alignment of controlled observations and theoretical considerations, as 
well as cultural and moral values, interests and circumstances (Rip 1992). Studies of 
scientific controversies have revealed that ‘facts’ are constructed from “repeated 
confrontations among disparate scientific observations, their interpretation by experts 
and stakeholders, and the ingrained moral and social commitments of 
                                                      
14 The value of interactive and learning strategies central to adaptive management is affirmed by a 
number of authors in a recent collection of SEA case studies (Partidário and Clark 2000). Chapter 7 
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decisionmaking institutions” (Jasanoff 1999: 139). Thus, particular scientific 
assessments are inescapably products of tacit political and institutional contingencies 
and commitments. The scope and content of scientific facts produced for policy are 
inevitably artefacts of a larger process in which scientific knowledge and political 
action are co-produced by a diversity of actors with different agendas and knowledge 
interests.  
These broader socio-cognitive processes also help to shape the scope and content of 
the policy frameworks themselves. When policy making is more closely associated 
with the process of implementation, it becomes an ongoing process in which policy 
goals and practices evolve as they are implemented in the ‘messy’ situations of 
practice. Precise standards must give way to scope for imprecision and ambiguity, 
“as an adaptive arena in which the contending parties can interact, negotiate, and 
settle and renegotiate the practical meanings as they go along” (Wynne 1987).   
The SEA process should be flexible enough so that decisions and judgments can be 
reviewed and modified based on future policy dialogue and negotiations, as well as 
on the basis of new scientific information. This temporal design feature is 
particularly suited to the ethos of sustainability. 
The qualities required of a dynamic SEA process that is also capable of facilitating 
decisions on which to take action have been identified by Eckley (2002) in a study of 
science-based policy assessments. The study compared the recent protocol on 
persistent organic pollutants, which was added to the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, with two previous protocols on sulphur emissions also 
associated with this convention. This study concluded that an effective SEA should 
be a process in which conclusions informed by scientific evidence could be delayed Reframing SEA 
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for later modification, with confidence that they would definitely be addressed at this 
later date. The benefits of this attribute, which Eckley (2002) calls ‘dependable 
dynamism’, were found to be two-fold. First, participants were more willing to base 
action on scientific information that was perceived to be less credible in the 
knowledge that the decision taken on this basis could be revisited.
15 Second, 
participants were willing to make compromises when it was agreed that options for 
future revisions would be kept open.
16  
Hazell and Benevides (2000) present compelling evidence for a more ongoing SEA 
commitment in their comparative study of the effectiveness of SEA within a policy 
framework (the federal Cabinet Directive) and a legal framework (the Farm Income 
Protection Act) in Canada. The study concluded that the legal framework, with fewer 
procedural requirements but with repeated assessments every five years, resulted in 
better compliance and superior quality assessments. Moreover, the legal framework 
more clearly embodied a long-term commitment to sustainability. Interestingly, the 
SEAs conducted under the law are not required until after the policy is approved, an 
approach which is contrary to the key SEA principle of conducting assessments as 
early as possible in the policy-making process. However, in contrast to the project-
based context in which this principle was first developed, the authors point out that 
policies ‘are rarely new and rarely end’ so that approaches to SEA may need to be 
                                                      
15 In this case, the decision to adopt the target of a 30 per cent reduction in sulphur emissions, based 
on inadequate scientific evidence, was able to be taken because it was recognised by all parties as a 
first step (Eckley 2002). In the same way, the pollutants included on the list did not have to be 
inclusive, so that inadequate scientific knowledge about a particular pollutant did not forestall decisive 
action on those that agreement could be reached.  
16 Eckley (2002) reported that the record of repeated assessments in this particular protocol seemed to 
give participants confidence in the institutional longevity of the convention, and thus the process. Chapter 7 
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concerned less with early assessment and more with flexible adaptation to the 
incremental nature of policy making. 
The view that SEAs are better conceived as interactive social processes of 
communication, rather than as documents that provide information to decision 
makers, underpinned research conducted under the auspices of the Global 
Environmental Change project at Harvard University.
17 Alex Farrell and his 
colleagues define environmental assessment as “the entire social process by which 
expert knowledge related to a policy problem is organized, evaluated, integrated, and 
presented in documents and otherwise to inform decision-making” (Farrell et al. 
2001: 312). Within the SEA process, scientists, decision-makers, and advocates 
communicate to “define relevant questions for analysis, mobilize certain kinds of 
experts and expertise, and interpret findings in particular ways” (Farrell et al. 2001: 
312). 
In a comparative study of five SEAs conducted at various jurisdictional levels (sub-
national, national, international and global), Farrell et al. (2001) confirm the 
conclusions reported in Chapter 2 that social and political judgments are made at all 
stages of the process: in the framing of questions and problems to be considered, in 
decisions about who will participate (how and why), in decisions about which results 
will be used, in choices about data analysis and interpretation, and in making 
summaries and specifying recommendations. An adequate understanding of the SEA 
process must therefore address questions regarding the definition of the problem; the 
articulation and accreditation of knowledge claims; the inclusion and exclusion of 
                                                      
17 This project was concluded in 2001. A number of documents associated with the project may be 
found on the website at http://environment.harvard.edu/gea  Reframing SEA 
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participants, policy options, and domains of inquiry; and the nature and terms of 
communication. Given the stakes associated with these choices, SEAs are “powerful 
means of developing credible knowledge for policy making” (Farrell et al. 2001: 
312). The question of how credible knowledge is created comes to the fore.  
Recently, Caldwell has contended that “[s]trategies for impact assessment should 
imply and lead to strategies for policy in action” (Caldwell 2000). This action 
orientation was evident in several of the SEA case studies reported in Partidário and 
Clark (2000), where incremental, interactive, and learning strategies were applied to 
the dynamic context of policy making. As a dynamic and ongoing process, SEA must 
attend to the context of implementation, and to institutional arrangements capable of 
sustaining the quality of the relationships between policy actors. These institutional 
relationships are important to create short-term agreement on policy goals, whilst 
sustaining a long-term commitment to an ongoing and adaptive process of policy 
making and reform.  
IV Public  Dialogue 
The essential need … is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion, and persuasion. That is the problem of the public (Dewey 1927: 208-9). 
A Changing International Policy Climate 
The need for an approach that integrates scientific analysis and public deliberation 
about the means and ends of policy making in the context of an ongoing assessment 
process has been recognised in the fields of risk assessment and global 
environmental assessments (particularly in the context of climate change), as the 
cases discussed in the previous section make clear. Recent studies by prominent Chapter 7 
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policy institutions are also significant in this regard. The UK Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (1998) examined the case for novel approaches to 
incorporating values into standard setting and environmental protection. The 
Commission endorsed the principle of face-to-face inclusive processes, 
recommended that all forms of government adopt such techniques where the issues 
are complex and broad in scope, and urged monitoring of experiments so that the full 
potential of such approaches could be realised. In the United States, the National 
Research Council’s report into risk characterisation stated: “We propose that it is 
necessary to reconceive risk characterization in order to increase the likelihood of 
achieving sound and acceptable decisions. We envision a process in which the 
characterization of risk emerges from a combination of analysis and deliberation” 
(National Research Council 1996: 1-2).   
On inspection, it is clear that the linear model of scientific and risk assessment has 
not been abandoned. However, it is now part of an entirely more complex process 
that is grounded in deliberative politics. Three aspects of these new approaches are 
especially worth noting (Jasanoff 1999):   
1.  Each advocates the intertwining of analysis with deliberation from the very 
earliest stages of the process. 
2.  Each emphasises feedbacks and recursion, so that initial problem frames 
can always be revisited and redrawn in the light of experience. 
3.  Each accepts the idea that closure comes from the needs of decision 
making, not from a search for ultimate scientific resolution.     
It is also of significance that several decision makers invited to deliver keynote 
speeches to the 2002 international IAIA conference recognised the need to focus on Reframing SEA 
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the social and political factors ignored in prevailing technocratic models of SEA. The 
centrality of communication and meaningful public engagement for these speakers 
indicates a certain openness amongst both private and public decision makers to the 
civic context of policy making, as well as a recognition of the importance of public 
legitimacy for their endeavours. These comments, I would suggest, fortify the 
relevance to decision-makers’ concerns of the recommendations made in this thesis. 
Olav Kjørven, the State Secretary for International Development, argued strongly 
that the aspiration in SEA to detached, objective representations of the ‘real world’, 
and associated assumptions of linearity and precision, “is not the way to go”. Rather, 
he argued, more meaningful communication is the key to the future orientation of 
SEA. Kjørven recommended that narrative and storytelling (the way humans have 
dealt with complexity for millennia) should be key modes of communication in SEA.  
In another address, Henk Dijkgraaf, President Directeur of Shell Nederland, made 
the point that no matter how certain the scientific evidence, political support for a 
project does not necessarily follow. He explained that in Shell’s processes of 
decision-making, the ‘decide, announce, defend’ approach is yielding to the ‘discuss, 
decide, deliver’ model, which embodies a challenge to facilitate meaningful 
stakeholder engagement at each stage. Dijkgraaf went on to argue that a more 
interdisciplinary approach to analysis is required in the context of sustainability, 
guided by the principle of environmental care.  
Akira Seki, Director General, Department of Regional and Sustainable Development 
with the Asian Development Bank, also highlighted the need for more meaningful 
public engagement in SEA, and recommended that more adequate attention be paid Chapter 7 
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to the implementation and management phases of the process. Seki pointed out that 
these latter phases can be subject to as much ‘political interference’ as earlier stages 
of the process—an observation which reinforces the point that implementation is not 
merely technical rule-following. The assumption that conflicts have been ironed out 
prior to ‘the decision’ is not manifest in reality.  
Models of Public Dialogue  
It is widely recognised that SEA should be an open discussion of the future, a 
process of open-minded reappraisal of policy which recognises we might make 
mistakes, and which embraces a willingness to change (Thérivel and Brown 1999; 
Partidário 2000). Engaging the public in this process centrally requires that the 
‘integration’ of the diverse concerns central to sustainability is not only about data, 
but about the quality of knowledge and debate. In other words, it is about articulating 
the public meaning of such knowledges. Thus, Olivia Bina discerningly identifies a 
central role for SEA in “the provision of an arena in which the moral and political 
dilemmas over the meaning of sustainable development … will have to be 
addressed” (Bina 2001: 13).  
In practical terms, citizens have consistently proved to be both enthusiastic and adept 
at evaluating expert advice, given the opportunity to participate in dialogical public 
forums (cf. Kuper 1997; Irwin 2001). Thus, “when people do see a personal or 
practical use for such scientific understanding and are sufficiently motivated, they 
often show a remarkable capability to learn” (Wynne 1991: 117).  
The potential achievements of collaborative processes of environmental policy 
making have been exemplified in forest policy negotiations in Queensland, Australia, Reframing SEA 
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where environmental NGOs and industry took control of an intensely political 
conflict:  
In effect, the stakeholder negotiations provided the ‘integration phase’ for reconciling 
the underlying economic and ecological values, which the official process lacked. 
With support from state officials, the stakeholders proved scientifically capable of 
rethinking values and objectives from first principles, applying these new concepts to 
the assembled data, testing the results and amending until a solution was found that 
was ecologically, economically, and politically rational (Brown 2002: 27).  
Reconciliation of these values was crucially dependent upon the policy actors 
reframing the problem in terms of three key sustainability principles: (1)  recognition 
of dynamism and change (which meant that ‘no change’ was not an option); (2) a 
temporal rather than spatial analysis (because the latter had effectively converted the 
issue into a property dispute that served only to confirm the underlying conflict); and 
(3) a recognition that sustainability requires improvement, rather than indicators of 
some absolute condition. Significantly, as Brown (2002) points out, these ‘principles’ 
should be thought of as ‘emergent design principles’ because they emerged through 
the interaction of participants in the context of the collaborative process itself (see 
Section V).  
The ‘stages’ of the SEA process described in the preceding section will require, in 
the spirit of pragmatism, the introduction of experiments with innovative forums and 
modes of dialogue. In what follows, I can only touch on the options available. The 
question of who should be the most central participants is implied by the nature of 
the inquiry at each stage:  
(1)  problem formulation – citizens. 
(2) anticipating  implementation – experts and citizens. 
(3)  adaptive management – stakeholders. Chapter 7 
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Forums for Citizen-Scientist Dialogue 
Science-citizen dialogue aims to go beyond the specific focus on policy decisions to 
address the broader consequences of social and technical progress for both science 
and policy. Therefore, “locating both analysts and citizens in a communicative 
context that allows the potential for interchange, challenge, and mutual learning …  
[opens] a conceptual door to the enhanced participation of citizens with experts in 
policy discourse” (Torgerson 2003).  
A number of practical requirements for dialogue between scientists and citizens, 
which may be used in evaluating the process, may be tentatively suggested (Irwin 
1995):  
•  Does the ‘social experiment’ permit the expression and development of 
wider social judgments, eg. concerning the credibility and trustworthiness 
of institutions? 
•  Do practical initiatives offer the possibility for enhancing rather than 
downgrading citizen knowledge, eg. citizens as knowledge generators as 
well as receptors? 
•  What model of science is assumed by such initiatives, eg. science as 
consensual, homogeneous and apart from social and technical controversy? 
•  Do various forms of public participation and science-citizen interaction 
permit real policy change in terms of structures and/or practices? More 
particularly, is there an opportunity for ‘social learning’ in terms of future 
research directions and for the organisation of scientific practices?  Reframing SEA 
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Forums that facilitate dialogue between scientists and citizens have been increasingly 
adopted in many countries. Consensus conferences and citizens’ juries are among the 
most effective in involving citizens directly (cf. Joss 1995; Renn et al. 1995). 
Reporting on experience with a citizens’ jury, Kuper (1997) argues that the strength 
of these deliberative institutions lies in their autonomy from the interests and 
concerns of stakeholders, and in their role as indicators of what a broader public 
would come to judge given the time, as well as the resources and information about 
the issues at stake (see also Coote and Lenhaghan 1997). 
The aim of directly involving citizens is not to replace either the role of experts or 
the authority of political representatives. More important is the interaction between 
all of these policy actors in the form of open and critical discussions. As Hajer and 
Kesselring observed in their study of transport policy in Munich, unless new 
deliberative practices “are conceived of as part of a broader policy-oriented 
discourse, [they] do not necessarily add to the level of democratisation” (Hajer and 
Kesselring 1999: 19). Clearly, as an established practice located at the boundary of 
science and politics, SEA holds the potential to be a constructive site for ensuring 
that public values are integrated into the recommendations made to elected 
representatives about future policy options.   
Scenarios 
Scenarios are often recommended as an appropriate way of dealing with uncertainty. 
Scenarios may be defined as “coherent, internally consistent and plausible 
descriptions of possible future states of the world” (Berkhout et al. 2002: 87). They 
typically include a narrative element as well as quantitative indicators. Based on their 
use of scenarios for climate impact assessment, Berkhout et al. explain that the Chapter 7 
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process “needs to accommodate integration of a diversity of viewpoints and technical 
expertise, producing an iterative process combining creative, participative workshops 
with work carried out by individuals or in small groups to synthesise and elaborate 
scenarios” (Berkhout et al. 2002: 93). Scenarios therefore combine a disciplined and 
systematic approach (through the elaboration and analysis of future social, economic 
and environmental conditions) with creativity (through participation, flexibility, and 
the openness of assumptions and judgments to challenge). In this way, scenarios are 
a means of ensuring that inquiry is both rigorous and relevant.  
Dialogical Modes of Communication 
Narrative and Storytelling 
Don’t ask, “What’s the problem?” ask, “What’s the story?”—That way you’ll find out what 
the problem really is (Neustadt and May 1986, cited in Forester 1993: 186). 
Narrative has an important role in capturing the temporal dimension of sustainability, 
which has both a past and future orientation. Narrative and storytelling are 
increasingly recognised as critical to the collaborative diagnosis of complex 
problems. Stories have “a flexible generality that enables them to be both adaptable 
and particular … [they act] as a usefully unconstrained means to interpret each new 
situation in the light of accumulated wisdom and constantly changing circumstances” 
(Brown and Duguid 1991, cited in Berkhout et al. 2002: 87). The role of narrative as 
a source of innovation is increasingly recognised in the study of organisations. In a 
discussion that clearly recalls the catalytic role of EA as described by Bartlett (1997), 
these enacting organisations “construct their own environments … they experiment, 
test and stimulate, and they ignore precedent rules and traditional expectations” (Daft 
and Weick 1984, cited in Berkhout et al. 2002: 87).  Reframing SEA 
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In a narrative mode of understanding, individual events can only be fully understood 
by locating them within the overarching plot. The future orientation of SEA 
inevitably requires forms of storytelling. But storytelling is not something altogether 
new to SEA. As Arie Rip points out, “elements of story-telling are already a key 
component in diagnosis and judgment: foregrounding of key features (‘characters’) 
against a background of circumstances, sketching interactions and indicating their 
evolution over time” (Rip 2000: 10). For Rip, storytelling is an epistemic craft that 
requires arguments that are persuasive and convincing, and capable of standing up 
against criticism. Conceived in this way, storytelling echoes the characteristics of 
rhetoric described in Chapter 6, in which the credibility of expertise has both 
cognitive (epistemic reliability) and ethical (moral character and trustworthiness) 
dimensions, and which has the practical purpose of moving the audience to act. The 
pragmatic nature of storytelling as an epistemic craft means that it is constrained by 
evidence, by the problem or purpose at hand, and by the actual and intended 
audiences.
18 In this mode of communication, “evidence is part of the plot, but should 
not be its master” (Rip 2000: 11).  
Rhetoric  
The interpretive approach to policy inquiry advocated here is inherently a rhetorical 
or persuasive medium (Tong 1986). The account of rhetoric given in Chapter 6 
emphasises the importance of argument in human thought, and the relationship 
between internal argument and societal controversy. Scientific knowledge-claims 
need to be assessable rather than just accessible by the public. The rationale for this 
                                                      
18 Rip (2000) argues that scientific argument similarly emplots the audience, but the elements of 
emplotment are seldom made explicit.   Chapter 7 
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emphasis is that “[t]ransparency, to begin with, is not consistent but selective; it 
hides even as it discloses…. Openness provisions cannot by themselves generate 
missing information, unpack embedded assumptions or bring data together in formats 
that invite novel interpretations” (Jasanoff 2002: 372-73).  
The emphasis of SEA on articulating the quality, and public meaning, of knowledge 
ensures the necessity of rhetoric as a mode of argument in policy dialogue. The 
meaning of personal views is only realised when located, however contingently, 
within wider societal debates. This is so because it is often only in a situation of 
conflict and dialogue that creative thought becomes possible. As Dewey reminds us, 
“conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It shocks us 
out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving … conflict is the 
‘sine qua non’ of reflection and ingenuity” (Dewey 1922, cited in Daniels and 
Walker 1996). 
V  Sustaining Institutions  
The particularly critical need seems to be to explore new forms of dialogue and 
learning, and new institutional relationships between “experts” and “nonexperts”. This 
should not be taken as anti-expertise. To the contrary, if expertise means legitimate 
authority, it is to restore a context in which expertise can exist (Wynne 1987: 15). 
As Brian Wynne makes clear in the quote above, the pressing need is to restore a 
context in which expertise can be a legitimate source of authority for policy. 
Institutions and practices are the forums in which words and ideas are translated into 
action and, despite ubiquitous indeterminacy and uncertainty, where social and 
epistemological order can be made to hold still (Jasanoff 1998). It is here that 
knowledge and social relationships interact (Wynne 1987). The major institutional Reframing SEA 
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challenge is “to create institutions that draw on the multiple knowledges and 
perspectives of citizens without sacrificing reason and rigor” (Jasanoff 2002: 377). 
As the discussion in chapters 5 and 6 made clear, the institutional dimension of 
policy analysis is not merely an analytical question, but is also a question of moral 
philosophy. The patterns of interaction which become institutionalised ultimately 
bear on questions of the meaning and purpose of knowledges and practices. The 
technological systems we put in place not only shape our values and identities, they 
are also reflections of them. It is in this sense that pragmatic insights into the social 
negotiation of knowledge claims, and hermeneutic insights into the reflexive nature 
of human inquiry, together ground a more fundamentally ‘objective’ (and thus more 
politically legitimate) account of expert knowledge than instrumentally rational 
accounts. Objectivity becomes directly connected to the democratisation and 
politically sanctioned questioning of authority (Jasanoff 1998). Credibility is tied to 
the assessibility (not merely the accessibility) of expert knowledges in the context of 
public justification. There is no need to believe that reason and rigor are sacrificed by 
this re-embedding of science in its civic context.  
Reflective Institutions:  Process is Context  
It has been argued in this thesis that the indeterminacy and uncertainty associated 
with the environmental consequences of policy decisions requires that policy 
commitments are exploratory and provisional, and open to challenge and revision. 
This stance requires an active trust, nurtured through the exercise of creative 
intelligence in our questioning, and institutionalised in the responsiveness of 
decisions and commitments to these questions. Because social systems are inherently Chapter 7 
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open-ended, attention shifts from a preoccupation with ‘correct’ decisions and 
toward a more open-ended concern for socially robust knowledge, and socially 
feasible decisions. This shift inherently involves a concern for the quality and 
integrity of policy relationships and interactions. It demands a “necessary 
correspondence between a new, more open-textured style of knowledge and new, 
more open-textured social relationships of decision making” (Wynne 1987).  
When the issue of context is reframed as civic rather than bureaucratic or narrowly 
political, we may begin to recognise that SEA is not only already oriented to its civic 
context, but is in effect capable of creating the context in which it operates (rather 
than adapting to an existing policy context). The assumptions embedded in the 
processes chosen to conduct policy inquiry themselves express “visions of our social 
order not only as it is, but also as it ought to be. They not only envision, but also 
create, the social realities by which we live” (Boggs 1993). This is a point made by 
Wynne (1987) when he says that, in policy making, process is context. At the same 
time, the dialogical context must be to some extent artificially created in the policy 
domain (Berkhout et al. 2002). Thus, the process SEA adopts will itself provide the 
social and institutional (contextual) conditions for policy making. Contrary to 
Thérivel and Partidário’s (2000) assertion that SEA’s future form will be strongly 
influenced by external planning forces, whether they be democratising or otherwise, 
a participatory SEA process has the capacity to create ongoing public support for 
SEA.  
In the same way, the internalisation of a learning orientation in SEA will encourage 
institutions to reflect on the assumptions underlying failed policies and to reframe 
their policy positions in the light of these new insights (Jasanoff 2002). This Reframing SEA 
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reframing was found by Laws and Rein to occur as a result of actors’ reconsideration 
of their own identity, as well as their relationships to others:  
The sense of interdependence, recognition of the importance of trust, and developing 
sense of the problem that has been gained demonstrate the kind of learning that these 
patterns of interaction have produced. The remarkable thing is that this kind of 
learning could develop out of conditions of such antagonism…. antagonistic 
relationships set where a background of uncertainty highlights interdependence in 
repeat interactions (Laws and Rein 2003).   
A learning approach therefore holds the potential to make what seem to be 
intractable policy debates in theory, more (at least provisionally) tractable in practice.  
When SEA is conceived on pragmatic terms as an ongoing and productive practice, it 
becomes clear that tractability cannot be achieved by applying general laws, but must 
be achieved in practice. As Arie Rip points out:  
This may sound like a compromise, but it is not a compromise to look down upon as 
being a second-best solution. The intellectual achievements of science are built on 
such a compromise. Consider the intractable problem of formulating knowledge 
claims with universal validity, and proving them, when one cannot do more than 
experiments of limited scope, in certain places and at certain times. Still, an edifice of 
scientific knowledge has been built on these precarious foundations (Rip 1999: 1). 
The temporary closure achieved to enable political action has both cognitive and 
social components. Jasanoff has called this a “serviceable truth”, which “satisfies 
tests of scientific acceptability and supports reasoned decision making” (Jasanoff 
1990: 250).  
Precaution:  An Emergent Design Principle 
The pragmatic theory of inquiry, and the associated socio-cognitive perspective on 
the social robustness of knowledge, is also applicable to the force of the Chapter 7 
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precautionary principle. Discussions of principles often turn into ideological debates 
in which rigidities and oppositions thrive. More constructively, the force of a 
principle may be thought of as deriving from its alignment in networks of findings, 
arguments, interests, values, and infrastructures. On this view, the precautionary 
principle may be thought of as an emergent design principle: now that it has emerged 
it can be used as a guideline for design, which shapes future action and interaction 
(Rip 1999). It would therefore require the drawing up of scenarios for possible 
trajectories or chains of events. The precautionary principle will only work as a 
principle-in-context (Rip 1999).  
The importance of embedding or contextualising the principle points to the 
importance of negotiation with stakeholders and the public to articulate the scope of 
the ‘rules of the game’ that will enable its implementation in the context of ongoing 
practices. This understanding is buttressed by O’Riordan et al. (2001b), who 
conclude  that the notion of ‘precaution’ is itself required to address an increasing 
number of public issues that are inseparable from their social and political context. 
Rather than a ‘principle’, precaution is an ethos, “an attitude of mind, a social 
culture, and a form of participatory and adaptive governance that should lead to a 
different ‘style’ of decision taking and stakeholder inclusion” (O’Riordan et al. 
2001b: 270).  Reframing SEA 
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VI Concluding  Remarks 
On balance, the politics of the environment is a politics of values rather than of 
interests. It resembles more the politics of morals and religion than the politics of who 
gets what, when, where, and how (Caldwell 1995, cited in Bartlett and Kurian 1999: 
427). 
The questions of uncertainty and value conflict associated with the environmental 
consequences of contemporary technological systems are first and foremost moral 
and political questions. These policy questions reflect disputes about what counts as 
legitimate knowledge, who is entitled to speak for nature, and how much authority 
science should command in relation to other ways of knowing. I have argued that 
these distinctively practical challenges intensify the need for meaningful ways of 
talking about the contribution of both environmental professionals and citizens in the 
process of policy inquiry. The pressing need is for reflective dialogical forums in 
which the important environmental problems of our age may be publicly debated, 
(tentatively) decided, and collectively acted upon. 
I have suggested that SEA is an important practical site for this task. The original, 
civic purposes of SEA are unmistakably practical. Thus, SEA has always been a site 
where society is busily making collective moral choices about the legitimacy of 
alternative forms of human-nature interaction. The public philosophy of civic 
environmental pragmatism developed in this thesis provides a richer theoretical 
framework, and a richer vocabulary, for understanding this essential societal process. 
Recast as a dialogical process of policy inquiry informed by a practical mode of 
reason, SEA provides a forum in which competing views about the ethical 
significance of environmental knowledges, and the range of human-nature 
interactions, may be articulated and contested.  Chapter 7 
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True to the spirit of pragmatism, I have undertaken to recover what is already present 
in the conceptual heritage and practice of SEA: the civic and human values that give 
the practice its point; and the practical competences of thought and action that guide 
environmental practitioners in establishing definitions of, and assigning meaning to, 
environmental problems. The public philosophy of civic environmental pragmatism 
is therefore a measure of the resources which already exist within western societies 
to help us cope with the challenges that arise. Significant in this regard are the 
enduring social practices of science and democratic politics—the original, civic 
purposes of SEA. – 373 – 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We shall not cease from explorations 
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
— T.S. Eliot 
 
from ‘Little Gidding’, The Four Quartets  
London, Faber 1963 [1949] p. 59 
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